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Abstract
The  present  work  investigates  the  standardization  and  cross-national  transfer  of  HRM  and  IR
practices  within  MNCs.  Based  on  comparative  institutionalist  theory,  this  multiple  case  study
includes Swiss subsidiaries of nine German and ten US MNCs as well  as four interviews with
experts from the SECO, UNIA, the Swiss Employers' Association and the Aprentas joint training
scheme. The investigation asks for Swiss host country effects on local HRM practices and the way
in which German and US MNCs relate to  the Swiss institutional  environment with its  specific
constraints and opportunities. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the Swiss national business system, Switzerland could be classified
as a particular form of a collaborative business system. The latter shares some important features
with  Germany,  whereas  others  rather  resemble  Anglo-Saxon  systems.  The  Swiss  institutional
environment holds many supports like a comprehensive system of dual vocational education and
training  and  is  marked  by  dense  associational  as  well  as  personal  networks.  Furthermore,
associations are playing an important part in the Swiss liberal corporatist state in terms of policy
formulation  and  execution.  These  elements  are  shared  in  common  with  the  German  business
system. On the other hand, there are no institutional safeguards or statutory rights that would be
comparable to the strict German employment protection legislation or co-determination rights for
works councils. In this respect, Switzerland is closer to the compartmentalised business system of
the USA. Both are marked by flexible labour markets and hold few legal-institutional constraints
for the definition of HRM and IR practices. At the same time though, the outcome of fairly stable
employment  relations  with  long  job  tenures  and  an  utterly  low  level  of  industrial  conflict  in
Switzerland are much closer to Germany than to the US. While in Switzerland there are few legal
constraints in place, the small Swiss society is marked by extensive networking and direct personal
contact. In such a constellation, the law of multiple encounters in life gives rise to strong forms of
social control that foster a consensual managerial style and cooperative industrial relations.
Main findings on German MNCs suggest that the latter do not show a consistent pattern concerning
their approaches towards standardization and transfer of HRM and IR practices. The majority of
German MNCs in our sample continues to be inspired by US models and shows strikingly similar
HR system architectures, transfer channels and mechanisms as well as levels of standardization as
their US counterparts. In those cases where standardization of HRM practices was rather low, our
evidence suggests that this is rather attributable to organizational-level factors than to a systematic
country-of-origin effect. One area where the German MNCs of our sample clearly showed more
local practices than their US counterparts was IR. Yet, having a closer look at how US concepts are
implemented in German MNCs, we could find some important differences that continue to persist.
For instance, important differences could be identified concerning the concept of corporate culture
and  relevant  practices  as  well  as  the  design  and  implementation  of  standardized  performance
management systems.
Concerning US MNCs, our findings largely confirm the results of earlier research. The US MNCs
of  our  sample  overall  showed  high  levels  of  standardization.  Generally  they  showed  a  great
willingness  to  transfer  country-of-origin  practices  downstream  towards  their  international
subsidiaries while heavily relying on standard processes.  Where lower levels of standardization
were found, this could clearly be attributed to a conscious strategic choice and to the international
growth history of the company. Yet, there is also surprising evidence in Switzerland. Based on the
findings of previous research notably in Germany, US MNCs were not be expected to be locally
deeply embedded and to actively participate in local associational networks. Yet, in Switzerland US
MNCs  were  collectively  organised  in  local  associational  networks  and  showed  a  remarkable
evidence of collaborative practices that go far beyond typical arm's length relations.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 Introduction to the field of research and to the 
present work
The present work investigates the cross-national transfer of human resource management (HRM)
practices within German and US-American multinational corporations (MNCs) towards their Swiss
subsidiaries. HRM  is  defined  broadly  as  relating  to  the  management  of  the  employment
relationship, and the devising and implementation of policies for dealing with employees. HRM
then  includes  recruitment,  remuneration,  discipline,  dismissal,  career  development,  skills  and
training,  and  involvement  as  well  as  the  decision  of  whether  or  not  to  treat  human  resources
collectively or individually (Ferner 1994: 80). Our objective is twofold. First, we aim to understand
the nature and kind of Swiss host country influences on HRM practice transfer. Second, we want to
further  contribute  to  our  knowledge  about  German  and  U.S.  MNCs,  their  approaches  towards
transfer and distinctive HRM practices, and especially their ways of approaching the Swiss host
country environment. As we will explain in some more detail in the following sections, our research
mainly builds on two strands of institutionalist organization theory, new institutionalism (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) and the national business systems (NBS) approach (Whitley 2000a). 
In order to guide our  analysis, we have formulated the following two research questions:
1) What  impact  does  the  Swiss  host  country  business  system  have  on  the  cross-national
transfer of HRM practices within German and US-American MNCs?
2) In  what  ways  do  German  and  US-American  MNCs  differ  in  their  approaches  towards
transfer and the handling of Swiss institutional constraints and opportunities,  and more
generally  in  their  manners  of relating to  the particular Swiss  institutional  setting when
transferring practices (Morgan 2007: 139)?
While the first question asks for Swiss host country effects that arise from local constraints on, and
resources for HRM, the second refers to the influence of German and U.S. country-of-origin effects.
These are meant to inform not only domestic HRM practice, but also the MNCs' overall approaches
towards transfer and adaptation of HRM practices in foreign host countries. Thus, it investigates the
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complex outcomes of a collision of different institutional rationalities  (Ferner et al. 2012: 166).
Research on cross-national  practice transfer  generally asks  about  the behaviour  of  MNCs from
different countries-of-origin and about the role that these organizations play within, and how they
themselves are influenced by, the process of globalization. This topic is hence part of a larger debate
on the drivers and effects of globalization and related questions around national distinctiveness and
global harmonization of organizational forms and managerial practices. In the following sections of
this  introductory  chapter,  we  will  present  the  origin  and  explain  the  interest  of  our  research
questions and the way how they will be approached. 
1.1 Research questions and rationale of the present work
Our specific research questions and the general interest of the present investigation may best be
understood  through  answering  a  set  of  underlying,  more  general  questions.  In  the  following
subsections, we will hence explain why it is meaningful to study MNCs and the cross-national
transfer of HRM practices within MNCs. Furthermore, we provide the rationale for our comparative
research design involving MNCs from Germany and the USA as two different countries-of-origin,
and Switzerland as a host country to MNCs.
1.1.1 Why do we study MNCs?
Due to their economic power, MNCs may be considered a central part of today's global economy.
To get a first impression of the role that MNCs play, we may have a look at some recent figures. In
2008, there were around 82 000 transnational- or multinational corporations1 with more than 800
000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD 2009: 223). The share of these companies in global gross domestic
product reached a historic high of 11 per cent in 2009 (UNCTAD 2010: xviii). And in 2011, foreign
affiliates of MNCs employed an estimated 69 million workers, who generated 28 trillion Dollars in
sales  and 7 trillion Dollars  in  value added (UNCTAD 2012:  xi).  Furthermore,  the 2012 World
Investment  Report  estimates  that  “[p]rojecting  the  data  for  the  top  100  TNCs  [transnational
corporations] over the estimated $5 trillion in total TNC cash holdings results in more than $500
billion in investable funds, or about one third of global FDI [foreign direct  investment] flows”
(UNCTAD 2012:  xv).  To  better  understand  these  figures  and  their  economic  impact,  we  may
1 In the UNCTAD publication, the expression “transnational corporation” (TNC) is used, while we prefer the more
generic term multinational corporation (MNC) to designate firms with international operations. These two terms and
their use in the international management literature will be defined and distinguished on the following pages.
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compare them to those of Germany as one of the world's top five national economies in terms of
GDP. In 2011, Germany had a population of around 81 million people who generated a GDP of
some more than 3.2 trillion Dollars (OCED 2013). This comparison reveals the enormous scale of
economic activity that is currently controlled by MNCs as increasingly powerful actors, who are
therefore  viewed  as  “principal  agents  of  the  internationalization  of  the  world  and  regional
economies” (Ferner 1994: 79) through FDI and increasing cross-border trade (Rugman and Verbeke
2004:  3).  According to  these same figures,  HRM practices  that  are  transferred cross-nationally
towards MNCs' foreign affiliates will hence impact a population of some 69 million employees.
MNCs  as  key  players  in  today's  global  economy  also  allow  to  qualitatively  distinguish  the
globalization of our days from what has been experienced in previous decades. In this respect, the
distinction between “shallow” and “deep integration” (Dicken 2003: 10–12) is important. Taking
into account the fact that before 1914, in quantitative terms the world economy was perhaps as open
as  today,  Dicken  (2003)  argues  that  the  nature  of  this  “shallow  integration”  was  qualitatively
different  from  what  we  are  experiencing  today.  By  1914,  economic  integration  was  largely
restricted to arm's length trade in goods and services between independent firms and international
movement of portfolio capital. In contrast, today “deep integration”, organized primarily within the
production networks of MNCs, and involving growing flows of FDI, foreign assets and integrated
global chains of production (Gereffi 1999) or global value chains (Gereffi et al. 2005), is becoming
increasingly pervasive.
Regarding the term “multinational corporation”, we can distinguish between a broad and a narrow
definition. While the narrow definition is based on legal ownership of operations in at least two
countries  (Buckley  and  Casson  1976),  the  broad  definition  emphasizes  control  of  productive
operations. In this perspective, control refers to the power relationship within the production chain
including the presence of a centre of strategic decision making. In most production chains, such a
centre can be found that is able to exert a significant degree of control over operations throughout
the chain, regardless of whether units are legally owned or formally independent (Cowling and
Sugden 1987). In the present work, the narrow definition will be adopted for two main reasons. The
first reason is the greater ease of operationalization. Since MNCs usually do not publish data on
how many  people  are  actually  employed  in  subcontracted  or  otherwise  dependent  firms,  it  is
difficult to assess such figures. Yet, in view of the phenomenon under research, i.e. the transfer of
3
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human resource management practices within MNCs, the second, even more compelling argument
concerns the extent of influence and control of the MNC over HR matters. As Edwards and Rees
(2006b:  48)  point  out  in  this  respect  “(...)  it  is  unheard  of  for  MNCs  to  demand  that  their
subcontractors establish performance management systems, but this is a common requirement that
the headquarters (HQ) of MNCs impose on their own operations”. Thus, transfer of practices is
rather unlikely to happen from the MNC towards indirectly controlled subcontractors and would
therefore not be observable in such a context.
The phenomenon of globalization with its wider social and economic implications (Guillén 2001)
has  attracted  considerable  interest  and  a  debate  has  evolved,  where  proponents  of  a  strong
globalization thesis are predicting a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990, 1995) and dissolving national
borders. The latter are opposed by a set of other observers who are denying that there has been
much significant change and convergence in the international economy, affirming that many aspects
of the globalization arguments are either exaggerated or not unprecedented (Doremus et al. 1998;
Hirst and Thompson 1999). 
Following  the  strong  globalization  theses,  national  and  regional  economies  would  become
increasingly  dominated  by  a  global  system  of  economic  co-ordination  and  control  where
competition  and strategic  choices  would be  organized  at  the  global  level.  In  this  new context,
national firms would become subordinated to multinational ones that would be accountable only to
global capital markets. While the ability of nation states to regulate economic activities is seen to
decline rapidly, global markets are expected to grow in importance. Accordingly, national economic
policies,  but  also  forms  of  economic  organization  and  managerial  practices,  are  predicted  to
converge around the most efficient ones as a result of global competition (Rees and Edwards 2006a:
10; Whitley 2000a: 117). Under the auspices of global markets, MNCs or TNCs, owing allegiance
to no nation state and locating wherever on the globe market advantage dictates, are seen as the
principle  economic  actors  and major  agents  of  change  (Rees  and Edwards  2006a:  5–6).  Thus,
following these arguments, nationality is no longer considered to be a meaningful concept in large
global MNCs (Reich 1990). 
However, the predictions from the strong globalization thesis have attracted a range of  critics on
several  grounds.  For  example,  Legrain  (2002:  108)  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that,  while  trade
volume has clearly risen, this growth looks far less spectacular when it is compared with the period
before World War One: while cross-border trade was 18 per cent of global GDP in 1914, it was 25
4
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per  cent  in  2000.  Several  authors  also  challenge  the  notion  of  stateless,  footloose  or  global
companies as depicted above, in arguing that most MNCs remain firmly rooted in one of the three
regions  of  the Triad,  and are still  relying on their  home base as the centre  for  their  economic
activities (Doremus et al. 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Legrain 2002; Rugman 2005; Rugman
and Verbeke 2004; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). In other words, we can summarize that “the
dominance  of  the  home  location  in  strategically  important  activities  remains  stubbornly  high”
(Meyer et al. 2011: 247). One key implication of these qualifications to the globalization theses is
that the predicted “forces for convergence in national forms of economic organization in general,
and the organization of firms in particular, are not as great as is commonly implied (...) [and that]
national differences in these respects remain significant” (Rees and Edwards 2006a: 16). In fact,
evidence suggests that,  until  present,  the notions  of the stateless,  footloose company and inter-
linked economy remain rather myths than reality (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Koen 2005: 544).
Authors who criticize the predictions of the strong globalization thesis argue that there is continued
diversity in the way in which societies solve similar problems (Tempel 2001: 15–16). For instance,
Maurice et al.' (1984) writings on the “societal effect” provided valuable insights into the sources of
such differences in depicting the way in which social institutions influence company strategies and
organizational practices in a systematic way, so that these reflect typically national patterns. But we
can also refer to Lane's work on “industrial orders” (Lane 1989, 1995) where she concluded that the
business  organizations  of  France,  Germany  and  Britain  continued  to  interact  in  nationally
distinctive ways though facing similar problems and opportunities. Porter (1990) has attributed the
success  of  international  companies  to  the  “competitive  advantage  of  nations”  in  a  sense  that
distinctive characteristics of their national resource basis are considered to provide firms with a
competitive  advantage  that  has  become  rather  more,  and  not  less,  important  in  the  event  of
increasing  internationalization  of  economic  activities  and  competition.  More  recent  arguments
around “institutional competitiveness” (Kristensen and Morgan 2007) point into this same direction
and, moreover, predict globalization to reinforce national institutional differences. In a similar vein,
Whitley (1994a;  2000a)  has developed the concept  of  “national  business systems” (NBSs) that
allows to depict the variations in economic organization between different countries that have been
formed in nationally specific institutional contexts. In his work,  business systems are defined as
“(...)  distinctive  patterns  of  economic  organization  that  vary  in  their  degree  and  mode  of
authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and interconnections
between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees” (Whitley 2000a: 33). Whitley explicitly
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notes the fact that the recent expansion of FDI across countries has intensified competition between
their  national  economies  and  institutional  arrangements.  This  line  of  thought  has  also  been
developed by Streeck (1991: 336) who argued that regime competition would increase as MNCs
that find institutional settings objectionable would “vote with their  feet,” and leave the country
without loosing access to the market. However, Whitley predicts that internationalizing firms are
unlikely  to  change  their  key  attributes  and  practices  substantially  unless  a  demanding  set  of
conditions would be met. 
Since MNCs may be considered as key actors and drivers of economic globalization, research into
these particular organizations holds great potential to further our knowledge about globalization,
and allows for the discovery of concrete evidence of convergence or divergence in organizational
structures, strategies, and practices.
1.1.2 Why do we study the cross-national transfer of HRM practices?
Being global as well as local players, MNCs are subject to various, often opposed influences and
pressures that are acting on their strategies, structures and HRM practices. In their seminal work,
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) argued that the new global economic environment with its combination
of local and global pressures forces companies to adopt new structures and strategies and to evolve
towards a new type of organization termed “transnational”. In this new environment, they identified
three key forces on managers in international firms. The first of these forces is the pressure towards
local adaptation that is due to continued differences in national cultures, attitudes and consumer
tastes. The second pressure is towards global integration because of the need to achieve economies
of  scale  on  an  international  level.  Finally,  in  view  of  shortening  life  cycles  of  products  and
technologies,  such  international  firms  would  have  to  respond  to  rapidly  evolving  markets  and
therefore face the need for worldwide innovation. The transnational organization would therefore
take  the  structure  of  an  integrated  network to  enable  large  flows  of  people,  knowledge  and
resources across interdependent units. This is in order to recognize new resources and capabilities,
capture them and leverage the advantages on a worldwide scale. Thus, transfer of practices across
operations appears to be one of the key consequences of the competitive strategies and structures
that MNCs adopt (Edwards and Rees 2006c: 84). 
Concerning  such  cross-national  practice  transfer  within  MNCs,  several  authors  have  identified
processes that could lead to changes and a decline in significance of national business systems,
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although without necessarily leading to a borderless world. Mueller (1994) as well as Martin and
Beaumont (1998) emphasize the transfer of “best practice” in MNCs, whereas Smith and Meiksins
(1995) point to the emulation of practices originating in dominant countries, a phenomenon they
termed “dominance effect”. Looking at these influences that are acting at the organizational level of
the MNC, Mueller thus (1994) underlines the importance of an  “organizational effect”  that may
complement or counteract the “societal effect” (Maurice et al. 1984) described above. The notion of
organizational effect directly arises from  organizational learning within MNCs from practices in
their international operations and the transfer of best practices from one location to the other, just in
the  sense  of  the  integrated  network  described  by Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (1998).  Thus,  practice
transfer  has  long  been  identified  as  an  important  source  of  competitive  advantage  for  the
increasingly  knowledge  driven  MNC  (Meyer et  al. 2011:  241),  allowing  for  organizational
capabilities to be internalised and exploited on a worldwide basis (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1988; Grant
1996; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Kogut 1991; Nohria and Ghoshal 1997). Consequently, MNCs
have a strong incentive to leverage practices on a global scale via transfer across national borders
within their network. Concerning HRM practices in particular, Evans et al. (2002: 55) point to the
importance of internal HR consistency as “finely tuned interrelationship” of practices throughout
the MNC network in order to achieve optimal organizational performance,  which represents an
important incentive for cross-national practice transfer. 
However, HRM is often viewed as the management function that is most strongly shaped by local
factors, and which therefore does not lend itself easily to internationally standardized, integrated
practices (Ferner et al. 2012: 165; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Rosenzweig and Singh 1991).
Referring to O'Hara-Devereaux and Johansen (1994) when commenting on this issue, Evans et al.
(2002: 62) explain that “(...) HRM is probably the function that is most sensitive to context, in
contrast to finance or engineering where figures, formulas, and calculations have intrinsic meaning
stripped of their context”. Thus, it is not surprising that the tension between global integration and
local  responsiveness has  for  long  been  one  of  the  key  issues  and  guiding  frameworks  in
international human resource management (IHRM) (Björkman and Stahl 2006: 4–5; De Cieri and
Dowling 2006: 16; Dowling et  al. 2009; Doz and Prahalad 1991; Rosenzweig 2006; Stiles and
Trevor 2006: 50). 
Recently, certain authors such as Quintanilla and Ferner (2003: 346) have argued for the need to
take a more contingent perspective on globalization and to explore the international transfer of HR
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practices as the complex outcome of MNC structure and strategy on the one hand, and institutional
constraints and opportunities of home and host countries on the other. These interactions can take
place on the local, national, international or sectoral level and imply the need to lessen emphasis on
grand tendencies in favour of the exploration of “how complex processes work themselves out in
particular  situations,  often  displaying  elements  of  both  convergence  (in  some  respects)  and
divergence (in others).”  Rees and Edwards (2006a: 17–24) suggest that the complex relationship
between  globalization,  national  systems  and  companies  could  best  be  understood  in  analysing
effects on several levels. Effects of  global economic trends comprise the internationalization of
sectors through liberalization and technical developments in IT. This first level is followed by the
regional  one, taking account  of the fact  that  dominant  patterns  of  trade and FDI are primarily
located within the three regions of the Triad. In a third place,  national effects should be analysed
that are referring to the distinctive differences between business systems and national institutions.
While global and regional effects may challenge some aspects of national institutional arrangements
and induce important changes, the national level is nevertheless still seen as a highly significant
one. These three macro-levels are hence setting the parameters within which organizations operate,
yet without completely determining the strategies and practices at the micro level of the company. It
is on this fourth level where the  organizational effect is located, including a range of contingent
factors at company level. For instance, the way an MNC is structured plays an important role in a
sense that highly standardized or internationally integrated production systems are most likely to be
influenced by the pressures  of  globalization demanding for  transfer  of  practices  across  borders
(Edwards 2011). Within these structures, in turn, power relations and political activities within the
MNC also play an important part in the event of a practice transfer (Ferner et al. 2012).
Based on such an approach,  it  has been argued that  the popular  vision of networks  is  flawed,
because the degree of strategic choice and scope for action of individual managers are considered to
be exaggerated (Rees and Edwards 2006a: 24). This view particularly applies to the very concept of
HRM which is generally considered to be of US-American origin (Brewster 2007; Gooderham and
Nordhaug 2010). Therefore, the HRM theory that developed “was rooted in a U.S. "ideal" which
has at  its core the notion of organizational autonomy” (Brewster 1995: 1). This notion, again, is
linked to “the "private enterprise" culture of the United States, and (...)[to] the concept of "the right
to manage"”, whereas European companies operate with “restricted autonomy” (Brewster 1995: 3).
In this connection, several authors point to constraints that are linked to the wider cultural  and
institutional context in which MNCs are operating (Tempel et al. 2005; Wächter 2004: 3). These
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authors argue that such “host country effects” (Ferner et al. 2001) may stem from “constraining” as
opposed to “permissive” host country institutional regulations (Ferner 1994, 1997; Marginson et al.
1993). For instance, in Germany, HRM and industrial relations (IR) are “(...) much more subject to
uniform  and  binding  regulations,  based  both  on  statute  and  formal  agreements  negotiated  by
encompassing actors” when compared to the more permissive British environment (Tempel 2001:
24).  Furthermore,  another restriction on strategic choice is  put forward in  describing MNCs as
“political animals” (Edwards and Rees 2006c: 84) where multiple interest groups are searching to
advance their own interests. Hence, the formal architecture of a network by senior management
alone is by no means considered to be sufficient to establish a real network. Rather, the precise
working of such networks would depend on the exercise of power (Edwards 2011: 495; Ferner and
Edwards 1995; Ferner et al. 2012). In this respect, the original home base is considered to have
disproportionate  influence  even  in  highly  internationalised  MNCs.  This  is  due  to  their
embeddedness within the home base, giving rise to a distinctive “country-of-origin effect” that is
reflected in the way companies internationalise and manage their human resources (Ferner 1997;
Wächter et al. 2003). 
Therefore, investigating into the cross-national transfer of HRM practices within MNCs allows for
the  collection  of  empirical  evidence  on  the  inter-  and  co-action  of  a  wide  range  of  different
influences and their effects in a management field that is equally marked by both, pressures for
integration  and convergence  towards  dominant  or  global  best  practices,  and pressures  to  adapt
practices to local institutional environments.
1.1.3 Why do we study Switzerland as a host country?
Switzerland's top ranking in the Global Competitiveness Report (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin 2012)
reflects the fact that it is an attractive, economically highly developed and competitive business
location. It is the country with the highest number of MNCs per 100 000 inhabitants worldwide
(Erten et al. 2004: 102), where 11 per cent of employees in the manufacturing and services sectors
are  working for  companies  with  foreign  direct  investors  (Swiss  National  Bank 2012:  12).  The
attractiveness of Switzerland as a business location is once more underlined by the positioning of
the country in the first quartile of the UNCTAD FDI attraction and potential indices, respectively
(UNCTAD 2012: 32). Following Naville et al. (2007a: 8), in 2004 MNCs were accounting for 34
per cent of total Swiss GDP, with 24 per cent being attributable to domestic Swiss and another 10
per  cent  to  foreign  MNCs.  These  figures  are  illustrative  of  the  high  degree  of  openness  and
9
Chapter 1 Introduction to the field of research and to the present work
“multinationality”  (Tempel  2001:  chapter  3.3)  of  the  Swiss  host  business  system,  which  is
furthermore reflected on an organizational level. Investigating the top management of European
companies, researchers recently found that the staffing of Swiss firms is strikingly international
(Davoine 2005; Davoine and Ravasi 2013).  Therefore, in view of the great attractiveness of the
business location and the massive presence of MNCs, Switzerland can be considered as an utterly
interesting and important field for research into IHRM in MNCs and the transfer of practices. 
Though, until present, astonishingly few is known about management and HRM in Switzerland.
Currently available  studies  on this  subject  are  attributable  either  to  the  strand of  cross-cultural
management, and thus take a cultural rather than an institutional view (Bergmann 1986, 1990, 1994;
Chevrier  2002,  2009;  Laurent  1983;  Tixier  1994;  Weibler  and  Wunderer  2007),  or  to  the
comparative  management  approach,  reducing  analysis  first  and  foremost  to  the  description  of
practices (Erten et al. 2004; Morley et al. 2000). However scarce the body of research on Swiss
management style and HRM is, it yet allows us to get some first ideas about local practices that may
inform our own in-depth investigation into the institutional basis of these practices. 
Given the great presence of MNCs in Switzerland and the paucity of scientific literature on Swiss
management and HRM practices, further research into the field of IHRM in Switzerland seems
highly indicated. With our investigation on HRM practice transfer towards the Swiss host country
we therefore follow the call for an extension of investigations on further countries (Tempel et al.
2005: 196). The available research on Swiss management style and HRM with its cross-cultural
approach or descriptive focus calls for approaches that are holding the potential to deliver causal
explanations, since the latter may significantly add to our understanding of local Swiss HR practices
within MNCs. Following a comparative institutional approach that explicitly takes into account
issues of agency has been identified as a viable strategy to generate such knowledge (Tempel  et al.
2005: 184; Tempel and Walgenbach 2004; Wächter 2004). 
As Morgan et al. (2003: 389) explain, practices that worked routinely in their country of origin are
“problematized” in the event of a transfer towards another institutional context where actors follow
another rationality. Such a “collision of two sets of institutional rationalities” (Ferner et al. 2012:
166) therefore holds a great potential for a better understanding of national management styles and
HRM practices  by making  explicit  underlying  assumptions  about  legitimacy and  rationality  of
practices in the eyes of actors who are marked by a distinct “socialised” or “societally informed
rationality” (Almond 2011a: 260; Almond et al. 2005: 281). That is why research into the transfer
of HRM practices within MNCs towards their Swiss affiliates can further our understanding of
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both, HRM practice transfer within MNCs, and local Swiss HRM practices and management style.
In the following sections we will provide an overview of different theoretical approaches in the
field of comparative international management and international human resource management and
provide some more information on the comparative institutional approach underlying the present
investigation.
1.1.4 Why do we compare German and US MNCs?
The design involving the comparative analysis of MNCs from Germany and the USA as countries-
of-origin is interesting for several reasons. First,  a closer look at the figures on German and US-
American FDI in Switzerland reveals that these two countries are among the most important direct
investors  in  Switzerland,  particularly  concerning  the  number  of  staff  employed  in  their  Swiss
operations.  Germany  accounts  for  some  100  000  and  the  USA for  nearly  57  000  employees,
representing 23 and 13 per cent of the total staff employed in foreign firms, respectively (Swiss
National Bank 2012: A18). Second, apart from the sustained presence of German and U.S. direct
investors  in Switzerland, there are strong theoretical arguments  for a comparison of companies
originating  in  these  two  countries.  Owing  to  the  theoretical  approach  of  comparative
institutionalism  that  has  been  adopted  for  the  present  investigation,  it  is  highly  relevant  that
Germany and the USA are widely considered to be situated on opposed poles on the spectrum of
capitalist economies in many respects. While Germany is a coordinated market economy (CME),
the USA are representing the opposed type of a liberal market economy (LME)(Hall and Soskice
2001a: 22). The “institutional distance” (Kostova 1999) between these two market economies is
hence important, and the different societal contexts have led to the establishment of quite different
human  resource  management  practices  within  the  German  (Giardini et  al. 2005;  Wächter  and
Müller-Camen 2002; Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992) and US-American context  (Ferner 2000a;
Ferner and Müller-Camen 2004). As we will see in more detail in our in-depth analysis of the two
NBSs, differences in the German and U.S. institutional environments led to the adoption of more or
less easily transferable HRM practices. While US MNCs are generally known for their sustained
willingness to transfer domestic HRM practices (Almond et al. 2005: 280; Ferner et al. 2004b: 367;
Tüselmann et  al. 2008:  1624–1625),  German MNCs were found to be less willing and able to
transfer  certain  domestic  HRM practices, and  fairly  often  to  adopt  a  more  selective  approach
towards  transfer  (Bluhm  2001;  Dickmann  2003:  279;  Dörrenbächer  2004;  Tempel  2001:  56;
Tüselmann et al. 2006: 69). 
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The availability of a certain body of literature on German as well as US HRM practices and MNCs'
approaches towards practice transfer is a great advantage for the present investigation. The results
of previous research allow for the formulation of some first informed expectations or propositions
concerning the approach towards transfer that German and US MNCs will presumably adopt in
Switzerland. Such propositions derived from theoretical reasoning and literature are highly useful to
find out about Swiss host country effects. Being well informed about earlier findings on differences
in  German  and US-American  MNCs'  approaches  towards  HRM practice  transfer  in  other  host
countries,  we  can  link  these  findings  to  the  concept  of  senior  managers'  different  “rationales”
(Redding 2005), “socialised” (Almond 2011a: 260) or “competing rationalities” (Edwards et  al.
2007b: 202). The latter are supposed to influence their distinctive ways of dealing with institutional
constraints (Oliver 1991) and the seizing of opportunities found in the local Swiss host country
environment. Such differences can be considered a deliberate manipulation of the variable country-
of-origin effect, that should leave us in a good starting position to better understand local Swiss
influences or host country effects as the great unknown variable. Thus, such a comparative research
design provides us with two different points of view from where and how to look at and analyse
Swiss host country influences,  and should allow us to gain a better understanding of the latter.
Furthermore,  following  Sayim  (2011:  592),  a  design  involving  “(…)  comparative  cases  from
different home-countries operating in the same (…) host environment might help differentiate more
clearly between institutional and contextual influences”. Still another reason for the comparison of
German and US-American affiliates in Switzerland lies in the institutional feature characteristics of
the  Swiss  host  business  system,  which  in  many respects  takes  a  middle  position  between  the
German  collaborative  and  the  US-American  compartmentalised  model.  As  we  will  see,  some
features of the Swiss NBS are close to the German one holding a range of institutional supports,
while others rather resemble the U.S. model and allow for a great deal of flexibility.  The thick
description (Redding 2005) of key institutional features of the Swiss host country business system
and a comparison with those of the German and US-American NBSs is hence a central part of the
present investigation.
1.2 Theoretical perspectives and approaches in the field of research
We have now placed our subject within the wider debate around globalization and convergence or
persisting divergence of organizational  forms, strategies and practices,  explained the origin and
interest of our specific research questions, and provided the rationale for our basic research design.
12
1.2 Theoretical perspectives and approaches in the field of research
When  investigating  HRM  practice  transfer  within  MNCs,  it  suggests  itself  to  have  a  look  at
corresponding  theoretical  perspectives  and  approaches,  especially  in  the  field  of  comparative
international  management2 and  IHRM, in  order  to  clearly define  and justify the  choice  of  the
theoretical framework underlying the present investigation. Therefore, in the following sections, we
will  summarize  different  theoretical  perspectives  and  approaches  in  comparative  international
management and IHRM. 
1.2.1 Comparative international management
In  comparative  international  management  research,  two  basic  categories  of  theories  can  be
distinguished. These approaches differ fundamentally in the role that is attributed to the cultural and
institutional context in which organizations are operating.
The  first  category  of  theories  has  been  termed “low-context”  (Child  2002;  Rees  and Edwards
2006a), “universalist” (Brewster 2004: 378; Koen 2005: 4–8) or “culture-free” (Evans et al. 2002:
57) approaches.  These are referring to universal  rationales such as economic and technological
forces, that are considered to determine particular structures and behaviours independently of the
local context, and globalization is conceived of as a driving force for homogenization (Gooderham
et al. 2004: 19). Consequently, increasing convergence between models of organization is predicted
together with countries developing similar economic and political systems. Koen (2005: 5–8) refers
to  structural  contingency  theory3 as  a  prime  example  of  an  influential  universalist  approach.
Following this perspective where “the isolated organization was the central unit of analysis” (Scott
1994:  204),  cultural  or  societal  characteristics  are  perceived as  negligible.  Here,  organizational
performance is seen to depend on the fit of organizational features to contingencies such as size or
technology employed. Thus, all organizations in a given environment would seek to attain fit and
finally resemble each other concerning their structural features. 
By contrast, the opposed category of theories known as “high-context”, “particularistic” or “culture-
bound”, posits that cross-national differences in cultural and institutional contexts are an important
2 We follow Koen (2005: 4) in seeing comparative international management as the study of management and 
organization in different societal settings.
3 Contingency theory posits that, under similar circumstances, the structure of an organization as its basic patterns of
control, coordination and communication can be expected to be very much the same wherever it is located Hickson
et al. (1974). In addition, successful organizations would adopt structures in response to a series of demands or
contingencies  such as size,  technology employed and the environment within which operations take place.  For
example, firms operating in a turbulent environment with single-product and process production technology would
be smaller than those ones operating in a stable environment with mass production technology. For a critical review
of structural contingency theory see for example Child (1982), Lane (1989), Whitley (2000a: 10–12), and Koen
(2005: 5–8).
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source of differences found in management and organization. In this respect, we can refer to cultural
and institutional approaches as two important theoretical frameworks that are guiding contemporary
comparative research in organization and management (Koen 2005: 8). 
While  both  cultural  and  institutional  theories  tend  to  emphasize  national  particularities  and
divergence, (Gooderham et al. 2004: 19; Lane 1989: 20), one basic difference consists in the way
they analytically perceive the influence of culture (Child and Tayeb 1982). 
In cultural approaches, culture is conceptualised as an ideational system focusing on values and
norms  (Hofstede  2001),  or  significations  and  meanings  (Geertz  1973)  that  are  transmitted  via
socialization,  and  meant  to  condition  a  general  propensity  to  act  in  a  certain  manner.  In
institutionalist approaches, cultures are seen as adaptive systems, embracing all forms of living that
societies have adapted from their environment. In this case, culture takes the form of artefacts or, in
organizational studies, the form of institutions, that are seen as “systems of socially transmitted
behavior patterns” (Child and Tayeb 1982: 41). Accordingly, such studies concentrate on how the
nature  of  organizations  reflects  the  institutional  features  of  the  society  they  are  embedded  in.
Institutions are seen as concrete expression of value orientations as they have historically developed
within a given society. Thus, proponents of this approach focus on the importance of history and the
idea  of  path  dependence  (North 1990).  Furthermore,  the “stickyness”  of  institutions  (Rees  and
Edwards 2006b: 33; Streeck 1987: 64) is an important concept, referring to the fact that institutions
are slow and difficult  to change. Despite these differences,  Koen (2005: 5) as well  as Wächter
(2004: 3–4) consider institutional and cultural theories rather as complementary than contradictory.
Yet, in the former, culture is seen as a background variable giving way to more concrete institutions.
These institutions constitute the context that is considered to shape entrepreneurial or organizational
action, and hence, HRM policy. Hollingsworth (1997a: 266) illustrates this point in explaining that
“there is a logic by which institutions coalesce into a social system of production (…) because
institutions  are  embedded  in  a  culture  in  which  their  logic  is  symbolically  grounded,
organizationally  structured,  technically  and  materially  constrained,  politically  defended,  and
historically shaped by specific rules and norms”.
1.2.2 International human resource management
Turning now from these two broad theoretical categories in comparative international management
research  to  the  field  of  international  human resource management  (IHRM),  we can  once more
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distinguish between different approaches. Several authors such as De Cieri and Dowling (2006: 15),
Weber  et  al. (1999) and Tempel  et  al. (2005:  182–184) have identified three broad approaches
termed “cross-cultural  management”, “comparative HRM” and HRM in MNCs which is widely
recognized as “international HRM”. 
While  the  first  approach  focuses  on  how  culture  influences  on  individual  behaviour  within
organizations, criticism addresses the widespread reduction on the dimensions of culture developed
by Hofstede (2001). Furthermore, methodological problems associated with his study such as the
critical equalling of nation and culture have been widely ignored (McSweeney 2002). Critics have
also argued that culture has become a kind of “catch-all” variable explaining everything and finally
nothing (Wächter 2004: 3) and that, due to the focus on individual behaviour, the analysis of the
organization as a whole with its HRM policy is neglected (Tempel et al. 2005: 182). Still other
researchers argued that institutions may “provide more perceptible material constraints on managers
than  the  more  abstract  and  diffuse  cultural  considerations.  Managers  faced  with  attempting  to
introduce variable pay may be more aware of the considerable tangible difficulties posed by laws
and institutions such as unions and works councils than of attitudinal issues” (Brookes et al. 2011:
76). All in all, Edwards et al. (2007b: 203) conclude that “these cultural approaches rarely offer a
convincing account of the sources of these national effects or how they evolve”. 
Comparative HRM as the second approach is concerned with the description and comparison of
HRM practices  in  different  countries  as  for  example  the  Cranfield  project  on  strategic  IHRM
(Brewster  2007;  Brewster et  al. 2000,  2004).  While  such  studies  have  contributed  to  the
identification and understanding of HRM practices in different countries, they have also attracted
some  criticism.  Weaknesses  have  been  identified  in  their  restriction  to  a  mere  description  of
differences while neglecting theoretical foundations (Weber et al. 1999) or providing only ex-post
theoretical explanations for the collected data (see for example Gooderham et al. 1999; Kabst et al.
2003). 
The  third  approach  differs  significantly  from  the  other  ones,  in  focusing  on  how  MNCs  are
organizing  their  personnel  function  on  a  global  level  (Weber et  al. 1999:  192).  Researchers
following this approach are describing and analysing how HR functions like personnel development
or recruitment are evolving in the course of internationalization and how new ones are emerging,
referring  frequently  to  the  typologies  of  Perlmutter  (1969)  or  Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (1998).
Regarding this approach, criticism has been concerned with the underlying assumption of freedom
of design in terms of the personnel function in the sense of “strategic choice” as discussed above,
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which is not necessarily given. Furthermore, the context in which MNCs operate is often reduced to
market conditions in different countries (Tempel et al. 2005: 183). 
However, recently still another approach in the field of IHRM has emerged that has been termed
comparative institutionalism (Tempel et al. 2005). This approach is concerned with the role played
by MNCs in promoting or resisting convergence or divergence of HRM. It explores  the interplay
between MNCs, home and host countries, and HRM practices, and has been recognized as a “(…)
distinctive line of inquiry within the  international HRM field” (Jain et al. 1998; Quintanilla and
Ferner 2003: 363).
1.3 The conceptual framework of the study
As  we  have  seen,  the  present  study  is  centred  at  the  heart  of  the  continuing  debate  around
statelessness  versus  national  embeddedness  (Granovetter  1985)  of  MNCs  and  their  power  to
transfer practices across boarders. This investigation aims to analyse the complex interactions of
macro-  and  micro-level  influences  on  cross-national  HR practice  transfer  within  MNCs.  Such
influences  take  the  form  of  country-of-origin,  host  country,  or  dominance  effects.  These  are
complemented by organizational effects that are contingent on corporate strategy and structure, as
well as issues of agency, power and interests within the MNC.
Taking a  comparative institutionalist approach,  the conceptual framework of this investigation is
clearly placed within the culture-bound category. In order to best depict and understand the dynamic
interaction  between  organizations  and  their  HRM  practices  on  the  one  hand,  and  institutional
environments on the other, we follow the suggestion of Ferner and Quintanilla (1998: 726) and
Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) to draw on two different strands of institutional theory that are
holding a great potential for cross-fertilization: new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Scott 1995) and the national business systems approach (Whitley 1994a, 2000a). As we will see, the
new  institutionalist  concept  of  isomorphism  helps  us  to  understand  the  interpenetration  of
organizations and their institutional environments. The business systems approach, in turn, serves as
a sophisticated theoretical framework to guide the in-depth analysis of the specific configuration of
the Swiss host country institutional environment at a societal level.  
As we have seen,  our particular interest  lies in  understanding the nature of Swiss host country
effects as one out of a set of key influences on cross-border HRM practice transfer within MNCs.
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The  highly  complex  process  of  cross-national  HRM practice  transfer  has  been  described  as  a
contextualised  construction  of  practices  (Barmeyer  and  Davoine  2011:  6).  In  the  present
investigation, HRM practices in Swiss affiliates of German and US-American MNCs are considered
as an outcome of the interplay of a complex set of factors at institutional macro- and organizational
micro-level. Due to the dearth of research into the issue of Swiss host country effects, our research
is  exploratory  in  nature.  With  the  research  question  asking  for  the  “how”  and  “why”  of  the
phenomenon  under  investigation,  i.e. transfer  and  local  adaptation  of  HRM practices  in  Swiss
affiliates of MNCs, this study follows a qualitative approach (Yin 2009). 
While our first research question asks for Swiss host country effects that arise from local constraints
on,  and  resources  for  HRM,  the  second  question  refers  to  the  influence  of  German  and  U.S.
country-of-origin effects. These are meant to inform not only domestic HRM practice, but also the
MNCs'  overall  approaches  towards  transfer  and  adaptation  of  HRM  practices  in  foreign  host
countries.  Thus,  it  investigates  the  complex  outcomes  of  a  collision  of  different  institutional
rationalities (Ferner et al. 2012: 166). The basic conceptual framework of the present investigation
has  been  adopted  from earlier  research  undertaken  by a  group  of  researchers  around  Hartmut
Wächter (Wächter and Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003) and is visualised in figure 1 below. The
starting point is the consideration that HRM, strategy and structure within the MNC are influencing
each other and hence cannot be discussed in isolation. Furthermore, contingency factors are known
to shape organizational structures and practices to some extent, although they are not at the heart of
our research. In fact, in a recent large-scale survey, Edwards et al. (2007a: xi, 103) found that size
and age of a MNC exert much less influence than might be expected. Following an institutional
perspective with its focus on societal embeddedness of organizations, HRM practices within MNCs
are  considered  to  be  shaped  to  an  important  extent  by  the  organizations'  external  societal
environment. While this environment is made up of cultural and institutional factors, our approach
focuses rather on institutions than on cultural influences. This focus on institutions follows directly
from the methodological considerations that have been discussed earlier.
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Figure 1: An institutional perspective on HRM
Source: Wächter et al. (2003: 6), based on Tichy et al. (1982: 48).
When HRM practices within an MNC are transferred across national boarders, they are supposed to
pass through an environmental filter. This filter consists of the cultural and institutional elements
the focal subsidiary is embedded in, as we can see in figure 2 below. In this graphical illustration,
the idea is reflected that the relevant socio-economic context of an organization is highly pertinent
for the establishment of an HR system. It is important to note that the concept of embeddedness
does not a priori exclude standardization efforts within MNCs or the integration of HRM practices
from a foreign model into the domestic one. However, the potential for cross-cultural learning and
standardisation is considered to be confined “to what is within the 'fit' of the relevant socio-cultural
context” (Pudelko 2006: 123).
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Figure 2: An institutional perspective on cross-national HRM practice transfer
Source: Based on  Wächter et al. (2003: 6).
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1.4 Outline of the study
The following chapters 2, 3 and 4 will deal with the theoretical approach and conceptual framework
of this investigation. Chapter 2 will first provide an introduction to new institutionalism and the
business system approach. We will explain how these two approaches can usefully complement
each other to account for external institutional influences on HRM and practice transfer as macro-
level factors. In chapter 3, we will turn our attention to internal organizational factors and issues of
MNC strategy and structure that give rise to micro-level organizational effects. In this respect, also
issues of power, agency and the development of subsidiary roles, and their respective influence on
cross-national HRM practice transfer, will be discussed. Our structure hence reflects the distinction
between  macro-  and  micro-level  factors  that  may influence  on  cross-national  practice  transfer.
Issues of agency and power will be discussed in both chapters 2 and 3, first with a focus on the
interplay between actors and institutions, and then with a focus on power resources and agency
within MNCs. Chapter 4 will integrate the insights from institutional theory, MNC strategy and
structure as well as latest contributions on power and agency into a common integrated conceptual
framework that allows for a “dynamic, multilevel version of institutionalist analysis” (Almond et
al. 2005: 299) and gives an overview of key influences, mechanisms and possible outcomes of
practice transfer within MNCs. 
The national business systems approach (Whitley 2000a) presented in chapter 2 helps us to better
understand why and in what ways the German and US-American market economies differ, and how
these differences translate into distinct characteristics of firms and HRM practices. In empirical
research, HRM and approaches towards transfer were found to differ in important ways between
German and US-American MNCs. A review of the most important features of the US-American and
German NBSs, their shaping of MNCs' domestic HRM and approaches towards transfer will be the
subject of chapter 5. Chapter 6 is then dedicated to the the thick description (Redding 2005) of key
institutional features and feature characteristics of the Swiss host country business system that are
being compared to those of the German and US-American NBSs. 
In chapter 7, we will start with a short discussion of paradigmatic, ontological and epistemological
questions and clarify the researcher's position. Furthermore, we will provide relevant information
on our methodology and research design. To do this, we will take up key insights of chapters 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6 in order to establish our research framework. At this point, we will formulate propositions
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that are based on our theoretical discussion and literature review. Details about the data collection
and analysis  process will  be discussed,  and methodological  choices  justified in  order to  render
transparent and reproducible every step in the investigation.
In Chapter 8, results of the empirical study are reported. This chapter is organized according to the
integrated conceptual  framework for  HRM practice  transfer  presented  in  chapter  4,  and to  our
research framework that has been established in chapter 7. Results of our analysis are systematically
presented according to MNC country-of-origin in order to allow for comparisons between German
and US MNCs.  Furthermore,  this  organization  of  our  own empirical  results  allows for  pattern
matching  with  our  expectations  as  based  on theoretical  reasoning  and on findings  of  previous
studies.  In  a  first  section,  we  will  provide  relevant  information  on  each  company  to  give  an
overview of several micro-level organizational variables as discussed in chapter 3 and 4. A second
section is dedicated to the issue of transfer itself. It deals with questions around willingness and
reasons for international HRM practice transfer, and analyses the transfer process itself. Results are
again discussed against the background of the conceptual framework on international HRM practice
transfer  and  the  patterns  of  typical  German  versus  US-American  approaches  that  have  been
established based on our literature review. The following third section reports our results concerning
particular HRM practices that are standardized. These are again discussed against the background of
the previously identified typical German and US-American patterns and the specific propositions
worded in our research framework. Special emphasis is put on the identification of key influences
and effects, namely country-of-origin-, dominance- and host-country effects, as well as aspects of
power and agency. The same analysis is then done in a fourth section for local HRM practices. This
identification of key influences enables us to uncover links of causality through an analysis of the
interplay of country-of-origin and Swiss host country influences as well as the role of organizational
variables in this highly complex process of contextualised construction of practices (Barmeyer and
Davoine 2011: 6).
Finally, a conclusion summarizes and discusses central findings, implications and limitations of the
present investigation, and points to possibilities for future research in the field.
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PART  II:  TOWARDS  AN  INTEGRATED  CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH INTO THE CROSS-NATIONAL
TRANSFER  OF  HUMAN  RESOURCE  MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES WITHIN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Chapter 2 Institutional environments, organizations and human 
resource management practices
As we have seen in the introduction, institutional theory is part of the high-context category of
theories that are focusing on the influence of the societal or cultural environment on organizations.
Since the focus here is on the relationship between organizations and their environments (Björkman
2006: 465), organizations are seen as open systems that cannot be considered in isolation from their
context  (Scott  1994,  2003).  Institutional  theory  has  been  chosen  due  to  the  greater  ease  of
operationalisation, its capacity to generate clear causal explanations and to account for changes over
time, whereas cultural approaches suffer from important methodological problems as discussed in
the introduction (McSweeney 2002; Tempel et al. 2005: 182; Wächter 2004: 3). Though, we will
not ignore the complex interdependencies between culture and institutions (Child and Tayeb 1982;
Lane 1989; Tempel 2001: 29).
Referring to the basic conceptual framework presented in the introduction, we will start with a
discussion of the institutional environment organizations are embedded in. Starting with a definition
of the term institution, in this chapter we will present two different strands of institutional theory,
new  institutionalism and  the  business  systems
approach, and explain how these two perspectives
can usefully be integrated and applied to the study
of  multinational  corporations.  On  the  one  hand,
new  institutionalism  has  generated  insights
concerning the concrete mechanisms through which
institutions  impact  on  organizations  and  the
diffusion  of  practices,  defining  the  organizational
field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1994) as a unit of analysis. On the other hand, the national
business systems approach (Whitley 1994a; Whitley 1994b; Whitley 2000a)  puts an emphasis on
the effects of a range of institutions at societal level and differences between countries. The latter
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approach focuses in particular on the level of the nation state as principle unit of analysis, since
“nation states constitute the prevalent arena in which social and political competition is decided in
industrial capitalist economies” (Whitley 2000a: 19).
2.1 Defining the three pillars of institutions
In order to discuss the impact of institutions on organizations, we shall begin with a definition of the
term  institution.  North  sees  institutions  as  regulative elements  in  defining  them  as  “perfectly
analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport.  That is, they consist of formal
written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal
rules  (…)  the  rules  and  informal  codes  are  sometimes  violated  and  punishment  is  enacted.
Therefore, an essential part of the functioning of institutions is the costliness ascertaining violations
and the severity of punishment (North 1990: 4). 
As  we  can  see,  North  emphasizes  the  problems  associated  with  the  monitoring  of  behaviour,
enforcement and punishment according to the rules, and stresses the importance of a neutral third
party. In this respect, he argues that a third party “must always involve the state as a source of
coercion” (North 1990: 64). We can therefore see the particular importance of the state as rule
maker, referee and enforcer in studying this regulative aspect of institutions. 
Moreover, we can see a second important element of institutions, that is their consisting of a formal
and informal part. In this respect, Helmke and Levitsky (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727) give a
more precise definition of “informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal
institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels
widely  accepted  as  official”.  Here,  we  can  clearly  see  the  smooth  transition  from  culture  to
institutions, which is the reason why the frontier between the two is “a critical area for research”
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728). In this respect, Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 728) propose to
“cast informal institutions in relatively narrow terms by defining informal institution in terms of
shared expectations rather than shared values. Shared expectations may or may not be rooted in
broader  societal  values”.  This  aspect  is  important  to  underline  the  argument  that  cultural  and
institutional  theory  should  not  be  seen  as  contradictory  or  mutually  exclusive,  but  rather  as
complementary. Even if our primary focus will be on formal institutions, also informal ones shall be
taken into account, since “the potential influence of informal regulations and custom and practice
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on the management of human resources should not be underestimated” (Tempel 2001: 63).
We have now seen the regulative element of institutions and the fact that these consist of formal and
informal rules. Scott's (1995: 48) definition of institutions is still more encompassing in defining
them  as  “culture-cognitive,  normative,  and  regulative  elements  that  (...)  provide  stability  and
meaning to social life”. Thus, a normative and a cognitive element as a second and third pillar of
institutions are completing the regulative one. 
The  normative pillar  emphasizes “normative rules, that introduce a prescriptive,  evaluative, and
obligatory dimension into social life (…) and include both values and norms” (Scott 1995: 37). In
this regard,  values are defined as “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable together with the
construction of standards”, whilst  norms are seen to “specify how things should be done” (ibid.).
Again,  we can  underline  the  closeness  of  institutions  and culture.  Following Koen (2005:  12),
informal  and  normative  institutions  are  very  much  alike,  both  of  them  expressing  customs,
traditions  and  values,  and  thus  making  it  difficult  to  disentangle  the  impact  of  informal  and
normative institutions from that of culture.  
Since values and norms apply rather to specific actors and positions than being generally applicable,
scholars were focusing on  roles that are defining appropriate action for individuals or positions.
Berger  and  Luckmann  (1967:  74)  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  roles  for  institutions  as
follows: “All institutionalised conduct involves roles. Thus roles share in the controlling character
of institutionalization. As soon as actors are typified as role performers, their conduct is ipso facto
susceptible to enforcement. Compliance and non-compliance with socially defined role standards
cease to be optional, though (…) the severity of sanctions may vary from case to case”. Therefore,
roles  can  be  seen  as  normative  expectations  of  what  actors  are  supposed to  do,  that  are  both
internalised  and  held  by  other  important  actors.  In  this  respect  though,  they  are  not  only
constraining, but also enabling as they confer rights and responsibilities. While both the regulative
and normative pillars of institutions somehow stress rules and enforcement, we can say that the
regulative  conception  focuses  more  on  a  logic  of  instrumentalism where  the  actor  reviews  his
interests  in  a  given  situation,  whereas  the  normative  conception  refers  more  to  a  logic  of
appropriateness with actors assessing the expectations associated with their roles (Tempel 2001:
35). 
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The cognitive pillar of institutions is not about rules, but underlines the role played by “the socially
mediated  construction  of  a  common framework of  meaning”  (Scott  1995:  45).  In  this  respect,
Zucker (1977: 728) explains that “the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less a taken-for-
granted part  of (...)  social  reality”.  These taken-for-granted assumptions  provide guidelines for
sensemaking and choosing meaningful actions (Tempel 2001: 35). While the regulative pillar is
about the rules of the game, the cognitive pillar is about the game itself and basic ideas associated
with it such as winning and loosing or team spirit. In the words of Zucker (1977: 730) it is more
about a “cognitive understanding of the "facts of life" rather than obligatory conformity”. In this
case, actors do not comply because of some kind of external pressure taking the form of rules and
sanctions or role expectations, but rather because predefined patterns of behaviour are taken-for-
granted as the way things are done, making other types of behaviour in most cases inconceivable.
Therefore, cognitive elements exert their influence “prior to and apart from any mechanisms of
sanctions specifically set up to support an institution” (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 55). 
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2.2 New institutionalism: interpenetration of organizations and environments
New  institutionalism  “has  emphasized  the  relationship  between  the  organiszation  and  its
"institutional environment", and the way in which this relationship shapes the organization's internal
structures” (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: 712). Researchers applying this theory to the study of
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1995; Westney 1987;
Zucker  1977;  Zucker  1988)  are  pointing  to  the  influence  of  socially  constructed  beliefs,
assumptions, expectations, rules and norms over organizations. These are considered to determine
how firms, schools or hospitals should be organized, why they exist and what kind of function they
perform (Björkman 2006: 463; Tempel and Walgenbach 2007: 2). 
2.2.1 Legitimacy and isomorphism in organizational fields
One key point emphasized by new institutionalists is their scepticism about the assumption that
formal  organization  can  be  explained  through  the  argument  of  efficiency.  In  this  regard,  new
institutionalists  argue that  particular  organizational  forms  do not  exist  because of  their  optimal
performance,  but  rather  because  they  correspond  to  institutionalised  expectations  (Tempel  and
Walgenbach 2004: 9), hence referring directly to the normative pillar of institutions as presented
above. organizations are seen as technical as well as social phenomena with their structures and
processes being shaped by more than technical rationality alone, attributing a major importance to
social  legitimacy  (Meyer  and  Rowan  1977).  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977:  348–349)  argued  that
organizations  would  adopt  structures  that  are  externally  legitimated  rather  than  in  terms  of
efficiency,  employing  external  or  ceremonial  assessment  criteria  to  define  the  value  of  these
structures. The dependence on external institutions would reduce turbulence, maintain stability and
promote the success and survival of organizations. Such decoupling of structures from each other
and from economic activities would  lead organizations to become isomorphic with the rationalizing
institutional myths of their environment as they are embodied in their external institutions (Meyer
and Rowan 1977: 345). 
Isomorphism is  therefore  a  key  concept  in  new  institutionalism  to  capture  the  process  of
homogenization among organizations, that has been defined as “a constraining process that forces
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149, referring to Hawley 1968). 
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In  contrast  to  Weber's  (1952)  concept  of  efficiency  and  competition-driven  bureaucratization,
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are providing another explanation for the high degree of homogeneity
between organizational forms and practices. In arguing that this homogeneity is an outcome of the
structuration (Giddens 1979) of organizational fields, they point to the state and professions as the
most powerful forces in driving this process (DiMaggio and Powell  1983: 147). DiMaggio and
Powell have defined the term organizational field as “those organizations  that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers,
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983: 148). In this respect,  structuration as a process of institutional definition would
consist of four parts: an increasing interaction between the organizations in the field, the emergence
of clear inter-organizational structures of domination and coalition, an increase in the amount of
information the organizations in a field have to deal with, and finally the development of a mutual
awareness between participants in the organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise
(DiMaggio and Powell  1983: 148).  Once a field is  structured,  powerful  forces emerge,  leading
organizations to become more similar to each other. While organizations may change their goals
and  develop  new  practices,  and  new  organizations  may  enter  the  field,  in  the  long  run
“organizational actors making rational decisions  construct around themselves an environment that
constrains their ability to change further in later years“ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). While
organizational innovations such as new structures or practices may initially be introduced in order
to improve performance, these new practices may become “infused with value beyond the technical
requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17). And as these structures and practices spread
to other organizations, it is not efficiency but legitimacy –  just as proposed by Meyer and Rowan
(1977) – that organizations search and obtain. Once a certain degree of structuration is reached in an
organizational field, it is this dynamic that leads to a decreasing extent of diversity within the field.
This  is  because  organizations  “respond  to  an  environment  that  consists  of  other  organizations
responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of
organizations' responses“ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149 paraphrasing Schelling 1978: 14). 
2.2.2 organizational fields, jurisdiction of belief systems and the nature of 
governance systems
In this context, Scott has argued that organizational fields are providing an important intermediate
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unit,  connecting the  level  of  individual  organizational  structure and  functioning  with  societal
processes (Scott  1994:  207).  Postulating  that  organizational  fields  differ  in  many  ways,  he
established three clusters of differences in adding the jurisdiction of belief systems and the nature of
governance systems as two new factors to the degree and type of structuration. Since these clusters
of differences may crucially add to our understanding of the nature of organizational fields, in the
following they will be shortly summarized.
Belief systems that “guide and orient the behavior of field participants” are about “complex systems
of presuppositions,  knowledge and beliefs, norms and rules that identify and distinguish among
sectors or arenas of contemporary social life” (Scott 1994: 208) with professionals playing a central
role in their creation and codification. But also the state and corporate actors are considered to be
major forces affecting field definition. While the role of the state in this respect is discussed in
terms  of  its  regulatory  power  –  an  issue  we  will  come  back  to  when  discussing  coercive
isomorphism  –  professional  associations  and  multinational  corporations  are  seen  to  shape
organizational fields through the diffusion of organizational models among societies. Thus MNCs
and the transfer of practices as well as professional associations may play a major role in shaping
local organizational fields and further isomorphism in the latter. Regarding belief systems, Scott
discussed  their  content,  penetration,  horizontal  linkages  and  exclusiveness.  While  their  content
refers  to  “the  nature  of  assumptions  or  institutional  "logics"”  (1994:  209)  reigning  the  five
institutional complexes of the economic sphere, the bureaucratic state, the family, the polity and the
religious realm,  penetration is about the identity of actors and the definition of roles, as we have
seen in our presentation of the normative pillar  of institutions.  Horizontal linkages concern the
extent  to  which a given belief  system, e.g.  the institution of private  property and the value of
freedom  of  choice,  is  interconnected  with  its  associated  activities,  thus  providing  cultural
consistency and coherence across differing domains. 
Furthermore, and of particular interest to our research subject, Scott (1994: 211) discussed the issue
of  exclusiveness of belief  systems.  In some organizational fields we might be able to identify a
dominating, single, exclusive belief system with a high degree of consensus existing among the
relevant actors as to the assumptions, norms and rules that should govern the field. Though, other
situations  are  imaginable.  A second  scenario  would  involve  a  dominant  belief  system  that  is
complemented by subordinated secondary forms, while a third variety would expose more generic
or "meta" institutional patterns with some degree of variation. Lastly, in a fourth scenario, two or
more strong, competing or conflicting belief systems would be present in a given domain. Due to
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the fact that MNCs, by their very nature, are straddling organizational fields as well as national
institutional environments (Westney 1993: 60), we should expect to encounter situations similar to
the fourth scenario involving competing or conflicting belief systems especially in the event of a
practice  transfer.  In  such  situations,  Oliver  (1991)  argued  that  managers  are  generally  not
confronted by a clear, unambiguous institutional imperative but rather by contested models. Thus, in
such instances alternative interpretations and strategic options are present and the jurisdiction of
belief systems will be more likely to be negotiable than determinant (Scott 1994: 212).
Governance systems  in which beliefs and rules are embodied, comprise three primary carriers of
institutionalised beliefs or rules. These are a) formal organizations with structural and procedural
apparatuses  to  exercise  centralised  authority,  b)  regimes  involving principles,  norms,  rules  and
decision-making procedures as a basis for cooperative behaviour among independent entities, and c)
cultures, belief systems and informal rules that operate without the presence of a collective centre
(Jepperson 1991: 150). 
According to  Scott  (1994:  212),  the  discussion  of  governance  systems inevitably confronts  the
complex reality of the nation state, where a variety of influences of state structure and governance
systems in organizational fields can be distinguished. Regarding general features of state structure,
Scott refers to four criteria established by Peters (1988):  extensiveness, including issues such as
size,  range  and  portfolios;  centralization,  concerning  the  number  of  subnational  governments,
formal,  fiscal  and  administrative  federalism;  hierarchy including  quasi-governmental  units,
nationalised industries, sub-departmental structures and procedural consistency and elaboration; and
finally participation, relating to structures for interest group participation (pluralist vs. corporatist
systems) and political parties. Scott (1994: 213) postulates that generally, the more extensive the
state is, the less autonomy and power would be devolved into structures located outside the state.
On the other hand, decentralised, fragmented and federalised structures would give rise to more
complex linkages among organizations in a sector. 
Concerning governance systems in organizational fields, Scott argues that states play a major role in
influencing on sector structure. Firstly, in their quality as actors, states can affect sectors by their
allocation behaviour or by the definition and enforcement of property rights. These are, in turn,
shaping social relations among social partners, competitors or buyers and sellers in determining “the
balance  of  power  among  a  wide  variety  of  economic  actors  in  civil  society”  (Campbell  and
Lindberg 1990: 636). Secondly, with their specific configuration, states as institutional structures
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can also influence on organizational  fields.  For example,  there are differences  in the degree to
which the state is unified or fragmented and full of conflict with respect to sectors. It therefore
provides  different,  geographically  variable  arenas  of  political  access  to  societal  actors  with
distinctive clusters of rules and conditions (Scott 1994: 215). In this respect, Scott refers to the
typologies that have been developed by Lindberg  et al. (1991) and Schmitter (1990). The former
identified  six  ideal-types  of  governance  mechanisms  including  markets,  obligational  networks,
hierarchies, monitoring systems, promotional networks, and associations. The latter proposed three
ideal types of economist modes of governance being markets with spontaneous equilibration, self-
reinforcing alliances and externally enforced controls. 
These  arguments  concerning  the  influence  of  state  structure  and  governance  systems  on
organizational  fields  as  intermediate  unit  that  connects  individual  organizational  structure  and
societal processes is highly important. As we have seen in the introduction to this chapter, new
institutionalism concentrates on mechanisms through which institutions impact  on organizations
and the diffusion of practices, while the business systems approach concentrates on societal level
institutions and primarily focuses on the level of the nation state. In discussing the impact of state
structure and governance mechanisms on organizational fields and thus the nature of sectors, a clear
link can be established between these two strands of institutional organization theory. Furthermore,
the concept of conflicting or competing jurisdictions of belief systems is highly relevant for our
understanding of the problematization of practices as described by Morgan et al. (2003: 389) and
the possible  “collision of  two sets  of institutional  rationalities” (Ferner et  al. 2012:  166)  when
practices are transferred from one national institutional environment towards another one.
2.2.3 Three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change
We will now turn from our consideration of isomorphism in organizational fields to a discussion of
precise  mechanisms through  which  institutional  isomorphic  change  can  occur.  Differentiating
between competitive and institutional isomorphism in institutional fields,  DiMaggio and Powell
(1983: 150) have identified the three mechanisms of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism
that will be depicted in the following paragraph.
Coercive isomorphism is stemming from formal and informal pressures on organizations that may
be exerted by other organizations upon which they are dependent, or may be attributable to cultural
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expectations in the society. In this respect, Scott (1987: 501) refers to  “environmental agents that
are sufficiently powerful to impose structural forms and/or practices on subordinate organizational
units”.  Hence,  coercive  isomorphism  as  imposition involves  the  state  as  a  key  player  whose
coercive power emanates from its role as legislator who creates a common legal environment to
which organizations are subject (Thomas and Meyer 1984).
At this point, a first parallel can be drawn between the regulative pillar of institutions (Scott 1995)
and coercive isomorphism with the importance attributed to the state. Here, coercive isomorphism
can serve to describe how institutionalised and externally legitimated rules that are set by the state
are  incorporated  in  organizational  structures  and  practices.  Thus,  organizational  legitimacy  is
achieved through operation in accordance with the relevant legal requirements.
Mimetic isomorphism as the second mechanism is not arising from coercion but through uncertainty
which encourages imitation. Under conditions of uncertainty, organizations may model themselves
on other organizations that they perceive to be more successful or legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell
1983: 152). Such models may be diffused intentionally or unintentionally with consultant firms or
industry associations playing an important role (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151). This type of
isomorphism  is  described  by  Scott  as  the  acquisition,  and  hence  the  deliberate  choice,  of
organizational  structure  (1987:  504).  This  is  seen  as  a  primarily  cognitive  process  where
organizations are seeking to behave in orthodox or conventional ways,  and to achieve status in
imitating  others  that  are  regarded  as  more  successful  (1995:  47).  This  process  encourages
homogenization because of the limited variety of available alternatives. Though, Westney (1987)
argues  that  mimetic  isomorphism also  offers  some  scope  for  deviation  from the  model  being
imitated.  Deviation  in  this  context  may be intended and take  the form of  an  adaptation to  the
institutions  of another  organizational  field,  or unintended when information about  the model  is
imperfect, idealised or filtered. The adoption of  Anglo-Saxon practices by continental European
companies as a consequence to challenges faced in the course of internationalization and the rise of
the  shareholder  value  model  (Ferner  and  Quintanilla  1998)  may serve  as  illustrations  of  such
processes, that may also be interpreted as dominance effects (Smith and Meiksins 1995).
The  third  source  of  isomorphic  change  called  normative  isomorphism originates  from
professionalization.  Following Larson (1977) and Collins  (1979),  DiMaggio  and Powell  (1983:
152) have defined professionalization as “the collective  struggle of members of an occupation to
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define the conditions and methods of their work, to control "the production of producers" (Larson
1977: 49–52), and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy“.
Scott  (1987:  502)  describes  this  isomorphic  process  as  the  authorization or  legitimation of
organizational  structure  by a  super-ordinate  unit.  Professions,  in  turn,  are  subject  to  the  same
coercive  and  mimetic  pressures  as  organizations.  While  groups  of  professionals  within  an
organization such as lawyers, accountants or engineers may considerably differ from each other,
they may be similar to their counterparts in other organizations. Furthermore, professional power is
both assigned by the state, and created by the activities of the professions (DiMaggio and Powell
1983: 152). Here, formal education and professional networks are seen as important sources of
isomorphism since both, universities and professional associations, are vehicles for the development
and  diffusion  of  normative  rules  about  what  constitutes  professional  behaviour  (Tempel  and
Walgenbach 2007: 3). Furthermore, the filtering of personnel during the recruitment process has
been identified as another important mechanism driving normative isomorphism, since firms from
the same industry hire staff from a narrow range of educational institutions. Common promotion
practices and the stipulation of skills levels required for particular jobs fit into this category, too.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 153) resume this argument as follows: “To the extent managers and
key staff are drawn from the same universities and filtered on a common set of attributes, they will
tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way”.
Zucker (1988: xvii) argues that isomorphic processes are reinforced by the fact that environments
are not only external to the organization, but that organizations and environments “interpenetrate”.
For a better illustration of this argument, we can refer once again to  Scott (1987) who identified
several different accounts for structural influence. On the one hand, imposition and authorization
are depicted as processes that are shaping organizational structures through coercive and normative
isomorphism and are hence involving external institutional agencies. On the other hand though, the
process  of  acquisition  that  is  associated  with  mimetic  isomorphism involves  actors  within  the
organization  who  consider  certain  externally  validated  structures  and  processes  as  legitimate.
Therefore,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  situations  where  structures  or  practices  are
“voluntarily adopted  by organizational managers – in contrast to the situations (...) in which the
major impetus for the change comes from outside the organization” (Scott 1987: 504).
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More recently, John Meyer and his colleagues (Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997) have applied  the
argument of isomorphism to a set of consultants involved in global discourse ,“operating almost
entirely in terms of scientific and professional (legal, medical, educational) models and methods”
(Meyer et  al. 1997:  166).  Meyer  highlights  the  process  of  general  emulation  of  models  and
associated  practices on a global scale. Welfare systems of states are serving as role model that are
copied  by  others,  and  “admired  firms  put  themselves  forward  as  models,  and  whole  sets  of
consulting firms and business school academics make a business out of aiding in the diffusion”
leading to an “increasingly rapid 'diffusion'  of models” (Meyer 2000: 242). These contributions
illustrate  how  normative  and mimetic  isomorphism can  take  place  on  a  global  scale as  well,
emphasizing global diffusion of practices  and their  adoption by organizations,  although without
discussing  how  such  practices  are  interpreted  or  translated  when  travelling  around  the  world
(Tempel and Walgenbach 2007: 2).
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2.3 National business systems: organizations and societal-level institutions
As  we  have  seen,  new  institutionalism  focuses  on  the  interaction  and  interpenetration  of
organizations and their institutional environment. It has contributed to our understanding of how
isomorphic  processes  lead  to  diffusion  of  practices  and  increasing  homogenization among
organizations within organizational fields as the most important level of analysis. 
In contrast, the national business systems approach focuses primarily on the “interpenetration of
institutional structures and organizations at societal level” (Tempel 2001: 43) and “highlights how
business  continues  to  be  influenced  by  the  national  institutional  frameworks  in  which  it  is
embedded” (Tempel and Walgenbach 2007: 2).  In this  view, every form of market exchange is
defined by  more complex and larger social processes constituting the framework where all kinds of
economic  exchange  are  embedded  in.  The  term  “embeddedness”  then  stands  in  contrast  to
neoclassical conceptions of markets, where transactions are defined to be “strictly rational, faceless
and  independent”(Dacin et  al. 1999:  320).  The  concept  of  embeddedness  hence  points  to
Granovetter's  (1985)  central  insight  concerning  the  on-going  contextualization  of  economic
exchange  activity  in  social  structures.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  concept  of  embeddedness,
researchers  have  sought  to  strike  a  balance  between  behavioural  rationality  and  economic
efficiency.  While  taking  economic  activity  seriously,  researchers  went  beyond  arguments  of
intentionality and efficiency in order to understand relational aspects of organizations (Granovetter
1985: 320–321). Following Beckert (2003: 769), the term embeddedness can be defined as follows:
“Embeddedness  refers to the social, cultural, political, and cognitive structuration of decisions in
economic  contexts.  It  points  to  the  indissoluble  connection  of  the  actor  with  his  or  her  social
surrounding”.
In this connection, Ferner and Quintanilla (1998: 714) have noted that the term national business
systems itself implies that there are “alternative ways of organizing economic activity rather than a
'one-best-way', even within the parameters of the capitalist system”. Tempel and Walgenbach (2004:
11) share this argumentation in stating that the focus of the national business systems approach is on
existing  differences in economic organization. These are taking the form of national institutional
regulations, and are predicted to be reproduced and to persist. Therefore, Whitley (2008: 3) sums up
that “these  differences are no more likely to converge to a single type of market economy in the
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twenty-first  century than similarly varied forms of capitalism did in the internationalised world
economy of the late nineteenth century” and that they “are reflected in significant variations in the
nature of leading firms in differently organised market economies”. It is hence at this point that we
can establish a direct link to the debate outlined in the introduction on economic globalization and
its implications for organizational forms and the role and power of MNCs concerning the diffusion
of practices. 
The idea that several "best ways" can exist, and moreover, that diverse institutional arrangements
can provide firms with  comparative institutional advantage (Casper and Kettler 2001: 6; Soskice
1999: 216) or “institutional competitiveness” (Kristensen and Morgan 2007) in specific sectors or
niches can be found in several works of comparative institutional theory (Albert  1993; Amable
2009; Hall and Soskice 2001b; Sorge 1991, 2004). 
Though, while Hall and Soskice (2001b) primarily distinguish between the two broad categories of
liberal  (LMEs) and co-ordinated market  economies  (CMEs) typically opposing Anglo-Saxon to
continental European systems of economic organization, “Whitley offered a way of distinguishing
between what in Hall and Soskice (2001b) became a single category of 'coordinated capitalism'”
(Morgan 2007: 130). Furthermore, Whitley (2000a: 42–44) has identified six ideal-types of business
systems and proposes a detailed framework to guide the analysis of national patterns of economic
organization. 
In this connection, he has defined business systems as “distinctive patterns of economic organization
that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the
organization of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees”
(Whitley 2000a: 33). Lane (1994: 64) described the notion of business systems in somehow more
tangible terms as “the sum of general practices and value orientations which characterise both the
internal organization of business units and their relations with their external environment. They are
regarded as constituted by the social-institutional environment in which they are embedded”. 
One important idea of this concept that is rather similar to new institutionalist thinking is that of
“reciprocal conditioning of business organizations and institutional complexes” (Lane 1994: 64).
Whitley  (2000a:  27)  suggests  that  in  business  systems,  “differences  in  societal  institutions
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encourage particular kinds of economic organization and discourage other ones through structuring
the ways that collective actors are constituted, cooperate, and compete for resources and legitimacy,
including the standards used to evaluate their performance and behaviour”. As we have seen in our
discussion of new institutionalism, legitimacy is a key concept in this approach, too, thus pointing
once  more  to  existing  linkages  between  the  two  strands  of  institutional  theory.  However,  the
emphasis of the business system approach is more on “control of economic resources” (Whitley
1994a:  157,  162) than on legitimacy,  as we will  explain in  some more detail  in  the following
sections.
According to Tempel and Walgenbach (2004: 9), the business systems approach provides the most
systematic and comprehensive framework for the analysis of national embeddedness of varieties of
economic organization into an institutional environment. Since both Switzerland and Germany have
been identified as CMEs (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 10; Soskice 1999: 204), the business systems
approach appears to be the most suitable for the purpose of this investigation. With its elaborate
analytical  framework,  this  approach  allows  for  a  fine-tuned  analysis   and  differentiation  even
between superficially similar,  i.e. coordinated,  systems.  Furthermore,  the varieties  of capitalism
theory of Hall and Soskice (2001b) “has been viewed widely as making incoherence and change
problematic” (Lane and Wood 2009: 534) whereas exactly issues of agency and institutional change
are increasingly considered to be of great importance in this field of research (Ferner et al. 2012;
Kostova et al. 2008; Kristensen and Morgan 2007; Morgan 2007; Tempel and Walgenbach 2007).
Therefore,  in the following paragraphs,  we will  provide an account of the main arguments and
components of Whitley's business systems approach that will serve as an analytical framework for
our  own in-depth  analysis  of  the  Swiss  host  country institutional  environment  (1994a;  1994b;
2000a; Whitley 2000b, 2008).
2.3.1 Defining the key characteristics and dimensions of business systems
Whitley (2000a: 15) proposes the business systems approach as a “comprehensive framework for
comparing and contrasting systems of economic coordination and control that attempts to identify
the critical  processes by which they become established,  reproduced, and changed as relatively
integrated  and  distinctive  business  systems”.  Concerning  the  establishment  of  such  systems,
Whitley  follows  Herrigel  (1994;  1996)  in  emphasizing  the  importance  of  the  period  of
industrialization  because  industrial  orders  involving  the  development  of  “ground  rules  for
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acceptable practice” are considered to be “closely connected to processes of modern state formation
and change” (Whitley 2000a: 18–19).
The analytical framework is based on two basic questions around the nature of firms, and ownership
and  legal  boundaries.  The  first  question  concerns  the  degree  of  organizational  integration of
economic activities and the second is  about the “ways that differently constituted groupings of
social actors control economic activities and resources” (Whitley 2000a: 32), hence referring to
control  and co-ordination outside  the  organization.  In  this  respect,  the  notion  of  social  actors
involves providers and users of capital,  customers and suppliers, competitors,  firms in different
sectors, as well as employers and employees.
Based on these two questions, Whitley has developed a typology for the comparison of different
business systems comprising three sets of characteristics. 
Ownership coordination as the first set is about the nature of firms as economic actors in different
societies  and concerns  firstly the relationship between owners  and managers  and the extent  of
owners' direct involvement in managing business. In this respect, Whitley distinguished between
three  major  types  of  control:  a)  direct  control  of  firms  by owners,  b)  alliance  control  where
considerable strategic decision-making is delegated to managers, but where owners nevertheless
remain committed to particular  firms,  and c)  market  or arm's  length portfolio  control  (Whitley
2000a: 35). Furthermore, ownership coordination concerns the scope of ownership integration of
economic activity and hence the degree of horizontal or vertical diversification. 
The  second  set  of  characteristics  relates  to  non-ownership  coordination,  that  is  forms  of
authoritative economic co-ordination that are not necessarily linked to the firm but which “share
common obedience to  established rules  of  conduct  in  the  pursuit  of  collectively agreed goals”
(Whitley 2000a: 31). These relate to the following three kinds of inter-firm relationships: between
the members of a production chain, between competitors, and between firms in different industries.
Such relationships vary considerably between adversarial  zero-sum contracting and competition,
and more institutionalised forms of cooperation between partners and competitors.
The third set of features concerns the different ways of managing employment relations and work
organization in  different  societies.  The  most  important  contrast  here  is  between  societies
encouraging reliance on external  labour markets on the one hand, and those encouraging more
commitment and mutual investment in organizational capabilities on the other. Therefore, this set of
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characteristics is about the extent of employer-employee interdependence and the related variations
concerning  the  degree  of  discretion  and  trust  employers  grant  to  the  bulk  of  their  workforce
(Whitley 2000a: 38–39).
Table 1: Key characteristics of business systems
Ownership coordination
Primary means of owner control (direct, alliance, market contracting)
Extent of ownership integration of production chains
Extent of ownership integration of sectors
Non-ownership coordination
Extent of alliance coordination of production chains
Extent of collaboration between competitors
Extent of alliance coordination of sectors
Employment relations and work management
Employer-employee interdependence
Delegation to, and trust of, employees (Taylorism, task performance discretion, task organization)
Source: Whitley (2000a: 34).
2.3.2 Ideal-types and boundaries of business systems
The three sets of characteristics presented above with their eight dimensions are considered to be
general features of business systems that exhibit particular interdependencies with each other to
form  distinct  ways  of  organizing  market  economies.  Since  various  characteristics  of  business
systems are interconnected,  only a limited number of possible combinations of business-system
characteristics is predicted to remain established in the long run. This is because contradictions
between  certain  combinations  would  cause  conflicts  between  social  groupings  and  existing
institutional arrangements (Tempel et al. 2005: 185). 
As a result of these linkages, Whitley (2000a: 41–44) has identified the following six major ideal
types of business system: 1)  fragmented business systems are marked by low ownership and non-
ownership coordination of economic activities, so that the overall level of coordination is rather
limited. Hong Kong has been identified as an example of such a business system. 2) coordinated
industrial  districts such  as  post-war  Italian  industrial  districts  and  similar  European  regional
business  systems are  dominated  by small  firms  and expose  relatively low levels  of  ownership
coordination,  but  more  extensive  forms  of  inter-firm  coordination  and  cooperation.  3)
compartmentalised business systems are somehow the inverse of coordinated industrial districts in
that large firms are dominant, hence exposing high levels of ownership integration but low levels of
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cooperation between firms and business partners.  Anglo-Saxon economies would be the typical
example of this kind of system. 4) state-organized business systems like the Southern Korean one
are  characterized  by large  firms  with  high  levels  of  ownership  integration  where  families  and
partners  as  owners  are  typically  able  to  retain  direct  control  because  of  state  support  through
subsidized credit.  In these systems, horizontal  linkages between economic actors and employer-
employee interdependence are rather limited by strong ties of vertical dependence. 5) collaborative
business systems expose less ownership integration of activities in  technologically and market-
unrelated sectors but more collective organization and cooperation within sectors. Owner control of
large firms in such systems is typically alliance, and there is a greater degree of employer-employee
interdependence and trust in skilled workers to be found than in compartmentalised systems. Many
continental European economies, especially the more corporatist ones, can serve as examples for
this ideal type. 6) Highly coordinated business systems like the Japanese one are also dominated by
alliance control. However, they show even higher levels of organizational coordination of economic
activities  throughout  the  economy  through  extensive  intra-  and  inter-sectoral  alliances  and
networks, where interdependence between employers and employees is typically very high. Table 2
provides an overview of the characteristics associated with each of the six ideal-types of business
system identified by Whitley.
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Table 2: Six ideal types of business systems
Business-system characteristics Business-system type
Fragmented Coordinated industrial
district
Compartmentalised State organized Collaborative Highly coordinated
Ownership coordination
Owner control Direct Direct Market Direct Alliance Alliance
Ownership integration of production
chains
Low Low High High High Some
Ownership integration of sectors Low Low High Some to high Limited Limited
Non-ownership coordination
Alliance coordination of production 
chains
Low Limited Low Low Limited High
Collaboration between competitors Low Some Low Low High High
Alliance coordination of sectors Low Low Low Low Low Some
Employment relations
Employer-employee 
interdependence
Low Some Low Low Some High
Delegation to employees Low Some Low Low High Considerable
Source: Whitley (2000a: 42); scaling: high-considerable-some-limited-low.
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Concerning  the  boundaries of  business  systems,  Whitley  (2000a:  44)  posits  that  “distinctive
systems of economic organization and control arise wherever key associated institutions are both
mutually reinforcing and distinctive from other ones”. While this does not a  priori exclude the
possibility of regional or sub-national business systems, he argues that it is often nation states that
develop distinctive national business systems (NBSs) for several reasons. Firstly, legal systems that
define and enforce private property rights are usually state-based in capitalist economies. Secondly,
the state is typically responsible for public order and organizes interest groups and the conventions
governing their competition and collaboration. Finally, nation states are also considered to be the
dominant level of organization for regulating financial systems and organizing skill development
and control. Whitley therefore concludes that “[a]s long as resources, legitimacy, and jurisdictions
are primarily controlled and contested within national boundaries, interest groups and their conflicts
will  remain  organized  at  the  national  level”  but  “[w]here  regional  governments,  financial
institutions, skill development, and control systems and broad cultural norms and values are distinct
from national ones and able to exert considerable discretion in the economic sphere, we would
expect  distinctive  kinds  of  economic  organization  to  become established at  the  regional  level”
(Whitley 2000a: 45). 
This argument is highly relevant to the present investigation since Switzerland is a decentralised
federal state (Braun 2003) where considerable resources and legislative powers are devolved to the
sub-national level (Trampusch and Mach 2011: 15) as we will see in more detail in chapter 6. This
constitutes an important factor that has to be taken consciously into account when analysing the
Swiss business system in order to infer on host country effects.
2.3.3 Major institutional arenas and institutional structuring of business system 
characteristics
In order to analyse how a business system is institutionally structured, Whitley (2000a: 47) suggests
to focus on a set of key institutions governing the “access to critical resources, especially labour and
capital” that are shaping the nature of business system characteristics. 
Such institutional features can be broadly characterized and compared across market economies in
terms of four major institutional arenas: the state, the  financial system, the  skill development and
control system, and dominant conventions governing trust and authority relations. In the same way
as Whitley stresses the interconnections between business system characteristics, he also points to
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the coupling and possible mutual reinforcement of these four institutional arenas that are considered
to influence on the degree of cohesion and the particularities of a business system (Tempel  et al.
2005: 185). 
Among  these  institutional  arenas,  Tempel  (2001:  45)  particularly  emphasizes  the  state  whose
“influence extends beyond that of direct economic rule maker to supporter and regulator of the
other  key (...)  institutions”.  In  this  connection  she also  highlights  the  close  link  between state
regulation  and  imposition  of  its  structures  on  other  institutions.  Therefore,  she  points  to  the
homogenising effect of coercive isomorphism within the realm of the nation state.
While the state as the first out of four major institutional arenas exposes many features and policies
that influence the nature of a business system, three of these are particularly important. The first
feature concerns the extent to which the state  dominates the economy and shares risks,  making
business dependent on state policies and actions. As Whitley notes in this respect, “many Anglo-
Saxon  states  have  neither  the  wish  to,  nor  the  capability  for,  actively  coordinating  economic
processes” (Whitley 2000a: 48), in contrast  to the Japanese or South Korean state.  The second
important feature concerns state  antagonism to intermediaries and refers to the extent to which
important  intermediary  economic  associations  between  individuals,  firms,  and  the  state  are
encouraged in a political system. Corporatist states like the German or Austrian one are known to
encourage the formation of such intermediaries and to develop strong forms of intra- and inter-
sectoral organization, making inter-firm cooperation, alliances and cartelization easier. The third
important state property refers to formal regulation of markets. This involves regulation of market
boundaries, entry and exit,  as well  as constraints imposed on the activities of economic actors.
While in some states skill certificates are issued by the state, in other countries such powers have
been delegated to industry associations and quasi-statutory bodies. Differences between countries
concerning labour protection legislation or regulation of the employment relation via collective
bargaining  agreements  could  also  serve  as  examples  of  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  state
regulation of markets. Streeck (1987: 68–73) for example distinguishes between the two principles
of status as opposed to contract, implying different degrees and kinds of state regulation in the field
of industrial relations in different countries.
Concerning  financial systems, the crucial feature concerns “the process by which capital is made
available and priced” (Whitley 2000a: 49) with the basic distinction being drawn between capital-
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market based systems on the one hand and credit-based financial systems on the other. In the former
system, capital is allocated by markets though competition. Investors are trading in portfolios and
thus remain only weakly committed to any single firm. With shares and hence ownership rights
being bought and sold off easily, such investors adopt a short-term focus and have a narrow interest
in the company fortunes which is encouraging strong markets for corporate control. In the latter
system,  capital  markets  are  typically  weak  and  rather  illiquid  and  play  only  a  minor  role  in
mobilizing and pricing investment funds. In this case,  the dominant institutions are either large
universal banks as is the case for Germany, or a combination of commercial banks and  long-term
credit banks that are coordinated by state agencies and ministries as in France or Japan. Since shares
are not easily traded in such systems, owners, bankers and trust managers become locked into the
fate of particular borrowers to a considerable degree. Therefore, they are more involved in decision-
making and the evaluation of investment plans than in capital-market based systems. 
In the third institutional arena, the system of skill development and control (Whitley 2000a: 50), we
can distinguish two broad and interrelated sets of institutions. Firstly, the  education and training
system where skills  are developed and competencies are certified,  and secondly the institutions
controlling the terms on which these skills are sold in labour markets, and how these markets are
being organized. 
Concerning  the  educational  system,  Whitley  follows  Maurice et  al. (1986b)  in  distinguishing
between unitary and generalist education systems on the one hand and dual, specialist ones on the
other. In the former systems, children are successively filtered by academic examinations. Here, the
grammar-school system leading to university entrance is regarded as superior to the state-practical
training that is reserved for bad students. In contrast, in dual systems as for example in Germany,
dual or specialist training that combines some elements of traditional apprenticeship with college-
based formal instruction is cooperatively managed by representatives of labour,  capital,  and the
state. In such systems, this kind of education is seen as different, but not greatly inferior to general
education. 
Relating to the institutions governing the labour market, an important factor is firstly the strength of
independent trade unions, and secondly, the extent to which unions are organized around certified
expertise as opposed to being based on industries or firms. While the first feature holds important
implications  for employers'  ability to  change strategic  priorities,  technologies,  and markets,  the
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second one has consequences for the internal organization of work process and the division of
labour (Child et al. 1983; Lane 1989). Furthermore, the extent to which bargaining is centralised is
seen  as  an  important  factor  because  of  its  influence  on  internal  cohesion  and  coordination  of
employers'  associations  and  union  federations.  Where  interdependent  linkages  in  the  field  of
industrial  relations  between  firms  and  unions  are  strongly  developed,  these  linkages  facilitate
collaboration between economic actors  since they have to work together  on a  continuing basis
(Whitley 2000a: 51).
The last of the four major institutional arenas are the  conventions governing trust and authority
relations. These are considered to be crucial because they structure exchange relationships between
business partners and between employers and employees. 
How trust is granted and guaranteed in an economy affects the level of inter-firm cooperation as
well  as the tendency to delegate control over resources. A prime is put here on the strength of
formal social institutions generating and guaranteeing trust between relative strangers, particularly
relating to property rights and the reliance on institutionalised procedures when making business
commitments.  These are seen as a critical  factor in the establishment of collaborative relations
within and between firms.
Concerning  authority  relations,  Whitley  summarizes  six  dimensions  affecting  subordination
relations in work organizations that have been identified by numerous authors (Whitley 2000a: 52).
The first dimension concerns the extent to which superordinate discretion is governed by formal
rules and procedures, and the second relates to the amount of reciprocity expected for deference and
obedience. The third dimension refers to the social and moral distance between leaders and led that
is considered to be appropriate in a society, and the fourth concerns the degree of autonomy and
independent status of subordinates. The fifth and sixth dimensions relate to the mode of legitimizing
access  to  superordinate  positions  and  the  extent  to  which  common  interests  can  be  invoked
successfully in claims for compliance with superiors' instructions. 
Out of several combinations of these dimensions, at least one far-reaching distinction can be drawn
between formal and paternalist political cultures. While the former restrict superordinate discretion
through formal rules and procedures,  acknowledging the independent and autonomous status of
subordinates and involving these in decision-making, the latter often imply a high degree of social
and moral distance between leaders and the led. Within the category of formal political cultures, a
further distinction can be made between communal and contractual forms of authority. While the
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former implies relatively high levels of mutual trust and commitment with authority relying upon
appeals to common interests and expertise of superordinates, the latter suggests relationships that
are  more  adversarial  with  a  prime  on  the  pursuit  of  self-interest.  While  communal  forms  of
authority appear to be more widespread in some Scandinavian and continental European countries,
contractual forms are more common in Anglo-Saxon societies (Lodge and Vogel 1987).
Summarizing the presentation of the business systems framework, table 3 provides an overview of
the four key institutional arenas and features structuring business systems, while table 4 presents the
connections  between  institutional  arenas  and  features  on  the  one  hand,  and  business  system
characteristics on the other hand. 
Table 3: Key institutional features (arenas) structuring business systems
The state
Dominance of the state and its willingness to share risks with private owners
State antagonism to collective intermediaries
Extent of formal regulation of markets
Financial system
Capital market or credit based
Skill development and control system
Strength of public training system and of state-employer-union collaboration
Strength of independent trade unions
Strength of labour organizations based on certified expertise
Centralization of bargaining
Trust and authority relations
Reliability of formal institutions governing trust relations
Predominance of paternalist authority relations
Importance of communal norms governing authority relations
Source: Whitley (2000a: 48).
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Table 4: Connections between institutional features and business system characteristics
Institutional features Business-system characteristics
Direct 
owner 
control
Market 
owner 
control
High 
ownership 
vertical 
integration
High 
ownership 
horizontal 
integration
Low alliance 
vertical 
integration
High 
competitor 
collaboration
Low alliance 
horizontal 
integration
High employer-
employee inter-
dependence
High 
delegation 
to workers
The state
Dominant, risk-sharing 
state
+ - + + - +
Antagonistic to 
intermediaries
+ - + -
Formal regulation of 
markets
- + +
Financial system
Credit based - + - + +
Capital-market based - + + + - + -
Skill development and 
control system
Strong public 
collaborative training 
system
+ + +
Strong unions - + +
Strong skill-based 
groupings
- - +
Centralised bargaining by
sectors
- +
Trust and authority
Low trust in formal 
institutions
+ - + - + - -
Paternalist authority 
relations
+ - -
Communitarian authority 
relations
- + +
Source: Whitley (2000a: 56).
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Table 5 opposes the Anglo-Saxon compartmentalised type of business system and the continental
European collaborative business system as the two ideal types that are representative for the USA
and Germany, respectively. 
Table 5: Institutional features associated with the Anglo-Saxon compartmentalised and the continental 
European collaborative type of business system
Institutional features Types of business system
Compartmentalised Collaborative
The state
Strength of state’s coordinating and developmental role Low Considerable
Strength and incorporation of intermediaries Low High
Strength of market regulation Low High
Financial system
Capital market or credit based Capital market Credit
Skill development and control
Strength of public training system Low High
Union strength Low to some High
Dominant organizing principle of unions Skill Sector
Centralization of bargaining Low High
Trust and authority
Trust in formal institutions High High
Paternalist authority Low Low
Communitarian authority Low High
Contractarian authority High Low
Typical business environment Arm’s length Collaborative
Source: Whitley (2000a: 60).
As we have seen in the introduction, these two business systems as the most relevant ones for the
present investigation are also classical representatives for the opposed LME and CME types of
market economies as they are discussed in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Gingerich
2004: 8–9; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21–33). As we will see in the following section, in these two
ideal types of business system where most institutional feature characteristics are opposed, different
ideal types of dominant firms have developed. This is one major reason for why subsidiaries of
German and US-American MNCs have been chosen for a comparison. An analysis of Swiss host
country effects on two sets of MNCs that are embedded in quite dissimilar home country business
systems provides us with two fairly different perspectives on the phenomenon under investigation.
Therefore, this design should be a suitable way to minimize the risk associated with comparative
institutional  research  of  over-emphasizing  national  distinctiveness  and  downplaying  similarities
between internationally operating firms (Rees and Edwards 2006b: 37; Tempel et al. 2005: 196–
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197). 
2.3.4 Business system characteristics and ideal types of firms
According to Whitley (2000a: 67), different kinds of business system  encourage the emergence of
certain ideal types of dominant firms. These can be distinguished on the one hand in terms of their
governance characteristics, and on the other hand concerning the organizational capabilities they
develop and coordinate as well as the strategies they pursue.
Governance issues are firstly related to the degree and type of management control and constraints
imposed on managerial decision-making. The latter can be constrained by interests and concerns of
employees, as for example in the case of Germany where employee rights are institutionally backed
up by the Works Constitution Act. Furthermore, constraints on managerial control may arise from
interests of business partners such as banks that are sharing control and risks, from membership in
business associations,  and from strong capital  markets (Whitley 2000a: 70,  2008: 7). Secondly,
dominant  goals  and  performance  standards  vary  between  a  prime  on  short-term  financial
performance where capital market-based financial systems are present, and growth or market-share
goals in credit-based financial systems (Whitley 2008: 6, 20).
organizational capabilities and strategies can be distinguished in terms of the relative contribution
of employees to their  development and improvement.  Furthermore,  we can distinguish between
firms  that  are  focusing  more  on  the  development  of  innovative  capabilities  as  opposed  to
organizational capabilities that are more focused on responsiveness to changing and differentiated
demands. The notion of strategy will be discussed in some more detail in chapter 3, where the
vision proposed by Whitley will be presented under the label “systemic approach” (Whittington
2001). 
Table  6  below  shows  two  ideal  types  of  dominant  firm,  the  “isolated  hierarchy”  and  the
“cooperative hierarchy”.  Our discussion is focused on these two ideal types since the former is
dominant  in  Anglo-Saxon  societies  with  compartmentalised  business  systems,  and  the  latter  is
characteristic for collaborative business systems as they develop in more corporatist societies of
continental Europe including Germany (Whitley 2000a: 76–77, 2000b: 859). 
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Table 6: Characteristics of two ideal types of firms: isolated and cooperative hierarchies
Characteristics Firm typeIsolated hierarchy Cooperative hierarchy
Governance
Management control type Capital-market constrained Credit-controller constrained
Employee-interests constrained Low Considerable
Business-partner constrained Low Some
Dominant goals Investor returns Growth
Capabilities
Employee contribution Low High
Innovation focus Limited Considerable
Responsiveness focus Low Limited
Source: Whitley (2000a: 75).
When discussing ideal types of firms, we have to keep in mind though, that actually these rarely
become established as such in a nation state. In this respect, Whitley (2000b: 858–859) explains that
from the fact that “few countries in the twentieth century have developed all the necessary features
for any single coherent way of organizing economic activities to be institutionalised as the dominant
one,  it  follows  that  there  are  few empirical  examples  of  these  types  with  all  their  distinctive
characteristics in anyone state or region”. In reality, institutions and coordination systems hence
more often display hybrid features. Nevertheless, as is always the case with typologies, their utility
lies in their capacity to reduce complexity (Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006: 196) to a manageable
amount, and therefore they can serve as models against which reality can be compared. In any case,
we will keep this remark in mind for our analysis of the Swiss business system that exposes some
features of a hybrid system as we will see in some more detail in chapter 6.
Whitley (2000a: 76, 85; 2000b: 859; 2008) describes that isolated hierarchies typically arise in
more  adversarial  contexts  with  highly  developed  formal  institutions,  making  arm's  length
contracting a reliable way of doing business. Moreover, such contexts are marked by a state that is
rather  regulatory  than  developmental,  weak  market  regulation  and  financial  systems  that  are
dominated  by  capital  markets.  The  latter  are  at  the  origin  of  strong  financial  performance
constraints on managerial decision-making (Whitley 2000a: 76) in the sense of a shareholder value
philosophy (Froud et al. 2000; Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 200; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000).
Risk sharing between business partners is difficult and public training systems are usually poorly
developed and hence do not require firms to cooperate with each other or with unions. Unions are
usually  rather  weak  and  bargaining  is  decentralised  so  that  there  is  no  need  for  employer
cooperation  in  central  forums.  Furthermore,  reliance  on  external  labour  markets  discourages
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employers  from  relying  on  employee  skills  as  the  basis  for  strategic  advantages.  Finally,
contractarian authority relations restrain the development of common identities and loyalties within
firms. Collaborative hierarchies (Whitley 2000a: 76, 85, 2000b: 859, 2008), on the other hand, are
to be found rather in states that are supportive of intermediary associations and inter-firm alliances,
coordinate  risk-sharing  between  firms  and  provide  forms  of  non-financial  support.  In  these
economies, markets are typically quite regulated, making firms conscious of sectoral boundaries as
well as identities and reputations of major participants. Credit-based financial systems that facilitate
risk-sharing also encourage cooperation within sectors while discouraging unrelated diversification.
Strong public training systems in these economies involve employers collaborating with each other
and  with  strong unions.  Moreover,  the  contribution  of  skilled  workers  to  firms'  capabilities  is
considerable in such firms, as for example in Germany (Whitley 2000a: 73), where workers develop
careers  based  on  increasing  technical  competence  (Kristensen  2003).  Cooperation  between
employers is furthermore enhanced through more centralised bargaining. Finally, reliance on greater
organizational loyalty and communitarian authority relations enhance commitment in this type of
firms. The following tables 7 and 8 provide an overview of the features and associations between
institutions, business system and firm type.
Table 7: Features of institutional contexts associated with isolated and collaborative hierarchies
Institutional features
Firm type
Isolated hierarchy Collaborative hierarchy
The state
Supportive, risk-sharing state - +
Predatory state - -
Antagonistic to intermediaries + -
Considerable market regulation - +
Financial system
Credit based - +
Capital market + -
Skill development and control 
Strong public collaborative training 
system
- +
Strong unions +
Centralised bargaining - +
Trust and authority
Low trust in formal institutions - -
Paternalist authority - -
Communitarian authority - +
Source: Whitley (2000a: 84).
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Table 8: Types of Business Systems, Institutional Features and Firm Characteristics
Types of business systems
Compartmentalised Collaborative
Characteristics of Business systems
Owner control type Market Alliance
Ownership coordination High Considerable
Alliance coordination Low Considerable
Institutional features
State coordination Low Considerable
Strength of intermediaries Limited High
Financial system Capital market Credit
Strength of collaborative public training system Low High
Trust in formal institutions High High
Characteristics of firms
Authority sharing with
(a) Business partners Low Considerable
(b) Skilled workers Low Considerable
Contribution  of  skilled  workers  to  organizational
capabilities
Low Considerable
Dominant firm type Isolated hierarchy Cooperative hierarchy
Source: Whitley (2000b: 859).
2.3.5 Social structuring of work systems
In a last step, Whitley discusses the social structuring of work systems as “distinctive patterns of
interconnected characteristics of (a) task organization and control, (b) workplace relations between
social groups, and (c) employment practices and policies” (2000a: 90). In this connection, we can
largely distinguish between Taylorist and responsible or delegated responsibility work systems. As
in the previous section, we will focus our short discussion on two types, i.e. Taylorist and negotiated
work systems. While  Taylorist work systems are typical for compartmentalised business systems,
negotiated work  systems as  a  variety of  the  delegated  responsibility  type  are  characteristic  for
collaborative business systems (Whitley 2000a: 92–93). As we can see in table 9 below, as is the
case  with  the  ideal  types  of  compartmentalised  and  collaborative  business  systems  and  the
associated types of isolated and cooperative hierarchy, also Taylorist and negotiated work systems
show opposed feature characteristics on all dimensions. 
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Table 9: Characteristics of work system types
Characteristics
Work system type
Taylorist Delegated responsibility - Negotiated
Task fragmentation High Low
Worker discretion and involvement Low High
Managerial control of work organization High Some
Separation of managers from workers High Low
Employer  commitment  to  employment
security for core workforce
Low Considerable
Rewards tied to Standardized jobs skills
Source: Whitley (2000a: 98).
The establishment of a particular kind of work system is conditional on a range of features related
to the constitution of interest groups as organized collective actors and institutions. Such features
include  the  strength  in  mobilizing  horizontal  interests  across  organizations  and  sectors,  their
occupational  or sectoral  specialization as well  as  the degree to  which they are incorporated as
legitimate  social  partners.  Furthermore,  the  involvement  of  owners  in  management  and  the
dependence of senior managers on the growth of particular companies or sectors differs markedly.
 
For example, strong horizontal interest groups are supportive of considerable employer commitment
to employment security, considerable discretion for skilled workers, and limited managerial control
over work organization. Incorporation of interest groups is also conducive to limited managerial
control  over  work  organization  and  limited  manager-worker  separation,  while  the  latter  is
furthermore supported by managers' dependence on specific firm and/or sector growth (Whitley
2000a: 99). Concerning institutional features, strong and broad public training systems with high
levels of joint employer and union involvement are positively associated with workers' discretion
and employer commitment to employment security and to skills as basis for rewards. State support
for  intermediate  organizations  weakens  managerial  control  over  work  organization  and  capital
market-based  financial  systems  influence  negatively  on  employer  commitment  to  employment
security (Whitley 2000a: 108). 
The  development  of  negotiated  work  systems is  positively  influenced  by  state  support  for
intermediary  organizations  which,  in  turn,  are  conducive  to  strong  horizontal  associations.
Furthermore, a high scope and strength of public training systems and strong employer and union
involvement  in  training  systems  influence  positively  on  the  incorporation  of  interest  groups
including labour. This, in turn, is also a feature that is positively associated with the establishment
of a negotiated work system. Lastly, manager dependence on growth of the firm or sector is another
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factor positively associated to the negotiated type of work system (Whitley 2000a: 110). On the
contrary, Taylorist work systems are most likely to become established where unions are weak and
not based on certified skills, and where the limited scope and strength of public training systems
leads to a shortage in adequately trained, but a surplus of unskilled workers. Furthermore, such
systems are likely to be found where managers are different and better educated than the large part
of the workforce, and not closely dependent on the success and long-term growth of individual
firms or certain sectors, and where the state does not involve labour organizations as legitimate
partners in management conflicts (Whitley 2000a: 111). 
Later on in this  work, we will  see how specific constellations of the features discussed in this
section have influenced on the development of different HR, IR and general management practices
in the respective German and US MNCs.
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2.4 Institutional environments and human resource management in MNCs
In the precedent paragraphs, we have presented two strands of institutional theory that have been
increasingly  applied  to  the  study  of  MNCs  (Kostova et  al. 2008:  994).  While  the  arguments
presented above are primarily referring to organizational fields and particular national institutional
environments,  in  the  following  sections  we  will  discuss  the  application  of  basic  concepts  of
institutional theory to the study of MNCs.
2.4.1 Multinational companies and isomorphic pressures
As we  have  seen,  the  concepts  of  organizational  field,  legitimacy,  isomorphism and  coercive,
normative and cognitive mechanisms of institutional pressures are central in new institutionalism,
together  with  the  underlying  idea  that  organizational  survival  is  determined  by  the  extent  of
alignment with the institutional environment (Kostova et al. 2008: 997). Though, when applying
these concepts and arguments to MNCs, we have to take into account that these organizations are
substantially different from domestic firms not only in degree, but also in kind (Westney and Zaheer
2001). This argument points to the “conceptual distinctiveness” (Kostova et al. 2009: 171) of the
MNC context with the “cross-border condition” resulting in “diverse, nonmonolithic, fragmented,
and possibly conflicting sets of external environments” (Kostova et al. 2008: 997) that are paired
with  highly complex internal  environments  including,  inter  alia,  power  struggles  (Ferner et  al.
2012). 
Given the great  complexity of MNCs and their  institutional environments,  Kostova and Zaheer
(1999: 67) have introduced the notions of internal and external legitimacy. While on the one hand
organizational  units  face  pressures  to  comply  with  internal  rules  and  to  adopt  common
organizational practices in order to achieve “organizational legitimacy” in the internal institutional
environment of the MNC, on the other hand they are subject to pressures to comply with rules and
expectations stemming from their external institutional environment. Given the presence of diverse
legitimating actors and conflicting models imposed on MNC units, Kostova and Roth (2002) argued
that the latter would reconcile these opposed pressures by engagement in  ceremonial adoption of
practices, thus pointing to the notion of decoupling as discussed by Meyer and Rowan (1977). That
is, MNC units would ceremonially adopt practices to gain legitimacy while de facto continuing to
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operate as they did before. MNC units are therefore facing contradicting institutional pressures for
isomorphism with their local environment and pressures for internal consistency (Rosenzweig and
Singh 1991). These conflicting pressures might be seen as analogous to the typology of integration
and responsiveness that is widely used in international business literature and IHRM (Björkman and
Stahl 2006; De Cieri and Dowling 2006; Dowling et al. 2009). Pressures for local isomorphism on
MNC foreign subsidiaries have been argued to be strong because of their “liability of foreignness”,
since a lack of legitimacy of foreign firms would lead to additional costs (Zaheer 1995: 343). As we
have  seen,  such  pressures  for  local  isomorphism  may  take  the  form of  coercive,  mimetic  or
normative pressures reflecting local regulations, values, norms and the taken for granted ways of
doing things of the local environment, pointing to the three institutional pillars as defined by Scott
(1995).
In this connection, Ferner and Quintanilla (1998) have depicted several types of isomorphism with
“local isomorphism” describing units that behave like local companies   in order to achieve external
legitimacy  whereas  “corporate  isomorphism”  reflects  consistency  within  the  MNC  to  achieve
internal legitimacy. In so far, we can directly establish the link with the argument of Kostova and
Zaheer (1999) about internal and external legitimacy. Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) argued that the
extent of local isomorphic pressures would differ according to the location and to the extent to
which  different  organizational  structures  and  processes  are  subject  to  local  and  corporate
isomorphism. The MNC is hence seen as an organization that shows varying degrees of internal and
external conformity depending on the location and organizational feature in question. 
Furthermore, Ferner and Quintanilla (1998) argue that structures and practices that are adopted by
MNCs may embody aspects of the parent company's country-of-origin institutional environment
giving rise to pressures termed “cross-national isomorphism”. In this connection, we can underline
the fact that in most MNCs, HQ is still dominant due to the concentration of resources and formal
authority. Therefore, it may be considered as a “field dominant” (Ferner et al. 2012: 171; Levy
2008) that influences disproportionately on MNC strategy, structure, processes and practices. In a
similar vein, Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005: 7) argued for strong pressures for uniform HR that are
due to the fact that strategic decisions are taken at HQ, largely by home country nationals, which
are informing MNC behaviour at the international level. Within MNCs, diffusion of practices is
enforced through “coercive comparisons” (Sisson 2006: 246–247), the threat of divestment and the
promise  of  investment  (Vernon  2006:  231)  as  well  as  career  opportunities  for  managers.  This
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dynamic has been termed “networking within hierarchy” (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 107; Edwards
et al. 1999).
The last form of isomorphism relating to MNCs discussed by Ferner and Quintanilla is “global
intercorporate isomorphism” and describes the picture of several MNCs becoming isomorphic to
each  other  as  a  class  of  global  organizations  by  mimicking  their  structures  and  practices
independently from local home or host country isomorphic pressures. In this respect, we may point
to  dominance effects (Smith and Meiksins 1995) arising from the dominant position of a nation
within the global economy. Firms originating in this dominant nation are perceived by others to be
successful which leads to mimetic isomorphism by imitation. 
Furthermore,  MNCs  may  learn  from  their  subsidiaries  that  are  located  in  other  national
environments and dispose of a longer experience in operating internationally. Such learning may
take  the  form  of  “reverse  diffusion”  (Edwards  and  Ferner  2004;  Ferner  and  Varul  2000a)  of
practices  from  subsidiaries  back  to  HQ  and  towards  other  units  of  the  MNC.  Such  intra-
organizational learning may include benchmarking (Sisson 2006; Sisson et al. 2003) and diffusion
of best practices, manufacturing strategies, technology and knowledge within the MNC, and has
been discussed under the denomination of “organizational effects” (Müller 1994: 421). 
Regarding  this  dynamic  of  dominance  effects,  best  practices  and  learning  within  and  between
MNCs, a recent study found that in the field of HRM, US-American dominance effects are strong,
leading  German  as  well  as  Japanese  MNCs  to  mimic  HRM  practices  of  their  US-American
counterparts since these are considered as best practices in the field and a source of competitive
advantage (Pudelko and Harzing 2007: 549–550). 
Though, concerning the copying and transfer of organizational practices across borders, the work of
Westney (1987) has shown that the result of such mimetic isomorphism will never be exactly the
same as the original that is  being imitated,  and that such departures from the original model –
whether they are deliberate or unintentional – may lead to innovations. Furthermore, she points to
the possibility of  selective emulation,  i.e. the transfer of only the desired features of the original
model. On the same subject, Tempel (2001: 57) suggests that, while local isomorphic pressures may
be the most important factor leading to deliberate departures from the original model, the absence
of supporting institutional environments or “legal, institutional and cultural props” (Edwards and
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Rees 2006d: 92) may lead to functional equivalents (Bluhm 2001: 161) or hybrid practices (Boyer
et  al. 1998;  Edwards  and Ferner  2004:  64–65;  Ferner et  al. 2012:  165)  being  installed  in  the
recipient units.
2.4.2 Multinational companies and embeddedness in national business systems
In the precedent paragraph we have seen how basic arguments of new institutionalism have been
applied to the study of the MNC and how different kinds of isomorphic pressures are acting on
practices  within  MNCs,  highlighting  mechanisms  for  diffusion  of  practices  and  conflicting
pressures  for  adaptation  and  legitimacy  from  the  highly  complex  internal  and  external  MNC
institutional  environment.  We  have  discussed  how  cross-national  isomorphism  and  the
disproportionate influence of HQ within the MNC network can explain the emergence of country-
of-origin effects, how the dominant position of certain national economies can lead to dominance
effects  and  how learning  within  and  between  MNCs  may result  in  diffusion  of  best  practices
pointing to organizational effects. We have also seen that the diffusion of practices through different
kinds of isomorphisms may result in innovations and hybrid practices or functional equivalents of
practices as a result of adaptations to local environments or incomplete information on the original
model.
Now, drawing on the analytical  grid of  the business  systems approach allows us  to gain more
detailed information about the strength and kind of isomorphic pressures in the sense of country-of-
origin-, dominance- and host country effects on MNCs and their foreign subsidiaries. An analysis of
the particular institutional environment of the MNC's home country enables us to understand how it
is embedded in this environment and in what ways this shapes HRM and IR practices of firms. The
same is true for the host country institutional environment of foreign subsidiaries that are embedded
in the external institutional environment of their host country that once again will influence on their
HRM and IR practices. Finally, in analysing home and host country institutional frameworks, we
can infer on the transferability of certain practices.
According to earlier propositions made by Ferner (1997), Noorderhaven and Harzing (2003) have
suggested that the sources of the country-of-origin effect are lying in the culture and institutions of
the MNC home country, while identifying the continued hiring of home country nationals and the
expression of their administrative preferences as an important mechanism through which the effect
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manifests itself in shaping structures, procedures and processes within the MNC. Their argument is
hence similar to the one proposed by Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005: 7) concerning the number of
home country nationals at HQ and their influence on international MNC behaviour. Besides, they
highlight the existence of  differences between subsidiaries of the same MNC (Noorderhaven and
Harzing 2003: 50) that are caused by adaptation to local circumstances, hence pointing to local
isomorphism taking the form of host country effects4. 
Concerning the nature or kind of country-of-origin effects, we can say that “MNCs are embedded in
the  assumptions,  practices  and  institutions  of  the  national  business  system  from  which  they
emerged” (Quintanilla et al. 2008: 681) that give rise to distinctive country-of-origin effects in the
sense  of  “undeliberate  influence  of  factors  related  to  the  culture  and  institutions  of  the  home
country” (Noorderhaven  and Harzing  2003:  52).  These,  in  turn,  have  been  found to  influence
markedly on  international control strategies of firms (Harzing 1999; Harzing and Sorge 2003). For
instance,  US-American MNCs are known to be rather  ethnocentric,  centralised and formalised,
using indirect personal or impersonal control mechanisms. These include sophisticated systems of
performance  management  and  tight  financial  control  that  are  operated  through  standardised,
centralised procedures (Edwards and Ferner 2002; Ferner et al. 2004b; Ferner and Quintanilla 1998:
715).  Many other  aspects  of  HRM in  MNCs could  be  named  that  have  been  shaped  by their
respective  country of  origin.  We will  come back to  a  detailed  discussion of  US-American and
German  country-of-origin  effects  and  their  shaping  of  distinctive  approaches  towards  the
management of human resources and the transfer of practices within MNCs in chapter 5. 
Relating to country-of-origin effects, Morgan (2007) argues for the careful application of this idea
since there is much evidence pointing to variety at sub-national levels of national business systems
(Lane and Wood 2009). The issue of country-of-origin effects, then is “less about predetermining
how a particular effect is manifested through a particular organization and more about a specific
understanding of how that organization relates to particular institutional settings, including in the
first instance its 'home' environment” (Morgan 2007: 139). 
Also Almond (2011a) reminds a careful use of the term country-of-origin effect. In this respect, he
suggests that while “the way in which firms organise in their home countries, as affected by the
4 Differences are also considered as a result from different roles played by the subsidiaries within the MNC or 
differences in size or age, as well as their origin pointing to the distinction between greenfield and brownfield 
investments. We will come back to this kind of differences within MNCs in some more detail in chapter 3 when 
discussing issues of MNC strategy, structure and agency. 
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relevant national business system, has the potential to shape HRM in the overseas subsidiaries (…)
However, (…) how such potential pays through into the reality of HRM in subsidiaries is highly
variable” (Almond 2011a: 258–259). In emphasizing that  actors within MNCs always have some
capacity to strategize, he argues that it is important to understand the way they think and what they
consider to be desirable outcomes. This, in turn, is deemed to be affected by two factors: firstly by
the institutional shaping of the rules of the game, and secondly by “subjective  interpretations of
what is  rational,  fair,  normal or  just”, referred to as “ideological norms” (Almond 2011a: 260).
While the first factor relates to coercive institutional pressures, the second rather points to cognitive
and normative mechanisms, that together constitute  the “socialised rationality” (Almond 2011a:
260) of actors who are strategizing within asymmetric power relations. This concept of socialised
rationality can also be linked to the closely related ideas about “rationale” forwarded by Redding
(2005: 124, 126). Thus, from a sociological point of view, a broader understanding of institutions
explicitly comprises the cultural-cognitive dimension in addition to the regulatory one which is
useful to understand how “institutions not only constrain, but also enable social actors by framing
social situations and making sense of them” (Heidenreich 2012: 554; Saka-Helmhout and Geppert
2011).
In this connection, Almond (2011a: 262) argues for a “double direction of causality” that is linked
to upward and downward flows or reverse and forward diffusion (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 97)
within the MNC. Due to the hierarchical nature of firms and the principle of “networking within
hierarchy” (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 107), potential effects of downward flows from HQ towards
subsidiaries are expected to be stronger than upward flows. However, Almond (2011a: 262) argues
that the empirical nature of effects from various flows will be “shaped by the precise hierarchical
structure of, and power relations within, individual firms”. The issues of power and agency within
MNCs will therefore be discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
Still another important aspect about country-of-origin effects concerns the influence of widely held
beliefs about dominant global best practice on the socialised rationality of HQ managers who are
clearly liable to such influences (Ferner et al. 2012: 168). These beliefs, in turn, may shape the
nature of  downstream diffusion,  though not  necessarily in  the sense of  home country practices
(Almond 2011a: 263). A recent investigation undertaken by Pudelko and Harzing (2007) found
clear  evidence  of  increasing  influence  of  dominant  best  practices  in  the  field  of  HRM within
German  MNCs,  with  US  American  practices  serving  as  the  strongest  source  of  inspiration.
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Therefore, managers may not so much want to export the concrete institutional arrangements of
their country or origin, but rather “a reified 'model of best practice', formed within but emancipated
from specific national and corporate contexts” (Elger and Smith 2006: 57). Almond (2011a: 265)
hence refers to “embedded managerial ideological norms” that can be considered as the potential
subject of attempted transfer to host countries, and which may differ from the reality of empirical
country of origin operations.
The kind and strength of embeddedness of MNCs in their country of origin business system has also
been argued to have important influences on the transferability of their HRM practices. Institutional
host country environments may constrain the diffusability of practices in two ways.  In the first
place, “constraining” host country institutional environments (Wächter 2004), for example in the
field of industrial relations (IR) (Tempel 2001: 52), may impose institutional-legal constraints and
restrict the firms' choice in many areas of HRM and IR practices. 
Furthermore, Almond argues for the possibility of a “de-nationalisation” of workers' preferences in
host countries, who might appreciate certain foreign practices that have been introduced by MNCs
to those that are traditionally in place in their own country. Such preferable foreign practices might
for instance be elements of relatively participative management styles or diversity policies and the
corresponding  concern  for  equality  (Almond  2011a:  261).  Finally,  cross-national  variety  of
employment practices within MNCs may also be the outcome of conscious engagement in strategic
segmentation by  senior  corporate  decision-makers  (Almond  2011a:  246)  and  hence  rather  an
outcome of strategic intent than of institutional constraints or negotiations between actors. A similar
point has been made by other authors who argued that regional or national embeddedness may be
considered as just one strategic option for MNCs that may as well adopt a footloose global strategy
in order to exploit  the advantages of cross-border,  value-creating networks (Aharoni and Brock
2010;  Heidenreich  2012:  551).  In  fact,  MNCs'  ability  to  shift  between  different  forms  of
embeddedness and disembeddedness may be considered a major advantage in comparison to other
companies (Teece 2006: 125). 
Therefore, the questions of how MNCs perceive and use relative advantages of their regional and
national  environments,  how  they  try  to  avoid  respective  disadvantages,  and  how  they  may
contribute to transformations of their national and regional environments (Heidenreich 2012: 551)
are important. 
In  fact,  there is  considerable evidence supporting the argument  of  a generally lower degree of
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embeddedness into and reliance on resources provided by their respective national and regional
home  country  context  among  US  MNCs  when  compared  to  their  German  counterparts.  Such
differences might as well affect German and US MNCs' approaches in dealing with or relating to
different host country contexts.
On the one hand,  practices  of  US-American MNCs have been argued to be easily transferable
because of the relative isolation of firms in their compartmentalised home country business system
(Whitley 2000a: 60). The latter exposes a “relative under-development of both the state and of inter-
organizational  mechanisms  of  governance  such as  networks  and  business  associations”  (Ferner
2000a: 7). In this environment, firms have developed their organizational practices independently
from institutional supports and hence, rendering the latter a priori more easily transferable towards
other contexts. Ferner  et al. (Ferner et al. 2004b: 367) have argued that US-American companies
are  likely  to  use  codified  and  reproducible  management  systems  that  can  be  managed  from a
strategic centre and are easily transferable since they are not highly dependent on tacit knowledge.
On the other hand, German MNCs have been argued to be firmly embedded in the cohesive and
tightly integrated collaborative German business system. Opposed to the US-American one,  the
latter is rich in institutional supports as well as inter-organizational mechanisms of governance and
coordination,  involving  in  particular  strong  business  associations  (Streeck  1997b;  Streeck  and
Schmitter 1985). Therefore, both the transferability of German practices that are heavily relying on
institutional supports and the willingness of German MNCs to transfer certain practices in the field
of IR that are related to co-determination have been questioned (Dickmann 2003; Dörrenbächer
2001, 2004). 
Moreover, apart from the limited transferability of originally German practices, also  changes that
the domestic national business system has undergone have been discussed.  Innovations taking the
form of deviant practices in the field of HRM have been brought about by US-American firms
(Wächter  and  Peters  2004;  Wächter et  al. 2003),  hence  pointing  to  the  role  of  MNCs  as
“transmission  mechanism” of novel practices and as “bridge” between different business systems
(Morgan  2007:  139–140).  These  deviant  and  innovative  practices  may  be  considered  to  have
increased the degree of multinationality (Tempel 2001: 59–60) of the German business system. In
the course of the increasing internationalization of firms and the accompanying exposure to new
foreign practices, managers that are embedded in several fields can draw on several logics. Such
managers  would then be more disposed to challenge domestic norms and traditional practices, and
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to  combine those from their  internal  and external  environment  (Deeg and Jackson 2007).  It  is
therefore not surprising that researchers have found evidence of Anglo-Saxonization (Edwards and
Rees 2006d: 97; Ferner and Quintanilla 1998) among German MNCs, although “in the German
manner” (Ferner  and Quintanilla  1998:  724)  thus  pointing  to  the adaptation  and integration  of
Anglo-Saxon concepts into the German context. 
In  this  connection,  Lane  and  Wood  (2009:  532)  point  to  agents that  may  interpret rules  in
contrasting ways,  leading to  experimentation and change.  Externally precipitated and internally
mediated change concerning the adoption by the nation-state of neo-liberal policies of de-regulation
have created new space for institutional entrepreneurs – e.g. MNCs – to transform current practices.
While at  the same time unions and other  representative organs of labour  have suffered from a
weakened capacity to defend employment and IR norms, this development has “further expanded
the space for adoption of diverse solutions, particularly in the realm of employment practices” (Katz
2005; Lane and Wood 2009: 536). We might therefore expect that the room for manoeuvre (Morgan
et al. 2003: 611; Müller 1998: 741; Vernon 2006: 237; Wächter 2004: 3–6) that has been found even
in the highly institutionalised German environment has grown. 
As for the strength of country-of-origin effects, it has been argued that the dominant position of the
USA and the  success  of  US-American  MNCs have been additional  incentives  for  the  latter  to
diffuse their practices what has strengthened the country-of-origin effect in these MNCs (Edwards
and Rees 2006d: 96, 100; Ferner et al. 2004b: 367). Moreover, the readiness of foreign managers to
adopt US-American practices has been encouraged by the fact that US-American HRM practices
are seen as a role model (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). Noorderhaven and Harzing (Noorderhaven
and Harzing 2003: 62) also suggest that the size of the home country economy influences on the
strength  of  the  country-of-origin  effect,  with  a  small  domestic  economy  weakening  it.  This
proposition seems to be supported by findings on “reverse diffusion” in Swedish MNCs that have
contributed to an erosion of country-of-origin effects (Hayden and Edwards 2001).
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further development of theory
As we have seen in the precedent paragraphs, new institutionalism and business system approach
are two institutionalist approaches in organization theory that have made a significant contribution
to the debate around the effects of globalization on organizational forms and management practices.
Whereas both approaches stress the interdependence and mutual  influence of organizations and
their  institutional  environments,  they  come  to  different  conclusions  concerning  global
standardization of organizational forms and management practices. 
While new institutionalism emphasizes the global diffusion of practices through different forms of
isomorphism,  the  business  systems  approach  highlights  how  the  embeddedness  of  business  in
national  institutional  frameworks continues  to  shape  different  practices.  In  an attempt  to  better
understand these different conclusions, and in order to check for the potential of cross-fertilization
of the two approaches applied to HRM in MNCs, Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) have undertaken
a systematic comparison of arguments furthered by the proponents of these two theories as well as a
discussion  of  limitations.  The  comparison  is  organized  along  four  dimensions:  mechanism  of
adaptation, unit of analysis, definition of institutions and portrayal of organizations. 
Concerning the mechanisms of adaptation, new institutionalism emphasizes the global diffusion of
concepts through isomorphism, while the business systems approach stresses the idea that tightly
linked business systems and institutional arrangements are reproduced. While isomorphism in this
context leads to increased legitimacy, but not necessarily efficiency, adaptation to the institutional
characteristics of a business system is efficient within the borders of this business system (Tempel
and  Walgenbach  2007:  6).  In  this  connection,  we  can  once  more  point  to  the  concept  of
embeddedness and the role of institutional contexts in influencing on strategic choices by shaping
“what  is  possible  and advantageous” (1999:  324) and hence impacting on which strategies  are
available and adopted.
However, both concepts show some limitations. While new institutionalism stresses the generality
and abstraction of diffused models, it remains unclear whether there is also diffusion of a common
language or if  normative concepts are  interpreted and utilised differently when transferred into
another  business  system.  In  recent  studies,  researchers  have  investigated  into  the  issue  of
interpretation and  sensemaking of  transferred  practices  by locally  embedded  actors  (Clark  and
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Geppert 2011) who are marked by a different “socialised rationality” (Almond 2011a: 260). Ferner
and Varul (2000a: 137) for example drew on anthropological concepts in arguing that “borrowed
elements may be regarded as  objets  trouvés,  whose  original purpose is transformed as they are
inserted into a pre-existing set of structures and values“. In a similar vein, Goutas and Lane (2009)
have applied translation theory to  the diffusion of  shareholder  value into the German Business
system, where an emphasis is equally put on the constant modification of ideas when entering new
contexts. While individual actors in this context may be portrayed as interpreters between diffused
practices  and  local  institutions,  MNCs  might  be  considered  as  synthesizers of  domestic  and
international  belief  systems (Tempel and Walgenbach 2007: 17–18) assuming a “bridging role”
(Morgan 2007: 139–140).
Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) identified a further shortcoming of new institutionalism relating to
the  fact  that  it  is  not  clear  whether  and  to  what  extent  institutional  structures  in  national
organizational  fields  change in  the  course of  diffusion  of  new concepts.  The business  systems
approach  again  posits  a  tight  feedback  loop  between  business  systems  and  institutions  which
precludes the consideration of the extent to which actors can adopt deviant strategies and practices
and may have more scope for the shaping of some practices than for others (Tempel 2001: 41). The
supposed tight  feedback loop thus  places  an emphasis  on business  system stability rather  than
change (Deeg and Jackson 2007). In this connection, criticism concerned the underlying tendency
towards structural determinism (Wailes et al. 2003: 621) in considering organizations and managers
as “passive pawns” that have little choice but to comply (Scott 1995: 132) rather than as active
players.  Thus,  in  recent  research,  MNCs and managers  are  seen rather  as  active  agents  whose
behaviour and practices are influenced, but not determined by institutional environments (Tempel
and  Walgenbach  2004:  22).  This  approach  reflects  the  underlying  reasoning  that  “an  entirely
determinist argument is inappropriate, and needs to be balanced by the inclusion of human and
organisational agency” (Redding 2005: 124). In this connection, Lane and Wood (Lane and Wood
2009: 532) suggest that there is “growing evidence that institutional rules and their implementation
are not as tightly coupled as hitherto assumed and that agents wilfully or inadvertently may interpret
rules  in  contrasting  ways”.  Similarly,  Streeck and Thelen  (2005:  14)  have  argued that  there  is
always “a gap between the  ideal pattern of a rule and the real pattern of life under it”. And also
Ferner et al. (2012: 170) posit that, in practice, “institutional elements are more 'loose-coupled', and
the national model less determinant”. Still other authors point to intra-model variety that has been
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argued to be rather the norm than an anomaly (Crouch et al. 2009).
Institutionalist approaches to the cross-national study of organizations have also been criticized for
concentrating on divergence whilst neglecting similarities and common systemic or transnational
factors (Müller 1994; Smith and Meiksins 1995). The argument of the Aix Group of researchers that
general influences – or, in the terminology used in the introduction, global macro-level influences –
could only ever fit into the divergence of national systems and thus perpetuate the “non-identical
reproduction of existing specificity” (Smith and Meiksins 1995: 252 citing Sorge), runs the risk of
denying change that may result  from the dynamic forces of international capitalism (Smith and
Meiksins 1995). In view of the criticism that the business systems approach has received for putting
too  much  emphasis  on  continuity  and  resistance  to  change  of  national  systems,  Whitley  has
considered  such  potentially  converging  influences  in  his  framework.  In  the  latter,  he  notably
discusses influences that may arise from international economic integration and from the activities
and power of MNCs to engage in cross-national transfer of practices (Tempel and Walgenbach
2004: 22; Whitley 2000a). Nevertheless, Tempel  et al. (2005: 196) as well as Rees and Edwards
(2006b: 37) highlight that the inherent risk of an over-emphasis on national distinctiveness is still
present, while existing similarities between MNCs from different countries and business systems as
well as the interaction of national factors with global, regional and organizational ones might be
played down. 
Therefore,  in  more  recent  research,  authors  tended  to  focus  more  on  issues  of  hybridization,
selective adaptation and change, as well as agency (Ferner et al. 2005b; Ferner et al. 2012; Morgan
2001; Wächter and Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003). While stressing the continuing importance of
the macro-level of the nation state,  this shortcoming has been addressed through the introduction of
a “new dynamism” (Morgan and Whitley 2003: 611). Change and agency have been integrated in
accounting explicitly for the embeddedness of local business systems into a wider global economy –
the  global  macro-level  –  and  in  analysing  how  MNCs  change  their  behaviour  when
internationalizing (Lane 2006). 
Relating to the next issue of Tempel and Walgenbach's (2007) comparison, the unit of analysis, we
have seen that new institutionalism focuses on institutional fields whereas the business systems
approach emphasized the nation state. Though, the borders of institutional fields have traditionally
been  equated  with  national  borders  as  studies  have  focused  on  North  America  (Tempel  and
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Walgenbach 2004:  14).  There is  hence a neglect  of cross-national  dimensions of organizational
fields. On the other hand, as the business systems approach equates the borders of a business system
with national  borders and emphasizes stability rather  than change, it  plays  down the effects  of
international activity on business systems. In this connection, Tempel (2001: 47–48) particularly
points to the work of political economists who emphasize the dynamism of  regime competition
(Streeck 1991: 336) and the exploitation of external change by institutional actors such as MNCs
(Lane and Wood 2009: 536; Tempel 2001: 48; Wächter and Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, not only the supranational level has been neglected, but also the  sub-national one.
Recent work suggests that varieties within national business systems at a sub-national level should
thoroughly be taken into account when discussing contextual effects on IHRM (Almond 2011a,
2011b; Lane and Wood 2009). In this connection, Almond (2011b: 533) argues that the dynamism
of regime competition for FDI has led host governance to shift away from imperative regulation in
the  sense  of  coercive  institutional  arrangements  and  imposition  of  constraints  towards  the
“competitive  provision  of  supports  for  MNCs  and  the  local  firms  dependent  on  them”.  This
argument is  of central  relevance for the subject of HRM practice transfer as we know that the
transferability of certain practices is conditional on the presence of institutional “props” or supports,
as for example in the field of dual vocational education and training (2006d: 92). In this respect,
Heidenreich (Heidenreich 2012: 550) takes up arguments worded by Meyer  et al. (2011) about
inter-organizational forms of learning and knowledge exchange with proximate companies that are
supported  by  institutions.  In  this  process,  the  latter  are  seen  to  shape  the  cooperation  among
heterogeneous actors and to provide collective competition goods comprising qualified employees,
basic  research,  advanced technological  competences,  reliable  infrastructures,  cooperative  labour
relations or subsidies.
Moreover,  the  relative  importance  of  the  sub-national  level  of  governance  is  argued  to  be
strengthened by a change in orientation of modern states away from the Keynesian welfare state
towards a Schumpeterian workfare state. This, in turn, implies a shift away from government with
centralised imperative coordination towards “governance” and hence, societal guidance strategies
(Jessop 1993:  10).  This  process  is  considered  to  lead  to  a  re-scaling  of  state  coordination  and
governance involving an upscaling of authority to supra-national institutions, and a downscaling of
responsibilities  to  sub-national  levels  (Boggs  and  Rantisi  2003).  Such  downscaling  of
responsibilities  to  the  sub-national  level  concerns  substantial  elements  of  the  institutional
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infrastructure around MNC units involving the coordination of relations between firms, universities
and other research organizations and training systems, hence pointing directly to typical examples
of institutional props as discussed earlier. State arrangements in Germany that are giving a high
degree of  autonomy to sub-national  levels,  often  predate  such recent  economic shifts  (Almond
2011b: 533). Concerning Switzerland, a similar point can be made, since state organization in this
case is also federal and highly decentralised according to the principle of subsidiarity (Bender et al.
2007: 178; Braun 2003; Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 256). 
Further  arguments  for  an  increasing  importance  of  the  sub-national  level  are  linked  to  the
advantages  of  spatial  proximity  for  the  knowledge-based  or  learning  economy  (Lundvall  and
Johnson  1994).  following  this  vision,  MNC  units  exercising  more  strategic  functions  and
entertaining closer links to regional firms and institutions are considered to be embedded in learning
regions  or  localised  clusters  of  economic  activity.  Spatial  closeness  is  supposed  to  back  up
innovative activity by face-to-face communication, shared conventions, personal relations and trust
(Cooke and Morgan 1998; Porter 1998), hence creating intangible assets at sub-national levels and
providing firms with sustainable competitive advantages (Almond 2011b: 534) by capitalising on
“geographically specific inter-firm relations” (Lane and Wood 2009: 543; Meyer et al. 2011: 246–
247).  Almond (2011b: 538) summarizes the arguments presented above in stating that “[t]o the
extent that host effects have shifted from constraints to competitively offered resources, at a time
where MNCs have more choices of location than was previously the case, then local institutional
arrangements also have the potential to affect the location decisions of MNCs”. MNC actors may
deliberately choose to strategically segment their HRM policies in order to better profit from only
locally available human resources since such advantages may outweigh those related to lower costs
through uniformity (Almond 2011a: 264–266, 2011b: 539).
Lane and Wood (Lane and Wood 2009: 542) also call attention to the fact that “firms can make
greater or lesser use of a range of alternative institutional supports” that are operating at different
levels. Almond (2011b: 542) suggests that, inter alia, the ability of the MNC to engage with high
trust  relations  with  local  firms  and governance  actors  and  the  degree  of  sub-national  business
system autonomy will affect their sub-national host embeddedness. 
In  order  to  better  understand  these  issues,  the  relations  between  MNC units  and  sub-national
governance structures and actors should be taken into account. This necessarily involves an actor-
centred  perspective  with  due  attention  to  outside  actors  such  as  governance  actors  and  firms
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entertaining strong relationships with the MNCs under research (Almond 2011b: 546). As we will
see  in  some  more  detail  in  the  presentation  of  the  methodological  approach  adopted  in  this
investigation,  following  these  suggestions  we  have  conducted  several  interviews  with  external
experts including the employer's association, representatives involved in the governance of regional
cooperative training schemes as well as union representatives.
Regarding the next issue of their comparison and critique, the definition of institutions, Tempel and
Walgenbach  (2007)  refer  to  Djelic  and  Quack  (2003)  who  have  pointed  out  that  new
institutionalism focuses in particular on Scott's (1995) normative and cognitive institutions, whereas
the business systems approach rather emphasizes structural-regulative institutions. The latter are
often underpinned by coercive mechanisms and argued to be most prevalent in shaping economic
activity.  While  a  weakness  of  the  new  institutionalist  focus  lies  in  the  openness  for  local
interpretation of  management  concepts  and practices  that  do  not  necessarily  contain  clear  and
unambiguous  prescriptions,  the  business  system  view  tends  to  play  down  the  influence  of
supranational institutions and the diffusion of normative and cognitive concepts by global actors.
The issues of interpretation and global actors and their treatment in latest contributions have already
been discussed above and will therefore not be repeated here.
Finally,  relating  to  the  portrayal  of  organizations,  both  approaches  tend  to  adopt  a  view  of
organizations  as  passive  pawns (Scott  1995:  132)  as  we have  already seen  earlier.  While  new
institutionalism emphasizes  factors  that  are  making actors  unlikely to  recognize  or  act  in  their
interests (DiMaggio 1988: 4), the business systems approach underlines the strong feedback loop
between business system and institutions. It hence neglects the fact that even in highly regulated,
tightly integrated and cohesive business systems as the German one, actors were able to find some
room for manoeuvre to introduce deviant practices (Müller 1998: 741; Quintanilla and Ferner 2003:
364; Royle 1998, 2004: 59; Tempel and Walgenbach 2004: 21). 
Tempel and Walgenbach (2007: 11) advocate inter alia an extension of the borders of organizational
fields through engagement  in  cross-national  research into institutional  entrepreneurs.  The latter
comprise actors  such as  MNCs,  consulting firms,  professional  associations  and academics  who
legitimize organizational forms and practices and thus contribute to their diffusion. First steps in
this  direction  have  already been made  by various  groups  of  researchers  (Kipping 1996,  1997;
Kipping et  al. 2004;  Meyer  2000;  Meyer et  al. 1997;  Sahlin-Andersson  and  Engwall  2002).
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Regarding the business systems approach, Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) propose to look beyond
national borders in considering global actors and the mechanisms they use to diffuse practices. At
the  same  time  they  suggest  to  loosen  the  tight  feedback  loop  between  business  systems  and
institutional frameworks. This might be achieved through considering the extent to which firms are
subject to multiple and potentially conflicting  belief systems – an idea that is reflected in recent
work on  competing socialised rationalities  held by actors within organizations (Almond 2011a:
260; Edwards et al. 2007b: 202)(see our precedent discussion of the jurisdiction of belief systems in
organizational  fields  as  proposed by Scott  1994).  Besides,  Tempel  and Walgenbach (2007:  16)
suggest to treat embeddedness of different business system characteristics as a variable to account
for convergence in some activities and divergence in others,  thus taking up arguments of other
researchers in the field (Quintanilla and Ferner 2003: 364).
Kostova and her colleagues (Kostova et al. 2008) expressed some fairly radical provocations to
central concepts of new institutionalist thinking when applied to the study of MNCs. A first issue
concerns the  notion of institutional field where they argue against the existence of such external
fields in the traditional sense in the case of MNCs. Introducing the notion of  meso field  when
referring  to  the MNC  with  its  multiple  subsidiaries,  they  build  on  conceptions  of  the  MNC
institutional environment as being marked by multiple, fragmented, nested and often conflicting
institutional  environments  (Kostova et  al. 2009:  172;  Morgan et  al. 2003:  389),  where  spatial,
language and organizational barriers preclude sufficient interorganizational interactions for such a
field in order to become sufficiently structured. In such circumstances they argue that pressures
stemming  from the  intraorganizational  field  or  internal  institutional  environment  (Kostova  and
Zaheer 1999: 67) of the MNC, that is backed up by the formal authority structure, may be stronger
than the external field traditionally discussed in new institutionalism (Kostova et al. 2008: 998). A
second  argument challenges the  notion of isomorphism.  In this  regard, they argue that a single,
clearly defined organizational field does not exist for MNCs at the meso level that is rather marked
by multiplicity and ambiguity of fields. This argument may be linked back to earlier ideas about the
jurisdiction  of  belief  systems  within  organizational  fields.  In  cases  where  two or  more  strong,
competing  or  conflicting  belief  systems  are  present,  these  become  less  determinant  and  make
alternative interpretations and negotiations possible (Scott 1994: 212). This situation is rather likely
to be found in foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. In addition, earlier discussed ideas about intra-model
variety and institutions being more loose-coupled, would lend further support to the suggestion that
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the traditional  concept of isomorphic pressures as they would exist  in a  single,  clearly defined
organizational field, is not necessarily applicable to MNCs (Almond 2011b; Crouch et al. 2009;
Ferner et al. 2012; Lane and Wood 2009). MNCs are hence considered to be exposed to multiple,
but weaker pressures. These are giving MNC units “broader latitude in picking and choosing which
models to adapt and to what extent they should respond to institutional influences” (Kostova et al.
2008: 999). While the existence of pressures from the local host country environment is not denied,
these  are  argued to be rarely for  isomorphism since MNCs are  considered  to  bring  something
distinctive that  is  valued to  their  host  country,  or they may even be viewed as  belonging to  a
different class and therefore be excluded from isomorphic pressures. Thus, expectations would be
limited to compliance with regulatory and legal domains.  While MNCs would therefore benefit
from a  high degree  of  institutional  freedom as  they are  exempt  from normative  and cognitive
pressures, similarity among firms might nevertheless be observed. However, this would rather be
the result of deliberate choices than attributable to compliance with external isomorphic pressures,
once again pointing to the “critical importance of agency in MNCs” (Kostova et al. 2008: 999).
Following from these arguments, isomorphism is not necessarily seen as a condition for legitimacy
or  survival,  hence making  decoupling and ceremonial  adoption of  practices  needless  for MNC
subsidiaries.  Only  on  the  meta level where  a  narrow set  of  global  standards  around  issues  of
corporate governance and ethics has become institutionalised for the organizational field of MNCs,
increasing transparency would make manipulation risky, hence leading to actual adoption, backed
by internal monitoring. Lastly, while legitimacy is considered essential for MNCs to overcome their
liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995), the MNC context is argued to challenge the traditional new
institutionalist  mechanism where legitimacy is achieved through isomorphism. Since conformity
with  multiple  and  conflicting  regulatory,  cognitive,  and  normative  institutional  expectations  is
impossible,  and  moreover  unnecessary,  the  status  of  legitimacy is  considered  to  be  achieved
through negotiation with actors. Legitimacy in this view is hence “more a social construction than a
function of isomorphism” (Kostova et al. 2008: 1001) and the issue of symbolic image building
becomes crucial. MNCs may associate their units with other highly legitimate units that are known
in a particular environment since “legitimacy gains (...) will tend to spill over“ (Dacin et al. 2007:
182). Moreover,  managers may skilfully play different sources of legitimation against each other
and MNCs may engage in practices that, while not required by the local institutional context, are
viewed  as  socially  desirable,  and  publicize  well  such  activities  to  build  additional  support.  In
summary then, MNCs are seen to be “embedded in multiple, fragmented, ill-defined, and constantly
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evolving institutional systems conceptualised at different levels of analysis, each characterized by a
distinct  institutional  process  and  degree  of  determinism  in  shaping  organizational  behavior”
(Kostova et al. 2008: 1001). Therefore, MNCs' relationships with their institutional environments
are considered to be dynamic, discretionary, symbolic, and pro-active. 
As we can see, this view is congruent with arguments presented earlier about the existence of a
room for  manoeuvre that  MNCs have been able to  find even within business systems that  are
considered to be highly institutionalised and constraining (Morgan and Whitley 2003: 611; Müller
1998: 741; Tempel 2001: 65; Wächter 2004). Furthermore, these arguments once more point to the
importance of a due consideration of social agents in the MNC context that have to engage in a
process of political negotiation to achieve a level of shared understanding about what constitutes the
rule system, where power plays a major role (Ferner et al. 2012; Kostova et al. 2008: 1002–1003).
When considering the relationship of multinational companies and their non-economic contexts in
such a  more  dynamic,  non-deterministic  perspective,  we may also point  to  the  concept  of  co-
evolution. Here, institutions, organizations and social actors are considered to reciprocally affect
each other's evolution and hence, the mutual shaping of companies and their societal environments
is analysed. Heidenreich (2012: 556) takes up key insights of our previous discussion in suggesting
to look at institutions as “symbolic, economic, political and legally sanctioned orders which are
reproduced  and  dynamically  transformed  by  embedded  social  actors  (both  companies  and
individuals), who are, in turn, shaped by these institutions (co-evolution)”.
Tempel et al. (2005: 197) call attention to yet another issue for future research that is  interaction
effects  which may arise from the interplay of country-of-origin and sectoral effects or country-of-
origin and corporate structure and strategy.  Therefore,  they suggest  to establish a link with the
literature  in  the  field  of  international  management  in  order  to  investigate  the  interplay  of
institutional and organizational factors in MNCs more systematically. The need to account for the
micro-level of the organization and the role of organizational effects is attributable to the influence
of  company strategy and  structure  on  HRM  policy  as  well  as  the  configuration  and  resource
distribution within the MNC network. In turn, different subsidiaries are playing different roles and
offer different power resources to actors within the MNC network. These micro-level issues will be
discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  following  chapter  3,  to  be  finally  merged  into  an  integrated
conceptual framework for research into HRM practice transfer within MNCs in chapter 4. This
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framework will take into account both institutional macro- as well as organizational micro-level
factors, integrating issues of agency and change as well as interaction effects into the institutional
perspective.
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In the precedent chapter we have presented two strands of institutional theory and their approaches
in accounting for the influence of external institutional contexts on organizations. As we have seen,
one major weakness that has been identified with institutional approaches is their neglect of issues
of power, agency and change as well as a focus that has traditionally been limited to the national
level  of  analysis.  Furthermore,  some  authors  suggested  that  due  attention  should  be  given  to
interaction effects that may arise from the interplay between organizational and institutional factors.
Therefore, coming back to the conceptual framework presented in the introduction, in the following
we will discuss important issues concerning MNC
structure, strategy and agency in order to integrate
these  organization-level  influences  into  our
conceptual framework. The following discussion of
these factors will be organized in two parts with the
first one discussing differences between companies
and the second one focusing on differences within
companies.  We will  start  the  discussion  of  these
issues with a consideration of how the macro-level
that was in the centre of the previous chapter can be theoretically linked to the micro-level of the
company.
3.1 Agency in multinational companies and the concept of transnational social 
space
One major challenge in the field of research into cross-national transfer of HRM practices within
MNCs is how to establish the link between the external macro-level and the internal micro-level of
the MNC that are both influencing on MNC structure, strategy and HRM practices. As we have
seen,  the  MNC  is  different  from  national  organizations  in  that  it  straddles  the  boundaries  of
organizational fields as well as national environments (Westney 1993: 60). Due to this boundary-
straddling nature, MNCs are confronted with different rules of the game leading to practices that
worked routinely in their country of origin being problematized within “the  'transnational social
space' that is the multinational” (Morgan et al. 2003: 389). In turn, the concept of transnational
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social  space  implies  a  vision  of  the  MNC as  “an  inherently  disordered  or,  at  the  very  least,
segmented social  space”(Rees  and Edwards  2006b:  40).  Such problems and the inefficiency of
certain country-of-origin practices in  foreign contexts may then trigger agency and institutional
change. In this connection, Seo and Creed (2002: 241) explain that “(...) the seed of institutional
change is likely to grow where and when institutionalised norms and practices conflict with day-to-
day functional/efficiency needs, become incompatible with and unresponsive to changing economic
and institutional environments, and/or no longer serve the interests and ideas of participants who
enact those norms and practices”. 
Following Morgan et al. (2003), corporate-level managers will try to order this space. To this end,
they will  employ formal  means of  control  and coordination  involving the creation  of  common
policies and procedures as well as the application of formal rules and means for monitoring and
accounting  for  performance.  These  are  supplemented  by  informal  forms  of  coordination  and
control,  such  as  the  creation  of  a  common  organizational  culture,  that  are  meant  to  further  a
common understanding of formal devices. In this connection, Ferner (2000b) highlighted the great
importance of common understandings for the functioning of formal or bureaucratic controls. 
To impose order, corporate headquarters (HQ) is seen to dispose of the following “channels of
influence” (Ferner and Edwards 1995: 231):  formal authority  relations associated with decision-
making power, resource-dependent power involving control of knowledge, uncertainty and financial
resources and “the  ability to  manipulate and mobilise symbolic elements of corporate culture in
order to legitimate decisions and courses of action“. 
Ferner and Edwards (1995: 243) hypothesized that “different combinations and patterns of power
relations are likely to characterize different kinds of MNEs”. In this regard, they have drawn an
important distinction between authority relations that are operating exclusively from the centre to
units, and resource-dependent relations that may operate not only from the centre to the unit, but
also vice versa as well as between units. Therefore, “relations between different parts of the MNC
may be characterized more by bargaining and trade-offs than by the authoritative flow of strategic
objectives  from the  centre  to  the operating  units”  (Ferner  and Edwards  1995:  238).  Especially
where resources are spread around the organization, the relationship between different units will
hence resemble exchange relations. In this connection, Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011: 40)
argue  that  while  there  being  a  structural  asymmetry between HQ and  subsidiaries,  the  former
depends  on  subsidiaries  in  many  cases  to  adapt  to  local  environments,  to  leverage  business
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opportunities and to generate valuable resources.
Ferner  and Edwards  (1995)  suggested  a  typology of  four  ideal  types  of  MNCs with  flows  of
influence within the organization depending on their organizational-structural characteristics. The
financial controller, as for instance a diversified conglomerate, exposes strong authority flows from
HQ and a strong resource dependence of units from HQ with both exchange and culture relations
being weak. The second type of integrated international company stands for cohesive, organically
grown transnational corporations where strong authority relations and high resource dependence of
units on HQ are visible, but where units nevertheless possess a certain amount of resources leading
to some degree of bargaining. Such firms would also be characterized by attempts to establish a
strong corporate culture increasing the likelihood of country-of-origin effects  and learning. The
third  type  of  decentralised  global  network comprises  companies  that  grew  primarily  through
acquisitions  and where authority relations  and units'  resource dependence on corporate  HQ are
weaker  since  units  possess  their  own  power  resources  enabling  them  to  engage  in  exchange
relations with the centre. In this case, corporate culture that is influenced by HQ as well as units is
considered important  to bind together semi-autonomous units  (Ferner and Edwards 1995:  244).
Therefore,  the  potential  of  HQ to transfer  centrally devised practices  would  be expected to  be
reduced whereas  the  stronger  role  of  units  might  further  learning and the  transfer  of  practices
throughout the company. Finally the federal international firm such as federal business services is
based  on  an  association  of  highly  independent  national  partnerships  characterized  by  strong
exchange and cultural relationships. In this type of organization, there is weak corporate centre that
has been created by the units and endowed with power to the extent that this has been accorded by
the units. Such central power would relate to the establishment of common international practice
standards in order to overcome centrifugal forces. While the country-of-origin effect in such units
would  be  expected  to  be  weak,  units  might  be  supposed to  develop common approaches.  The
typology of these four ideal types of MNC is displayed in table 10 below. 
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Table 10: Channels of Influence in Multinational Enterprises
Flows of influence
Type of enterprise
Financial control 
MNC (e.g. Hanson)
Integrated 
international 
company (e.g. ICI)
Decentralised 
global network 
company (e.g. 
ABB)
Federal 
international firm 
(e.g. large auditing /
consultancy 
partnership)
Resource-dependent power relations:
centre → units strong strong medium weak
units → centre weak medium medium strong
unit → unit weak weak weak strong
Authority relations:
centre → units strong strong medium weak
Exchange relations:
centre ↔ units weak medium medium medium
unit ↔ unit weak weak/medium strong strong
Culture relations:
centre → units weak medium/strong strong weak
unit → centre weak weak medium strong
unit → unit weak weak/medium strong medium
Source: Slightly adapted from Ferner (1995: 243).
The differences conceptualised in table 10 have two major implications: firstly that the willingness
of  corporate  HQ  to  transfer  HRM  practices  is  likely  to  vary  strongly  according  to  different
requirements following from corporate strategy and structure. Secondly, corporate initiatives and
influence may be challenged by other groups within the MNC. Power relations within MNCs are
hence seen as a crucial issue and central to the internal workings of MNCs (Ferner et al. 2012) in
which extra-firm institutions at the macro-level and intra-firm political processes at the micro-level
can be considered as strongly interconnected (Rees and Edwards 2006b: 40) in shaping the “range
of indeterminacy” (Edwards et al. 2007b: 208) for the definition and transfer of HRM policy and
practices within MNCs.
Very recently,  Ferner  et al. have further developed the argument about MNCs and agency in a
contribution that discusses “how the analysis of power can be incorporated into an understanding of
cross-institutional  practice  transfer”  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  164).  They posit  that  power  is  to  be
understood in its institutional context since actors shape transfer through processes that draw on
institutional resources on the macro level of the host business system as well as the micro level of
the MNC. Such processes would then influence on transformations and adaptations that transferred
practices undergo. 
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Following their argumentation, new institutionalists with their concepts of institutional distance and
institutional  duality  (Kostova  1999;  Kostova  and  Roth  2002)  “suffer  from  a  neglect  of  old
institutionalist questions about power, coalitions, interests and competing value systems” (Ferner et
al. 2012: 164; Powell 1996). These concepts are not taking into account actors' ability to shape
institutions to their need and hence to influence the transfer process depending on what is at stake
for them in the confrontation of cognitive, normative and regulative frameworks in the event of a
practice  transfer.  While  Kostova  (1999)  already discussed  the  issue  of  internalization,  i.e. full
assimilation to host employees' cognitive mindsets and normative frameworks, Ferner et al. (2012)
name an array of possible outcomes involving several dimensions that we will present in some more
detail in chapter 4. 
Concerning agency and power, they distinguish between three dimensions of power (Lukes 2005)
that may be related to MNC actors' behaviour in the event of practice transfer. They are adopting the
terminology  of  Hardy  (1996)  who  has  termed  the  first  dimension  power  of  resources.  This
dimension concerns power that is derived from the control of scarce resources involving hiring and
firing, rewards or expertise in order to influence behaviour in case of opposition. As we can see, this
first dimension is also present in the discussion of channels of influence (Ferner and Edwards 1995)
that  we have  presented  above.  The second dimension has  been called  power of  processes and
concerns the procedures and political  routines incorporated in decision-making processes. Here,
powerful actors can shape the agenda, determine processes and rules governing decision-making,
and they can prevent some groups from full participation in decision-making while others may force
their way into the processes. The third dimension has been labelled power of meaning and relates to
how organizational groups “legitimize their own demands and 'delegitimize' those of others through
the management of meaning and the deployment of symbolic actions” (Ferner et al. 2012: 166).
While the power of meaning is built upon the resource power deriving from the primary economic
activity  of  the  firm,  it  also  provides  a  link  with  new institutionalist  arguments.  The notion  of
meaning sheds light on how the cognitive and normative pillar of institutions (Scott 1995) embody
power relations and serve the interests of certain actors. At the same time though, these pillars may
be  contested  by  others  rather  than  being  seen  as  set  in  stone.  Meaning  is  considered  to  be
particularly important since this hidden dimension is  rendered visible (Ferner et al. 2005a) by the
“collision of two sets of institutional rationalities” (Ferner et al. 2012: 166) when institutionalised
practices are transferred across institutional contexts. Transfer hence potentially leads to conflicts of
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institutional  rationality  that  are  resolved  through  the  deployment  of  power  capabilities.  To
understand the outcomes of transfer, Ferner et al. (2012: 167) therefore suggest that two questions
are important: firstly, what are the power capabilities of MNC actors, and secondly, what interests
are present regarding transferred practices?
Following Ferner et al. (2012: 177), the concept of institutional distance  (Kostova 1999) should
therefore be replaced by the concept of “modified institutional distance”. In this new concept, the
impact of institutional distance upon transfer is modified by the power of MNCs as actors. While
existing  dominance  effects  may provide  MNCs with  power  to  manage meaning and to  reduce
normative opposition, MNCs also possess power as active rule makers that engage in “institutional
work” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).  This institutional work results in  institutional variants or
niches within the host setting and hence mitigates the constraining impact of institutional distance. 
Furthermore,  configurations  of  power  capabilities  and  interests  of  actors  within  the  MNC  are
considered at the level of corporate HQ and in subsidiaries. They involve multiple actors who may
oppose transfer, though without necessarily entailing overt resistance (Oliver 1991). This interplay
and the respective power capabilities of subsidiaries in terms of resources, processes and meaning
will therefore affect transfer outcomes, making it impossible to “read off” (Tempel et al. 2005: 188)
transfer outcomes from institutional distance alone.
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Drawing on contributions in the field of international management as suggested by Tempel  et al.
(2005:  197),  we will  provide  an  overview of  important  issues  concerning  MNC structure  and
strategy in order to account for differences in organizational-level effects between MNCs. These
involve the implications that company strategy and structure hold for control, communication and
coordination of international activities as well as different kinds of internationalization and market
entry.  Such  organizational  factors  have  also  empirically  been  found  to  influence  greatly  on
international  HRM practice  transfer  within  MNCs (Myloni et  al. 2007)  and hence  deserve our
special attention. We shall begin with a definition of the term strategy to discuss in the following
key issues concerning strategy and structure within MNCs as well as other organizational factors
influencing on HRM practice transfer.
3.2.1 A definition of the term strategy
Following Hyman (1987: 27–28), many modern definitions of 'strategy' refer to long-term planning
as a central feature. Chandler (1962: 13) for example considered strategy to be the “determination
of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action
and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals“. Though, Whittington (2001)
has identified  four different approaches towards strategy that can be distinguished along the two
dimensions  'outcomes'  and  'process'.  The  'outcomes'  dimension  refers  to  whether  a  strategy is
merely about maximizing profits or if it is pluralistic, referring to a range of goals out of which
profit maximization is just one. Considering 'processes', Whittington distinguishes between a view
of strategy as a product of deliberate planning or as emergent and hence being rather the outcome of
accidents, compromise and opportunities. 
The first, classical approach towards strategy sees the latter as deliberately planned with the aim of
profit  maximization.  This  is  the  approach  underlying  not  only  the  aforementioned  work  of
Chandler,  but  also that  of Porter (1986a;  1986b; 1987; 1990).  According to  Edwards and Rees
(2006c: 68) in this approach, where Chandler considered the multidivisional structure  as the best
suited for a strategy of product diversification, the notion of 'structure follows strategy' is evident.
Though, as we have already outlined in the introduction, this vision has been criticized as being too
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simplistic. It implies a view of managers as omniscient and able to develop a clear understanding of
their  environment  and  to  implement  a  strategy  while  ignoring  internal  as  well  as  external
contradictions, tensions and conflicts that are likely to be particularly acute in MNCs. 
The second approach called 'evolutionary'  also shares the vision of profit  maximization as sole
outcome of strategy, but it considers the environment to be too unpredictable to allow for any long-
term  planning  in  a  classical  sense.  This  approach  adopts  a  view  of  senior  managers  having
“bounded rationality” (March 1978). Here, strategies and structures are rather considered to emerge
from accident and chance with a following process of selection through competition in markets.
This is the perspective adopted by Williamson (1975) whose vision of selection through market
competition has  been criticized with  reference  to  entry barriers  and strong market  positions  of
certain firms. 
The processual approach is more centred on actors and sees strategy as emerging from a series of
negotiations and compromises and hence as an outcome of political  rather than purely rational
processes or market forces. Cyert and March (1963) as well as Mintzberg (1987) are among the
most well-known authors adopting such a view on strategy. Edwards and Rees (2006c: 69) note
that,  while  this  approach has been criticized for neglecting the embeddedness of organizational
actors in their social contexts, the emergent nature of strategy and the divergence of interests that it
explicitly addresses are of utmost importance for MNCs that straddle different business systems.
Finally, the systemic approach posits that the structural context of a firm strongly shapes the nature
of its strategy. Objectives and practices of strategy are considered to be dependent on the particular
social system in which strategy making takes place. One important contribution of this perspective
is seen in the fact that it highlights differences between countries in corporate strategies and hence
the  issue  of  embeddedness  that  has  been  neglected  by  the  processual  approach.  An  empirical
illustration of how strategy formulation and implementation in the escalator industry  differs across
countries has been delivered by Matten and Geppert (2004). Whitley (2000a) and Lane (1995) have
explored how the structural context of a particular country influences on strategic priorities of firms
that do not necessarily have to focus exclusively on profit maximization. Though, criticism of this
approach concerned once more the neglect of divergences of interest within organizations and their
influence on corporate strategy making.
Concerning HRM in MNCs, the systemic perspective holds some important implications since it
demands a thorough appreciation of the way an MNC's country of origin influences the way it
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operates at the international level. This influence gives rise to the country-of-origin effect stemming
from the embeddedness of an MNC in the national business system of its country of origin. In this
connection, authors like Edwards and Rees (2006c: 80) argue that the distinctiveness of national
business systems is  still  important despite  economic globalization,  because most  MNCs remain
firmly rooted in their country of origin. The concentration of key activities and power in their home
country results in the centre assuming the status and role of a  “field dominant” (Ferner et al. 2012:
171; Levy 2008), pointing to “asymmetric power relations” (Almond 2011a: 260) with other units
within the MNC. Thus, HQ is seen to influence disproportionately on strategy formulation with
strategies reflecting significant country-of-origin effects. As Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005: 7) put it:
“Whether or not there is a conscious attempt to ‘export’ the style and associated practices of the
home country, the fact that key strategic decisions are taken there, largely by nationals of the home
country, informs the behaviour of the firm at the international level. In many MNCs, this legacy
creates a ‘country of origin effect’ that is carried over directly to the foreign subsidiaries (...)“.
3.2.2 Differences in strategy and structure between multinational corporations
As we have seen, one key feature of MNCs concerns their operating in a variety of national contexts
and hence their “multiple embeddedness” (Meyer et al. 2011). On the one hand, this circumstance
gives  rise  to  multiple  institutional  pressures  (Forsgren et  al. 2005;  Westney 1993)  resulting  in
“institutional duality” (Kostova and Roth 2002; Tempel et al. 2006a) and conflicting pressures for
internal  and external legitimacy (Kostova 1999) on MNC subsidiaries.  The mechanisms behind
these pressures have been discussed in chapter 2. 
On the other hand, MNC strategy and structure is subject to other pressures that are attributable
rather to market forces. In chapter 1.1.2 of the introduction,  we have outlined three key forces
acting on managers in MNCs that have been identified by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998). These are
firstly pressures  towards  local  differentiation in  response to  continued differences  in  consumer
tastes across nations and cultures, secondly pressures towards global integration in many industries
where economies of scale have to be achieved at the international level, and finally pressures for
worldwide innovation to successfully compete in rapidly evolving markets due to shortening life
cycles of products and technologies. In this connection, we have also summarized some criticism
concerning the transnational solution proposed by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998). While some authors
adopting a systemic perspective on strategy have pointed to restrictions on strategic choice that are
are to  do with institutional  pressures (Tempel et  al. 2005:  183;  Wächter  2004: 3),  others  have
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highlighted the vision of MNCs as “political animals” (Edwards 2011; Edwards and Rees 2006c:
84;  Ferner et  al. 2012),  hence  following a more processual  view on strategy.  In  the precedent
paragraph, we have seen how these different perspectives can be integrated in considering the MNC
as a “transnational social space” (Morgan et al. 2003).
In this section, we will focus on the organizational level and on how the three competing pressures
are influencing on MNC strategy to different degrees depending on sector and time period. Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1998) have identified various  organizational forms that are more or less suited to
meet  these  competing  demands.  Furthermore,  they  argue  that  the  nature  and  strength  of  these
pressures have changed in the course of the twentieth century and that particular organizational
forms were evident in certain periods. 
The first  organizational  form they described resembles a  decentralised federation and has  been
termed “multinational”. This form was evident in the period between 1920 and 1950 called “multi-
domestic” era, when competition took place mainly in national markets that were protected and
marked by widely differing consumer tastes. The strategy and associated structure best suited to
such  conditions  is  a  collection  of  national  companies  managing  their  local  business  largely
independently from HQ. This form allows for a maximum of national responsiveness and is rather
similar  to  Perlmutter's  (1969)  “polycentric”  firm  as  well  as  Porter's  (1986b)  “multidomestic”
approach. 
Due to the fact that country subsidiaries in such organizations are highly independent and decision-
making in employment practice is decentralised, a key implication for HR is that there is likely to be
very little influence on personnel policy and practice from HQ on subsidiaries (Beechler et al. 1993;
Schuler et al. 1993). As decisions will be left to local managers,  it  is likely that there is not a
significant number of expatriate managers. Flows are mainly limited to capital, whereas flows of
persons and knowledge between HQ and subsidiaries are very limited and operational controls are
loose. Furthermore, as all parts of production or service provision are carried out in one location,
there  is  also  little  requirement  for  knowledge  transfer  across  units  and  borders  in  such
organizations. In order to avoid confusion with the term “multinational” in the typology of Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1998) that is used more generally when referring to “multinational companies” in this
investigation, we will use the closely related notions of poylcentric or multidomestic to designate
the organizational form.
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The second form described by Barlett  and Ghoshal,  a centralised hub, is  typical for the period
between  1950  and  1980  and  has  been  termed  “global”.  During  this  period,  the  cost  for
transportation  and  communication  began  to  fall,  trade  was  being  liberalised  and  the  minimum
efficient scale fell, hence making economies of scale more important. US firms internationalised
through FDI particularly in Europe with an aim of realizing economies of scale through the creation
of  “mini-replicas”  of  home  country  operations.  This  approach  was  well-suited  to  produce
standardized  goods in  a  highly cost-efficient  way and thus  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  and
efficiency through global integration. We can hence identify similarities with Perlmutter's (1969)
ethnocentric approach where the focus is on the dominance of home country values and practices,
and where foreign subsidiaries are seen and managed as a cultural extension of the parent. 
Concerning  HR,  this  means  that  certain  home  country  practices  are  implemented  in  foreign
subsidiaries  (Dörrenbächer  and  Gammelgaard  2011:  42),  particularly  in  the  field  of  work
organization. This implies a distinctive parent company approach towards HRM and hence involves
a higher degree of cross-national HRM practice transfer (Myloni et al. 2007: 2060; Rosenzweig and
Singh 1991). In this case, expatriates are placed in key positions in order to control and enforce HQ
policy  and  practices.  Such  organizations  are  marked  by  tight  financial  as  well  as  operational
controls  with  strategic  decisions  being  centralised,  involving  unidirectional  flows  from HQ  to
subsidiaries.  Typically,  foreign  operations  in  such  firms  were  low  value-added  production
operations  while  high-tech  and high value-added operations  such as  research  and development
remained concentrated within the home country. 
The third form, that is comparable to a co-ordinated federation,  was also typical for the period
between 1950 and 1980 and has been termed “international”. In this case, the organizational form
has been designed to take account of the growing importance of spreading innovations across the
company. Therefore, the strategy of this group of companies is “based primarily on transferring and
adapting the parent company's knowledge or expertise to foreign markets” (Bartlett and Ghoshal
1998:  17).  This  kind  of  organization  is  less  centralised  than  the  global  firms,  allowing  local
management to adapt the nature of products or services to the national market, without being as
decentralised as the multinational firms. In terms of Permutter's (1969) terminology, this type of
organization would hence be placed between the polycentric and the ethnocentric firm. Since in this
case  centrally  developed  innovations  are  to  be  transferred  towards  local  subsidiaries,  in  such
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companies there are unilateral flows of knowledge from HQ to subsidiaries. Local managers are
responsible for the implementation of HQ innovations, and to ensure that knowledge and expertise
from the centre are exploited. Therefore, while control is unlikely to be as strict as it is in global
firms, there will certainly be some requirements from HQ that subsidiaries have to comply with.
Expatriates in such organizations are less controllers and enforcers than facilitators of the transfer of
expertise and knowledge from the centre and hence an important contact point.
Finally, over the last two decades, Bartlett and Ghoshal have argued that, due to developments in
technologies and markets, more and more industries would be subject to simultaneous pressures of
local  differentiation,  global  integration  and  worldwide  innovation  as  explained  above.  The
“transnational” form is hence proposed as a solution to deal with these competing pressures and is
argued to be “necessary for every company that operates in an international environment” (Bartlett
and Ghoshal 1998: 20). This form involves the creation of an integrated network where every plant
has a distinct  role and is  specialised in a particular part  of the production or service provision
process. Disposing of some freedom to respond to local factors, such companies would at the same
time  achieve  scale  economies  through  their  integration  of  international  operations  within  the
network.  Furthermore,  knowledge  and  expertise  would  be  diffused  within  this  interdependent
network and hence be conducive to worldwide learning and innovation. This form has much in
common with Perlmutter's (1969) geocentric firm, while the notion of the integrated network also
relates to Hedlund's (1986)  heterarchy. Such organizations  are marked by large flows of people,
resources  and  knowledge  in  various  directions  between  interdependent  units,  and  they are  co-
ordinated  through  shared  decision-making.  The  practices  in  place  in  every  unit  partly  reflect
innovations stemming from other parts of the network with  expatriates from different plants and
countries bringing about this exchange of knowledge and expertise. 
According to Edwards and Rees (2006c: 75–76), especially the concept of an integrated network as
it is present in the transnational organizational form holds major implications for IHRM. Schuler et
al. (1993: 427) highlight that MNCs are realizing that “a systematic approach to developing human
resource policies and practices may give competitive advantage” since a major goal of MNCs is to
facilitate learning and the transfer of this learning across units. In this connection they argue that
HRM can assist in the systematic integration of regions with HR policies and practices, supposed
that they are “consistent with the needs of the business to achieve competitiveness, be flexible and
84
3.2 Differences between multinational companies and implications for IHRM
facilitate the transfer of learning across units” (Schuler et al. 1993: 431). This consistency as “finely
tuned interrelationship of practices” (Evans et al. 2002: 55) is considered to be highly important for
performance  in  that  it  provides  the  organization  with  the  staff  and  competencies  necessary to
implement  corporate  strategy.  For  example,  an  integrated  network  will  need  a  group  of
internationally  experienced  managers  that  have  gained  knowledge  about  different  units  and
countries where the MNC operates. In order to facilitate cross-country and cross-unit mobility of
expatriates, in turn, certain corporate-level standards will have to be defined and implemented in the
field of HR, e.g.  a  common framework for  performance and career  management.  Scullion and
Starkey  (2000)  argue  that  many  MNCs  have  less  difficulty  in  strategy  definition  than  in
implementation  and  the  associated  adaptation  of  control  structures  to  the  imperatives  of
globalization. In global firms, problems of control are exacerbated due to considerable geographic
and cultural distance as well as complex and heterogeneous environments. Therefore, bureaucratic
and output-based forms of control are seen to leave more and more way to more subtle cultural
forms of control (Martinez and Jarillo 1991: 441) through socialization. This, in turn, implies more
frequent  transfers  of  expatriates  and  a  transformation  of  organizational  culture.  The  growth  in
importance of cultural-social forms of control is due to management tasks that are getting more
unstructured  and  more  uncertain  as  for  example  in  the  case  of  cross-national  mergers.  In  this
connection, the HR process is considered of utmost importance since “HR strategy emerges as the
primary device for strategic implementation and control in the global/transnational firm” (Scullion
and Starkey 2000: 1075). Evans et al. (2002: 39) also point to the failure of structural solutions to
the problems of coordination and control, highlighting once more the central role of HRM as “the
crux of today's challenges of knowledge management” in providing cohesion to the MNC. We will
discuss different forms of control in some more detail in chapter 3.3 when considering differences
within MNCs.
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Table 11: Overview of organizational forms
organizational form multinational
polycentric
multidomestic
“decentralised
federation”
global
ethnocentric
“centralised hub”
international
in-between  ethno-
polycentric
“co-ordinated
network”
transnational
geocentric
heterarchic
“integrated network”
Associated 
features
Strength of flows 
HQ→subsidiaries
weak strong medium strong
Strength of flows 
between units
weak weak weak strong
Direction of flows 
between units
bidirectional
HQ↔subsidiaries
unidirectional
HQ→subsidiaries
unidirectional
HQ→subsidiaries
multidirectional
Locus of decision-
making
decentralised,
country subsidiary
strongly centralised
at HQ
strategic decision
guided by centre,
adaptation
decisions at local
level
shared decision-
making involving
several levels and
units
Coordination needs weak medium medium strong
Interdependence 
(total)
weak strong strong strong
Dependence on HQ weak strong strong medium
Subsidiary 
interdependence
weak weak weak strong
Source: Own compilation based on concepts proposed by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), Perlmutter (1969),
Porter (1986a), Hedlund (1986), Harzing (2000).
On the  other  hand though,  this  need  for  internal  consistency may be  challenged by needs  for
external  legitimacy as  national  institutional  constraints  on practices for example in  the field of
performance evaluation and compensation of employees may counteract MNC internal HR policy
and practices (Kostova 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002; Tempel et al. 2006a). 
Therefore, at this point we can establish the link to a basic problem of IHRM in MNCs that is how
to reconcile the need for internal HR consistency arising from company competitive strategy and
structure on the one hand, and the need for local adaptation on the other that is due to the fact that
the HRM function is subject to strong local institutional pressures and therefore does not lend itself
easily  to  standardized,  integrated  practices  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  165;  Rosenzweig  2006:  39;
Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). It  is this dichotomy of competing
pressures stemming from the organization on the one hand and multiple environments on the other
that is  important when considering the origins of the widely discussed  tension between global
integration and local adaptation as a guiding framework in IHRM (Björkman 2006: 466; Björkman
and Stahl 2006: 4–5; De Cieri and Dowling 2006: 16; Dowling et al. 2009; Doz and Prahalad 1991;
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Rosenzweig 2006; Stiles and Trevor 2006: 50). 
3.2.3 Diversification strategies and international integration
Differences in firms' diversification strategies may have important influences on the strength of
global  HRM  policies  and  practices.  In  this  respect,  we  can  distinguish  between  spatial
diversification into new markets in order to realise  synergistic economies on the one hand, and
diversification into new products to secure  financial economies on the other (Hill and Hoskisson
1987). Based on this distinction, Marginson (1992: 534) argues that, whilst synergistic economies
can be achieved through coordination of international activities by corporate HQ, the realization of
financial economies that may arise from arbitrage5 requires a great degree of autonomy for each
division. Therefore Coller and Marginson (1998: 6) conclude that corporate HQ intervention and
influence is likely to be greater in companies that attempt to realise synergistic economies than in
those targeting financial economies. 
Furthermore,  and  closely  linked  to  the  precedent  argument  around  synergistic  and  financial
economies,  Ferner (1994: 81) highlights the consequences of the spread of organization around
operationally independent international product divisions in MNCs that he considers to be “likely to
encourage the growth of 'multi-centred' companies”. Related to this tendency, he also points to a
number of cases where MNCs have transferred the head office of international business divisions
outside the home country, thus strengthening the interdependence of different corporate units and
reducing the central role of corporate HQ as it is described in the integrated network structure of
transnational corporations. Table 12 below gives an overview of different forms of integration and
their corresponding implications on the strength of global HR policies.
5 Ghemawat  (2007)  defines  arbitrage  as  a  way  of  exploiting  differences  across  countries,  treating  these  as
opportunities instead of constraints. For example, thanks to differences in tax arrangements MNCs may engage in
transfer pricing to manipulate their liabilities. The idea of arbitrage can hence be linked to the argument about
regime competition Streeck (1991). Meyer et al. (2011: 241) argue that arbitrage is made possible by the multiple
embeddedness of the MNC both in home and host country environments, enabling the MNC to capture gains from
trade through the internalization of market transactions.
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Table 12: Forms of international integration and strength of global HR policies
Form of integration Implications for international HRM
Financial
economies or
synergistic
linkages ?
Segmentation or
replication?
Differentiate or 
standardise?
Development
and mobility of
key staff
Standard pattern
of work
organization
International
code or
agreement
Financial
economies - - Weak Weak Weak
Synergistic
linkages
Segmentation
Differentiation Strong Weak Moderate
Standardisation Strong Weak Strong
Replication
Differentiation Moderate Moderate Moderate
Standardisation Strong Strong Strong
Source: Edwards (2011: 493).
3.2.4 Contingency factors and further influences on IHRM in MNCs
In his model for strategic HRM in MNCs, Dowling (1999) further suggests that industry and size of
the domestic market are two important variables that influence on the strategy and structure an
MNC will adopt. 
Concerning industry, Dowling draws on the work of Porter (1986a: 11) who argues that “there are
some questions for strategy that are peculiar to international competition (...). These questions all
revolve (...) around how a firm's activities in one country affect or are affected by what is going on
in other countries – the connectedness among country competition“. In this respect, he identifies the
industry as  “the  arena  in  which  competitive  advantage  is  won or  lost”  (Porter  1986a:  11).  He
describes that the pattern of international competition differs markedly from industry to industry. At
one end of this spectrum he places multidomestic industries where competition in each country is
essentially independent  of competition in  other  countries.  A multidomestic industry is  therefore
present in industries where competition takes place on a country basis and intangible assets have to
be employed in and adapted to each country.  Competitive advantages are hence largely country
specific. On the other end of the spectrum, Porter identifies what he termed global industries where
firm's competitive position in one country is heavily influenced by its position in other countries.
Such industries are “not merely a collection of domestic industries but a series of linked domestic
industries in which rivals compete against each  other on a truly worldwide basis” (Porter 1986a:
12). Transnational pressures, in turn, combining the need for local adaptation and global integration
have  been  strongest  in  certain  industries  such  as  pharmaceuticals  and  automobiles.  In  these
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industries, firms must be close to local authorities and consumers while at the same time utilizing
global efficiencies in research, product development, manufacturing and marketing. 
On  the  contrary,  in  industry  environments  where  global  or  local  pressures  clearly  prevail,  the
development of a differentiated transnational approach would not be appropriate. This is because
unnecessary organizational complexity in a “simple” environment can be as unproductive as an
unresponsive simplistic structure in a highly complex business environment.  In this respect, Evans
et al.  (2002: 30–31) are pointing to the  principle of requisite complexity in organization theory,
underlining that  the internal  complexity of an organization should reflect  the complexity of  its
external environment.
Concerning  HR  implications  of  these  different  industry  characteristics,  Dowling  (1999:  35)
concludes that in multidomestic industries “the role of the HR department will most likely be more
domestic  in  structure  and orientation”  implying hence  a  minimum of  integration  requirements.
However, the contrary is true for MNCs operating in global industries where the “imperative for
coordination” (Porter 1986a: 36) requires the HRM function to be structured in order to deliver the
international support required by the primary activities of the multinational. The positive effect of a
global strategy on HRM practice transfer has also received empirical support in a quantitative study
carried out in eighty Greek subsidiaries of European and American MNCs (Myloni et al. 2007:
2063). As we can see, these industry characteristics and their influences on HRM are analogous to
those of our previous discussion of organizational forms and the resulting strength of corresponding
pressures for internal HR consistency or local adaptation.
But also  company size as a classical contingency factor can be supposed to influence on HRM
practice transfer. According to Child (1973) and Kimberly (1976), there is a curvilinear relationship
between  company  size  and  structural  complexity.  Thus,  greater  company  size,  especially  in
combination with other variables as technology, location and environmental variables predicting
complexity,  has  a  direct  relationship  with  formalization  of  practices.  Therefore,  the  larger  the
company size in terms of employees is, the more formalised and standardized practices in the field
of  HRM  including  bureaucratic  controls,  might  be  expected.  Furthermore,  formalization  and
standardization themselves may serve as transmission channels for the cross-national transfer of
HRM practices, as is typically the case in many US MNCs (Edwards and Ferner 2002; Ferner  et al.
2004b: 366; Quintanilla et al. 2008: 682).
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Furthermore,  strong  commonalities  between  operating  units  in  industries  that  are  marked  by
standardized production associated  with  centralization  of  decision-making on IR issues,  is  also
likely to boost transfer of practices, as we have already seen in some more detail in the previous
section (Edwards 2011; Edwards et al. 2010: 617–618; Edwards and Rees 2006d: 101–102).
Concerning  the  size  of  the  domestic  market,  Dowling  (1999:  37)  argues  that  “[a]  very  large
domestic market influences all aspects of how a multinational organizes its activities”. When firms
grow in a large domestic market,  they are considered to be more likely to use an international
division to organize international operations rather than global product structures, and managers
will mostly dispose of domestic market experience. Such senior managers are therefore supposed to
be likely to under-emphasize international operations and to fail to recognize important differences
between countries (Dowling 1999: 38) in the sense of an ethno- rather than poly- or geocentric
mindset (Perlmutter 1969). This argument is further supported by other authors (Ferner et al. 2004b:
378) who have come to the same conclusions, describing a “tradition of parochial, inward-looking
HR” in many US-American MNCs, where for instance diversity policy was driven ethnocentrically
as a global policy and disseminated in a standardized form. Dowling et al. (2009: 14–15) are also
referring to the United Nations transnationality index, showing that US MNCs originating in the
world's  greatest  domestic  market  have  a  much greater  domestic  orientation  when compared to
MNCs originating in countries like Switzerland or Sweden whose domestic markets are small.
Another related aspect that has been discussed in this connection is the method by which MNCs
have expanded overseas and the mode they have chosen to  entry new markets. Where firms have
chosen to grow organically via the establishment of greenfield sites, HR policy and practices were
found to be more integrated when compared to situations where the firm grew internationally via
acquisitions of  brownfield sites (Björkman 2006: 466; Evans et al. 2002: 179; Rosenzweig and
Nohria 1994: 234). Harzing (2002) has shown that companies following a multidomestic strategy
preferred acquisitions whereas global companies were more likely to enter new markets through
greenfield investments. Furthermore, acquired subsidiaries that generally displayed a higher level of
local  responsiveness  were  allowed to  operate  more  independently and  enjoyed  lower  levels  of
control than greenfield sites. Though, the management modes of greenfield and brownfield sites
seemed to converge over time, hence pointing to the influence of subsidiary age as a contingency
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factor (Harzing 2002: 222). 
Therefore, the transfer of practices from the country-of-origin is supposed to be easier in the case of
greenfield sites whereas the potential for reverse transfer and diffusion of new innovative practices
originating from subsidiaries may be expected to be greater in the case of growth via acquisitions
(Edwards et al. 2010: 618; Tempel 2001: 117).
Finally, international experience of the MNC has been identified as an important factor influencing
positively  on  HRM  practice  transfer.  This  finding  has  been  explained  with  the  tendency  of
internationally more experienced MNCs to adopt more informal types of control.  This, in turn,
involves  especially  international  managerial  training  and development  programmes  to  socialise
managers,  thus  strengthening  the  degree  of  informal  control  that  is  exercised  on  subsidiaries
(Myloni et al. 2007: 2066–2067).
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3.3 Differences within multinational companies and implications for IHRM
In the precedent section, we have seen how differences between MNCs concerning industries and
markets, entry mode, diversification, strategy and structure as well as firm size are associated with
different configurations or organizational forms. These forms, in turn, influence on the strength of
various “channels of influence” (Ferner and Edwards 1995), and the power resources of several
actors  within  the  MNC.   Furthermore,  we have  seen that  certain  organizational  forms  like  the
transnational one that implies the establishment of an integrated network, involve greater flows of
knowledge and people than others, and hence require more coordination and HR consistency (Evans
et al. 2002: 55). On the other hand, we have seen how these demands for internal consistency are
opposed by local isomorphic pressures and market needs. The tensions arising from these opposed
pressures have been integrated into IHRM research as integration-responsiveness framework (De
Cieri  and  Dowling  2006:  16;  Rosenzweig  2006).  We  have  further  presented  the  concept  of
transnational  social  space  (Morgan et  al. 2003).  The  latter  may help  us  to  understand  and  to
establish  the  link  between  the  internal  micro-level  of  the  MNC,  including  issues  of  corporate
strategy and structure as well as agency and various channels of influence with the external macro-
level of institutional environments.
In  the  following  section  we  will  focus  on  differences  within  MNCs.  These  involve  different
mechanisms  of  control that  are  meant  to  enable  HQ  to  coordinate  and  steer  the  organization
strategically. We will continue by discussing how differences in resources and knowledge flows that
are associated with various types of subsidiaries will affect HQ's need for control on the one hand,
and the power of subsidiaries to resist central control and influence on the other. Furthermore, we
will  consider  which  subsidiaries are  likely  to  be  targets  of  HRM  practice  transfer  or  may
themselves serve as sources of practices that are then transferred back into the network of the MNC.
3.3.1 Control, coordination and communication within multinational companies
As we will see in further detail in the next section, vertical linkages between HQ and subsidiaries as
well  as lateral  relationships between affiliates  are  closely related to  specific strategic roles that
different types of subsidiary assume. The multiplicity of vertical and lateral relationships within an
MNC, in turn, points to issues of control and coordination. In this connection,  coordination and
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control may be understood as “all the mechanisms instituted to tie the operations and decisions
within and across components into a larger whole and establish coherence of meaning and purpose
within the large enterprise” (Harzing and Sorge 2003: 190). Coordination, in turn, can be linked to
communication, and hence, to organizational conduits. Edwards et al. (2010: 618) call attention to
the fact that the richness of transmission channels between HQ and subsidiaries is central to the
transfer of expertise across borders (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). 
As we have seen earlier, coordination demands in HRM will vary according to corporate strategy.
Moreover, as Evans et al. (Evans et al. 2002: 465) explain, there is also further differentiation of HR
activities within firms going beyond the binary scale of global-centralised or local-decentralised
since “a middle ground came into the picture – what should be coordinated?”. 
Accordingly,  today  there  is  a  wide  variety  of  HR  delivery  mechanisms including  outsourced,
brokered activities, centralised or tightly coordinated integrated activities, locally undertaken tasks
and those that are undertaken by global or regional service centres or regional centres of excellence.
Finally,  there  are  complex  activities  that  are  best  performed  by  international  project  groups.
Distinguishing between the extent of integration on the one hand and differentiation of HR tasks on
the other, Ulrich (Ulrich 1997) opens up a matrix where different HR tasks and activities can be
located. Following this scheme, the positioning of various HR tasks and activities can be shortly
discussed (Evans et al. 2002: 465–469). 
Accordingly,  service brokers would  perform tasks  that  are  marked by low integration and low
differentiation  such  as  payroll  processing  or  responding  to  standard  employee  questions  about
benefits or pensions, and delivery of basic generic training.  Corporate staff would be responsible
for highly integrated, lowly differentiated tasks including high potential management development.
Business units or local subsidiaries would assume the HR role in highly differentiated but lowly
integrated areas encompassing IR and collective bargaining or recruitment and technical training of
the operational workforce. Though, local responsibility can well be combined with coordination
through best practice sharing or centres of expertise, thus raising the level of integration. The latter
as well as service centres or regional structures would take a middle position in areas where both,
some measure of integration and differentiation is needed, like in the case of expertise in managing
expatriation. Finally, concerning highly complex matters like performance management or global
recruitment process design,  high differentiation and high integration are needed. In these cases,
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integrated solutions like cross-boundary project groups would seem to be most suited. 
Another characteristic related to coordination and control is the  existence of intermediate tiers of
organization between local subsidiaries and HQ such as international business divisions or regional
HQ. The existence of such intermediate structures was found to be associated with greater higher-
level control of subsidiary HR policy “multiplying the scope for control particularly in large and
heterogeneous firms and the standardization of products and services beyond national markets”
(Ferner et al. 2011: 500, 503). Therefore, we may expect particularly high degrees of central control
and standardization of HR policies in large MNCs with internationally standardized products or
services that are additionally exposing intermediate structures. 
In this respect, we can hence assume  cross-national practice transfer  to happen mostly in areas
where a high level of integration and consistency is needed, affecting certain HR issues more than
others. These propositions are largely in line with empirical findings of other authors (Bae  et al.
1998; Lu and Björkman 1997; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994: 232–233; Vachani 1999) on internal
differentiation of HRM practices within MNCs. They found that certain HR issues were more prone
to transfer than others. The degree of transfer depended on whether the practice was considered
critical to maintaining internal consistency following pressures for global integration and affected
rather executives, or whether well-defined local norms were in place that affected rank-and-file
staff.  In  a  more  recent  study,  Myloni  et  al. (2007:  2066,  2069)  have  found  that  especially
performance appraisal  and training  practices were  the  ones  with  the highest  level  of  transfer,
whereas practices related to compensation were found to be the least transferable ones. Ferner et
al. (2011: 500) found similar evidence with “performance items having lower discretion than rank-
and-file items” and lower discretion over attitude surveys and employee information than for union
recognition or employee consultation.
In any case, concerning the transfer of employment practices, an important question relates to the
existence of international channels that the HR function has and through which HR practices and
policy may be diffused. Distinguishing between codifiable and tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander
2003; Szulanski 1996), Edwards et al. (2010: 618) resume that whereas “procedural channels” like
international committees, information systems, databases and management audits are well-suited to
transfer codifiable knowledge, “people-based channels” such as cross-national working groups or
international assignments are likely to be more effective to diffuse tacit knowledge. Presence and
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strength  of  international  channels  in  the  HR  function  were  found  to  impact  strongly  on  the
likelihood of reverse or upstream transfer, especially when the source unit disposes of a large and
well-resourced HR function (Edwards et al. 2010: 629). Furthermore, where strong international
HR channels were present, local discretion in HR policy making was found to be lower (Ferner  et
al. 2011: 495). Overall, the issue of coordination and communication is of paramount importance
for MNCs as they are becoming increasingly knowledge-driven (Meyer et al. 2011: 241).
As we have seen,  diffusion of practices occurs through networking between MNC units, where
conduits play an important part. Though, such networking is usually underpinned by HQ retaining
control  over  subsidiary  units  and  mangers,  and  can  therefore  be  termed  “networking  within
hierarchy” (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 107; Edwards et al. 1999: 294). Concerning diverse control
mechanisms used to monitor managers' behaviour, Harzing and Sorge (Harzing and Sorge 2003)
have established a classification of control mechanisms on the two dimensions direct/explicit versus
indirect/implicit and personal/cultural versus impersonal/bureaucratic/technocratic (see table 13). 
Corporate control mechanisms are defined here as “the instruments that are used to make sure that
all units of the organization strive towards common organizational goals” (Harzing and Sorge 2003:
198) and can be divided into four categories. The first set of control mechanisms is placed in the
direct-personal  category  and  involves  centralization,  direct  supervision  and  expatriate  control
whereas  the  second  category  combines  direct  control  with  impersonal  means  resulting  in
standardization and formalization. The third category implies the use of indirect ways of personal
control,  taking  the  form  of  socialization,  informal  communication  and  management  training
practices. The fourth category combines indirect with impersonal ways of control and relates to
practices such as output control and planning. 
Table 13: Subsidiary control mechanisms - classification on two dimensions
Personal/cultural 
(founded on social interaction)
Impersonal/bureaucratic/technocratic 
(founded on instrumental artefacts)
Direct/
explicit
Centralization, direct supervision, 
expatriate control
Standardization, formalization
Indirect/
implicit
Socialization, informal communication, 
management training
Output control, planning
Source: Harzing and Sorge (2003: 198).
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Concerning corporate control practices, Harzing and Sorge (2003: 206) conclude in their empirical 
analysis that “control mechanisms remain firmly and primarily impregnated by the country of origin
(…) The results provide further support for the existence of unique country patterns, even for the
most internationalised companies in the world in their most supranational corner”. In this respect,
US-American  MNCs are  known for  the  high  degree  of  central  influence  they exert  over  their
foreign operations and the formalised nature of this control (Almond 2011a: 261; Edwards et al.
2010: 615; Ferner et al. 2004b).
But also  subsidiary size was found to influence on control. In this respect, larger subsidiaries are
likely to experience a high level of indirect personal control from HQ (Harzing and Sorge 2003:
201).  Equally,  Myloni  et  al. (2007:  2069)  found  that,  while  mechanisms  of  co-ordination  and
control are generally important for the smooth transfer of HRM practices, specifically informal
control practices had a considerable impact on the transfer of performance appraisal and training
practices.
Furthermore, centralised control tended to be higher where subsidiaries are  located in CMEs, but
lower for  older subsidiaries, where  union density is high and where the subsidiary serves local
markets (Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2008). 
As we can  see,  some of  these control  mechanisms have  been referred  to  when presenting  the
channels of influence (Ferner and Edwards 1995) that corporate HQ disposes of to instill order into
the  MNC network,  and when discussing  how formal  mechanisms of  control  are  backed up by
informal ones (Ferner 2000b).
3.3.2 Different subsidiary roles and implications for HRM and practice transfer
A typology of subsidiaries has been argued to be useful owing to its potential to reduce complexity
of  MNC organizational  reality into  “a manageable number  of  related characteristics,  making it
easier  to  understand  and  explain  the  functioning  of  multinational  companies”  (Harzing  and
Noorderhaven 2006: 196).
In this respect, several authors have developed typologies of subsidiaries of MNCs (Bartlett and
Ghoshal 1986; Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1988; Gupta and Govindarajan
1991; Roth and Morrison 1992) according to their strategic role. These typologies are largely based
on resource-dependence theory (Aldrich 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) which suggests that an
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organization is dependent on other actors since it is not able to generate autonomously all resources
that are needed to survive. In this regard, the strategic role of a subsidiary depends on the extent of
discretion it has over the allocation of a resource, the criticality of this resource for the survival and
maintenance of the organization, and on the existence of alternatives to the resource in question
(Taylor et  al. 1996:  974).  Depending on the  subsidiary's  strategic  role  within  the  MNC,  HQ's
approach to HRM and control then is predicted to vary accordingly. Since the parent company relies
on  foreign  subsidiaries  for  certain  essential  resources,  it  is  dependent  to  varying  degrees  on
subsidiaries and subsidiary employees,  and will  search to increase control  over subsidiaries the
more it depends on them (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). In this connection, the effective and efficient
management  of  knowledge  flows is  supposed  to  be  the  most  important  source  of  competitive
advantage for MNCs (Bartlett et al. 2004; Doz et al. 2001; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000) and
hence of paramount importance for organizational success.
Therefore, our discussion will focus on one typology of the different strategic roles of subsidiaries,
which has been established by Gupta and Govindarajan (1991). These authors have built on the
notion of the MNC as integrated network (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998) to categorize subsidiaries on
the  basis  of  knowledge  flows  to  and  from the  rest  of  the  corporation,  making  their  typology
particularly relevant to the present investigation of the transfer of HRM practices. Furthermore, it is
a  typology  that  has  been  empirically  validated,  hence  lending  support  to  “the  notion  that
subsidiaries  can  take  on  different  roles  within  MNCs,  that  these  roles  can  be  meaningfully
conceptualised based on knowledge inflows and outflows, and that these roles are associated with
different control mechanisms, relative capabilities and product flows" (Harzing and Noorderhaven
2006: 212). 
Gupta  and Govindarajan  (1991)  distinguish  between  outflows of  resources  from the  subsidiary
either to the parent or to other parts of the organization, and inflows, that is resources flowing into
the subsidiary from the parent or other parts of the organization.  Based on the two dimensions
volume and direction of resource flows, they propose four kinds of subsidiary roles as depicted in
figure 3. The  Global Innovator stands for a subsidiary that serves as a source of knowledge for
other units, a role that has become more important with MNCs moving towards the transnational
model where subsidiaries can act as centre of excellence. The second category is called Integrated
player and depicts important nodes in the MNC network, that are receiving and transferring equal
amounts  of  knowledge from and throughout  the  organization.  These  two  subsidiary types  may
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hence  be  viewed  as  performing  “creative”  as  opposed  to  “traditional”  roles  within  the  MNC
network (Meyer et al. 2011: 242). Thirdly,  Implementors are heavily dependent on  inflows from
other parts of the organization while not engaging in knowledge creation themselves, and hence
provide little knowledge to other units. Finally, local innovators are self-standing subsidiaries that
are marked by small amounts of knowledge in- and outflows, while locally engaging in knowledge
creation. Following Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006: 197), this situation typically occurs when
local knowledge is considered too idiosyncratic to be of use in other organizational units. 
Figure 3: Typology of strategic roles of subsidiaries according to resource outflows and inflows
Global
Innovator
Integrated
Player
Local
 Innovator Implementor
Source: Gupta and Govindarajan (1991: 774).
Concerning control of different subsidiary types, we can suppose that HQ will attempt to establish
high levels of control especially on Global Innovators and Integrated Players as these are marked by
large amounts  of outflows towards  HQ and the rest  of the organization,  thus  increasing parent
company dependence.  Though,  Global  Innovators  are  themselves the least  dependent  on parent
company inputs and would hence be expected to have the potential power to resist central control
and influence (Taylor et al. 1996: 975). At the same time, Global Innovators also need a relatively
high level of autonomy in order to be able to develop new knowledge and skills which is achieved
through closer contacts with external local partners and suppliers (Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006:
198–199).  This greater degree of local embeddedness into the host environment is important since
it is here where the subsidiary controls critical linkages with key actors (Andersson  et al. 2007;
Geppert and Williams 2006). Further problems related to control of creative subsidiaries are linked
to the fact that “unconditional enforcement of ownership rights through headquarters centralization
can destroy valuable resources” (Meyer et al. 2011: 245), for instance when key personnel leaves or
key contacts remain unleveraged (Mudambi and Navarra 2004).  Subsidiary local embeddedness
may also turn out to be a two-edged sword in cases where subsidiaries have to compete internally
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for  HQ's  resources  promoting  inter-unit  rivalry  and  inducing  subsidiaries  to  be  unwilling  to
cooperate and to share knowledge (Greenwood et al. 2010; Mudambi and Navarra 2004). We can
therefore conclude that  the design of “control structures to implement dual embeddedness [i.e. in
the local host environment and in the MNC internal network] is a delicate balancing act” (Meyer et
al. 2011: 245).
While  on  the  one  hand,  Implementors can  easily  be  controlled  through  the  use  of  formal
mechanisms thanks to their unilateral resource dependence on HQ, on the other hand, due to greater
interdependence in the case of Integrated Players, informal means of control through socialization
and networks are considered to be more adequate. For  Global Innovators,  the extent of control
through socialization and networks would be medium. Overall, Taylor et al. (1996: 975) suppose
that the “degree of similarity” between the HR practices at HQ and in subsidiaries as an indicator
for control would be highest in Integrated Players and lowest in Local Innovators.
Concerning HRM practice transfer, we can argue together with Temple (2001: 126–127) that those
subsidiaries exposing the greatest outflows of knowledge can be supposed to serve as sources for
learning for other units within the MNC. Alternatively, we could say that "the more resources are
controlled by the local HR function, the better placed will be the subsidiary to supply practices to
the rest of the group" (Edwards et al. 2010: 619). Global Innovators and Integrated Players are
hence the most likely to be in control of special skills, for instance expertise of local management in
certain HRM practices, that HQ wishes to diffuse throughout the network. Such subsidiary types
might hence potentially serve as source units for reverse transfer (Edwards 1998; Edwards and
Tempel 2010;  Hayden and Edwards 2001),  for example of practices originating from dominant
countries (Smith and Meiksins 1995). Evidence of learning in German MNCs about HRM practices
of Anglo-Saxon origin from their  UK subsidiaries is  illustrative for such processes (Ferner and
Quintanilla 1998; Ferner and Varul 2000a).
3.3.3 Evolving subsidiary roles and power resources within multinational 
corporations
We have now seen that different subsidiaries can assume, or be assigned by HQ, different strategic
roles. These, in turn, are associated with specific control mechanisms and strongly influence the
likelihood  of  certain  types  of  subsidiaries  to  serve  either  as  sources  or  rather  as  receivers  of
transferred practices.
Though, recent research has suggested and empirically confirmed that the subsidiary roles initially
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assigned by HQ may be abandoned by subsidiaries adopting subversive strategies instead of boy
scout  behaviour  (Delany 2000;  Dörrenbächer  and  Gammelgaard  2006;  Morgan and  Kristensen
2006). This is due to lucrative business opportunities subsidiaries come across in their environment,
to  their  interest  in  improving  their  position  within  the  MNC,  or  to  a  more  autonomous  role
perception of subsidiary managers who choose to take initiatives themselves (Dörrenbächer and
Gammelgaard 2011: 31). Such subsidiary strategizing may then be interpreted by corporate HQ
either  as  valuable  contribution  to  organizational  success  since  these  subsidiaries  may  deepen
comparative  advantages  through  upgrading  local  capabilities  and  taking  advantage  of  local
configurations  of  skill,  cooperation  and  knowledge  transfer,  or  it  might  be  viewed  as
insubordination and arrogance. In the latter case, HQ might adopt “hardball strategies”, drawing on
its formal authority and resource power in order to bring deviating subsidiaries back in line by
installing tighter control mechanisms, laying off local subsidiary management or even closing the
subsidiary.  For  subsidiaries,  this  implies  that  they  should  be  well  aware  of  their  own  power
resources they can rely on in case of conflict with HQ, and  what level of autonomy and strength is
associated with them (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2006: 31).
The classic concept of power as defined by Dahl (Dahl 1957: 202–203) meaning that “A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”, is applicable
to headquarters in this case. Though, it has been argued that for subsidiaries it makes more sense to
adopt  another  notion  of  power  referring  to  “the  subsidiaries'  ability  to  influence  their  parent
companies  in  their  strategic  and  operational  decision-making  activities”  (Dörrenbächer  and
Gammelgaard 2006, 2011: 31). Therefore, in this case, the distinction between “formal authority”,
pointing to the right to decide and “real authority” referring to the effective control over assets and
decisions  (Aghion  and  Tirole  1997),  is  relevant.  This  is  because  the  latter  type  of  authority
corresponds to the type of power subsidiaries possess (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011: 32).
In this respect it may also be argued that “while headquarters has ownership rights, the extent to
which they translate into enforceable property rights depends [on] the outcome of the bargaining
game between the headquarters (…) and  the subsidiary” (Meyer et al. 2011: 245 referring to Foss
and Foss 2005). 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011: 32–34) now distinguish
between the following four types of subsidiary power: micro-political bargaining power, systemic
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power,  resource-dependency  power  and  institutional  power,  that  are  varying  in  strength  and
sustainability.  Micro-political  bargaining  power is  associated  with  subsidiary  management's
lobbying  behaviours  (Dörrenbächer  and Geppert  2006,  2009),  combining own initiatives,  issue
selling (Ling et  al. 2005), strategic information politics and manipulative behaviour (Surlemont
1998). In this connection, Cantwell and Mudambi (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005: 1112) have argued
that  “[a] subsidiary’s  capacity  to  evolve  to  the  point  at  which  a  competence-creating  mandate
becomes viable depends upon the ability of its own managers to develop and exercise a ‘voice’ in
the wider corporate group”, where HQ's attention can be considered a vital commodity (Bouquet
and Birkinshaw 2008).  Therefore,  also potentially  precious  resources  such as  the  location  in  a
highly attractive cluster have to be skilfully used by subsidiary managers in bargaining processes in
order  to  provide  the  subsidiary  with  power  (Bélanger  and  Edwards  2006).  Micro-political
bargaining power is overall considered to be important. However, it is neither particularly strong,
since it often depends on the ownership of valuable resources and can be counterbalanced by HQ's
bargaining  skills,  nor   sustainable,  since  negotiation  skills  of  subsidiary  managers  are  not
necessarily uniquely located in one specific subsidiary.  Systemic power of a subsidiary is derived
from its position within the corporate value chain, where single subsidiaries often operate selected
parts (Roth and Morrison 1992) or are responsible for a specific function in the intra-firm division
of  labour.  However,  the  power  derived  from such  a  situation  is  not  very  strong  as  its  use  is
constrained to inside the MNC network. Furthermore, its sustainability is questionable since HQ
might reconfigure the value chain in the long run, unless the value-chain specialization is linked to
the  locally  contained  availability  of  critical  resources  making  HQ  unable  to  change  the
configuration without creating major disadvantages (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011: 33).
Resource-dependency power is the kind of power that has been discussed in the previous section
about different subsidiary roles and is linked to its position within the MNC network and the control
over critical resources. Such power is considered to be strong when subsidiaries control critical
resources  such  as  market  access,  market  knowledge  or  membership  in  an  innovative  business
network that might be essential for the performance of the MNC as a whole (Dörrenbächer and
Gammelgaard 2011: 34). Furthermore, resource-dependency power is stepped up by the fact that it
is highly difficult for corporate HQ to evaluate the quality and significance of the subsidiaries' local
business  environment.  Learning  about  all  the  local  business  networks  worldwide  would  be  an
overwhelming  task  “owing  to  bounded  rationality  and  the  headquarters'  limited  information-
processing capacity” (Andersson et al. 2007: 808). Lastly, institutional power is viewed as a strong
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and sustained resource for subsidiaries (Geppert and Williams 2006) that does not even have to go
hand  in  hand  with  a  deep  local  embeddedness.  In  certain  environments,  subsidiaries  can  use
institutional structures in a proactive way in asking for subsidies or in fending off the introduction
of undesired standardized practices and policies. In the latter case, subsidiary management might
call  HQ's  attention  to  legitimation  problems  in  case  of  a  violation  of  host  country  laws  and
regulations (Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Tempel 2001: 212) or to high costs associated with plant
closures  in  coordinated  market  economies  (Dörrenbächer  and  Gammelgaard  2011:  34;  Tempel
2001: 207). Such power is sustainable since institutional structures usually change only slow and
incrementally  and  the  handling  of  host  country  institutional  settings  is  difficult  for  outsiders.
Moreover, it  has been argued that “[m]ore subtle and tacit cognitive and normative elements of
institutional frameworks are even more subject to insider exegesis” (Ferner et al. 2012: 174).
Notwithstanding  its  comparative  weakness  and  non-sustainable  character,  micro-political
bargaining power is yet considered to play a central role in internal negotiations. Its importance is
due to the fact that the use of every other form of power needs “to be enacted in a politically
sensitive  way”  (Dörrenbächer  and Gammelgaard  2011:  39)  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of  HQ's
retaliation.  Therefore,  special  attention  should  be  given  to  the  way  power  is  communicated.
Moreover, subsidiaries have be aware of the erosion of their power resources over time and the need
to nourish existing and to develop new ones. This, in turn, involves inter alia an engagement in
micro-political manoeuvring on HQ level to gain re-allocated resources and mandates in order to
ensure that HQ stabilises or increases the amount of leeway granted instead of reducing it. To be
able to engage successfully in such micro-political bargaining, subsidiaries will need to understand
their relative system position. Such politically sensitive information is usually spread informally
and access is therefore conditional on connections to HQ and other subsidiaries “on a broad basis
through multiple personal ties based on trust” (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011: 41). In this
respect, communication skills, a good reputation and a subsidiary management that has an interest
in  the  long-term  development  of  the  subsidiary  are  pre-requisites  to  build  up  micro-political
bargaining power (Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2010; Vora and Kostova 2007). In this respect, the
argumentation of Morgan and Kristensen (Morgan and Kristensen 2006) would lead us to expect to
find  locally  embedded and hence  more  long-term developmentally oriented  managers  rather  in
subsidiaries that are located in coordinated market economy environments. Furthermore, Kristensen
and  Zeitlin  (2005) have  shown  that  acquired  subsidiaries  that  used  to  be  independent  have  a
stronger power position than greenfield sites, while Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011: 42)
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point to the potential influence of corporate strategy with subsidiaries in multidomestic companies
having a supposedly stronger position as compared to other strategy variants (see also Edwards and
Rees 2006d: 101).
103
Chapter 4 Influences, mechanisms, dimensions and outcomes of HRM practice transfer within multinational 
companies – an integrated conceptual framework
Chapter 4 Influences, mechanisms, dimensions and outcomes of 
HRM practice transfer within multinational companies – an integrated 
conceptual framework
While in chapter 2 we have seen how external societal-level institutional environments impact on
HRM  practices  and  policies,  chapter  3  focused  on  internal  organizational  factors  and  their
respective influence on HRM. Therefore, the factors and mechanisms discussed in chapter 2 are
attributable  to  the  global,  national  and  local  macro-level,  whereas  chapter  3  treats  micro-level
factors. The present chapter will now build on the insights derived form this discussion of macro-
and micro-level influences on
HRM  practice  transfer  in
order  to  discuss  influences,
mechanisms  and  possible
outcomes  of  HRM  practice
transfer  in  MNCs  in  an
integrated  conceptual
framework.
Discussing macro-level institutional influences on HRM practice transfer within MNCs has allowed
us  to  better  understand  the  origin,  nature  and  strength  of  country-of-origin,  host  country  and
dominance  effects.  In  this  connection,  institutionalist  research into  MNCs with  its  concepts  of
country-of-origin and host country effects has helped us to “reveal the socially embedded nature of
the power relations, the goals, strategies and tactics that shape the various negotiations of order at
different levels of the firm, creating and delimiting 'corridors of choice' for the various actors within
its productive system” (Almond 2011a: 268). 
4.1 Some preliminary conclusions about influences on HRM practice transfer 
within MNCs
In our discussion of the various macro-level influences on HRM practice transfer within MNCs, we
have sought to understand how the embeddedness of MNCs in an institutional environment gives
rise to country-of-origin effects and in what ways host country institutional factors can influence on
cross-border transfer of practices. 
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4.1 Some preliminary conclusions about influences on HRM practice transfer within MNCs
Concerning the  nature of country-of-origin effects, we have learned that they do not just directly
reflect  home country models  and practices,  but  that  it  is  rather  “embedded managerial  norms”
(Almond 2011a: 265) that are the subject of attempted transfer and that these may be distinct from
the empirical reality of country-of-origin practices. Nevertheless, the original argument about the
persisting influence of the societal context of the country an MNC originates from, remains valid
(Edwards and Rees 2006b: 59, 63; Ferner 1997; Rees and Edwards 2006b; Wächter and Peters
2004; Wächter et al. 2003).
Considering the strength of country-of-origin effects, we have seen that on the global macro-level
country-of-origin and dominance effects interfere with each other. On the one hand, this may lead to
a strengthening of country-of-origin effects in MNCs originating from dominant countries (Edwards
and Rees 2006d: 96, 100). On the other hand, dominance effects may essentially contribute to an
erosion or transformation of country-of-origin effects due to learning from dominant role models
and  reverse  diffusion  of  Anglo-Saxon  practices  in  MNCs  from smaller  countries  (Ferner  and
Quintanilla 1998; Hayden and Edwards 2001). Therefore,  it  is not surprising that US-American
MNCs originating from the dominant country of the 20th century (Djelic 1998) have been found to
expose strong country-of-origin effects and a strong tendency towards transferring HR policies and
practices. In this case, the latter have usually been centrally devised by actors that are embedded in
the US American business system and hence reflect the “socialised rationality” (Almond 2011a:
260) of home country actors or the “rationale” of this particular societal environment (Redding
2005:  126, 136; Witt  and Redding 2009).  This attitude and approach has been described as “a
'myopic view of the world that was  Home Town-centric'” (Edwards et al. 2005: 1273, citing an
American respondent). 
Especially in the field of HRM, Pudelko and Harzing (2007) found that the U.S. model seems to
serve as the strongest source of inspiration for the design of international HRM policy and practices
within German MNCs. Based on new institutionalist thinking, this fact may be interpreted as a form
of “global inter-corporate isomorphism” (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: 714) and put down to the
strong influence of  dominance effects (Smith and Meiksins 1995) on a  global  level.  These are
inducing  managers  of  German  MNCs  to  adopt  practices  of  Anglo-Saxon  origin  (Ferner  and
Quintanilla 1998) and to model their HRM systems on “dominant 'global' ideas about best practice”
(Almond 2011a: 262–263). 
On the one hand,  new institutionalist  research has  discussed how international  consultants  and
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academics have contributed to the international diffusion of Anglo-Saxon models (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983: 151; Meyer 2000: 242; Meyer et al. 1997: 166). On the other hand, research following
the business systems approach has emphasized the role of US American MNCs as innovators in
host countries like Germany where they transferred their country-of-origin policies and practices
and hence challenged traditional ideas about HRM and IR (Singe and Croucher 2005; Wächter and
Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003). These arguments also point to the active role of MNCs as actors,
where especially US-American MNCs have been found to be “reactive” (Pulignano 2006: 512)
rather than acquiescent (Oliver 1991) and to sideline host country institutional influences (Geppert
et al. 2003b: 625). This behaviour points to the power of MNCs as actors to engage in “institutional
work” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) and to “mould the host system into something 'acceptable'”
(Almond 2011a: 264) and thereby to reduce or “modify” institutional distance (Ferner et al. 2012).
Thus, MNCs should not just be conceived of as rule-takers, but also as active rule-makers (Ferner et
al. 2012: 169; Streeck and Thelen 2005).
Even though it has been argued that traditional concepts of new institutionalist thinking around
institutional fields and local isomorphism may not apply unchanged to the meso field of the MNC
(Kostova et al. 2008), empirical evidence on the spread of global models of best practice in the field
of HRM across MNCs of various countries of origin seems to indicate that at least mimetic forms of
isomorphism  are  present  among  MNCs.  Acquisition  of  practices  in  the  case  of  mimetic
isomorphism mirrors a deliberate choice of actors inside the organization and hence points to the
cognitive pillar of institutions (Scott 1987: 504). This deliberate choice, in turn, can be linked to
belief systems (Scott 1994) or to embedded ideological norms of socialised actors (Almond 2011a:
260,  265).  If  these  actors  are  globalised  managers,  they  may  feel  as  part  of  an  international
managerial  community  of  expatriates  (Moore  2006:  406)  having  developed  multiple  identities
(Delmestri 2006). When such actors interpret best practice models, their preferences may hence
well be de-nationalised since “'global' (or dominant) economic, managerial and cultural norms can
be regarded as intervening in the construction of identities of actors at all (...) levels” (Almond
2011a: 263). 
While  the  arguments  about  global  influences  on  actors'  identities  and  socialised  rationality
basically also apply to host country actors,  our discussion of  host country effects  revealed still
further elements. Traditionally the influence of host country effects on cross-border practice transfer
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has been considered as some form of constraint imposed on MNCs. These may take the form of
coercive institutional pressures or lacking institutional supports that are needed for a successful
transfer of certain country-of-origin practices (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 92; Streeck 1997b: 243-
244, 252; Tempel 2001: 64, 66).
However, our discussion of sub-national levels of embeddedness (Almond 2011b; Lane and Wood
2009)  has  shown  that  it  is  reasonable  to  think  of  host  country  effects not  only  in  terms  of
constraints, but rather to actively consider the “competitive provision of supports for MNCs and the
local firms dependent on them” (Almond 2011b: 533) since “institutions may serve as resources as
well as constraints” (Almond et al. 2005: 281). Moreover, we have seen that in order to be able to
benefit  from locally  available  resources,  an  MNC subsidiary  has  to  be  locally  embedded,  i.e.
integrated into a locationally immobile “web of value-creating linkages” where informal institutions
and membership in “clubs” is considered to be important (Meyer et al. 2011: 247). As we will see in
more detail in our analysis of the Swiss host country business system in chapter 6, such arguments
around the importance of the sub-national level of national business systems seem to be particularly
pertinent. 
In a second step, we have discussed the influence of micro-level factors. In this connection, we have
seen how various company-level factors including structure and competitive strategy (Bartlett and
Ghoshal  1998;  Porter  1986a,  1986b,  1987),  but  also  entry  mode  and  international  degree  of
standardization and integration of production or service provision may require varying degrees of
international HRM integration (Edwards and Rees 2006c; Schuler et al. 1993) and hence practice
transfer within MNCs. Depending on the complexity of the environment the MNC faces, different
structures  and  strategies  will  be  adopted  which  imply  different  needs  for  coordination  and
integration (Evans et al. 2002: 30–31). Where MNCs face highly complex environments and try to
develop an  integrated  network  in  order  to  evolve  towards  the  transnational  form,  coordination
demands in HRM are highest, whereas multidomestic companies are likely to see little advantage in
international standardization of HRM practices and policies (Dowling 1999; Harzing 2000, 2002).
Strong incentives for standardization in the field of HRM are furthermore found where companies
try to realise synergistic economies based on the international provision of standardized products or
services (Edwards 2011). Where companies try to exploit international differences through arbitrage
and access location-specific  knowledge and resources, different subsidiaries will assume different
strategic roles and control certain resources, thus creating situations of interdependency within the
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MNC network. Moreover, our discussion of different HR tasks and activities (Evans et al. 2002:
465–469) has shown that there are different needs for integration and differentiation in different
functional areas of HRM, implying that transfer is likely to happen first and foremost in those areas
that are marked by higher levels of integration.
As we have seen,  different types of subsidiaries can be distinguished as based on their respective
knowledge in- and outflows (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991; Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006), that
demand different control and HRM practices (Taylor et al. 1996). Though, subsidiary roles are not
set in stone and evolve over time, a process in which their endowment with different kinds of power
resources  and  agency play  a  central  role.  In  this  respect,  national  and  local  institutional
environments once more play an important part. Not only are they the basis of institutional power,
but  they  also  strongly  shape  locally  available  resources,  and  hence,  influence  on  the  resource
dependent power of subsidiaries (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2006, 2011; Dörrenbächer and
Geppert 2006, 2009). 
In this respect, the suggestion to think of MNCs as “political animals” (Edwards and Rees 2006c:
84), thus highlighting the “contested nature of organizational life in MNCs” (Edwards 2011: 487;
Ferner et al. 2012) seems very useful to understand and capture the highly important micro-political
processes and strategizing within MNCs. Such strategizing of actors who are seizing opportunities
to obtain stronger power resources to engage in bargaining processes with other units and HQ is
largely in line with a more processual view of strategy (Whittington 2001).
Moreover, agency and strategizing is by no means confined to actors and units within the MNC, but
entails furthermore the whole MNC as actor who can engage in negotiations with local authorities
to gain legitimacy (Kostova et al. 2008) or in institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) to
modify institutional distance (Ferner et al. 2012). These forms of agency are particularly important
when a MNC wishes to introduce innovative or deviant practices (Pulignano 2006; Tempel 2001:
59; Wächter 2004).
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4.2 An integrated conceptual framework for HRM practice transfer within MNCs
In the extant literature, the influences previously discussed have been integrated into a framework
for  research  into  the  transfer  of  employment  relations  and  practices  within  MNCs.  In  this
framework,  influences  have  been  grouped  into  four  key  influences,  namely  country-of-origin
effects, dominance effects, pressures for international integration, and host country effects (Edwards
and Ferner 2002). In the following, this framework has successively been enlarged and refined by
integrating issues of power, agency and change (Almond et al. 2005; Edwards et al. 2007b; Ferner
et  al. 2012).  Following  the  logic  of  this  enlarged framework or  “political  economy approach”
(Edwards et al. 2007b: 201), the MNC is viewed as “a highly complex configuration of ongoing
micro-political power conflicts at different levels in which strategizing social actors/groups inside
and outside the firm interact with each other and create temporary balances of power that shape how
formal  organizational  relationships  and  processes  actually  work  in  practice”  (Morgan  and
Kristensen 2006: 1473).
In the present investigation, we will largely build on this framework while integrating a more fine-
tuned analysis  and consideration of the sub-national  level  of business systems (Almond 2011b;
Lane and Wood 2009; Rees and Edwards 2006a: 22–24) and applying the most recent conceptions
of power and agency of, and within MNCs (Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2006, 2009; Ferner  et al.
2012; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). 
In this  connection,  actors can be conceptualised on three levels. In a first  step,  we can discuss
MNCs as  actors and  rule-makers  (Ferner et  al. 2012)  who  are  engaging  in  institutional  work
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) and negotiate legitimacy directly with local authorities (Kostova et
al. 2008).  Secondly,  we can investigate into  subsidiaries as actors.  In this  case we can further
distinguish between agency related to the local embeddedness of subsidiaries into their external
institutional  environment  where the membership in  informal  clubs is  important  to  benefit  from
locally available resources (Meyer et  al. 2011), and the internal leverage of these resources by
managers who may engage in subversive strategies in order to develop their subsidiary's strategic
role and assets (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Delany 1998; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011;
Morgan and Kristensen 2006). This, in turn, is linked to the third level of actors being  mangers,
their career orientations and degree of local embeddedness. According to their personal interests and
career orientations, they may decide to take different courses of action (Dörrenbächer and Geppert
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2009, 2010; Morgan and Kristensen 2006). Furthermore, as we have seen, local managers also act
as  interpreters  of  local  institutions,  especially of  cognitive  and normative  elements  of  the  host
country environment (Tempel and Walgenbach 2007: 17–18), and might hence play a key role in the
local implementation or adaptation of transferred practices. An overview of this classification is
provided in table 14 below.
Table 14: Three categories of actors and aspects of agency
Actors Aspects of agency
MNC Rule-making, institutional work, reducing institutional distance
Negotiating legitimacy
Subsidiary or
MNC unit
Internal: subsidiary strategic role and 
subversive strategizing, competition for 
resources and mandates communicating 
in a politically sensitive way about local 
constraints
micro-politics of information shaping
External: local embeddedness – membership in 
informal networks and clubs granting access to 
valuable resources
Short-term US-American MNCs:
focus on quick returns, 
no engagement in long-term commitment 
and development of existing institutional 
advantages,
focus on accountability of managers to 
HQ, 
use of budgets, targets and benchmarks 
as disciplinary mechanisms in investment
bargaining
Longer-term German MNCs:
despite international growth through mergers 
and acquisitions and hence lost impunity to 
outside financial market scrutiny, managers 
remain sensitive to achieving long-term change 
and improvement; use of budgets, targets and 
benchmarks rather for negotiating improved 
performance in local sites than as disciplinary 
mechanisms in investment bargaining
Managers Degree of local embeddedness and career orientation, multiple identities
Short-term US-American MNCs: 
managers as part of the authority 
structure of the MNC managerial 
hierarchy, 
passive relationship with particular social 
and institutional context of site
Longer-term German MNCs:
long-term focus of senior managers who are 
identifying strongly with the firm, potentially 
more active relationship with institutional context
of site 
Source:  own elaboration largely  based on Ferner  et  al.  (2012),  Almond (2011b),  Kostova et  al.  (2008),
Tempel  and  Walgenbach  (2007),  Lawrence  and  Suddaby  (2006),  Morgan  and  Kristensen  (2006),
Dörrenbächer (2004: 445, 447), Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011), Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2009),
Meyer et al. (2011), Moore (2006), and Kristensen (2007).
Referring to transfer of HRM practices, we can distinguish between direct and indirect mechanisms
(Liu 2004: 507) that are used by MNCs.  Direct mechanisms comprise guidelines and rules with
subsidiaries being asked to comply with a set of corporate HRM policies. In this case, HQ employs
“procedural” channels (Edwards et al. 2010: 618) to pass HR policies and practices as a  form of
codifiable knowledge to subsidiaries (Taylor et al. 1996). The use of these channels points to formal
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authority  relations  between  HQ  and  subsidiaries  (Ferner  and  Edwards  1995)  and  will  hence
regularly be backed up by formal systems of management control involving rewards and penalty
systems.  In  this  respect,  benchmarking,  coercive  comparisons  and  competition  for  corporate
investment among subsidiaries are widely used means to ensure the identification, diffusion and
adoption of corporate-wide standard practices (Coller and Marginson 1998; Sisson 2006: 243, 246-
247). Relating to the use of such direct transfer mechanisms, Liu (Liu 2004: 508) argues that, while
an advantage lies in the speed of transfer, possible strong objection from employees may be viewed
as a major disadvantage, especially when transferred practices are believed to damage their benefits.
Corporate best practice schemes might also be added to this category (Coller 1996; Martin and
Beaumont 1998; Müller and Purcell 1992; Sisson 2006: 246; Tempel 2001: 131). Indirect transfer
mechanisms are different from direct ones in that the HR practices that are to be transferred are
attached to some carriers. These may include corporate culture or expatriates from HQ and will
rather concern HRM practices that relate to the company way of doing things representing more
tacit knowledge that is better transferred using people-based channels (Edwards et al. 2010: 618;
Liu  2004:  508).  Thus,  international  management  training  courses,  a  strong  and  explicitly
communicated corporate culture and international mobility of expatriate managers as well as regular
international meetings may all serve to socialise managers in the company way (Coller 1996: 165;
Myloni et al. 2007). Expatriates have also been argued to play “a considerable role as interpreters
and  implementers  of  HR and  business  strategy”  (Harris  and Holden  2001:  85).  These  indirect
mechanisms are hence rather related to cultural relations between different units of a MNC (Ferner
and Edwards 1995). As we can see, the different  mechanisms used to transfer HR practices  are
actually  all  some  kind  of  control  or  coordination  mechanism.  In  this  respect, direct  transfer
mechanisms are attributable to the category of direct-impersonal control involving standardization
and  formalization.  Indirect  mechanisms  can  be  linked  to  direct-personal  control  including
expatriates,  and  indirect-personal  control  practices  relating  to  socialization,  informal
communication and management training (Harzing and Sorge 2003: 198).
Due to the fact that cross-national transfer of HRM practices is highly complex, we can distinguish
between several dimensions and outcomes. Starting with the dimensions of practice transfer, we can
distinguish  between  the  degree  of  adaptation  or  hybridization  of  practices,  the  degree  of
internalization, the functionality, and finally the directionality of transferred practices (Ferner et al.
2012:  164).  While  hybridization refers  to  a  combination  of  the  transferred  practice  with  host
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country practices (Becker-Ritterspach 2009), internalization is about the extent of assimilation of a
practice  to  the  working  assumptions,  cognitive  understandings  and  normative  frameworks  of
subsidiary  employees  and  managers.  Thus,  this  dimension  is  directly  linked  to  the  socialised
rationalities (Almond 2011a) of local actors.  Functionality concerns the question of whether the
transferred practices perform the function intended for them by HQ actors, or whether they work in
unintended or even dysfunctional ways. In this respect we can also point to cases where functional
equivalents of practices related to German dual VET, that are hard to transfer, were found in Central
and Eastern European countries (Bluhm 2001: 161). Finally,  directionality relates to the fact that
transfer may basically happen in three directions: “downstream” or “forward” diffusion from HQ to
subsidiaries,  “upstream”  or  “reverse  diffusion”  from  a  subsidiary  back  to  HQ,  and  “multi-
directional”,  “flow” or  “horizontal”  diffusion,  where practices  originating in  one set  of  foreign
operations are spread throughout the company to another one (Edwards 1998: 696; Edwards et al.
2010: 614; Edwards and Rees 2006d: 97; Tempel 2001: 57). 
In this respect, especially the earlier discussed power of meaning takes on great importance since
“institutional” (Ferner et al. 2012: 167) or “socialised” rationalities of actors (Almond 2011a: 260)
are mirroring normative-cognitive frameworks. These, in turn, are susceptible to be influenced by
the  shaping of  corporate  cultures,  codes  and other  socialization  practices  referred  to  earlier  as
indirect transfer mechanisms.
Taking into account different constellations of institutional distance, power capabilities and interests
of involved actors, Ferner et al. (Ferner et al. 2012: 177–181) have developed a model of transfer
outcomes. As we have seen earlier, these authors have argued for the need to replace institutional
distance in a Kostovian sense (Kostova 1999: 312) by the concept of modified institutional distance
as a way of taking into account the modifying influence of dominance effects and MNC power as
active  rule-makers  on  institutional  distance  and  cross-national  practice  transfer.  Furthermore,
depending on the specific configuration of power resources and interests, subsidiary actors can take
either  a  supportive  or  oppositional  stance,  while  the  latter  does  not  necessarily  imply  overt
resistance  (Oliver  1991).  As  a  result  of  this  complex  interplay  of  various  factors,  six  typical
scenarios can be identified that are based on differentiation along the dimensions presented above.
A first outcome would be successful transfer where functional practices are internalised. This would
be  most  likely  to  happen  in  situations  where  HQ  actively  wants  to  transfer  practices,  where
institutional distance is low, dominance effects and institutional space or room for manoeuvre are
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high, HQ disposes of strong power capabilities, and interests of HQ and subsidiary are concordant
and homogeneous  among subsidiary actors.  A second scenario  involving increased  institutional
distance and more resource power of the subsidiary could lead to functional hybridization including
some  adaptations.  This  is  likely  in  cases  where  practices  are  transferred  by  means  of  broad
framework policies where local adaptation is expected in HR and employment relations areas such
as performance management, variable pay, and employee involvement (Edwards et al. 2007a). An
alternative third scenario would instead result in resistive hybridization. In such circumstances, low
internalization  is  likely  “where  transfer  disrupts  internal  accommodations  and/or  is  seen  as
dysfunctional  for  subsidiary  performance,  and  where  subsidiary  actors  have  sufficient  power
capabilities,  such  as  interpretive  control  of  local  meaning  frames”  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  178).
Furthermore,  weaker  dominance  effects,  more  constrained  institutional  space  and  subsidiary
interests that diverge from HQ's interests would increase the probability of such an outcome. A
fourth outcome would be a failure of transfer which is likely to happen when dominance effects are
absent,  institutional  distance is  high,  the subsidiary disposes  of  strong power resources  and its
interests diverge from those of HQ. Where institutional space as well as subsidiary resource and
process power are moderate but interests of subsidiary actors are different from those at HQ, this
fifth  situation  makes  ceremonial  compliance probable.  Contrary  to  the  argument  furthered  by
Kostova et al. (2008) about ceremonial compliance being unnecessary in case of MNCs due to the
non-existence of a strong and clearly defined institutional field, in the typology proposed by Ferner
et al. (2012), ceremonial compliance would be a possible transfer outcome under certain conditions.
Finally, in situations where interests are concordant and where subsidiary's power capabilities are
considerable  –  for  example  in  cases  of  strong  local  embeddedness  allowing  the  subsidiary  to
develop scarce  resources  of  great  value  for  the  whole  MNC –  reverse  transfer might  happen.
Especially in situations where the subsidiary's host system is more dominant than the MNC's parent
system, the conditions of reverse transfer are ideal, as has already been found for example in the
case of UK-based “vanguard” subsidiaries of German MNCs (Ferner and Varul 2000a). Although
this  model  of  six  transfer  outcomes  is  not  exhaustive  and  both,  other  outcomes  and  other
combinations of variables leading to the same outcomes are possible, such a typology nevertheless
seems useful to us thanks to its capacity to reduce complexity (Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006:
196).  Table  15  below summarizes  our  discussion  of  cross-national  HRM practice  transfer  and
provides an overview of key influences, mechanisms, dimensions and  outcomes associated with
practice transfer.
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Table 15: Overview of the integrated conceptual framework for HRM practice transfer
Key influences on macro 
and micro level
Mechanisms Channels knowledge 
characteristics
Associated measures Dimensions Outcomes
Macro institutional: 
Country-of-origin effect 
(cross-national 
isomorphism)
direct Guidelines, 
structures and 
rules
Procedural 
channels
Codifiable 
knowledge
Coercive comparisons, 
benchmarking, explicit 
formal systems of 
management control, 
resource-power of HQ 
(investment decisions, 
rewards, careers)
Degree of adaptation or 
hybridization
Successful transfer 
(functional practices 
are internalised)
Macro institutional: Host 
country effect (local 
isomorphism)
best practice 
schemes
internalization Functional 
hybridization
Macro institutional: 
Dominance effect (global
inter-corporate 
isomorphism)
indirect Socialization 
mechanisms 
linked to 
corporate 
culture
People-
based 
channels
Tacit 
knowledge
International management 
training and development, 
international project groups
functionality Resistive 
hybridization  (low 
internalization)
Micro: International 
integration effect, global 
strategy, coordination 
and control (corporate 
isomorphism)
International 
transfer of 
managers
Directionality:
- Forward or downstream 
diffusion
- Reverse or upstream 
diffusion
- Multi-directional, flow or 
horizontal diffusion
Failed transfer
Ceremonial adoption
Micro: Political aspects of
power and agency, 
subsidiary roles
Reverse transfer
Source: own compilation based on Edwards and Ferner (2002), Ferner and Edwards (1995), Ferner and Quintanilla (1998), Ferner et al. (2004b), Almond et al.
(2005), Edwards (1998), Hayden and Edwards (2001), Edwards and Ferner (2004), Edwards et al. (2005), Edwards et al. (2010), Edwards and Tempel (2010),
Tempel  (2001),  Edwards  et  al.  (2007b),  Ferner  et  al.  (2012),  Almond  (2011a),  Almond  (2011b),  Edwards  (2011),  Dörrenbächer  (2001),  Dörrenbächer  and
Gammelgaard (2006),  Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011), Liu (2004), Meyer et al. (2011), Szulanski (1996), Taylor et al. (1996), and Yu and Wu (2009).
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PART  III:  NATIONAL  BUSINESS  SYSTEMS  AND  HRM
PRACTICE TRANSFER WITHIN MNCS – GERMANY, THE USA
AND SWITZERLAND
As  we  have  seen,  our  choice  to  compare  German  and  US-American  MNCs  is  theoretically
informed. Germany and the USA differ markedly in terms of the institutional structuring of their
business systems and are considered to be situated on opposed poles on the spectrum of capitalist
economies in many respects (Farndale et al. 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 22; Wächter et al. 2004:
85) with Germany “(...) epitomising the CME” (Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2008: 153) and the USA
being “(...) a typical liberal market economy” (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 8). 
In  chapter  2.3  we  have  presented  the  analytical  framework  of  the  business  systems  approach
(Whitley 2000a) with its key institutional arenas as well as different categories of ideal types of
business  systems  and  firms.  We  have  illustrated  how  this  approach  allows  for  a  more  subtle
distinction  between,  and analysis  of,  institutional  environments  than  the  varieties  of  capitalism
literature (Hall and Soskice 2001b) that proposes only two large categories of CMEs and LMEs. In
our discussion of the business systems framework, we have seen that the USA are an example of a
compartmentalised ideal type of business system. In this type of NBS, isolated hierarchies have
become established as the dominant type of firm, with work systems that are rather Taylorist in
nature.  On  the  other  hand,  Germany is  an  example  of  a  collaborative  business  system where
dominant  firms  are  cooperative  hierarchies,  where  negotiated  work  systems  with  delegated
responsibility have developed.
In our integrated conceptual framework presented in the precedent chapter, we have identified five
kinds of influences on cross-national HRM practice transfer within MNCs. Three of these factors,
dominance,  country-of-origin  and host  country effects,  have  been attributed  to  the  institutional
macro-level,  whereas the remaining two have been categorized as micro-institutional influences
acting  primarily  on  organizational  level.  In  chapter  2.4  we  have  discussed  how  isomorphic
pressures  and the  nature  of  business  systems shape the  kind,  direction  and strength  of  macro-
institutional dominance, country-of-origin and host country effects in the event of cross-national
HRM practice transfer within MNCs. 
Part III of the present investigation is now dedicated to the three macro-institutional influences and
their  effects  on  HRM  and  cross-national  practice  transfer  in  our  three  country  constellation
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involving the USA and Germany as country-of-origin and Switzerland as host country to MNCs.
In chapter 5, we will  provide an overview of salient features of the German and US-American
national business systems as concrete examples of a collaborative and a compartmentalised business
system where German and US-American MNCs are embedded in, respectively. In this connection,
embeddedness  points  to  the
“contextualization  of  economic
activity  in  on-going  patterns  of
social relations” (Dacin et al. 1999:
319). 
In  a  second step,  important  results
of  empirical  investigations  into
cross-national  HRM  practice
transfer  in  German  and  US-
American MNCs, and their ways of
approaching  different  host  country
institutional  environments   will  be
presented.  This  empirical  evidence
complements  our  theoretical
information  about  the
embeddedness  of  these
organizations in their respective business system. Moreover, it provides some empirically validated
information on typical  country-of-origin  and dominance effects within German and US-American
MNCs. Therefore, we provide a review of recent studies that investigated into how German and
US-American MNCs were dealing with different kinds of host country business systems' constraints
and opportunities in the event of HRM practice transfer.
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In a  second step,  chapter  6  will  then focus  on the
most  important  features  of  the  Swiss  host  country
institutional environment. This time, the focus is on
isolating  possible  local  influences  on  HRM  and
HRM  practice  transfer  in  terms  of  host  country
effects.
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Chapter 5 German and US-American MNCs – country-of-origin 
effects and HRM practice transfer 
Chapter 5 is organized according to the country of origin. Therefore, in a first step we will focus on
country-of-origin effects and HRM in German MNCs, before discussing the same issues for US-
American  MNCs  in  a  second  step.  We  will  start  with  an  overview  of  salient  features  of  the
respective national business systems in order to understand the nature of firms, and influences of the
national business system on “domestic” HRM in Germany and in the USA, respectively, where the
MNCs under scrutiny have historically grown. The overview of business system characteristics will
then be complemented with a literature review of empirical studies dealing with the transfer of
HRM practices. This is done in order to isolate typical patterns and approaches of German and US
MNCs in dealing with different  host-country environments.  Such patterns will  then be used to
formulate propositions about expected approaches towards transfer of German and US MNCs in
Switzerland, that can be matched with our own empirical results.
5.1 German MNCs – country-of-origin effects, overall approach towards transfer 
and host country effects 
The following section is organized in three parts. In
a  first  step,  we will  provide  a  short  overview of
salient  features  of  the  German  national  business
system and its  influences  on  German  “domestic”
HRM.  In  a  second  step,  evidence  on  German
MNCs'  overall  approach towards  transfer  will  be
summarized.  Here,  our  aim  is  to  detect  concrete
evidence of the influence of country-of-origin and
dominance  effects  as  macro-level  institutional
influences on cross-national HRM practice transfer. Based on this more general information, a more
detailed analysis of empirical evidence on German MNCs in different host countries will be done.
This third section is hence aimed at an analysis of specific outcomes of the interaction of German
country-of-origin, dominance and host country effects. This analysis yields important insights into
how German MNCs related to the institutional settings of other host countries, which allows for the
formulation  of  concrete  propositions  concerning their  expected  ways  of  approaching the  Swiss
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environment.
5.1.1 Salient features of the German national business system and domestic HRM
Firms, markets and MNC internationalization
German firms as “collaborative hierarchies” (Chandler 1990) have for long relied on the export of
high quality products while focusing on the realization of  economies of scope within a flexible
production  system  termed  diversified  quality  production (Geppert et  al. 2003a;  Geppert  and
Williams 2006; Hollingsworth 1997a: 272, 284; Lane 2000a: 210). Flexible production systems
require firms to be in close technical contact involving coordination and even cooperation with
other  producers  and a  highly skilled  workforce  which  is  achieved  through collective  forms  of
governance.  Therefore,  German  firms  are  considerably  less  isolated  than  their  US-American
counterparts.  Long-term cooperation between capital and labour and between competitors within
rich networks that are based on long-term relationships, are nurtured by relatively high levels of
trust between economic actors. Moreover, the German environment is marked by communitarian
obligations, and a certain degree of external coercion is exercised on economic actors to adhere to
these obligations (Hollingsworth 1997a: 272–275; Streeck 1997a). Underlying these characteristics
is a vision of firms as social institutions rather than as mere networks of private contracts or as the
property of shareholders. Thus, “their internal order is a matter of public interest and is subject to
extensive social regulation by law and industrial agreement” (Streeck 1997b: 241).
German MNCs are embedded in a cohesive and tightly integrated business system that is rich in
institutional supports and inter-organizational mechanisms of governance and coordination. Due to
this local embeddedness, both the  transferability of German practices that are dependent on the
provision of institutional supports, and the  willingness of German MNCs to engage in transfer –
especially  of  practices  associated  with  co-determination  –  have  been  repeatedly  questioned
(Dickmann 2003; Dörrenbächer 2001, 2004).
German MNCs are known for their  relative tardiness in establishing production and large scale
employment outside Germany when compared to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (Cantwell  and
Bellak 1998; Ferner and Quintanilla 1998; Ferner et al. 2001: 109). As Kristensen and Morgan
(2007: 201) explain, only recently, “a combination of political and economic pressures has led the
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largest firms in Germany to grow internationally through mergers and acquisitions (…) to ensure
that  they  are  not  outperformed  by much  larger  US-  or  UK-based multinationals”.  The  overall
preference of German MNCs for  growth and foreign market entry via acquisitions has also been
underlined by Dörrenbächer (2004: 445, 447). In order to carry out these large-scale merger and
acquisition  activities,  German  firms  had  to  enter  international  financial  markets  and  convince
international investors through foreign listings and improved transparency to gain access to the
funds needed (Geppert et al. 2003a, 2003b: 622; Lane 2001, 2006). Even though German MNCs
have lost some of their “impunity from outside scrutiny” when undertaking long-term investment,
German managers are still sensitive to long-term change and improvement which is facilitated by
the continued presence of some patient capital that provides a buffer against frequent short-term
reconfigurations (Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 201–202). We will come back to this last argument
in the section dealing with the financial system and corporate governance.
The state and economic coordination
While the German state  is  not  developmental  or  risk-sharing in  nature and generally limits  its
interventions  to  defining  the  regulatory framework that  governs  economic  activity,  it  is  highly
supportive of intermediary associations. As Streeck (1997b: 242) explains, “[i]t is through state-
enabled  collective  action  and quasi-public,  'corporatist'  group self-government  that  the  German
political economy generates most of the regulations and collective goods that circumscribe, correct
and underpin the instituted markets of soziale Marktwirtschaft”. Rich institutional supports as well
as  inter-organizational  mechanisms of  governance  and coordination  include in  particular  strong
industry-based business associations and trade union federations that are firmly integrated into the
corporatist state (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 14; Kenworthy 2003: 11; Streeck 1997b; Streeck and
Schmitter 1985). These intermediaries assume an important role in coordinating economic activities
including  the  diffusion  of  new  technologies,  inter-firm  cooperation  within  research  networks
(Verbundforschung)(Lane 2000a: 211) and   common technical standard-setting (Hall and Soskice
2001a: 26). Besides, the German state supports private firm efforts through high public spending on
research  and development  (Streeck 1997b:  242).  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  the  U.S.,  German
contract law may be seen as complementary to the presence of strong business associations since it
encourages  relational  contracting  among  companies.  For  associationally  enabled  technology
transfer,  tightly  written,  formal  contracts  are  often  inadequate  whereas  relational  contracting
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sustains such relationships (Casper 2001). 
Adopting  a  systemic  view  of  corporate  strategy  (Whittington  2001),  we  may  therefore  argue
together with Hall and Soskice (2001a: 27) that under these conditions, corporate strategies are
encouraged that focus on product differentiation and niche production rather than direct product
competition with other firms in the same industry.
The  German  state  also  plays  an  important  role  in  the  joint  coordination  and  financing  of  the
comprehensive system of dual initial vocational education and training (dual VET) as we will see in
some more detail in the section on the German education and training system below.
The state and labour market regulation
Contrary to the USA, Germany is considered a heavily regulated environment (Quintanilla et al.
2004: 130) where institutional regulations impose important restrictions on managerial prerogative.
According to Müller,  “German labor market institutions restrict  management's right to manage”
(Müller  1999b:  132)  and  can  hence  be  considered  in  direct  opposition  to  U.S.  ideals  of
“organizational  autonomy”  and  “the  right  to  manage”  (Brewster  1995:  1–3).  In  the  German
environment,  “managers of large German firms face capital  and labour  markets that are  highly
organised, enabling both capital and labour to participate directly in the everyday operation of the
firm and requiring decisions to be continuously negotiated” (Streeck 1997b: 241). Therefore, in the
field of labour market regulation, the German state plays a significantly more important role than
the U.S. federal state. 
Following the “principle of status” (Streeck 1987), in Germany there is a marked tendency towards
juridification  of  the  employment  relation which  is  accompanied  by a  strong formalization  and
standardization of regulations (Avery et al. 1999: 22; Royle 2004; Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992:
25). Thus, we may say that employee relations are “currently strongly influenced by legislative
safeguards” (Williams and Geppert 2006a: 48). This is also reflected by rather strict employment
protection legislation above OECD average (Venn 2009: 8). In this connection, Harcourt et al. point
out  the  fact  that,  while  German  just-cause  rules  are  allowing  for  redundancies  in  wider
circumstances than this is the case in France, “Germany's dismissal procedures are in many ways
more  onerous”  (Harcourt et  al. 2007:  964)  because  they  require  greater  levels  of  worker
involvement. Worker involvement in restructuring and redundancies, in turn, is closely linked to the
representative organ of the works council since “the measures provided for under a redundancy plan
stem from negotiations between the employer and the works council, and such negotiations must
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result in an agreement between the parties” (Morin and Vicens 2001: 51).
Regarding German labour market organization, three key institutions governing the German labour
market have been repeatedly highlighted:  collective bargaining,  dual VET, and  co-determination
(Giardini et  al. 2005;  Guest  and Hoque 1996: 53; Lane 2000a:  212; Müller  1997: 613, 1999a,
1999b; Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002). While both, the system of collective bargaining and dual
VET  will  be  discussed  in  separate  sections,  we  will  first  have  a  closer  look  at  workplace
representation and co-determination.
Based on the German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972), works councils are
endowed with far-reaching statutory co-determination rights in the area of social affairs which gives
them a  strong  influence  on  HRM practices.  In  this  regard,  Williams  and  Geppert  (2006a:  57)
explain that “management is forced to seek the agreement of the works council on any changes to
areas such as working time, work scheduling, bonuses and performance targets of employees, the
payment of  wages  and salaries,  workplace training,  data  held on employees  and monitoring of
workers”. Furthermore, Giardini et al. (2005: 68) point out the fact that “(t)raditionally, strong ties
exist between the works council and the trade union of the respective industry, as many employee
representatives  are  also  member  of  a  trade  union”.  However,  they guard  explicitly  against  the
common, but improper oversimplification to assume that works councils' influence in a company
equals trade unions' influence. In fact, we may recall that works councils are legally obliged to give
priority to corporate interests and the welfare of their company (Bluhm 2001: 163) which may at
times differ from trade unions' political objectives. In this respect, also Lane (2000a: 212) points to
a “clear separation of functions between unions and works councils”.
Streeck considers works councils' co-determination rights as “social constraints” that are imposed
on  economic  actors  by  authoritative  state  intervention.  In  his  view,  such  constraints  support
cooperative, trust-based relations between economic actors through the creation of additional, non-
economic  incentives.  He  therefore  argues  that  “(c)redible  information  that  the  other  side  has
noneconomic in addition to economic reasons not to defect accelerates and consolidates the growth
of trustful  relations” (Streeck 1997a:  202).  Furthermore,  he distinguishes  between two types  of
noneconomic  reasons  in  this  sense.  These  may  either  consist  of  culturally  supported  moral
commitments precluding opportunistic behaviour, or of impersonal rules like formal law, providing
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for  “sufficiently  strong sanctions  to  make  opportunistic  withdrawal  from reciprocal  obligations
highly unlikely to factually impossible” (Streeck 1997a: 202). According to this distinction, co-
determination rights of German works councils clearly belong to the second kind of noneconomic
incentives as they are based on the Works Constitution Act. Similarly,  works councils'  statutory
rights as well as employment protection legislation may be viewed as a “'control in being'  that
entices the parties involved to bargain for a compromise at the level of the firm, without running the
incalculable risk of the vagaries of an outside decision” (Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992: 27). In
this way, Wächter (1992: 23) has argued that union influence and codetermination have served as an
important building block of German social market economy  (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) thanks to
their “mitigating  impact insofar as the side-effects on employment, working conditions, etc. have
attracted considerable attention and have become part of management's decision process”. We may
hence  expect  these  institutional  constraints  on  managerial  decision-making  to  impact  on  the
“societally informed rationality” (Almond et al. 2005: 281; Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002) of
German management actors. This proposition is further supported by Kostova and Roth's (2002:
218) suggestion to view organizational actors as “carriers of institutions” whose cognitive profiles
and judgements of practices are influenced by the institutional context.
German management may hence be considered to be  institutionally forced into the adoption of a
consensual  style in  the  field  of  employee-  and  industrial  relations  since  works  council
representatives  are  legally  endowed  with  important  institutional  power  resources  (Ferner et  al.
2012:  173–174).  The  latter  may  object  changes  in  such  central  areas  as  working  time,  work
organization or performance appraisal. Works council opposition to restructuring plans, including
the obligation to  achieve an agreement  in  case of redundancies,  may render  management's  life
difficult and yield high costs. Thus, it is not astonishing that Wever (1995) described the German
approach to structuring the relationship with human resources as “negotiated”.
Industrial relations
The field of IR seems especially well-suited in order to illustrate the interaction between HRM
practices  in  organizations  and institutional  environments  since IR institutions are  central  to  the
regulation of the employment relation. As we have seen, we can distinguish between permissive and
constraining IR systems (Tempel 2001: 52) in different business systems. Being aware of various
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difficulties that are making international comparisons of IR systems problematic, we can refer to
Hyman (2001: 211) who explains that one dominant analytical premise in recent Anglo-American
research is “the principle that 'institutions matter'”. He explains that the institutional framework of
IR that became “established either by law or by historic compromises between the organizations of
workers  and  employers  (...)  generates  norms,  practices  and  mutual  expectations  which  acquire
considerable  inertia”  (Hyman  2001:  211).  Though,  besides  institutions, IR  systems  and  their
comparison also involve the  functions of these institutions and the  issues they are dealing with
(Hyman  2001:  14–20).  In  this  connection,  Tempel  (2001:  49)  argues  that  industrial  relations
institutions  can  be  “defined  against  the  background  of  common  problems  associated  with  the
employment relationship” – hence pointing to issues – that she locates in the conflict inherent in the
employment relationship, the indeterminacy of the labour contract and the inequality of bargaining
power. Therefore, considering the functions of IR institutions, these can be considered as regulating
the nature of the employment relationship and the ways in which this is done. IR institutions may
consequently be defined as “the rules which are made by industrial relations organizations or actors
to regulate the problems which are inherent in the employment relationship” (Tempel 2001: 50). We
can distinguish between the way rules are made – unilaterally or joint –, the form that they take, as
they may “have their basis in law, a written collective agreement, an unwritten agreement (…) or
merely an understanding that has the force of custom” (Edwards 1995: 5) and the scope of rules that
may regulate at national, industry, company, establishment or work group level (Purcell 1995). 
Concerning IR, Germany has been described as a “constraining” environment (Giardini et al. 2005;
Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002; Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992) as opposed to “permissive”
ones  like  the  UK  (Ferner  1994,  1997;  Marginson et  al. 1993;  Tempel  2001:  21).  Strong
constitutional protections are in place to guarantee collective bargaining autonomy for unions and
employers' associations, allowing them to regulate wages and working conditions in a relatively
centralised and coordinated  form on industry level  (Lane 2000a:  212;  Venn 2009:  16)  without
government interference (Streeck 1997b: 242).
In  Germany,  IR  have  traditionally  been  “characterized  by  codetermination  and  co-operation”
(Wever 1995: 606) and “business and labour are known as the 'social partners'” (Wever 1995: 607).
Lane (2000a: 212) emphasizes German industrial relations' “capacity of promoting social peace”
and  to  influence  via  codetermination  and  collective  agreements  on  the  quality  of  labour.  It  is
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therefore not astonishing that German industrial relations have been characterized by a very low
level of conflict (Glunk et al. 1997: 100; Lesch 2004: 15).
Social justice and carefully negotiated consensus within the German model of co-determination at
the workplace level are considered to be closely linked to the ethos of the  Betriebsgemeinschaft
(works community) incorporating the notion of a community of interests (Calori and Dufour 1995:
64; Ferner et al. 2001: 109; Ferner and Varul 2000b: 82; Schlie and Warner 2000: 35; Wächter and
Stengelhofen 1992). 
Concerning  collective  bargaining,  we  may  say  that  traditionally  industry-based  collective
bargaining  led to high levels of collective bargaining coverage and a relatively egalitarian wage
distribution. These, in turn, promoted solidarity as well as union strength and made wage demands
predictable for employers (Lane 2000a: 212). 
However, recently several authors have highlighted signs of vertical disintegration within German
industry  and  of  changes  within  the  system of  industrial-  and  employee  relations  towards  dis-
articulation over the last  twenty years (Doellgast  and Greer  2007;  Tüselmann et  al. 2006:  67).
Guertzgen  (2009:  326–327)  describes  a  trend  towards  more  decentralised  forms  of  wage
determination starting in the early 1990s that has been driven by three developments. First,  the
absolute number of firm-specific collective wage agreements that have been negotiated between an
individual  firm  and  an  industry-specific  trade  union  has  increased  sharply.  Second,  wage
determination without collective bargaining coverage is growing in importance and may either take
the form of  individual  wage contracts  or  of  plant-specific  agreements  (Betriebsvereinbarungen)
between works council and management. Third, even within centralised wage agreements there is a
tendency to allow more flexibility at firm level through the inclusion of contractual opt-out clauses
(Öffnungsklauseln)  or  hardship  clauses.  Such  opt-out  clauses  delegate  issues  that  are  usually
specified in the central collective agreement such as working-time and pay conditions to the plant-
level. Hardship clauses enable firms that are close to bankruptcy to be exempted from the central
agreement. These developments have led to a sharp decline in industry-level collective bargaining
coverage of wages and working conditions starting from approximately 90% in 1989/90 and falling
to 71% in Western- and 57% in Eastern Germany by 2001 (Schmidt et al. 2003: 224–225). These
rates have continued to decrease until 2010 and have reached 56% in Western and 37% in Eastern
Germany with co-determination reaching 45% of employees in the private sector in Western and
37% in Eastern Germany (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011: 242–247). 
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Besides the marked regional differences between Eastern and Western Germany, further differences
have been found between firms of different sizes. While overall collective bargaining coverage in
Western  Germany is  clearly above the  level  in  the  eastern  part,  this  difference  decreases  with
growing firm size. While firms with more than 1 000 employees in the west showed a collective
bargaining coverage rate of 81,2%, firms of similar size in the east reached a comparably high level
of 77,0% (Schnabel 2006: 170). This result received further support by Van Klaveren and Tijdens
(2011: 68) who found higher levels of unionisation, collective bargaining coverage and employee
representation in MNCs than in other firms. Bluhm (2001: 166–167) who found similar results with
German MNC affiliates in Eastern Europe explained this trend towards a more cooperative attitude
of management in bigger firms with the concentration of union activities and the presence of the
most powerful works councils with strong union ties in larger firms.
In view of such marked differences in IR within the German business system between regions and
classes of firm sizes, it becomes apparent that differences within national business systems need to
be accounted for duly (Royle 2004: 52).  Such differences may translate into interaction effects
between  organizational  structure  and  size,  industry  or  regional  specificities  with  institutional
country-of-origin  effects  (Tempel et  al. 2005:  197).  Since various  effects  may overlap or  even
amalgamate, this complicates the task of isolating clear country-of-origin effects that are linked to
the national business system institutional configuration. Such differences in terms of “variation at
the source” (Meardi et al. 2009: 505) will have to be analysed carefully since they may shape the
approach of German MNCs abroad. While this does not contradict the existence and influence of
country-of-origin effects, however we should keep in mind that the latter do not necessarily need to
be homogeneous across all MNCs from one country when these differ along other dimensions like
size, industry, and region. In this connection, Tüselmann (2006: 69) also reminds us that “(...) the
home country effect is not fixed, but evolves in line with changes in the institutional infrastructure”
and hence, the nature of the country-of-origin effect among German MNCs is well susceptible to
reflect  changes  that  the  German  system  of  IR  has  undergone  during  the  past  twenty  years.
Furthermore,  due  to  important  international  influences,  some authors  are  describing  tendencies
among MNCs to put their embeddedness into national systems of IR into question and to substitute
these with organization-specific systems (Coller and Marginson 1998; Marginson and Sisson 1994).
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Education and training systems 
As we have seen, German firms have grown in a social system of diversified quality production
requiring a highly skilled workforce that may operate with minimal supervision (Hollingsworth
1997a:  272).  Therefore,  the  comprehensive  German  system  of  dual  vocational  education  and
training (dual VET) may be considered as complementary since it provides firms with employees
disposing of such industry-specific or firm-specific skills (Hall  and Soskice 2001a: 25; Soskice
1999:  206–207).  Currently,  about  two  thirds  of  school  leavers  in  Germany  opt  for  vocational
training of some kind, with three quarters of these going into the dual system and one quarter into
school-based training (Bosch and Charest 2008: 433). This system is governed jointly by a tripartite
arrangement involving the government that runs vocational training schools and the social partners.
The latter are consisting of employer associations and trade unions who are designing curricula,
with the employers implementing vocational training through the chambers of commerce (Bosch
and Charest 2008: 436; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25; Soskice 1999: 206). The involvement of social
partners  is  even  legally  defined  as  an  inherent  element  of  the  German  system  of  dual  VET
(Winterton 2007: 287). 
As distinct from the U.S., the level of vocational specificity and standardization of the quality of
education is rather high (Kerckhoff 2001: 5) in dual VET thanks to nation-wide minimum standards
that  are  detailed  in  the  federal  law on vocational  education  and training  (Berufsbildungsgesetz
(BBiG) 2007; Winterton 2007: 288). Following the typology established by Winterton (2007: 284),
the German system of dual VET hence corresponds to the workplace-focused, state-regulated type
of VET system. In this kind of system, the participation of the social partners is a decisive factor in
maintaining  the  close  linkage  between  training  system  and  labour  market  when  developing
occupational profiles for initial and upgrading training, and it facilitates the recognition of training
certificates on the labour market as well as their embeddedness in the wage system of German firms
(Bosch and Charest 2008: 433). German students entering the dual system are prepared to carry out
the duties of a particular occupation, leading to a much “stronger education-first job association in
Germany  than  elsewhere”  (Kerckhoff  2001:  9)  which  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  U.S.
educational system that focuses on general skills. 
Another  interesting  feature  of  the  German  educational  system  is  the  fact  that  an  increasing
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proportion of apprentices with the Abitur (high school diploma) go through a so-called dual study
programme which is a hybrid between vocational training and tertiary education, or first complete
an apprenticeship before entering university (Bosch and Charest 2008: 435–436; Kerckhoff 2001:
16).
In  view  of  recent  substantial  structural  changes  in  the  economy,  i.e. the  introduction  of  new
technologies and forms of work organization as well as the expansion of the service sector, Bosch
and Charest (2008: 436) come to the conclusion that dual VET “can still be an important instrument
for  creating  an  intermediate  tier  of  skilled  workers”  allowing  German  firms  to  continue  in
developing “one of the world's most skilled labor forces” (1997a: 287). Though, the recent decline
in collective bargaining coverage is considered a potential threat to the foundations of the dual
system in Germany since it entails an increase in the share of low-wage skilled workers in various
sectors  (Bosch and  Weinkopf  2008)  which  might  considerably undermine  the  attractiveness  of
vocational training for young people (Bosch and Charest 2008: 437).
Overall,  the  German education  system provides  strong technical  education at  all  levels  with a
relatively good quality of primary and secondary education. Traditionally, German managers were
trained as  engineers  rather  than  doing an  MBA as  in  the  USA (Schlie  and Warner  2000:  37).
Technical expertise is held in high regard in Germany and it is not only the most important basis for
middle  managers'  authority,  but  quality  of  skill  and  amount  of  experience  are  also  the  most
important promotion considerations in German firms (Glunk et al. 1997: 98; Stewart et al. 1994;
Streeck 1997b: 243; Warner and Campbell 1993). In line with this focus on technical expertise,
internal functional career paths with low job hopping and high firm loyalty (Calori and Dufour
1995: 68; Glunk et al. 1997: 99) are hence typical for German management development (Evans et
al. 2002: 376–377; Klarsfeld and Mabey 2004; Kristensen 2003).
Financial system and corporate governance
Traditionally, the German financial system has been bank credit rather than capital market-based
and marked by extensive cross-holdings in the ownership structures of large firms shielding them
from take-overs  and pressures  for  high  short-term returns  that  are  emanating  from shareholder
control (Lane 2000a: 211). The traditional German system hence corresponds to the type of bank-
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oriented, insider-dominated, stakeholder-focused Rhineland model of corporate governance (Weil
2002). These characteristics of the financial system are considered to be related to the notion of
German  stakeholder capitalism in a sense that the “objectives of the firms have to balance the
pursuit of profit by a consideration of social justice” (Lane 2000a: 211). The notion of stakeholder
capitalism in this sense can hence be linked back to a more systemic notion of strategy as discussed
earlier (Whittington 2001). 
Other authors (2004: 3, 13) have underlined the link between the two-tier board structure of German
companies, and the German stakeholder approach and social partnership. In German companies,
supervisory and managerial leadership are separated and 50 per cent of members of the supervisory
body are coming from the employee side. Since the supervisory board appoints the members of the
management board, top management has to consider shareholder and employee interests at the same
time. This difficult task, in turn, requires a process of decision-making that is marked by careful
cooperation with and consultation of stakeholders within network structures. Social partnership in
Germany  is  therefore  embedded  in  an  institutionalised  approach  of  problem-solving  through
compromise and consensus rather than confrontation, just in the sense of the “negotiated approach”
described by Wever (1995).
Although recently the relationships between German banks and business firms continue to evolve
and  the  historic  importance  of  banks  in  coordinating  the  German  economy  is  declining
(Hollingsworth 1997a: 285), OECD data on stock market capitalization and firm financing suggest
that bank credit, and hence some patient capital (Hall and Soskice 2001b: 22), still continues to play
an important role for German firms (Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 202; OECD 2004: 19–20). As
we have seen above, when expanding their activities internationally through FDI, especially large
MNCs had to access funds on international capital markets and hence, the system has undergone
some important  changes  towards  more transparency and protection of shareholder  rights in  the
recent two decades. Though, in the German stakeholder society (Schlie and Warner 2000: 35), the
adoption of the shareholder value philosophy is not as straight out as it is in the U.S. (Jürgens et al.
2000; Schlie and Warner 2000: 45–46) since important elements of the insider model such as cross
holdings are still intact (Almond et al. 2003: 439–441). Goutas and Lane conclude that, even if
German MNCs like Daimler  and Volkswagen have adopted the idea of  shareholder  value,  this
concept has been  translated into the German context. In this process, the ownership structure of
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firms has played an important role. German MNCs have succeeded in maintaining access to patient
capital  via  institutional  investors  like  pension  funds  (Goutas  and  Lane  2009:  341–342).  This
analysis supports earlier arguments forwarded by Ferner and Varul (Ferner and Varul 2000a) who
considered shareholder value as an “objet trouvé” that was integrated into a pre-existing stakeholder
context.  They  argued  that  the  significance  of  shareholder  value  “is  very  different  where
shareholders  are  family  members  and  house  banks,  rather  than  arm's-length  institutions  and
individuals looking to maximize short-term returns” (Ferner and Varul 2000a: 137). This theses is
furthermore supported by Vitols (2004) who introduced the notion of an augmented stakeholder
system where, interests of institutional investors are integrated into the old stakeholder coalition of
interests.  He  argues  that,  on  the  level  of  practice,  this  leads  to  the  adoption  of  a  negotiated
shareholder  value  model  where  shareholder  value  must  be  negotiated  within  the  augmented
stakeholder coalition including employee representatives. This, in turn, translates into compromises
as  for  example  in  the  area  of  performance  management,  where  performance-based  pay  is
introduced,  though  not  unilaterally  imposed  as  in  U.S.  companies,  but  negotiated  with  works
councils “which  generally requires elements of  collective regulation and limits on the extent of
performance pay“ (Vitols 2004: 370). The term “negotiation” hence  appears to run like a thread
through our discussion of the German business system.
Conventions governing trust and authority relations
The  strength  of  formal  social  institutions  generating  and  guaranteeing  trust  between  relative
strangers has been emphasized in our discussion of institutional arenas in Chapter 2. Especially
property rights and reliable institutionalised procedures when making business commitments are
therefore central aspects of a business system. Such aspects are reflected in the rule of law and a
well-functioning and independent jurisdiction with a low level of corruption. 
Therefore, in this last section, we will consider the strength of formal institutions generating trust
between  potential  business  partners  and  the  reliance  of  institutional  procedures  when  making
business commitments in Germany. For this purpose, we will draw on the latest publications of
Transparency International to find out about the comparative level of corruption in Germany and
potential effects on business relations. With a score of 8.0 out of 10, Germany is ranked 14 out of
183 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2011a), being in the
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second best group of countries together with, inter alia, Japan, Iceland and Switzerland. A closer
look at the Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International 2011b) reveals that, similarly
to the situation reported for the USA, a large majority of 70% of people asked perceived an increase
in corruption. However, although political parties are believed to be the most affected by corruption,
with a grade of 3.7/5, they still seem to do fairly better than their U.S. counterparts. Relating to
police,  public officials  and judiciary,  the values of 2.3,  3.2 and 2.4/5 reveal significantly lower
levels of corruption than in the USA concerning central institutions for doing business.
Authority relations are difficult to discuss when adopting a purely institutional perspective. Yet, as
explained in section 1.4 of the introduction, we follow authors like Koen (2005: 5) and Wächter
(2004: 4) in considering institutionalist and culturalist contributions in comparative international
management  research  to  be  complementary  rather  than  mutually  exclusive.  Several  cultural
dimensions identified by Hofstede (2001) or Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012) can help us
to  better  understand  and  describe  authority  relations  within  organizations.  Since  these  cultural
dimensions are fairly common to researchers in comparative international management, they will
not be presented and discussed in further detail in this place.  We will hence draw on culturalist
contributions in order to analyse these aspects of the German business system. 
Hofstede (2001: 377) classified German-speaking countries with their small power distance and
strong  uncertainty  avoidance  in  his  matrix  of  implicit  models  of  the  organization.  Here,  the
corresponding  organization  type  is  the  work-flow  bureaucracy  and  the  implicit  model  of  the
organization is that of a well-oiled machine, where clear structures and processes reduce the need
for hierarchical control. These features provide a suitable basis for large spans of control together
with  a  low  degree  of  social  and  moral  distance  between  leaders  and  led.  Furthermore,  these
characteristics are in line with the classification undertaken by André Laurent (1985: 49) who found
that German organizations are perceived as role formalization systems with a strong emphasis on
detailed job descriptions and well-defined functions. This implies rather high degrees of autonomy
within the realm of well-defined jobs and the governance of superordinate discretion by formal
rules and procedures as they are typical for works systems with delegated responsibility (Whitley
2000a:  98).  The  corresponding  institutional  feature  may  well  be  seen  in  German  labour  law,
especially the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972), that defines a range of
statutory  rights  for  employee  representatives  and  significantly  constrains  unilateral  managerial
prerogative, as we have seen in some more detail in our earlier discussion of German HRM and IR.
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Laurent furthermore underlines that German, like Swiss and American managers, “seem to report a
more rational and instrumental view of authority that regulates interaction among tasks or functions
(…) [where] authority (…) appears to be more an attribute of the role or function” (Laurent 1985:
46).  This  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  Germans  share  a  formal  political  culture  with  US-
Americans  as well  as  Swiss people.  Furthermore,  evidence of “social  engineering” (Calori  and
Dufour 1995: 64) and the establishment of “productivity coalitions” (Windolf 1989), the generally
cooperative style in IR and the fact that German managers stress the value of mutual support and
team spirit  (Stewart et  al. 1996:  209)  just  in  the  sense  of  the  ethos  of  the  works  community
(Betriebsgemeinschaft) (Ferner et al. 2001: 109), seem to strongly suggest that common interests
may be invoked more easily in claims for compliance with superiors' instructions than this might be
the  case  in  the  U.S..  As  we have  seen  in  our  discussion  of  the  educational  system,  access  to
superordinate positions and authority is legitimated in Germany through technical expertise that is
acquired throughout long functional career paths within the same company (Barmeyer and Davoine
2008: 11; Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1996; Calori and Dufour 1995: 68; Evans et al. 2002: 376–377;
Glunk et al. 1997: 99; Kristensen 2003; Lawrence 1980).
5.1.2 HRM in German MNCs and cross-national HRM practice transfer
German  HRM  has  been  described  as  “essentially  reactive  to  the  statutory  framework  of
codetermination” (Ferner et al. 2011: 488). In this connection, bureaucratic principles, rules and
procedures as well as a tendency towards juridification (Verrechtlichung) have been identified as
important  features  of  German  personnel  management  (Avery et  al. 1999:  22;  Wächter  and
Stengelhofen 1992: 24–25). Therefore, much of the work of the personnel manager in Germany
consists  in  interpreting  and  applying  legal  regulations  as  well  as  implementing  collective
agreements  on  pay  and  working  conditions  reached  on  higher  levels.  The  German  personnel
manager is hence essentially a mediator between corporate management and the workforce and
works council (Ferner and Varul 2000b: 82; Wever 1995). Though, Ferner and Varul (2000b: 85)
found that overall, the bureaucratisation of international HR policy in German MNCs was only very
partial with detailed guidelines for a narrow range of issues. Therefore, at the time when their study
was carried out, apparently the degree of formalization of German MNCs' international HR policies
seemed to be rather low. 
Generally,  unilateral  managerial  prerogative and the freedom to design HRM policies are fairly
constrained in the German business system due to the institutions of dual VET, co-determination
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and collective bargaining that are governing the German labour market and require a pluralist style
of HRM (Giardini et al. 2005). In addition, German labour law with its labour protection legislation
imposes further constraints or “legislative safeguards” on ER and HRM (Royle 2004; Williams and
Geppert 2006b: 48). Therefore, the room for manoeuvre and for experimentation in the field of
HRM and IR within the German business system has historically been comparatively small. 
On the other hand, German firms are embedded into an integrated CME or collaborative business
system environment  that  provides  rich  institutional  supports,  and  where  the  local  institutional
context demands for collaboration (Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011: 573–574). For this reason,
practices  of  German  firms,  especially  those  that  are  linked  to  co-determination  and dual  VET
(Dickmann 2003), might be expected to be less context-generalizable (Taylor et al. 1996) than those
of  their  U.S.  counterparts.  As  we  have  seen,  practices  in  coordinated  business  systems  have
generally been argued to be “more institutionally embedded in a range of inter-locking structures
and arrangements” (Ferner et al. 2011: 488) and hence, to rely more on the interaction of a greater
range of  context-specific  actors  and organizations.  In  such environments,  relationships between
actors often depend on non-market mechanisms such as business associations and long-term trust-
based networking among firms for the development of their core competencies. 
Probably linked to the institutional embeddedness of German HRM practices that are less context-
generalizable than  U.S.  practices,  German  MNCs  were  found  to  be  more  likely  to  send  out
expatriates to their subsidiaries than their U.S. counterparts or those from the UK, and to make
more use of informal, personal control and feedback mechanisms (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998:
725;  Harzing  2001).  Further,  German  MNCs  were  found  to  be  marked  by  higher  levels  of
decentralisation (Ferner and Varul 2000b: 87, 91), allocating more resources,  competencies and
organizational as well as financial autonomy to their subsidiaries. This approach should allow for
the development of local networks in host countries, similar to those that are found in the German
industry (Ferner et al. 2011: 487; Geppert et al. 2003b: 629; Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 204;
Lane 2000b; Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011: 573).  HRM in German MNCs has traditionally
been  described  as  long-term  oriented  and  less  concerned  with  short-term  financial  ratios  and
performance indicators (Dickmann 2003: 267;  Ferner  and Quintanilla  1998: 725).  Furthermore,
Dickmann  (2003:  267)  points  out  management-employee  cooperation and  their  search  for
consensus as well as a developmental orientation of HRM. In this respect, German education and
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VET institutions support high levels of professional skills and knowledge within one function up to
the intermediate management level. Therefore, a strong emphasis is put on personal development
and further training. Co-operation on plant level is facilitated by collective bargaining on industry
level, since contentious issues such as wages are taken out of the workplace (Dickmann 2003: 267;
Dörrenbächer 2001: 9). The consensus orientation and co-operative IR are also reflected in the fact
that German-owned MNCs continue to be significantly more likely than their U.S. counterparts to
have representative arrangements (Marginson et al. 2010: 165; Tüselmann et al. 2003; Tüselmann
et al. 2006).
Overall, the available evidence suggests that German MNCs seem to be  less inclined or able to
transfer their country-of-origin HRM and IR practices leading to a rather subtle country-of-origin
effect (Dickmann 2003) and only a  selective transfer of  practices  (Dörrenbächer  2004).  In  this
connection, Ferner et al. (2001: 123) explain that “the exertion of country-of-origin influence may
occur  in  quite  subtle  ways.  The  nationally  embedded  culture  of  cooperative  relations  between
workforce  and  management,  for  example,  is  not  transferred  through  formal  institutional
arrangements  such as  works  councils,  but  is  specifically adapted to  the  constraints  of  the  host
environment”.  Tüselmann  et  al. (2006)  and Dickmann (2003) come to  a  similar  conclusion  in
stating that, due to its strong institutional embeddedness, the specific configuration of the German
model  is  probably not  transferable.  This  is  arguably  the  case  for  dual  VET in  the  UK where
necessary institutional supports are not available (Dickmann 2003: 276; Ferner et al. 2001: 116). A
similar lack of supports also rendered the transfer of lean production models towards the USA
infeasible (Friel 2005). 
However,  transfer  has  been  argued  to  be  possible  to  a  much  greater  extent  concerning  basic
principles of the home country model in the sense of a more general managerial style, an ethos or a
mindset serving as a frame of reference (Dickmann 2003; Meardi et al. 2009: 492; Tüselmann et al.
2003; Tüselmann et al. 2006: 69). Such German mindset has been found to include more openness
for  and use of  collective  or  dual  forms of  representation (Tüselmann et  al. 2006:  75)  and co-
operative IR (Dickmann 2003; Müller 1999b: 129). Furthermore, a social partnership orientation
(Warner  and  Campbell  1993:  89–90)  which  is  linked  to  the  notion  of  works  community  or
Betriebsgemeinschaft (Ferner et al. 2001: 109) and a concern for employment security (Dickmann
and Müller-Camen 2006: 586; Friel 2005: 51) were frequently present in German MNCs.
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Empirical research showed that German MNCs in permissive environments like the UK, USA and
Hungary partly did not recognise unions and did not transfer co-determination practices (Dickmann
2003: 274), nor did they attempt to transfer representative organs or parts of German dual VET
(Beaumont et  al. 1990; Dörrenbächer 2001: 17, 2004: 450; Ferner et  al. 2001). In this respect,
Guest  and  Hoque  (1996:  64)  stated  about  German  MNCs  in  the  UK  that  “German-owned
establishments are not particularly enthusiastic about trade unions and collective arrangements, and
they seem less enthusiastic than other national categories about training. (…) it is also worth noting
in passing that the German parents exerted a rather low level of influence”. The last finding on
rather  decentralised structures  in  HR and  IR  is  once  more  supported  by  Chang's  (2006:  250)
research  of  German  MNCs  in  Southern  Korea  where  all  three  German  subsidiaries  decided
autonomously on issues such as recruitment,  personnel development,  pay and negotiations with
unions. And also the case study findings of Stehle and Erwee (2007) seem to point once more into
the  same  direction.  In  their  case  studies  of  three  German  MNCs  in  Indonesia,  Thailand  and
Singapore,  HQ's respondents indicated that practices could be adapted according to local needs
within the parameters of some guidelines or basic principles, and these decisions were to be taken
by the subsidiaries (Stehle and Erwee 2007: 76). 
In the UK (Ferner et al. 2001; Ferner and Varul 2000a) and Hungary (Dörrenbächer 2001, 2004),
German MNCs took advantage of this new flexibility to free themselves from their institutional
heritage and to make use of the greater latitude in the sense of a differentiation by choice of their
HRM and IR abroad (Geppert and Mayer 2006: 27; Tempel 2001, 2002, 2003; Tüselmann et al.
2006: 67).
As we have seen, German MNCs do neither originate in the dominant business system nor do they
have a long-standing international experience as many of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. These
facts may as well provide additional explanations for their cautious approach towards the transfer of
country-of-origin practices. Furthermore,  it  has been argued that these same factors have raised
German MNCs interest  in  U.S.  style  HRM innovation.  The greater  international  experience  of
Anglo-Saxon MNCs and their innovations in HRM stimulated German MNCs' desire to learn from
the former (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998; Müller 1999b: 139; Tüselmann et al. 2006: 69), including
reverse transfer from their foreign subsidiaries (Ferner and Varul 2000a). Findings of Pudelko and
Harzing (2007) lend further support to the argument about Anglo-Saxonization in showing that the
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USA are serving as the greatest source of inspiration and provider of best practice models in the
field of HRM for German MNCs in the sense of a strong dominance effect.
Table 16: Overview of HR practice transfer in German MNCs
Typical HR 
architecture
Attitude towards 
transfer
Transfer 
mechanisms
Practices subject to transfer
Traditionally 
more 
decentralised 
than US MNCs 
in HR/IR policy 
making and  
practices
Subtle, selective 
transfer of country-
of-origin HRM/IR
differentiation by 
choice: freeing 
themselves abroad 
from certain 
elements of their 
institutional heritage
since early 1990s 
considerable  
learning from Anglo-
Saxon MNCs 
including reverse 
transfer (“Anglo-
Saxonization”)
apparently less 
emphasis on single 
use of formal 
channels
including some more
use of expatriates 
than US MNCs
transfer of mindset and basic principles:
pluralist tradition of co-operative IR, 
consensual style and partnership, job 
security, ethos of community of interest or 
works community (Betriebsgemeinschaft)
more use of collective forms of ER/IR and 
indirect forms of communication than US 
MNCs
long-term developmental HRM / training 
culture informed by experience with German
dual VET
no transfer of certain elements of the 
German system like co-determination that 
are felt to be constraining
Source: own compilation based on Royle (2004), Chang (2006), Giardini  et al. (2005), Dickmann (2003),
Dickmann and Müller-Camen (2006),  Friel  (2005),  Ferner  and  Quintanilla  (1998),  Dörrenbächer  (2001),
Dörrenbächer (2004), Ferner and Varul  (2000b), Ferner and Varul (2000a), Ferner  et al. (2001), Tempel
(2001), Tempel (2002), Tempel (2003), Ferner et al. (2011), Taylor et al. (1996), Wächter and Stengelhofen
(1992), Müller (1999b), Meardi et al. (2009), Guest and Hoque (1996), Beaumont et al. (1990), Geppert et al.
(2003b), Kristensen and Morgan (2007), Avery et al. (1999), Williams and Geppert (2006b), Harzing (2001),
Lane  (2000b),  Saka-Helmhout  and  Geppert  (2011),  Marginson  et  al. (2010),  Tüselmann  et  al. (2003),
Tüselmann et al. (2006), Friel (2005), and Geppert and Mayer (2006).
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5.1.3 German MNCs in different host countries
In the following, we will  analyse German MNCs'  approaches towards transfer in different host
countries in more detail in order to learn about out how they dealt with specific local constraints and
took advantage of opportunities. This information is important in order to formulate propositions or
expectations concerning German MNCs' probable ways of relating to the Swiss host country.
In their recent survey on IR/ER practices of German MNCs in the permissive host country setting of
the UK, Tüselmann et al. (2006) found that German MNC subsidiaries showed a “pervasive home
country imprint in the form of a consensual and co-operative ER style and ethos” and that only a
small  minority had the strategic  desire  to  escape the German model to pursue low cost  labour
flexibility  strategies  (Tüselmann et  al. 2006:  75).  Dualistic  approaches towards  ER/IR  where
representative  channels  of  labour  are  involved  in  the  introduction  and  operation  of  direct
involvement practices (Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy 2005), and that are based on commitment to
pluralism, were especially found in German MNCs with a high degree of international exposure.
While the uptake of high performance- (HPWS) or high involvement work systems (HIWS)6, that
are considered a global best practice, appeared to be a universal feature across German subsidiaries,
MNCs  operating  in  more  internationalised  industries  were  most  likely  to  blend  US  style  ER
innovations into collective ER (Tüselmann et al. 2006: 77). Tüselmann et al. (2006: 78) hence argue
that  German  MNCs  do  not  operate  a  traditional  collective  approach,  but  that  there  is  a  dual
approach  emerging,  resulting  in  a  German  style  hybrid  ER  that  “embodies  a  selective  and
integrative  appropriation  of  best  practice  elements  of  the  US  model”  that  may  represent  an
alternative to the individualistic high road approach of the US model. Tüselmann et al.'s (2006)
findings  about  German-based MNCs tendency to  recognize  trade  unions  in  the  UK context  is
supported  by Marginson et  al.  (2010:  173),  but  less  so  their  conclusion  about  German  MNCs
embracing a new dual model of ER,  where equal weight is given to direct and indirect forms of
employee consultation.
Contrary to the results of these recent studies, in earlier survey studies, Beaumont et al. (1990) as
6 Edwards and Wright (2001: 570) see high involvement work systems to entail at least some combination of schemes
to promote employee discretion and autonomy, systems of upward and downward communication and serious 
attention to the development of employee skills. Furthermore, they may or may not deploy performance-based pay 
and other features of HRM. According to Gmür and Schwerdt (2005: 229), besides the notion of 'high performance 
work system', we can also find the term 'high involvement work system' in the literature which is similarly 
operationalised. 
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well as Guest and Hoque (1996) found high degrees of and  preference for non-unionism  among
German subsidiaries in the UK. However, Ferner and Varul (2000a) who found considerable intra-
model variation among German MNCs including non-unionism in some UK subsidiaries, located
this finding rather in the  devolution of responsibility for IR policy to subsidiary managers than
attributing  it  to  a  U.S.-style  anti-union  ideology.  This  might  also  explain  that  German  MNCs'
subsidiaries in the USA differed greatly from the parents' practices in terms of vacation days and
benefits (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994: 247–248). In her detailed case studies of German MNCs of
the  chemical  and  pharmaceutical  industry,  also  Tempel  (2001:  226)  found  that  IR  issues,  and
especially the decision of whether or not to participate in collective bargaining, was devolved to
subsidiaries and adapted to local British practices. 
Moreover, she found an interesting country-of-origin effect in one of her German case study MNCs
in the UK, that was directly linked German co-determination. As e have seen earlier, German co-
determination requirements entail lengthy negotiations with works councillors, leading to high costs
for  lay-offs.  Although  an  internal  comparison  showed  British  operations  to  be  me  favourable,
redundancies were made in Britain, while German jobs were protected. Therefore, Tempel (2001:
209)  concludes  that  “(t)he willingness  and ability of  the  German parent  company to carry out
redundancies in Britain is shaped by the permissiveness of the British industrial relations system
and stands in stark contrast to the agreements made in Germany to protect the German locations and
German  workforce”.  In  this  case,  a  German  country-of-origin  influenced  mindset  and  major
institutional constraints pushed German management to take advantage of the permissive nature of
the British host national business system to carry out such painful measures as a mass lay-off in
Britain, even if employees there had performed better than in Germany.
Moreover,  during the past twenty years,  major changes in the German system of IR as well as
continued  learning  from  Anglo-Saxon  MNCs  suggest  still  further  possible  reasons  for  the
contradictory findings on German MNCs' approaches towards IR abroad. As we have seen earlier,
in the 1990s the German system of IR was still marked by a very high coverage rate of collective
agreements on a sectoral level. At that time, HR/IR in many German MNCs was also still marked
by a pronounced parochialism (Ferner and Varul 2000b: 87), while international policies were not
yet well-developed. By the year 2000, as part of their learnings from Anglo-Saxon MNCs, many
German MNCs had already established international HR/IR meetings and working groups devising
international  policy  guidelines  and  frameworks,  and  adopted  Anglo-Saxon  style  policies  and
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practices like performance management systems and the use of culture as a formal management tool
(Ferner et al. 2001: 111–114). At the same time, the German system of collective IR has become
more flexible, including many opening clauses for sectoral agreements or firms negotiating their
agreements on firm or plant level. It may therefore be that German MNCs do not any more feel as
constrained in their HR/IR approach as they did twenty years ago. Moreover, they may equally have
capitalised on their experiments and learning abroad to develop new international HR/IR policies as
a  blend  of  positively  viewed  German-inspired  and  Anglo-Saxon  elements  as  proposed  by
Tüselmann et al. (2006). 
Intra-model variation between German MNCs in their ER/IR approaches as found in some studies
(Meardi et al. 2009) might also well be due to differences in their respective production model and
industry characteristics  as proposed by Dörrenbächer  (2004).  Therefore,  such differences  might
also, at least partly, be attributable to interaction effects (Tempel et al. 2005: 197).
Further findings of Ferner et al. (2001: 118) about German MNCs in the  UK point to a common
commitment  of  German MNCs to training.  However,  the  transfer  of  a  German-style  system of
vocational training was rare due to problems of retaining the staff in a labour market context that
encourages  mobility.  In  his  case  study on  German  MNCs'  subsidiaries  in  the  UK and  Spain,
Dickmann (2003) found a strong willingness to pursue  long-term HR policies abroad. Long-term
HR instruments and a long-term horizon were reflected in career plans, succession schemes and
development plans. Interestingly, half of the case study firms had  dual VET programmes  both in
Britain and Spain due to perceived training gaps, although they had proportionately fewer staff on
these programmes than in Germany (Dickmann 2003: 275). Yet, successful implementation of dual
VET was not guaranteed in the UK because of the lack of exogenous support factors. One of the
banks for example terminated the scheme after having lost their graduates to the external labour
market as a result of the absence of German high-quality, abundant labour supply and long-term
career patterns (Dickmann 2003: 276-277, 280), confirming the earlier  findings of Ferner et  al.
(2001). 
In none of these studies, any company wanted to transfer formal industrial relations rights such as
co-determination. 
Spain as a host country is characterized by a  highly legalistic framework of labour and labour
market regulation.  Issues such as redundancies, the nature of employment contracts  and IR are
governed by legal regulations. Rights and structures of unions and their representatives are hence
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laid down in detail. Furthermore, a statutory framework granting worker representation on plant
level in companies with 50 or more employees is in place. Therefore, despite low levels of union
membership, unions have been able to exert considerable influence within firms through the support
they receive in workers' committee elections. Until recently, also job and skill classifications as well
as grading structures within firms were tightly regulated by sectoral labour statutes. This system,
that was characterised by considerable rigidity, has meanwhile been replaced by sectoral collective
agreements (Ferner et al. 2001: 117). 
In their  German case study MNCs in Spain,  Ferner et  al.  (2001: 118) found that German-style
training  systems were  transferred,  but  served more  as  a  selection  procedure  than  as  a  training
system. Though, they reported that a perceived low level of general standard skills in the Spanish
labour market combined with strong internal labour markets and low mobility encouraged a high
investment strategy involving dual VET. Concerning IR, a more adversarial stance of local unions
in  Spain  was sometimes  hard to  understand for  German managers  coming from an essentially
cooperative culture. An interesting case of transfer of German cooperative mindset towards Spain
was found in some German MNCs, were management was able to pursue “productivity coalitions”
(Windolf 1989). Such coalitions are aimed at strengthening the position of the firm in the interests
of both, management and workforce, and have in one case led to a successful fight against plant
closure together with the local works committee. Another case is about an HR team pioneering a
flexibility agreement over working time with its unions being another evidence of how the legalistic
Spanish system, if operated skilfully, leaves considerable leeway for new practices (Ferner et al.
2001:  119–120).  German  companies  were  hence  successful  in  cases  where  they  achieved  in
adapting the German orientation to cooperative ER to the peculiarities of the Spanish context. In
their  approach to  operating the local  context,  German MNCs'  approaches  stood hence in  sharp
contrast to US MNCs whose “global preference for non-unionism produced a determination to find
ways round even the toughest environmental constraints. Such behaviour (…) would be rare in
German companies abroad” (Ferner et al. 2001: 120). Another interesting aspect about the Spanish
host country concerns the lack of a well-established national managerial style in the MNC sector
and great U.S. influence in management education through MBA programmes. This was reflected in
a lack of local managerial confidence making Spanish mangers less likely to challenge German
practices and policies coming from HQ than was the case with their British counterparts (Ferner et
al. 2001:  121).  Finally,  the  vivid  contact  of  some  Spanish  managers  with  U.S.  management
140
5.1 German MNCs – country-of-origin effects, overall approach towards transfer and host country effects 
practices  through  their  education  or  previous  professional  experience  also  allowed  German
companies to further learn from their foreign subsidiaries, a bit similar to the cases reported from
their  Anglo-Saxon  vanguard  subsidiaries  (Ferner et  al. 2001:  122;  Ferner  and  Varul  2000a).
Dickmann (2003) found that  two small  German banks in  Spain did  not  have a  works  council,
possibly as a result of their small size, and local management attempted to treat employees in such a
way as not to provoke incidents that might result in the constitution of works councils (Dickmann
2003: 275). Furthermore, in Spain a number of  informal employee involvement mechanisms were
seen as a means for achieving better management-labour relations (Dickmann 2003: 276). As we
will see in chapter 5.2, similar approaches to prevent conflict with unions have been chosen by US
MNCs in Spain. Manufacturing firms, in turn, accepted works councils and trade unions in Spain,
but none of them had a works council in the UK. 
Ferner et al. (2001: 123) thus conclude that German influence may manifest itself in different forms
in  different  host  environments.  While  in  Britain  cooperative  relations  may  involve  bypassing
unions, in Spain it means to find a modus vivendi with unions and the works committees. They also
pointed to the fact that management choice and orientation are important factors in determining how
regulatory constraints  impact  on HR/IR policy making in  practice.  Since  the  impact  of  formal
institutions can be negotiated, the same structures can function in very different ways.
In Poland and the Czech Republic, Bluhm (2001: 157) found that operations in the production sites
studied  were  dominated  by German managers  and hence,  expatriates represented  an  important
channel through which companies transferred organizational as well as IR practices. Most of the
firms in Bluhm's sample had tried to transfer working time accounts as they were implemented in
most  of  the  firms  in  Germany as  a  negotiated  form of  working  time  flexibility  following  the
German pluralist and co-operative tradition in IR. Though, the transfer of these accounts proved to
be  difficult for two reasons: local working time regulations are more restrictive than in Germany,
and low basic wages made well-paid overtime work very attractive,  raising  incomes to a level
people  can  live  on so  that  local  employees  had no interest  in  such a  model.  Furthermore,  the
increased job security was not very attractive since local employees in urban centres could easily
find  another  job somewhere else  (Bluhm 2001:  159).  Therefore,  the four  cases  out  of  six  that
successfully implemented working time accounts negotiated a compromise including better basic
pay, corresponding to a strategy that was not solely based on cost minimization. Concerning dual
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VET,  especially  the  SMEs  in  Bluhm's  sample  were  less  disposed  to  provide  in-house  training
facilities. This was partly attributed to the low level of skills required for the kind of manufacturing
processes shifted to the Czech and Polish plants, but it also reflects a lack of institutional support by
the state, chambers and associations, and difficult legal requirements in this field. However, even if
a straight transfer of training practices to central Europe appeared to be rather the exception than the
rule, Bluhm points out that 6 out of 18 larger sized firms established close relationships with local
vocational schools by providing practical training to teach apprentices required skills. Some local
schools, adapted the contents of their curricula to meet the demands of the German firms for special
skills.  This approach of cooperating with local vocational schools has been classified by Bluhm
(2001: 161) as a “functional equivalent” to the provision of in-house vocational training, while both
options  are  shaped  by  the  rationality  underlying  the  German  system  of  dual  VET.  These
apprenticeships  were  considered  an  efficient  recruiting  strategy preferable  in  the  long  run  to
recruiting from the external labour market. With such an approach, firms can ensure that apprentices
acquire firm-specific skills, and it allows for the selection of candidates before employing them
regularly.  Moreover,  young  people  can  be  socialised  in  expectation  of  relatively  long-term
employment, hence reflecting the strategy pursued also at home (Bluhm 2001: 162). Concerning IR,
there  was  no  common behaviour  pattern  observable  in  Bluhm's  sample.  Once  again,  the  most
important differences existed between small and large firms. Large firm size was the best predictor
of cooperative behaviour towards unions. Bluhm (2001: 167) speculates that this might be due to
the stronger concentration of union activity on large firms, to the fact that larger German MNCs
also have the most powerful works councils with strong connections to unions at home, and to the
existence of European works councils in such firms, fostering cross-border monitoring, information
exchange and collective bargaining. On the other hand, most small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) adopted a non-cooperative approach and a strong anti-union attitude in dealing with formal
labour  representation,  again  largely  reflecting  what  they  did  in  Germany.  Three  family-owned
SMEs established some kind of works council  in  a top-down manner with the aim of keeping
unions out of  the enterprise. Nevertheless, closer analysis allowed to trace some influence of the
German rationale underlying the works council system. The larger firms cooperating with a union
tried to oblige the latter to give high priority to company welfare, just as German works councils are
legally obliged to do. Bluhm's (2001: 163, 166) explanation of this behaviour is that “managers
interpreted the plant-level representation system primarily as a workers' representation of their own
particular firm and much less of more general union interests. In fact, it was not accidental that in
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the interviews many German expatriates referred to the union committees in their plants as 'works
councils' […] and not as union organizations”.
In Hungary, a rather permissive host country environment, the German firms investigated in a case
study carried out  by Dörrenbächer (2004) showed a full  transfer of their  respective  production
models towards Hungary. Though, different models were already in place in Germany, comprising
post-Fordist, Fordist and project-based models. On the other hand, in the field of labour relations,
the companies deviated from the German model in important ways.  Trade union representatives
were present in only about a quarter of the companies, works councils were weak and rather served
the  communication  needs  of  management,  and  wages  were  mostly  negotiated  individually or
informally on company level with a total absence of collective agreements on sectoral level. Such
policies  and  practices  hence  rather  reflect  an  individualised  Anglo-Saxon  approach  than  the
traditional  German  model  (Dörrenbächer  2004:  449–450).  Furthermore,  hire  and  fire,  use  of
temporary workers  and frequent  overtime was  common in  several  companies.  In  line  with  the
findings of Bluhm (2001), Dörrenbächer also found that the  larger German companies generally
felt more obliged to stick to the social partnership principles of the German model, arguing that
“[e]xporting the social partnership attitude abroad appears to be more an issue of potential public
pressure on the large,  highly visible MNCs or by those smaller MNCs who gave their  Eastern
European subsidiaries a strategic role in the overall development of the MNC” (Dörrenbächer 2004:
453). Yet, even in these cases, companies only transferred parts of the IR model that did not put into
danger  the  advantages  of  a  permissive  environment  such  as  high  production  flexibility  and
favourable production costs.
In their recent study comparing German and US MNCs in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, Meardi et
al.  (2009:  497)  found that  German  country-of-origin  effects  were  manifest  in  an  emphasis  on
technical knowledge, multi-skilling, job rotation, internal mobility and, in line with Bluhm's (2001)
earlier  findings,  annualised  working  hours as  preferred  form  of  working  time  flexibility.
Furthermore, they made more generalised use of open-ended rather than temporary contracts than
their  US counterparts.  No evidence  of  country-of-origin  effects  was  found in  the  field  of  ER.
German  firms  neither  were  more  likely  than  their  U.S.  counterparts  to  use  indirect  employee
participation  through  works  councils  or  unions,  nor  were  they  less  likely  to  embrace  direct
participation  mechanisms.  Control practices  from HQ,  the  use  of  teamwork and  pay  flexibility
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emerged as “disembedded” forms of global best practices in all of the German MNCs of the case
study. Again in line with earlier findings of Bluhm (2001), also the German MNCs of Meardi et al.'s
(2009) study exposed great intra-model variation, reflecting corporate culture, or in other words,
the company's traditions and approach at home. One company with a strong stakeholder tradition
stroke collective agreements and operated a sophisticated system of consultation, made extensive
use of expatriates and provided considerable amounts of training. The latter included co-operation
with local schools, departing from the traditional German model only in that pay was much more
variable than in Germany. Another German MNC exposed a corporate culture that was much less
German, reflecting the fact that employment in foreign subsidiaries exceeded that in Germany. This
company was  blamed  by trade  unions  of  undercutting  previously achieved  standards  of  social
dialogue  and  collective  bargaining  over  pay  has  been  fraught  so  that  IR  were  overall  more
adversarial. Though, also in this plant, the organization of production was more typically German
with  an  emphasis  on  multi-skilling,  training  including  co-operation  with  local  schools  through
apprenticeships and annualised working hours. These differences also reflected different degrees of
centrality of the German production and international integration of production with other plants,
with both elements being higher in degree for the first MNC (Meardi et al. 2009: 502). Though,
even between the Polish and the  Hungarian  plant  of  the  first  case MNC there were important
differences. The Hungarian plant was first used for experimenting with new practices, and union
recognition was achieved only after several years of conflict, intense pressure from the German IG
Metall and changes in the local labour market situation with shortages and high turnover.
In  Korea,  Anglo-Saxon  performance-related  pay was  introduced,  but  blended with  pre-existing
local seniority-based practices into a new hybrid practice. Furthermore, a similar  distinction as in
Germany  has  been  found  between  workers  covered  by  collective  agreements  and exempt
managerial or clerical employees that negotiate their pay individually with their employers (Chang
2006:  245-246,  252).  A  high  investment  in  training  was visible  in  major  efforts  to  train  local
employees,  though without transferring German-style dual  VET. Function-specific  trainings and
courses were rather delivered internally via coaching, and in one case study company, such training
could  even  include  a  long-term  stay  at  German  HQ  (Chang  2006:  247).  ER/IR  in Korean
subsidiaries of the German MNCs were found to be  cooperative. In two out of three investigated
MNCs,  Chang  (2006:  248)  found  that  collective  negotiations  with  unions  took  place.  In  the
remaining third MNC, a labour-management-council was in place that consisted of employee and
employer representatives in equal measure, and the union was endowed with consultation rights.
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Yet,  due  to  a  feeble  membership  level  and  hence  a  lack  of  representativeness,  until  then  no
collective bargaining was in place. Were unions and collective agreements were in place, issues
related to overtime work, working conditions and vacation had to be agreed on in negotiations,
whereas training and promotions were decided upon unilaterally by the employer (Chang 2006:
249). Furthermore, in line with findings about German MNCs showing comparatively high levels of
decentralization in terms of  HR and IR, all the three Korean subsidiaries of Chang's (2006: 250)
study  decided  rather  independently  from  HQ  on  major  issues  such  as  recruitment,  personnel
development, pay and wage negotiations with unions.
As Yu and Wu (2009: 123) pointed out, especially German MNCs' approaches towards collective
representation deserve further investigation. As we have seen in our review of empirical research on
German  MNCs  in  the  UK  and  in  Middle-Eastern  Europe,  there  is  mixed  evidence  on  their
approaches towards HRM and IR in institutionally permissive business systems. As we have seen,
especially earlier studies undertaken in the UK found that responsibility for IR was devolved to
local subsidiaries with the result  of IR practices being local and hence not involving collective
representation. On the other hand, later studies found some extent of German influence shining
through in the sense of an overall cooperative social partnership approach. Such influence was also
found in Middle-Eastern European countries and may or may not lead to collective representation or
the establishment of forms of functional equivalents to German institutions like works councils or
dual VET. This evidence suggests an overall creative, cooperative approach towards transfer and
dealing with local host country constraints and opportunities, at least among the bigger and well-
embedded  German  industrial  MNCs.  German  MNCs  may  hence  combine  some  degree  of
“differentiation by choice” (Tempel 2001; Tempel et al. 2005: 193, 2006b: 27) as in the area of
employee co-determination, where to the best of our knowledge no study has found such practices
to be transferred abroad, with “social engineering” (Calori  and Dufour 1995: 64), “productivity
coalitions” (Windolf 1989) and the establishment of local functional equivalents (Tempel 2001: 57)
for dual VET as well as cooperative relations with unions. The latter have been found to be treated
somehow  similar  to  German  works  councils  (Bluhm  2001)  and  hence  reflect  a  potentially
unconscious (Edwards and Kuruvilla  2005: 7),  but nevertheless present  influence of a mindset,
philosophy or  ethos,  that  is  deeply embedded into  the  German model.  This,  in  turn,  seems to
support the suggestion made by Bluhm (2001: 156) that “(...) institutional choice is a matter of
bounded  rationality.  Actors  can  change  their  policies,  but  they  cannot  control  entirely  their
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expectations (and the expectations of others) or the social norms and routine practices to which they
are accustomed”. 
Table 17 below summarizes key findings of the most important empirical investigations on cross-
national transfer of HRM and IR practices in German MNCs towards different host countries.
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Table 17: German MNCs in different host countries – overview of empirical evidence
Host country,
authors
Constraints and opportunities German MNC reaction
UK,
permissive
environment
(Beaumont et
al. 1990;
Dickmann
2003;  Ferner
et  al. 2001;
Ferner  and
Varul  2000a;
Guest  and
Hoque  1996;
Marginson et
al. 2010;
Tempel  2001;
Tüselmann et
al. 2006)
Low absorptive capacity: 
lack  of  institutional  supports  for  dual
VET  and  no  comparable  long-term
career patterns as in Germany inter alia
due to flexible external labour markets
and  less  emphasis  on  technical
competence
great freedom in the field of IR
No transfer of formal IR rights (co-determination)
studies carried out in the early-mid 1990s revealed many non-unionised subsidiaries;
recent studies found greater use of collective ER approaches than in US MNCs; 
some evidence of collective ER being combined with individual HIWS into a dual approach as a blend of
German consensual/partnership-oriented approaches and individual Anglo-Saxon practices
some cases of transfer of dual VET with mixed success
HR/IR policy often determined locally at subsidiary level
Spain,
constrainng
environment
(Dickmann
2003;  Ferner
et al. 2001)
Highly  legalistic  framework  of  labour
regulation /  organization of  the labour
market covering:
redundancy,  nature  of  employment
contracts,  statutory  model  of  worker
representation within companies, rights
and  structures  of  unions  and  their
representatives
lack of qualified labour
strong internal labour markets and low
mobility
IR more conflictual than in Germany
Introduction of dual VET schemes in some cases rather as a selection tool, in other cases in response to
a perceived lack of adequately skilled employees on local labour markets
generally greater ease with apprenticeship training schemes due to stronger internal labour markets with
less mobility
in some cases preventive measures to avoid industrial conflict; use of informal communication channels
to improve management-labour relations
cooperative tradition in ER/IR was reflected in creative ways of dealing with local structures: 
in some cases productivity coalitions were achieved together with local works committees, in other cases
collective agreements were negotiated to introduce flexible working time schemes or standard- instead of
temporary contracts were used in order to increase organizational commitment
manufacturing firms accepted works committees and unions in Spain, whereas some banks did not have
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a works committee
Korea,
constraining
environment
(Chang  2004,
2006)
Strong role of the state (investment in
education and infrastructure, subsidies,
policies  to  promote  exports,  control
over financial resources)
strong  local  norms  and  traditions
(seniority, lifelong employment, gender-
based  pay  differentiation,  subjective
evaluations including personal traits)
Introduction of Anglo-Saxon performance-related pay blended with local seniority-based pay leading to
new hybrid practices
developmental  HRM  with  strong  focus  on  technical  training;  no  transfer  of  German  dual  VET,  but
exhaustive training for local staff that was sometimes delivered in Germany
overall cooperative IR including unions and collective agreements
differentiation between workers covered by collective agreements and exempt managerial and clerical
employees
comparatively high level of decentralization in HR/IR decision-making
Czech
Republic  and
Poland,
permissive
environments
(Bluhm 2001), 
Working-time  regulations  more
restrictive than in Germany
local  labour  market  with  very  low
salaries
Overall considerable variety especially between SMEs and large-sized MNCs, and selective transfer of
the German model via a) a transfer of selected elements of the German system that are positively viewed
and b) the interpretation of local institutions in ways that translate important German concepts and the
rationality underlying German institutions:
difficulties  in  transferring  working-time  accounts  due  to  restrictive  local  working-time  regulations  and
unwillingness of local employees to participate (low salaries and need of  paid overtime work or second
job); successful transfer/implementation in cases where local employees were persuaded in negotiations
including the outcome of better basic pay
an  important  part  of  the  larger  German firms cooperated  with  local  vocational  schools  to  provide  a
functional equivalent to German dual VET, hence following the same rationality underlying the German
system;
a major motivation for this approach was that firms considered apprentice training an efficient recruitment
strategy, that was considered preferable in the long run to recruiting from the external labour market
large  companies  provided  more  dual  VET-like  training  schemes  and  accepted  unions  with  regular
bargaining over wages and working conditions, SMEs showed non-cooperative and anti-union attitudes
the  rationality  underlying  German  works  council-management  relationship  showed  through  in  large
companies'  cooperative  approach  towards  union  committees  in  that  they  tried  to  oblige  the  union
committee to focus on the well-being of the firm rather than on general political aims of the union. This
directly reflects legal obligations of German works councils at home.
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Hungary,
permissive
environment
(Dörrenbächer
2004)
Weak unions and works councils, rights
often not enforced
Full transfer of the production model used in Germany (Fordist low-skill / low-cost; post-Fordist high-skill;
project-based) according to needs of the industry
only selective or  no transfer  of  labour relations model:  no collective agreements,  no or  weak works
councils, individual or company-level wage agreements based on informal discussions
many Anglo-Saxon style individualised practices (e.g. wage determination)
large companies felt more obliged to respect social partnership rules than smaller ones
Poland,
Hungary,
Slovenia,
permissive
environments
(Meardi  2007;
Meardi et  al.
2009)
Constraints rose with tightening of  the
local labour market for skilled workers,
high turnover and the need to recognize
more assertive trade unions since 2000
Control practices from HQ, teamwork and pay flexibility emerged as “disembedded” global best practices
strong emphasis on technical knowledge, generally more reliance on multi-skilling, job rotation, internal
mobility
emphasis on training including co-operation with local schools for apprentice training
annualised working hours as preferred form of working time flexibility
no general country-of-origin effect in ER; German MNCs were no more likely to use indirect employee
participation  through  works  councils  or  unions  –  and  not  less  likely  to  embrace  direct  participation
mechanisms than their U.S. counterparts
differences  between  German  MNCs  and  between  Polish  and  Hungarian  plants  of  the  same  MNC
reflecting  disintegration  of  the  German  model  at  home  and  hence  differences  in  corporate  culture,
different degrees of international production integration, and local labour market constraints
Source: own compilation based on Beaumont et al. (1990), Guest and Hoque (1996), Ferner and Varul (2000a), Ferner et al. (2001), Tempel (2001), Bluhm (2001),
Dickmann (2003), Chang (2004), Chang (2006), Dörrenbächer (2004), Tüselmann et al. (2006), Meardi (2007), Meardi et al. (2009), Marginson et al. (2010).
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5.2 US MNCs – country-of-origin effects, overall approach towards transfer and 
host country effects
Similar to our discussion of the German NBS, German
HRM and HRM practice transfer in German MNCs,
the following chapter is organized in three parts. In a
first  part,  we  will  provide  an  overview  of  salient
features of the U.S. national business system and its
influence on domestic  U.S. HRM. In a second step,
based on an analysis of available empirical evidence,
typical  patterns  and  approaches  towards  transfer
among  US MNCs  will  be  isolated.  Finally,  a  more
detailed review of studies investigating HRM practice transfer within US MNCs towards different
host countries will be provided in order to learn about their approaches in dealing with host country
constraints and opportunities. Again, information obtained from this three-step analysis will provide
the basis for the formulation of propositions or expectations concerning probable approaches of US
MNCs towards HRM practice transfer and their ways of relating to the Swiss institutional context.
5.2.1 Salient features of the US-American national business system and domestic 
HRM 
Firms, markets and MNC internationalization
A  first  overriding  feature  of  the  US-American  business  system  is  its  “relative  under-
institutionalization,  compared with the strong, relatively rigid institutional  arrangements of (…)
Germany” (Ferner et al. 2004b: 379). Owing to the  relative lack of institutional regulation, US-
American MNCs were free to experiment and to develop innovative practices, making them less
tolerant of institutional constraints in host environments than other foreign firms (Ferner 2000a: 35,
39).  In this  respect,  Godard (2002: 259) points to U.S. employer norms that are marked by an
exceptional antistatism and may explain their great resistance to labour laws as a form of state
regulation.
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US-American MNCs have historically grown through standardized mass production for a large and
homogeneous domestic market, focusing on economies of scale (Hollingsworth 1997a: 268). In this
environment, firms have early developed formalised hierarchies, Chandlers “visible hand” (1977),
and innovative organizational  structures  such as  the multidivisional  form (Chandler  1962).  The
organizational capabilities of large domestic firms in production, marketing and distribution as well
as financial control of geographically remote operations that have been created within mass markets
later  provided the basis  for their  pioneering role  in  internationalization (Chandler  1990;  Ferner
2000a: 6). The USA are therefore considered to be an “old” investor country, whereas Germany is
seen as a “young” one (Cantwell and Bellak 1998: 103). As we have seen above, the enormous size
of the U.S. domestic market and the strong performance of the U.S. economy throughout the largest
part of the twentieth century was conducive to a rather ethnocentric orientation of US MNCs.
Within the hierarchical system of management adopted by U.S. firms excelling in mass production,
management  tended  to  adopt  strategies  of  deskilling  their  employees  and  engaging  in  more
opportunistic “arm's length dealings with suppliers and distributors” with “hard-nosed bargaining
over prices” (Hollingsworth 1997a: 269, 296). As we will see, it is in this kind of  arm's length
relations between economic actors where dominant contractual forms of authority (Whitley 2000a:
52–53) as a recurrent feature of the U.S. business system are reflected. 
The state and economic coordination
US-American “competitive managerial capitalism” evolved in an environment emphasizing market
competition as  opposed  to  German  “cooperative  capitalism”  (Chandler  1990).  Coordination
problems in the liberal US-American market economy are hence resolved through firms'  reliance
on market relations and sharply separated hierarchies, while there is less institutional support for
non-market  forms  of  coordination  (Clark  and Almond  2004:  540;  2004:  66;  Hall  and  Soskice
2001a: 27). This reliance on market relations is supported by strong legal institutions and a strict
interpretation of written contracts following the principle of “sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out
by clear performance” (Macneil 1974: 738) whereas relational contracts with other firms get little
assistance  from  the  U.S.  legal  system  (Hall  and  Soskice  2001a:  31).  In  the  U.S.,  business
associations and trade unions are weak which has been led back to the large size of the country and
the great number of firms with differing interests (Hollingsworth 1997a). Therefore, in the  U.S.,
neither do employers generally coalesce around issues of concern to them specifically as employers,
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nor  are  industry  associations  generally  concerned  with  defining  or  defending  the  interests  of
member firms as employers (Wever 1995: 608). 
Strict anti-trust legislation limiting the scope for cooperation between firms, and the absence of an
explicit industrial policy further sustained these characteristics (Ferner and Müller-Camen 2004:
67). Hall and Soskice (2001a: 31) illustrate this issue with the example of research consortia, where
US firms  ran  the  risk  of  being  sued  for  triple  damages  under  antitrust  law  until  the  National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 had been passed, and also subsequently only an estimated part of
1 to 7 per cent of funds spent on research and development in the U.S. private sector are devoted to
collaborative research. 
In such an environment characterized by competitive intensity, which is additionally marked by a
highly individualistic ideology (Brewster 1995: 2–3, 2007: 773; Guest 1990: 390; Hofstede 2001),
employment as well as inter-firm relations usually take the form of  contract-based, arm's length
market relationships (Ferner 2000a: 8; Ferner and Müller-Camen 2004: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a:
29–30; Redding 2005: 142).
Moreover, the emphasis on markets has been strengthened by the historical weakness of the state as
an economic actor whose primary role  has been to  “set  parameters  for the behaviour  of other
economic  actors” (Ferner  2000a:  7).  However,  we should guard against  a  simplistic  view of  a
liberal,  non-interventionist  U.S.  state.  In  this  respect,  O'Sullivan  (2005:  553)  points  to  “the
historical  importance  of  the  U.S.  government  in  shaping  technological  development“ in  the
military-industrial complex as well as biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. In these fields,
research  funding  provided  by  the  U.S.  government  is  of  utmost  importance  to  commercial
innovation and hence, success in radical innovation can be considered a product of  “distinctively
non-liberal institutions” (O'Sullivan 2005: 554).
The state and labour market regulation
Concerning  labour market  regulation, the  US-American  federal  state  has  been utterly reluctant
concerning the imposition of statutory regulations on the employment relationship.  This  liberal
attitude is manifest in the fact that the U.S. state “does not guarantee paid annual leave, maximum
length of working week, a mandatory day of rest, or evening or night shift premiums” (Phelan et al.
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2007:  351)  and U.S. employment protection legislation standards  are  the least  strict  among all
OECD member states (Venn 2009: 7). This utterly weak legal regulation of employment relations
reflects  the  “employment-at-will  doctrine”  (Muhl  2001).  These  characteristics  correspond  to  a
principle of contract (Streeck 1987: 68–73) and cover the bulk of non-union private sector workers
(Harcourt et  al. 2007:  964),  where  “employers  face  few  constraints  in  making  redundancies”
(Edwards and Rees 2006a: 292). 
On the other hand, Wever (1995: 610) adds an important qualification concerning the nature of U.S.
government involvement: while “government's involvement in employment relations matters is not
extensive, (...) where it is involved its engagement is quite intensive, detailed and controlling”. In
this  connection,  she  points  to  the  system  of  exclusive  union  representation  and  government
regulation of IR with laws regulating substantial areas over which employers and unions may or
may not bargain. Still another notable exception to the absence of statutory regulation in the field of
employment relations is discrimination, where “Federal legislative protections (…) from wrongful
discharge  based  on  race,  religion,  sex,  age,  and  national  origin”  (Muhl  2001:  3)  have  been
established starting in the 1960s. The particular “diversity agenda in the USA” (Ferner et al. 2005a:
308) is closely linked to the historical legacy of social and racial heterogeneity with the associated
social tensions deriving from slavery and mass immigration (Kurowski 1999, 2002). 
The  utterly  great  flexibility  of  the  U.S.  labour  market  that  imposes  hardly  any constraints  on
numerical flexibility has encouraged firms' reliance on external labour markets (Ferner 2000a: 11;
Ferner  and Müller-Camen 2004:  70).  The focus  on external  labour  markets,  in  turn,  limits  the
development  of  long-term stable  relations  between employers  and employees.  Yet,  the  latter  is
considered a prerequisite for a highly skilled and broadly trained workforce (Hollingsworth 1997a:
271). Especially the developments since the 1980s, involving increasing job insecurity, a rise in
contingent employment and layoffs, have been critically commented upon (Uchitelle 2006) . In this
respect, some authors point to the breakdown of “the old social contract – job security in return for
commitment”  in  the  1990s  (Phelan et  al. 2007:  553).  In  this  connection,  Kochan  (2006:  378)
observes that “layoffs became acceptable as a strategy of first rather than last resort” since evidence
from the stock market showed no negative effect on share prices. Osterman (2010: 408) concludes
on recent trends on the U.S. labour market that employment has become less secure, and employee
voice and power expressed via unions has declined, while at the same time new high commitment
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systems have spread. While on the one hand jobs are on average more skilled, on the other hand a
very substantial low wage labour market has persisted and there is overall evidence of growing
diversity of employment practices.
Industrial relations
Concerning IR in the U.S. business system, the latter has been described as a “deregulated and
lightly institutionalised IR setting” that is marked by an individualistic management philosophy and
deeply  rooted  management preference  for  non-union employment  relations  (ER)  policies
(Tüselmann et al. 2008: 1624). On the one hand, this preference may in part be due to the wish to
circumvent the rigidities imposed by detailed government regulation in specific areas as discussed
above.  On  the  other  hand,  management  antipathy  to  unions  is  also  reflecting  the  ideal  of
organizational autonomy and the concept of the “right to manage” (Brewster 1995: 1, 3).  Facing a
legitimacy crisis  beginning in  the  1930s that  revolved around concerns  about  the  concentrated
market power of trusts, employers perceived a threat to management power and prerogatives from
both, unions and the state (Godard 2009: 92–93). This philosophy is incorporated in a “unilateral”
approach to structuring the relationship with human resources (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29; Wever
1995). The U.S. system of IR has traditionally been viewed as more conflictual and more strongly
driven by the strategies of the employers than the German one (Wever 1995: 606). This is manifest
in a considerably higher amount of working days lost per 1 000 employees due to industrial conflict
when compared to  Germany (Lesch 2004: 17).  In Godard's  (2009: 87) view “perhaps no other
country’s labor history contains more tales of working-class struggle and sacrifice than America’s”.
Generally, the prevalent arena of IR in the U.S. is the company level. The collective agreement
coverage rate of 13% is one of the lowest among OECD countries (Venn 2009: 18) and union
membership rates of 11.8 and 11.4 per cent for 2009 and 2010 respectively are clearly below the
OECD average of 18.4 and 18.1 per cent (OECD 2012c). 
In view of the lack of co-ordination among both unions and employers' associations on a national
level (Wever 1995: 608), it  is not surprising that the focus in the field of HRM and IR/ER has
always been on the organizational or sub-organizational level with the underlying assumption of
great organizational latitude with regard to the management of personnel (Brewster 2007: 770).
Though, it has been argued that this US-American core assumption does not readily apply to a
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European setting of HRM that is  marked by several  internal  as well  as external  constraints  on
organizational autonomy (Brewster 1995: 11).
Historically,  also  the  U.S.  have  seen  a  period  when  IR  was  collectively  organized  and  fairly
regulated.  Kochan et  al.  (1994) provided a  well-known description of  the  New Deal industrial
relations system, including the rigidities emanating from legal regulations such as the Wagner Act
of 1935, the National Labor Relations Board and  job control unionism (Wever 1995: 609). This
particular  IR  system was  especially  well-suited  to  the  needs  of  standardized  mass  production
(2000a:  14).  Yet,  starting  in  the  1960s  a  new,  more  flexible  non-union  model  of  employment
relations emerged that was better suited to the needs of new, rapidly growing industries such as
computing, electronics and services, while the union model started to decline. In this connection,
Jacoby (Jacoby 1997) has coined the term “welfare capitalism” to describe this  new non-union
model  where  “the  business  corporation,  rather  than  government  or  trade  unions,  would be  the
source  of  security  and  stability  in  modern  society”  (Jacoby  1997:  1).  As  distinct  from  the
continental European corporatist-statist or Scandinavian social democratic types of welfare state,
the liberal U.S. welfare state provides only residual social benefits and hence leaves large space for
companies to jump in and fill the gap (Esping-Andersen 1990b). Welfare capitalist firms started to
introduce  innovative  techniques  to  win  the  commitment  of  their  employees.  Such  techniques
included individualised, performance-related pay systems, new team-based, high performance or
high involvement work systems and a variety of social science techniques like employee surveys
and  communication  programmes.  Furthermore,  these  firms  established  internal  labour  markets,
offering a high degree of employment security based on functional flexibility of well-trained staff.
Sophisticated techniques of recruitment and selection assured the hiring of candidates with the right
qualifications and potential, and firms took up the German notion of Gemeinschaft or community of
interests between employer and employees (Jacoby 1997: 40, 47, 238). 
The existence of union and non-union sectors and geographical regions in the U.S. has been argued
to be at the origin of a  “competitive tension in the  domestic environment between unionised and
non-unionised sectors“ (Beaumont and Townley 1985;  Edwards  and Ferner  2002:  103).  In this
respect, the GM Saturn plant is often referred to as a paramount example of the union model, where
management and labour representatives have intended to take stakeholder interests more seriously
into  account  (Kochan  and  Rubinstein  2000).  This  has  been  argued  to  be  difficult  in  the  U.S.
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business environment where generally the “importance of developing HRM systems that address
the concerns of all key stakeholders is not widely recognized” (Schuler and Jackson 2005: 17). In
this  connection,  Godard (2002:  272)  argues  that  “[u]nless  appropriate  institutional  and cultural
support  systems are  in  place,  stakeholder,  consultation,  and representation  rights  may prove of
limited effectiveness”. In any case, the existence of two competing models of employee relations
within  the  U.S.  NBS  may be  viewed  as  an  example  of  “variation  ''at  the  source'',  leading  to
employment  systems  that  are  ''moving  targets'':  both  internally  varied  and  evolving,  or
''recombinant''” (Meardi et al. 2009: 505). Such variation may be conducive to different approaches
towards IR and HRM between firms from different sectors or geographic regions although they may
be embedded in the same national business system.
As we have seen earlier, recent developments starting in the 1980s involving greater competition,
unstable product markets and reduced margins led to an erosion of the welfare capitalist model.
While  contemporaneously  pressures  for  short-term  financial  results  and  shareholder  value
increased, commitment and loyalty of employees was undercut by downsizing and layoffs (Ferner
and Müller-Camen 2004: 78).  In his critical discussion of welfare capitalist employment practices,
Osterman (1999: 144) does not “come away convinced that the manors represented anything other
than a collection of specific practices aimed at keeping out unions combined with unusually strong
antiunion animus on the part of the chief executives of these firms”. In his opinion, employment
stability as the most salient and distinct element of welfare capitalist firms “seems more attributable
to product  market  advantage than to  employment practices” (Osterman 1999:  144).  Ferner  and
Müller-Camen (2004: 78) also call attention to the fact that even within welfare capitalist firms,
dual internal labour markets continued to exist with managers and engineers being treated quite
differently from low-skilled production workers. Furthermore, within the non-union strand of firms,
in sectors like fast food and retail, low-road variants of non-unionism prevailed.
Overall, referring to the framework for the analysis of employee relations proposed by Guest and
Conway (1999), we may argue that the U.S. NBS, while exposing a dualism between union and
non-union models of employment relations, has a strong bias towards individualised approaches
with some sectors having developed high-road approaches including HIWSs and others adopting
low-road individual approaches.
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Education and training systems
In the U.S., the education and training system is complementary to the highly fluid external labour
markets in that its institutions provide formal education that focuses on certification in general skills
(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 30). The decentralised system of IR did not encourage the social actor's
involvement in the apprenticeship system which, in turn, is not feasible without close collaboration
with  the  labour  market.  Since  apprenticeship  training  in  the  U.S.  was  dependent  on  collective
bargaining or on employers' willingness to train, the number of apprentices fell together with the
decline in trade union density and coverage by collective agreements. Therefore,  except for the
construction  industry,  today  the  apprenticeship  system  is  not  highly  developed  and  formal
apprenticeship is not an important component of initial vocational training in the USA (Bosch and
Charest 2008: 437). While companies often work closely together with community colleges and
other training providers when extending their own training, the training provided is not based on
generally recognized industry standards to which program sponsors would be bound, which is due
to the highly decentralised nature of the U.S. educational system (Lerman 2008: 74–76).  Thus,
Kerkhoff (2001: 5) ascertains that standardization “is by far the lowest in the United States” when
compared to France, Germany and Great Britain. This is due to the fact that the National Skill
Standards Board that has been created in 1994 did not succeed in establishing a national system of
skills  standards.  One of the reasons for this is  the weakness of employers at  the national level
(Bosch and Charest 2008: 438). Thus, “[m]ost American students obtain general credentials (a high
school diploma or a bachelor's degree) that seldom have vocational meaning, and they obtain them
from educational institutions that are among the least standardized in the world” (Kerckhoff 2001:
7). While the Office of Apprenticeship within the Employment and Training Administration of the
U.S.  Department  of  Labour  oversees  the  U.S.  system of  apprenticeship  training,  its  budgetary
resources are minimal and its responsibilities concern rather protection of safety and health and the
prevention of discrimination than the content  of vocational training (Lerman 2008: 73–74). The
estimated share of vocational programmes among the population with completed upper secondary
education  in  2005  was  of  only 5% (Bosch and  Charest  2008:  432)  and  there  is  a  continuous
shortage of skilled labour in the intermediate tier (Bosch and Charest 2008: 440). In this connection,
a recent survey carried out in the spring of 2007 (Lerman et al. 2009) found that nearly all of the
participating  registered  apprenticeship  sponsors  reported  that  the  apprenticeship  program helps
them meet their skill demands. Still another interesting finding of this survey concerns the risk of
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poaching or free-riding of competitors that is theoretically considered a disincentive for firms to
provide their employees with general skills (Edlund and Gronlund 2008: 247). Lerman et al. found
that only about one quarter of surveyed sponsors regard poaching as a significant problem and even
among those, about 85 per cent still recommend apprenticeship to others (Lerman et al. 2009: 20-
21, 42). 
Schlie and Warner (2000: 37) summarize that the US educational system is marked by a relatively
poor technical education at the shop floor and a relatively poor quality of primary and secondary
education. In this system, managers are trained as generalists rather than as specialists or technical
experts,  and MBA programmes  are  well-developed and play an important  role  in  management
training. Managers who received such a high-level general education are then usually marked by
great functional and inter-firm mobility along their career.
Financial system and corporate governance
The  U.S.  model  of  corporate  governance  can  be  characterized  as  market-oriented,  outsider-
dominated and shareholder-focused (Weil 2002). As Perlitz and Seger (2004: 11) explain, in such
systems “one finds a tendency to please the shareholder in the short  term” and “managers seek
short-term profit at the expense of long-run market positions”. In the USA, there are no close-knit
corporate networks capable of providing investors with inside information on company progress
which makes dispersed investors dependent on publicly available information to value the company
(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 28–29). U.S. firms have a unitary board structure where neither employee
representation on supervisory bodies nor separation between supervisory and managerial leadership
is required (Perlitz and Seger 2004: 3). The development of a strong market for corporate control
particularly in the 1980s (O'Sullivan 2000: ch. 5) and the model of shareholder capitalism have had
profound consequences on corporate behaviour and HRM/IR (Ferner 2000a: 9) taking the form of
short term strategies and short term financial goals (Geppert et al. 2003b: 624). For U.S. firms that
are relying on liquid capital markets for the provision of capital (OECD 2004: 19–20), creating
shareholder value is one of the major drivers of senior management decision-making (Froud et al.
2000;  Lazonick  and  O'Sullivan  2000).  In  the  U.S.,  shareholders  currently  are  predominantly
institutional investors which actively monitor share prices and engage in frequent transactions on
the capital markets to maximize returns in the short term (Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 200). The
158
5.2 US MNCs – country-of-origin effects, overall approach towards transfer and host country effects
financialization  theses  (Froud et  al. 2006)  hence  posits  that  managers  translate  capital  market
pressures for performance gains into financial performance targets inside the firm. For this purpose,
sophisticated  business  planning techniques  are  used  that  are  sustained by powerful  IT systems
(Ferner et al. 2004b) to set and monitor targets and to make different performance levels between
units visible. While the impact of downsizing and layoffs on employee commitment have already
been discussed above, radical shifts in business strategy (Almond et al. 2005: 299) and frequent
restructuring of firms have been led back to the sharp shareholder value orientation of U.S. firms
(Froud et al. 2000).
Conventions governing trust and authority relations
Lastly,  we  will  consider  the  strength  of  formal  institutions  generating  trust  between  potential
business partners and the reliance of institutional procedures when making business commitments.
Analogous  to  our  analysis  of  the  German  NBS,  we  will  hence  take  a  closer  look  at  the
trustworthiness of relevant institutions like the legal system, and the level of corruption in the U.S.
NBS.
Individual property rights are strongly protected by the fourth and fifth amendments of the US
Constitution  (United  States  of  America  1789).  Concerning  reliable  institutional  procedures,  an
independent jurisdiction and the rule of law, we can draw on the latest publications of Transparency
International. On their Corruption Perceptions Index, the USA are ranked 24 th of 183 countries with
7.1/10 points and are thus part of the third best group of countries, together with, inter alia, Ireland,
Belgium and France (Transparency International 2011a). A further look at the Global Corruption
Barometer 2010/11 (Transparency International 2011b) reveals that a large majority of 72% of U.S.
citizens asked perceived that  the level  of corruption has increased in  the last  three years.  This
concerns mostly political parties that are judged with a 4.3 on a scale ranging from 1 for not at all
corrupt to 5 for extremely corrupt. Public officials, police and judiciary are significantly better rated
with 3.8, 3.3 and 3.4. For doing business in a country, we would expect public officials and the
judiciary being the most important  institutional elements  since these bodies decide on licences,
permissions and sanctions or help individuals to enforce contractual obligations when a business
partner fails to deliver. When comparing the current U.S. corruption rating with other advanced
OECD countries, we might expect that business is not excessively influenced by corruption. Formal
institutions may be considered sufficiently reliable to serve as a formal-institutional guarantee for
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contractual obligations to be respected and for administrative processes to be delivered correctly
and equally.  Though, a 24th rank with a negative development in recent  years,  a very negative
judgement on political  parties and a moderately high extent of perceived corruption concerning
public officials is far from being a desirable status for the world's leading market economy.
As we have done for Germany, we will again draw on culturalist contributions in order to learn
about the nature of authority relations in the U.S. Hofstede (2001: 377) considers power distance
and uncertainty avoidance values to span a matrix of four different implicit models of organization.
In this matrix, the USA are part of the Anglo-Nordic cluster exposing a small power distance score
of 40 together with an equally weak uncertainty avoidance, displaying an index of 46 (Hofstede
2001: 500). In such cultures, the implicit model of the organization would therefore resemble a
market and be implicitly structured. The small power distance furthermore implies that there is few
social and moral distance between leaders and led. Furthermore, the USA are the highest ranking
nation on individualism (Hofstede 2001: 500), pointing to high degrees of autonomy and working
for  individual  rather  than  common  interests.  Trompenaars  and  Hampden-Turner  (1996:  53;
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 2012) furthermore classified the USA as a universalist culture,
where the respect of formal rules and laws is more important than the consideration of personal
relationships. We might therefore also expect the relation between superordinate and subordinate to
be governed by formal rules and procedures. Job control unionism during the New Deal, that we
have discussed earlier, might serve as a good example of clear sets of rules governing IR, and hence
the  relation between leader  and led.  But  also  Luthans and Hodgetts  (1996:  106)  emphasize “a
consistent system of abstract rules and standards which help ensure uniformity in the performance
of duties and co-ordination of tasks” and “a spirit  of formal impersonality in which duties are
carried out” as elements of classical US-American organizational design. These features strongly
qualify  the  USA  as  a  formal  political  culture  as  opposed  to  paternalist  ones.  Lodge  (1987)
distinguishes  between  two  varieties  of  formal  political  cultures,  with  Anglo-Saxon  countries
typically exposing contractual forms of authority, while in Scandinavian or continental European
countries communal forms of authority are more widespread. As we have seen, there is a pervasive
market mentality present in the U.S. NBS (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29–30; Hollingsworth 1997a:
271; Redding 2005: 142), which confirms the classification of the U.S. as a formal political culture
where  contractual forms of authority are in place. Philippe d'Iribarne (1989), who identified the
logic of a fair contract as the basic principle of U.S. management, lends further support to the thesis
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of  predominant  contractual  forms  of  authority  in  the  USA.  Legitimate  access  to  superordinate
positions  and status  in  the  USA are  achieved through personal  accomplishments  (Trompenaars
1996: 62; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 2012), which are usually evaluated as performance
against  predefined  plans  and  objectives  (Luthans  and  Hodgetts  1996:  109).  The  motive  of
achievement is also very present in the writings of the U.S. psychological theorist and founder of a
well-known motivational theory, David McClelland (1953; 1961).
5.2.2 HRM in US MNCs and cross-national HRM practice transfer
Following our overview of important features of the U.S. business system, we will now provide an
overview  of  how  country-of-origin  effects  translate  into  distinct  HRM  policies,  practices  and
approaches towards transfer within US MNCs. In order  to do so,  we will  summarize the main
findings drawn from a body of recent empirical research on US MNCs' approaches towards transfer
and HRM practices in their foreign subsidiaries.
A first characteristic distinguishing US MNCs from their counterparts of other countries-of-origin is
their comparatively high degree of centralization with corporate HQ playing a strong role in global
HR policy formulation (Almond 2011a: 261). This overall structural feature is accompanied by a
strong tendency towards  formalization and standardization (Ferner et al. 2004b: 366). US MNCs
were at the forefront in introducing sophisticated,  IT-based systems of  performance management
including  highly differentiated pay systems and  tight financial control (Ferner et al. 2004b: 365;
Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: 715; Geppert et al. 2003b: 624; Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 200).
These characteristics reflect strong market-based norms or a “market mentality” (Hollingsworth
1997a: 271) behind the employment relationship and US MNCs' “focused concern for shareholder
value” (Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2008: 156).
Taken together, the elements of centralization, formalization and standardization facilitate  cross-
national transfer through formal channels  of  more “context-generalizable”  (Taylor et  al. 1996:
964) HR practices and competencies that are commonly found among US MNCs (Ferner et al.
2004b: 367; Ferner et al. 2011: 488; Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 200). Such practices usually take
the form of  codified and reproducible management systems that can be managed from a strategic
centre  and that  are  easily transferable  since  they are  not  highly dependent  on tacit  knowledge
(Ferner et al. 2004b: 367). These results are further supported by recent survey findings, confirming
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that local subsidiaries of US MNCs generally dispose of lower levels of discretion in HR policy
formulation than MNCs from other countries (Ferner et al. 2011: 495). 
Another typical feature of US MNCs concerns their overall  willingness to transfer domestic HR
practices, leading to consistently strong country-of-origin effects. These are reflected in attempts to
transfer HR practices and IR policies in a standardized manner on a global scale in order to leverage
competencies and increase efficiency across plants internationally (Almond et al. 2005: 280; Ferner
et al. 2004b: 367; Tüselmann et al. 2008: 1624–1625). According to Schuler and Jackson (2005:
20), U.S. firms putting a strong emphasis on strategic HRM have developed high involvement work
systems (HIWS) where a whole set of HR practices is assumed to work in concert with each other as
part of a complex system. The idea behind is that of HIWS bundles where complementarities exist
between  the  constituent  practices  if  these  are  internally  consistent  and  mutually  sustaining  or
reinforcing (Ichniowski et al. 1997). In such systems, “any performance effect may be conditional
upon adopting of the full repertoire of high-involvement practices, and performance gains may fail
to be realised if practices are implemented in a piecemeal fashion” (Edwards and Wright 2001:
577). Therefore, internal HR consistency becomes a crucial issue to many US MNCs. This is strong
incentive for cross-national HR practice transfer in order to establish globally integrated HIWSs.
Cross-national practice transfer also includes the diffusion of best practices that are considered as
sources of competitive advantage, and hence, connected to firm financial performance (Schuler and
Jackson 2005:  14,  20-21).  The willingness  of  US MNCs to  transfer  on the one hand,  and the
receptiveness of European host business systems on the other, have been positively influenced by
the fact that “an increasingly internationalised economic system appears to be dominated  by the
USA, a position that has since the 1950s encouraged other national business  systems to ‘import’
American approaches to business in general and industrial relations specifically“ (Clark 1999; Clark
et al. 2005: 508; Gilpin 2000). For instance, “Ireland and Spain have for some time viewed foreign
MNCs as partners in economic development and pursued permissive export-led strategies towards
FDI” (Clark et al. 2005: 512–513). 
The flexibility of the liberal U.S. NBS has encouraged employers to assume a “proactive” stance
(Ferner et al. 2011: 488; Lawrence 1996) and to experiment, bringing forth major innovations in the
field of HRM and IR. The great freedom in terms of HRM and IR practices that the U.S. NBS
grants to firms and management, and the proactive approaches adopted by US firms, are therefore
standing in sharp contrast to what we have seen in Germany. In the latter case, the freedom of
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organizations in terms of their  HRM practices is strongly restricted by institutional regulations,
rules and procedures  including co-determination (Ferner et al. 2011: 488) and an overall tendency
towards juridification (Verrechtlichung)(Avery et al. 1999: 22; Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992: 24–
25).
Some of the innovative practices7 transferred within US MNCs towards their European subsidiaries
are  related  to  individualization  of  HRM  including  performance-related  pay,  but  also  the
management of corporate culture  and the use of formal corporate culture as a management tool
(Ferner et  al. 2004a:  117)  in  the  sense  of  “cultural  engineering”  (Alvesson  2002:  47–48).
Furthermore,  U.S.  innovations  in  HRM comprised  techniques  developed  or  applied  in  welfare
capitalist firms in order to win the commitment of their employees. The latter comprised inter alia
general  welfare programmes and  benefits  such  as  pension  plans.  Health  care  systems,
unemployment insurance, and attractive remuneration. In sophisticated performance management
systems, performance-related pay has been coupled with more flexible,  individualised forms of
performance  appraisal,  profit-sharing  schemes  and  promotions.  Moreover,  such  MNCs  have
tailored policies to new labour market segments, and hence, introduced family-centred policies. Still
another important innovation was the use of social science techniques (Jacoby 1997: 220-228, 246)
such as  regular  employee  surveys  (Ferner  2000a:  17;  Ferner  and Müller-Camen 2004:  75–77).
Structural  innovations  in  HRM  concerned  the  search  for  economies  of  scale through  the
establishment of HR shared services (Ulrich 1995) as well as outsourcing and off-shoring of HR
activities (Ferner et al. 2011: 488; Lever 1997).
Lastly, as we have seen in our discussion of salient features of the U.S. national business system,
the  diversity of the U.S. workforce has given rise to the elaboration of well-developed diversity
policies and programmes (Kurowski 1999, 2002). Since one of the traditional roles of U.S. HR
professionals is to assure compliance with legal regulations (Schuler and Jackson 2005: 13), they
have developed diversity programmes partly because of a series of legislative measures following
the civil rights movement (Bond and Pyle 1998; Dessler 2002: chapter 2), and partly because of
demographic trends that are at the basis of the business case for diversity. In this connection, Ferner
et al. (2005a: 308–310) point to unresolved tensions between equal opportunities and business case
strands,  arguing  that  despite  the  strength  and  visibility  of  the  U.S.  diversity  agenda,  equality
legislation in the U.S. has lacked supporting systems of social regulation like unions and collective
7 In this connection, Wächter et al. (2004: 86) defined innovative practices as “those that deviate from common, wide-
spread practices in a given context”.
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bargaining that help to build and enforce legal rights in Europe. Limited evidence of small-scale
studies  suggests  that  US  MNCs  began  in  the  latter  part  of  the  1990s  to  transfer  diversity
programmes to  their  overseas  operations  (Egan and Bendick.  2003;  Wentling and Palma Rivas
2000). Though, the findings of empirical research seem to indicate that overall initiatives abroad
were fewer and less  aggressive.  Companies  rather  transferred the basic  framework including a
common global mission, corporate values, global diversity teams, common administrative structures
and training programmes (Egan and Bendick. 2003). Within these frameworks, foreign subsidiaries
were then given autonomy to adapt policy to local concerns.  In European countries,  especially
gender policies were pervasive that included affinity groups and mentoring systems for women
employees as well as targets or quotas (Ferner et al. 2004a: 121; Ferner et al. 2005a: 313; Gunnigle
et  al. 2004:  171).  In  some  cases,  women's  quotas  were  perceived  as  a  constraint  by  local
management which led to tensions with HQ (Quintanilla et al. 2004: 146–147), or diversity was not
at all perceived as a local management priority (Wächter et al. 2003: 105, 2004: 104–105).
Besides being conducive to various innovations, the freedom to experiment also led to a great deal
of  variation across  sectors  and  regions  within  the  U.S.  NBS,  pointing  to  a  great  amount  of
“variation at the source” (Meardi et al. 2009: 505) especially in terms of ER policy. Such variation
comprises New Deal job control unionism (Kochan et al. 1994: 28; Wever 1995: 609) in some
sectors and regions, high-road non-union HRM in welfare capitalist firms (Jacoby 1997) as well as
low-road non-union HRM models as for example in the fast  food business (Clark and Almond
2004: 540; Clark et al. 2005: 512). Thus, following Guest and Conway's (1999) framework for
analysis  of  ER policy  choices,  within  the  US NBS,  we  can  identify traditional  collective ER
involving collective voice mechanisms but no high involvement work systems (HIWS), individual
high-road models  including  HIWS  and  individual  low-road models  where  neither  HIWS  nor
collective  voice  mechanisms  are  in  place.  Lastly,  we  might  argue  that  innovations  within  the
unionised sectors led or may lead to the establishment of dual collective ER models involving both,
collective voice mechanisms and HIWS. Cases like the well-known Saturn plant might serve as an
illustration of such developments (Kochan and Rubinstein 2000).
Though, in field studies, US MNCs have been repeatedly found to exhibit strongly individualistic
management philosophies and a strong preference for direct forms of employee consultations which
translated into a clearly  negative attitude towards unions and collective forms of representation
(Almond et al. 2003: 433; Clark and Almond 2004: 538; Ferner et al. 2005b: 703; Geppert et al.
2003b: 625; Marginson et  al. 2010: 173; Tüselmann et  al. 2008: 1624). These traits have been
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argued to reflect the “antiunionism  of major variants — union avoidance ‘low road’ and union
substitution ‘HRM’ — of the American business model“ (Marginson et al. 2010: 155). Furthermore,
wide-spread anti-union stances seem to have a strong influence on the mindset of many American
managers who consider union recognition equalling management failure (Ferner et al. 2004a: 118;
Wächter et al. 2003: 87, 2004: 95).
Individual performance appraisals, individual reward systems and merit pay as well as monitoring
of  the  effectiveness  of  training  have  been  identified  as  “characteristically  US human  resource
management practices” (Gooderham et al. 2006: 1492) that are indicative for a rational, calculative
approach (Gooderham et  al. 1999).  Such  practices  are  based  on  an  assumption  of  employer-
employee  unanimity  where  firms  follow  a  unitarist rather  than  a  social  partnership  approach
(Sparrow and Hiltrop 1994). 
Table  18  below  summarizes  key  findings  of  previous  research  concerning  US  MNCs'  overall
approaches towards HRM practice transfer.
Table 18: Overview of HR practice transfer in US MNCs
Typical HR 
architecture
Attitude towards 
transfer
Transfer 
mechanisms
Practices subject to transfer
Comparatively 
strong 
centralisation, 
formalisation and
standardisation; 
HQ as strong 
centre for 
decision-making 
in the field of 
HR/IR: central 
design of global 
policy, 
frameworks, 
processes and 
practices
Strong willingness 
to transfer inter alia 
linked to dominant  
systemic position of
US NBS and 
introduction of high 
involvement work 
systems (HIWS) 
implying strong 
need for internal HR
consistency;
standardised and 
formalised practices
are easily 
transferable
Heavy use of formal 
channels: standard 
policies,  practices, 
processes and 
frameworks 
supported by IT-
systems; 
HR coordination 
through regular 
international contact 
and formal reporting 
lines
Calculative HRM practices as part of HIWS 
involving sophisticated performance 
management systems relying on 
individualised, performance-related pay and 
broad-banding of salary levels
non-union ideology: strong preference for 
individual forms of ER/IR and direct forms of
communication
clear and formal corporate culture integrated
as part of management development/ 
socialisation practices
diversity policy frameworks
Source: Own compilation based on Almond (2011a), Almond et al. (2003), Kristensen and Morgan (2007),
Ferner et al. (2011), Ferner et al. (2005b), Ferner et al. (2005a), Ferner et al. (2004b), Ferner et al. (2004a),
Ferner and Müller-Camen (2004), Ferner (2000a), Ferner and Quintanilla (1998), Geppert  et al. (2003b),
Almond  et  al. (2005),  Wächter  et  al. (2003),  Fenton-O'Creevy  et  al. (2008),  Kurowski  (1999),  Kurowski
(2002),  Gunnigle  et al. (2004), Quintanilla  et al. (2004), Wächter  et al. (2004), Gooderham et al. (1999),
Hollingsworth (1997a), Tüselmann et al. (2008), Schuler and Jackson (2005), Jacoby (1997), Kochan et al.
(1994),  Kochan and Rubinstein  (2000),  Wever (1995),  Guest  and  Conway (1999),  Sparrow and Hiltrop
(1994), Meardi et al. (2009), Clark et al. (2005), Clark (1999), Gilpin (2000), Lawrence (1996), Ulrich (1995),
Lever (1997), Bond and Pyle (1998), Dessler (2002), Wentling and Palma Rivas (2000), Egan and Bendick
(2003), Clark and Almond (2004), Marginson et al. (2010), and Edwards and Wright (2001).
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5.2.3 US MNCs in different host countries
As we have done for German MNCs, in a third step we will now have a closer look at US MNCs
and HRM practice transfer in distinct host countries in order to learn about their typical approaches
of dealing with host country constraints and of using locally available resources. Based on this
information, we can later formulate propositions concerning US MNCs' expected ways of relating
to the Swiss host country.
When studying the cross-national transfer of strongly individualised, calculative HRM practices as
part of US HIWSs, researchers investigating at the host country subsidiary level have focused their
attention especially on IR systems and legal frameworks in CMEs. This is due to the fact that
several  CMEs  constrain  the  freedom  of  firms  to  apply  market  driven  management  practices,
particularly in regard to pay policy (Pulignano 2006; Quintanilla et al. 2008; Wächter and Peters
2004; Wächter et al. 2003). In this connection, Gooderham et al. (2006: 1496) pointed out a central
difference between the US and the European setting in  explaining that  “[a]t  a  general  level  in
Europe substantial firm autonomy and weak trade unions is the exception rather than the rule”.
While empirical research generally confirms the picture of US MNCs' IR policies being strongly
shaped by a non-union ideology, the IR practices and systems in place in their foreign subsidiaries
were found to depend on a whole set of influences including host country regulatory environments,
labour market constraints and micro-political issues. In fact, many US MNCs accept and comply
with local norms in terms of union recognition and membership, be it for legal reasons or for the
perceived costs of departing from established patterns and traditions in the field that may arise from
bad morale and publicity or industrial action (Edwards and Ferner 2002: 102). Hence, different host
country regulatory regimes as well as industry characteristics moderate the degree of US country-
of-origin influence in IR and ER. 
In the following section, we will have a closer look at empirical evidence on US MNCs in different
host country environments in order to find out in how far and in what ways US country-of-origin
influence is reflected in their  transferred practices, and how US MNCs deal with different host
country  institutional  as  well  as  labour  market  constraints  and  opportunities.  In  this  respect,
especially strongly regulated CME host country environments as in Germany have been repeatedly
found  to  impose  major  restrictions  on  the  transfer  of  non-union  IR  policies  and  strongly
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individualised,  performance-based pay systems. Conforming to these arguments,  in their  survey
study Gooderham et al.  (2006: 1506–1507) found that calculative HRM practices in US MNCs'
subsidiaries were significantly less common in the German, Danish and Norwegian CME settings
when  compared  to  the  UK,  Ireland  and  Australia.  Case  studies  in  several  CME environments
including Germany, Spain and Italy brought further insights into the nature of specific host country
constraints and the way US MNCs dealt with the latter when trying to transfer HR practices.
As we have seen,  in  the  German NBS,  dual  VET,  industry wide collective  bargaining and co-
determination on plant level via the works councils and hence, a multitude of legal and collective
regulations  governing  IR,  have  repeatedly  been  argued  to  represent  the  most  important  labour
market institutions that are imposing important constraints on the transfer of individualised, firm-
centred US HRM practices (Giardini et  al. 2005; Müller 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Singe and
Croucher  2005;  Tempel  2001;  Tempel et  al. 2006a;  Wächter et  al. 2003,  2004;  Wächter  and
Stengelhofen 1992; Williams and Geppert 2006a). Due to the  strength of German labour market
institutions  some  authors  have  even  asserted  that,  in  the  German  IR  system,  “simple  union
avoidance is not an option” (Almond et al. 2005: 291).
However,  case  study evidence  suggests  that,  while  US  MNCs  formally  seem to  comply  with
German regulations, they also engaged in extensive exploration of options. Clark et al. (2005: 507)
observe that “US MNCs have presented the most direct challenge to the existing IR system in
Germany, with both the sectoral bargaining system, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the system of
codetermination being targets of policy change” among some of their case study firms in the 1990s.
Wächter et al.  (2004: 94–101) have reported on pragmatic reasons for US MNCs to align their
remuneration  to  the  provisions  of  the  collective  agreement  but  on  attempts  to  clearly separate
unions and works councils.  Strict  avoidance of collective agreements and lay-offs of unionised
workers running for election as works councillor in one US bank even caused a broad-based public
campaign against the bank (Wächter et al. 2004: 96). Although open avoidance of works councils
has  not  been discovered in  the cases  investigated by the  group of  researchers  around Hartmut
Wächter, US MNCs have extensively used the latitude granted by the German Works Constitution
Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972; Wächter et al. 2004: 98–99). Yet, other case studies revealed
that certain US MNCs adopted works council avoidance strategies (Köhnen 2000; Müller 1998;
Royle 1998; Royle and Towers 2002). Furthermore, while eager to clearly separate works councils
and  unions  wherever  possible,  the  former  appeared  to  play  an  important  role  in  many  case
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companies (Wächter et al. 2003: 105). There was rather close cooperation involved in most cases,
while the extent of cooperation decreased with increasing union influence (Wächter et al. 2004: 98),
suggesting that  US companies tried to  strongly influence the works councils.  Kluge and Vitols
(2001: 3) reported that Anglo-Saxon managers valued the legitimacy effect of works councils and
explained  that  “[b]y  successfully  supporting  restructuring,  works  councils  can  reduce  foreign
owners' mistrust and prejudices about German codetermination”. Also interesting in this connection
is  Cooke's  (1997:  13–14)  finding  about  US investors  who  generally  seemed  to  be  much  less
concerned  about  employee  representation  through  works  councils  than  with  involvement  of
employers'  associations  or  trade  unions.  In  their  review of  empirical  investigations,  Singe  and
Croucher  (2005:  131)  came  to  the  conclusion  that  US  MNCs  generally  seem to  allow  works
councils to be established on employee request, although preferring direct communication and rapid
change, and that they are trying to exert strong influence on works councils. Companies prioritising
overt  works council  avoidance were especially found in the fast  food (Royle 1998;  Royle and
Towers 2002) and retail (Köhnen 2000) sectors. Since such strategies in these sectors are consistent
with those of German competitors, it is hard to distinguish between country-of-origin, sectoral and
company size effects (Singe and Croucher 2005: 132). Still another interesting contribution is the
study undertaken by Tempel et al. (2006a). At a first glance, the German operations of three of their
case study companies  seemed to fully comply with local collective representation practices. They
were covered by a collective agreement either on industry or company-level and had works councils
in place. However, deeper examination revealed that subsidiary managers were put under intense
pressure from HQ to deliver results  regardless of local collective representation agreements.  In
cases  were the subsidiary's  performance track had been poor  throughout  the  1980s and 1990s,
subsidiary management could not use local institutional arrangements as a buffer. Owing to the
need to re-establish internal legitimacy, local subsidiary management decided to reorganize their
operations into legally independent firms, hence separating the unionised production facilities from
the rest.  They left  the constraining metalworking collective agreement  and signed a framework
agreement  with  a  more  moderate  service-sector  union  that  fixed  only minimum standards  and
granted great latitude to introduce the company's new global variable pay system and to re-establish
the  38  hours  working week (Tempel et  al. 2006a:  1557).  Other  companies  were successful  in
avoiding union campaigns for collective bargaining by paying their employees more than the pay
rates established in the collective agreement, or through introduction of communication channels
and sophisticated HRM practices to retain good staff, thereby successfully avoiding demands from
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staff for works council representation (Almond et al. 2005: 291; Tempel et al. 2006a: 1559). Still
another  way  of  dealing  with  collective  agreements  that  would  hinder  performance-based  pay
increases was to agree with works council on a wage matrix, and hence, to consolidate collectively
agreed wage increases into basic pay, and to act on additional forms of remuneration to ensure that
poor  performers  would  not  gain  (Almond et  al. 2005:  297).  These  cases  nicely illustrate  how
external constraints were defined and interpreted by central and local actors within micro-political
processes,  leading to  differing  modes  of  operation  according to  personal  objectives  and power
resources available to subsidiary actors. Such option-exploring in the field of collective bargaining
is also reported in other companies like IBM that have “a history of movements in and out of
different employers' associations” (Singe and Croucher 2005: 133) as well as in further case studies
(Wächter et al. 2003). Wächter et al. (2003: 388) argue that managers in German subsidiaries are
under considerable pressure to remain union-free, while on the other hand US MNCs reluctance to
join employers' associations might be due to the fact that the latter are dominated by large German
employers,  leaving  US  MNCs  in  a  situation  where  they  can  exert  little  influence  (Singe  and
Croucher 2005: 133).
All in all, concerning US MNCs as actors in the German host country, Singe and Croucher came to
the conclusion that there are different types of behaviours ranging from support/innovation within
the  existing  system  over  formal  compliance/content  avoidance  and  option  exploration/system
avoidance  to  public  criticism.  The  authors  express  little  doubt  about  US MNCs  affecting  the
German business system. Especially the ones following a strategy of content or system avoidance
are “certainly playing a role in eroding the articulations between unions and works councillors, and
those between employers and mainstream employers' associations which have historically made the
system function” while  “doing so in  ways consistent  with many German employers'  practices”
(Singe and Croucher 2005: 134). 
On  the  other  hand,  US  firms  seem  to  appreciate  certain  resources  provided  by  this  CME
environment like the highly skilled labour. In fact, Vitols (2001: 14, 16, 17) found that the dual
system of  VET is  appreciated  by US firms  as  an  important  resource  to  them provided by the
German host country. 
In Spain, Quintanilla et al. (2004: 135–136; 2008: 690) pointed to the strong legalistic system of IR.
This implies the compulsory application of terms of sectoral bargaining because of the extension to
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non-signatory firms (Almond et al. 2005: 292) and a strongly regulated labour market where legal
barriers to dismissal of permanent employees are high. 
In this environment, the case study conducted by Almond et al. (2005) revealed that in companies
operating a performance management system with forced distribution, permanent low-performers
having already received a maximum of two years of intensive training  were invited to leave the
company with a generous severance pay to avoid union conflict (Almond et al. 2005: 298–299).
Faced with the significant, legally enforced role unions play in Spain, US MNCs were found to take
preventive measures (Quintanilla et al. 2004: 143–145; Quintanilla et al. 2008: 690) including the
payment of higher than average salaries and additional benefits in order to prevent labour conflict
while complying with legal requirements. Spanish works councils in reality were found to play a
much weaker role than those in Germany and greatly dealt with routine administrative issues while
management was less compliant in cases of weak works council organization (Almond et al. 2005:
290,  293).  A greater  constraint  in  the  Spanish  host  country  setting  is  indirectly  linked  to  the
education and training system which is causal to the local scarcity of qualified personnel that firms
face  on  the  local  labour  market.  This  constraint  led  US  MNCs  to  put  special  emphasis  on
sophisticated recruiting processes of young university graduates from business schools which were
approved by HQ, and on internal personnel development and career planning for high potentials
(Quintanilla et al. 2004: 145; Quintanilla et al. 2008: 692).
Interestingly, similar constraints were also found in Turkey, where “as a result of the education and
skills development system, qualified and educated employees still belong to a small 'elite' group”
(Sayim 2011: 590). Facing the need for a multi-skilled and qualified workforce at operational as
well as managerial levels, US MNCs responded to such labour market pressures in adopting an
internal labour market approach in their Turkish subsidiaries and joint ventures (Sayim 2011: 589–
591).
In Italy, Pulignano (2006) found that local unions established a national coordination programme to
respond to the MNC's perceived anti-union attitude and its threat to trade union bargaining power.
This led the company to guarantee a national inter-plant harmonization concerning pay and working
conditions.  However,  union bargaining power in terms of the appraisal  system was much more
restricted due to the easy transferability to other lower cost locations in Europe. At the same time,
the  US MNC was able  to  establish a  work-out  system for  employees  whose performance was
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judged insufficient, despite the existence of a common country-based framework of employment
protection legislation. This was achieved by taking measures to establish that dismissal took place
for legitimate reasons. Summarizing on the Italian host country, Pulignano (2006: 514) states that
“more institutionalised national settings offer greater scope to constrain the networking of certain
corporate practices among subsidiaires”.
However, even in generally more permissive LME host country settings, IR systems of US MNCs'
subsidiaries are not invariably non-union. 
In a recent survey study on ER approaches of US subsidiaries in the UK, Tüselmann et al. (2008)
confirmed findings of previous studies on a distinct US country-of-origin imprint on ER. US MNCs
were somewhat less likely than domestic firms to adopt a trade union approach and instead showed
a clear  preference for operating individualistic  high involvement  work systems. Yet,  in the UK
setting,  ER  approaches  varied  greatly  according  to  industry  characteristics.  Non-union  ER
approaches  were  especially  wide-spread  in  US  MNCs  operating  in  highly  internationalised
industries with associated strong pressures for international integration of their activities. High-road
approaches  were  especially  likely  to  be  adopted  in  highly  internationalised,  skill-intensive
industries,  whereas the low-road variant  was more wide-spread in highly internationalised,  less
skill-intensive industries (Tüselmann et  al. 2008: 1631).  Therefore,  these findings provide clear
support for the argument that “the country-of-origin impact is not tout court, but a matter of degree”
(Tüselmann et al. 2008: 1624), by illustrating how it combines with industry characteristics to form
diverse outcomes. Still further case study evidence (Clark and Almond 2004; Ferner et al. 2004a;
Ferner et al. 2005b) suggests that there is no homogeneous pattern among US MNCs' subsidiaries
in the UK in the field of IR. In fact, several subsidiaries of US MNCs in the UK continued with a
pluralist  IR tradition.  This  corresponds  to  common practice  in  certain  industries  and reflects  a
pragmatic approach of British managers who did not share in the same ideological anti-union stance
of their U.S. colleagues. As long as British mangers succeeded in establishing an efficient pattern of
ER without losses of production their pragmatic local interpretations were accepted by U.S. HQ
(Ferner et al. 2004a: 119–120). Local perceptions and interests that are related to the societally
informed rationality of host country managers (2005: 281; Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002) and
associated micro-political bargaining hence strongly shaped patterns of union relations and non-
unionism in UK subsidiaries of US MNCs (Ferner et al. 2005b). Furthermore, “tighter competitive
conditions  in  the  UK  prevent  strategic  choice  and  established  preferences  in  approaches  to
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industrial relations from constraining investment activity“ (Clark and Almond 2004: 549) so that
even traditionally strict non-union companies that formerly would not have invested in unionised
businesses were forced by product market difficulties to accept collective representation practices.
IR  in  the  UK  also  included  individual  performance-related  pay  with  the  nature  of  individual
performance  management  being  strongly  led  by global  managers.  This  is  concordant  with  the
characteristic trait of strong centralization in the design of HR and IR policy among US MNCs.
Several of these systems also included forced distribution, and hence, the greater risk of dismissal
for the low performers following the American concept of employment at will (Clark and Almond
2004:  550).  Such characteristics have been described as  “a clear  shift  away from sophisticated
paternalism and towards policies of an increasingly 'hard',  'performance-driven' flavour” (Clark et
al. 2005: 499).
In the case of Ireland, early U.S. investors rather used to follow the typical pattern of subscribing to
collective  bargaining.  In  contrast,  US MNCs arriving  after  1990 established  largely non-union
systems or “double-breasting” arrangements with some, but not all plants recognizing unions (Clark
et al. 2005: 499). In this respect, Gooderham et al. (2006: 1499, 1507) pointed to the now dualistic
nature of  the Irish institutional  setting since in  its  pursuit  of  FDI,  Ireland granted considerable
freedom in the field of IR to greenfield sites which was used by US MNCs to introduce a unitary
management style. Gunnigle et al. (2004) also pointed out that, while plants established during the
1960s and 1970s were usually unionised, starting in the 1980s especially US MNCs more and more
opted for non-union approaches. Were collective agreements exist, these are negotiated on plant
level and establish pay increases for unionised workers whereas non-unionised ones receive more
performance-related  pay.  Especially  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  plant-level  collective
agreements offered above average pay when compared to the non-compulsory national agreements.
In non-union plants, pay for nearly all employees was performance-based. Similar to the UK, the
emphasis of diversity policies was put rather on gender than on ethnicity in Ireland.
In their recent case study of German and US MNC subsidiaries in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia,
Meardi et  al.  (2009: 507) found that,  compared to their  German counterparts,  country-of-origin
influence among the US MNCs was reflected in their use of unilateral forms of flexibility including
overtime, appraisal-based variable pay as well as temporary employment. IR arrangements varied
according to entry mode and local labour market conditions. In one case of  a sizeable, old, highly
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unionised brownfield plant in Budapest, collective bargaining over pay on plant level was combined
with extensive training on the job. In another case though, the initial strategy was sharply focused
on labour cost-cutting. This involved extreme  flexibility, though with a highly-skilled workforce.
This strategy, that had been operated during the 1990s, had to be altered as from 2003 the arrival of
new investors led to a tightening of the labour market for skilled workers, leading management to
increase pay, to introduce social benefits, and to recognize a union as negotiating partner (Meardi  et
al. 2009: 503–504).
In  Lebanon, Nakhle (2011) found that, while on the one hand there are few “hard” institutional
constraints that might lead to coercive isomorphism, on the other, multiple strong local norms are
present that can be linked to cultural value orientations and might as well be considered as informal
institutions  (Helmke  and  Levitsky  2004:  727).  Due  to  the  presence  of  local  norms,  the
implementation  of  performance  appraisals  as  part  of  globally  standardized  performance
management systems was locally adapted in an informal way in order to allow employees to save
their  face.  Strong local family ties and related norms were reflected in their  flexible use when
locally adapting recruitment practices. In this respect, personal relations were also found to play an
important part since in this small country, managers employed in MNCs are being recruited from a
very limited number of international business schools. Thus, this institutional element linked to the
local  education  and  training  system as  well  as  to  the  small  size  of  the  country,  led  to  strong
interpersonal relationships in the business community. The latter were also used in order to recruit
good local staff.  The strong role of personal relationships and family ties nevertheless led to a
tightening of the corporate code of conduct in one case in order to prevent the risk of nepotism.
Particularly interesting in this respect is the fact that this tightening of respective rules in the code of
conduct was done by local Lebanese management.  Compensation and benefits  were adapted to
include social security benefits in order to compensate for the rudimentary Lebanese welfare state. 
Table 19 below summarizes key findings of the most important empirical investigations on cross-
national transfer of HRM and IR practices in US MNCs towards different host countries.
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Host  country,
authors
Constraints and opportunities US MNC reaction
Germany,
constraining
environment
(Almond et  al.
2005;  Clark et
al. 2005;
Köhnen  2000;
Müller  1998;
Royle  1998;
Royle  and
Towers  2002;
Singe  and
Croucher
2005;  Tempel
et  al. 2006a;
Wächter et  al.
2003, 2004)
Important constraints imposed in the area of IR/ER: 
works  constitution  act:  granting  far-reaching  co-
determination  rights  to  works  councils  on  plant
level;  restricts unilateral  decision-making power of
management  and  imposes  need  for  negotiation,
e.g. in the area of performance appraisal practices
industry-level  collective  bargaining:  working
conditions, working hours and overtime as well as
base pay are traditionally decided upon outside the
firm
comprehensive  system  of  dual  VET:  no  legal
obligation  to  participate,  well-trained  workforce
available,  contents  of  training  determined
collectively outside the company
strict  employment  protection  legislation:  dismissal
only  for  right  cause,  mass  lay-offs  are  onerous,
difficult  to  introduce  performance  management
systems relying on forced distribution with dismissal
of weakest performers
Legally  compliant,  though  not  acquiescent  but  reactive  approach;  challenging  of  the
institutional framework; approaches towards handling of host country constraints comprising
especially legal compliance with content  avoidance and extensive option exploration with
system avoidance
restructuring  activities  in  order  to  escape  legal  obligations  (works  council  formation  or
employee representation on board level)
strict separation of works council and unions
trying to  exert  influence  on works  councils  (in  some cases  on  choice  of  members);  co-
operation with non-unionised works councils because of legitimising effect
preventive  measures  like  above-average  salaries  and  direct  communication  channels  to
avoid unionisation or works council constitution
reluctance to join German employers' associations seemingly because of limited influence of
US MNCs in these structures
if  member of employers' association: frequent change of association to strike agreements
with more moderate unions granting more latitude to firm-level adaptations
active agency of US MNCs exacerbating tendencies of the system towards disarticulation
Spain,
constraining
environment
(Almond et  al.
2005;
Quintanilla et
al. 2004;
Quintanilla et
Legalistic  IR:  provisions  of  collective  agreements
declared legally binding for whole sector
legally empowered unions
strict employment protection legislation
scarcity  of  well-trained  workforce  on  local  labour
markets
Compliance with legally binding collective agreements (treated as if it were laws)
preventive measures to avoid unionism and industrial conflict: above-average pay, employee
involvement and participation, generous severance pay in case of dismissal
internal  labour  market  approach  with  early  recruitment  from  selected  partner  business
schools and internal training including socialisation to corporate culture
marginalisation of works councils (attribution of routine administrative tasks)
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al. 2008)
works  councils  regularly  less  strong  than  in
Germany
US HQ equal opportunity policies for women sometimes perceived as constraint by local
managers
Italy,
constraining
environment
(Pulignano
2006)
Strong employment protection legislation
strong, assertive unions
Some concessions to unions concerning equal working conditions among all Italian plants
threat  of  de-localisation  used  in  negotiations  with  unions  to  push  through  performance
management system with dismissal of poor performers; 
facing employment protection legislation, generous severance pay was granted and some
effort has been undertaken to establish that dismissals took place for legitimate reasons
UK, permissive
environment
(Clark  and
Almond  2004;
Clark et  al.
2005;  Ferner
et  al. 2004a;
Ferner et  al.
2005b;
Tüselmann et
al. 2008)
Traditionally stronger role of unions than in USA, no
comparable anti-union ideology, 
permissive IR system
liberal labour legislation
No evidence of  institutional constraints opposing a shift  towards more shareholder value-
driven, hard performance management practices
tolerance of British managers' pragmatic dealing with unions as long as results are delivered
some US-inspired diversity  policies perceived  as  inadequate  to  European setting;  British
managers bargaining with US HQ using own corporate policies to negotiate diversity issues
or lay-offs, diversity transformed into equal opportunity/women policies
in some businesses, increasing product market pressures forced US MNCs to accept the
acquisition of unionised plants
great differences according to choice of high-road or low-road individualistic approaches to
ER in different industries (depending on knowledge intensity)
Ireland,
permissive
environment
(Clark et  al.
2005;
Gooderham et
al. 2006;
Gunnigle et al.
2004)
Traditionally  stronger  role  of  unions  and  non-
compulsory  national  collective  bargaining
agreements; 
overall rather weakly regulated IR/ER
traditionally large supply in qualified labour, though
strong decline of  unemployment quota since mid-
1980s caused a somewhat shorter supply of labour
Strong impact of dominant US FDI on economy as a whole
while some older plants established in the 1960s and 1970s are unionised, starting from the
1980s/1990s investors are more and more following a non-union or double-vested approach
(unions recognised at some plants only)
where unions exist, non-compulsory national collective agreements are often taken as a first
benchmark  to  offer  higher  standards  in  in-house  agreements  (especially  pharmaceutical
industry)
unionised employees paid according to the collective agreement, non-unionised ones more
performance-based; in non-union plants nearly all workers received performance-related pay
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emphasis of diversity programmes put on gender
Poland,
Hungary,
Slovenia,
permissive
environments
(Meardi  2007;
Meardi et  al.
2009)
Constraints rose with tightening of the local labour
market  for  skilled  workers,  high  turnover  and  the
need  to  recognize  more  assertive  trade  unions
since 2000
Unilateral imposition of overtime work and flexible patterns of shift work
importance of financial parameters stressed and less emphasis on technical knowledge than
in German MNCs
more variable pay subject to individual assessments by foremen
extensive training taking place on the job in one case to achieve multi-skilling
initial cost-minimizing strategy in one plant in Hungary had to be altered when facing a tighter
labour market – higher pay and social benefits, recognition of union as a negotiating partner
Turkey
(Sayim 2011)
Local shortage of qualified labour Adoption of internal labour market approaches
Lebanon
permissive
environment
(Nakhle 2011)
Few “hard” institutional constraints on HRM practice
but strong cultural norms that might be considered
as informal institutions (family bands, saving face,
strong role of personal relations in business)
multitude  of  personal  networks  stemming  from
recruitment  of  HR  managers  from  very  few
international schools
rudimentary welfare state
weak unions
Implementation of formally standardized practices in the area of performance appraisal was
informally adapted to local context
corporate codes of conduct in one case tightened by local management to prevent nepotism
local recruitment practices adapted in that local personal networks were used to recruit good
staff
local compensation and benefits practices adapted to include social security benefits
Source: Own compilation based on Tempel et al. (2006a), Wächter et al. (2003), Wächter et al. (2004), Wächter and Peters (2004), Wächter and Müller-Camen (2002), Wächter and
Stengelhofen (1992), Edwards and Ferner (2002), Ferner  et al. (2004a), Ferner  et al. (2005b), Giardini  et al. (2005), Müller (1997), Müller (1998), Müller (1999a), Müller (1999b),
Almond et al. (2005), Quintanilla et al. (2004), Quintanilla et al (2008), Gunnigle et al. (2004), Royle (1998), Pulignano (2006), Singe and Croucher (2005), Tüselmann et al. (2008),
Gooderham et al. (2006), Clark et al. (2005), Clark and Almond (2004), Sayim (2011), Tempel (2001), Cooke (1997), Williams and Geppert (2006a), Royle and Towers (2002), Köhnen
(2000), Kluge und Vitols (2001), Vitols (2001), Meardi et al. (2009), Nakhle (2011).
                                                    176
Chapter 6 The Swiss host country business system
Chapter 6 The Swiss host country business system
In the following analysis of the Swiss host country NBS and its potential effects on HRM, a special
focus is put on key institutions governing the Swiss labour market. An analysis of the financial
system and issues of corporate governance is also included, even though we believe the nature of
the financial  system to exert influence on MNC strategy and HRM practices first and foremost
directly  in  or  via  the  country-of-origin  of  the  MNC.  Key strategic  decisions  about  listings  on
domestic  or  foreign  stock  markets  to  finance  internationalization  or  important  research  and
development activities are usually still made at corporate HQ and not at subsidiary level (Edwards
and  Kuruvilla  2005:  7).  Still,  a  thorough  analysis  of  issues  related  to  financial  markets  and
corporate  governance  might  hold  the  potential  to  gain  some insight  into  embedded managerial
ideological norms of Swiss managers (Almond 2011a: 265). However, we would  strongly suggest
that the financial system of the Swiss host country does not influence directly on the adoption of,
for example, the introduction of performance management and accounting systems in the sense of a
host country effect. Yet, the meaning and sense that managers ascribe to such systems might also be
important to understand the degree of acceptance or ways of implementing specific practices.
6.1 Salient features of the Swiss national business system and domestic HRM
As  we  have  argued  earlier,  Switzerland  represents  a
particularly interesting case of a host country for US and
German MNCs, because it combines features of liberal
and  coordinated  institutional  environments.  In  the
following section, we will present these features in some
more  detail.  The  detailed  comparative  analysis  of  key
institutions  governing  the  Swiss  labour  market  will
provide us with a sound picture of institutional pressures
and room for manoeuvre (Wächter 2004) for local firms.
As we have seen in our discussion of institutional environments and host country effects on HRM,
institutions not only define the rules of the game, but they also shape managers' understandings of
their  role  and  the  meanings  of  practices.  Therefore,  in  the  following  analysis  we  will  try  to
understand not only the effects of formal institutions in terms of coercive isomorphic pressures, but
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also normative and cognitive  elements that may have an important influence on local managers'
socialised rationality (Almond 2011a: 260) and further our understanding of Swiss host country
rationale (Redding 2005: 136).
As we will see, in Switzerland there are significantly less formal institutional constraints in place
than  in  Germany.  However,  Tempel  reminds  that  “(…)  the  potential  influence  of  informal
regulations  and  custom  and  practice  on  the  management  of  human  resources  should  not  be
underestimated”  (Tempel  2001:  63).  This  argument  once  more  underlines  the necessity to  take
informal regulations duly into account in the analysis of a national business system and host country
effects on HRM. At this point, we shall remind that we follow Koen (2005: 12) who suggests that
informal and normative institutions are alike, both expressing customs, traditions and values, and
that it is difficult to disentangle the impact of informal (North 1991: 97) and normative (Scott 1995:
37)  institutions  from that  of culture.  Accordingly,  we do not  consider  cultural  and institutional
approaches as mutually exclusive but as complementary for our analysis of the characteristics of the
Swiss national business system and potential host country influences. Similar to our analysis of the
German and U.S. NBSs, we will start with a discussion of the characteristics of firms and markets
before turning to the different key institutional spheres or arenas structuring business systems. 
In order to achieve the most accurate description possible of the elements of the Swiss national
business system and their working in reality, we opted for a triangulation of information sources.
Therefore, additionally to our in-depth literature analysis, we conducted four expert interviews with
specialists from the Swiss Employers' Association, the UNIA trade union, the State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs SECO and the Aprentas joint training scheme of the Basel region. In this way, we
could gain a deeper insight into the actual working of important labour market institutions thanks to
the views held by actors who are actively involved as part of these institutions. This additional
qualitative information revealed highly valuable, and corresponding interview extracts are used in
the text in order to illustrate and to corroborate our literature-based findings. Further information on
our  methodological  approach  and  triangulation  is  provided  in  the  following  chapter  7  on
methodology and research design.
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Firms and markets
In  our  analysis  of  the  German  NBS  we  have  seen  that  firms  are  not  isolated  like  in  the
compartmentalised business system of the USA, but deeply embedded into a rich framework of
institutional supports and inter-organizational mechanisms of governance and coordination. In this
collaborative  type  of  business  system,  cooperation  between  economic  actors  is  supported  by
networks  of  long-term  relationships  and  relatively  high  levels  of  mutual  trust.  Moreover,  the
presence of communitarian obligations together with a certain degree of external coercion on actors
to adhere to these obligations further sustain trustful and cooperative relationships (Hollingsworth
1997a: 272–275; Streeck 1987). Firms in this business system have therefore been described as
“collaborative hierarchies” (Chandler 1990) that are considered to be social institutions rather than
pure networks of contracts or simply the property of shareholders. This vision of the firm, in turn,
gives rise to extensive social regulation by law and industrial agreement since their internal order is
viewed to be a matter of public interest (Streeck 1997b: 241). Concerning Switzerland, considerable
evidence suggests that a similar vision of firms as social institutions and socially instituted markets
prevails in the Swiss coordinated market economy (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 9). In Switzerland,
equally  important  institutional  frameworks  as  in  Germany are  in  place  concerning  educational
institutions as well as associations. However, an important difference consists in the fact that “(…)
Switzerland (…) being more of  a  people-networking society,  it  tends  to  be less  legalistic  than
Germany” (Avery et al. 1999: 22). 
For  the growth and consolidation of  trustful  relations,  Streeck (1997a:  202) has underlined the
importance  of  credible  information  for  business  partners  on  the  existence  of  non-economic  in
addition to economic reasons for the other side not to defect.  These,  in turn,  are of paramount
importance in collaborative business systems. As we have seen in Germany, such non-economic
reasons not to defect primarily consist of impersonal rules and formal law as “control in being”
(Wächter  and Stengelhofen  1992:  27).  Strict  employment  protection  legislation  and the  Works
Constitution  Act  provide  for  sufficiently  strong sanctions  to  make  opportunistic  behaviour  and
withdrawal from reciprocal obligations between employers and employees as well  as social-  or
business partners more generally unlikely. However, in the less legalistic Swiss national business
system, we suggest that such reasons rather consist of “culturally supported moral commitments
that preclude or inhibit opportunistic behavior“ (Streeck 1997a: 202), corresponding to the idea of
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social constraints in Durkheim's sense (Durkheim 1997). Such elements may well take the form of
informal regulations and custom and practice (Tempel 2001: 63). This might especially apply to the
small Swiss society. Here, citizens have regional roots and multiple civil commitments including
honorary  offices  in  clubs,  training  seminars  and  so  on,  so  that  “one  learns  quickly  about  the
possibilities  of  multiple  encounters  in  life”  (Weibler  and  Wunderer  2007:  283).  The  issue  of
honorary  offices  as  an  important  part  of  Swiss  citizenship  has  also  been  underlined  and  thus
confirmed by our interviewee from the Swiss Employers' Association who explained: 
“... the issue of honorary offices, this is still a matter of course in Switzerland. You are somewhere
in  a club and maybe your are working on the club's  board,  and the  accountant  just  does  the
bookkeeping for the club which is easily done. Here, this is entirely part of our mentality...” (Swiss
Employers' Association: 124, own translation)
Another striking feature of Swiss markets is the history of a “high tolerance for domestic cartels” as
part  of  what  David  and  Mach  (2006:  1)  call  “institutions  of  domestic  compensation”. Such
institutions served to compensate those social groups that fell behind the developmental process and
allowed to sustain social peace. An explanation for this high tolerance for cartels can be found in the
dualism of Swiss economic policy between liberal external and highly protectionist internal policies
(Mach 1998: 32) which reflects the dual economic structure of the country. In Switzerland, highly
globalised export sectors are opposed by sheltered private and public sectors of the domestic market
that are characterized by little competition, cartelization and high costs (Furgler 2000: 133). In this
connection, Rentsch et al. (2004: 17) emphasize that only 15 per cent of Swiss firms are subject to
international competition, while the great majority belongs to the domestic economy, preferring a
policy of regulation and foreclosure of the domestic market. Complementary to this first contrast
between domestic and export industries, there is another one between the strongly regulated product
market, which is characterized by a long tradition of state interventionism on the one hand, and a
very  liberal  labour  market on  the  other  (Armingeon  and  Emmenegger  2007:  194–195).
Baudenbacher  (2001:  359) recalls  that  Switzerland  has  for  long  been  a  “cartelist  bastion”
(kartellistische  Trutzburg)  whose  antitrust  legislation  and  enforcement  practice  stood  in  stark
contrast  to  that  of  the  European Economic  Community and did  not  comply with  international
standards. It was only in 1995 that a paradigm change took place in Swiss antitrust law, leading
inter alia to the adoption of the concept of effective competition. In 2001, deficits concerning the
enforcement of antitrust law have still been criticized by experts (Baudenbacher 2001: 353) and
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direct  sanctions  were  not  introduced  before  2004  (Bundesgestz  über  Kartelle  und  andere
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Kartellgesetz) 1995: Art. 49A). Armingeon and Emmenegger (2007:
197) also call attention to the fact that cartels are still recognized as lawful in Switzerland provided
that they are in the public interest.
Swiss state organization, political system and political culture
Switzerland  is  a  small  state  at  the  heart  of  Europe  that  has  “a  contradictory  and  paradoxical
relationship to the European Union” (Boucher and Wickham 2003: 26). The EU literally surrounds
the  country since  1995 and constitutes  Switzerland's  main  foreign  market  as  well  as  the  main
foreign supply market (Furgler 2000: 128). Yet, Swiss citizens decided via a referendum in 1992 to
stay outside the EU, while “government has had to adapt Swiss laws to meet European standards
and practices  whether  it  wanted  to  or  not” and “without  being able  to  share  in  making them”
(Church 2000: 142; Mach et al. 2003). This is due to the close and asymmetric dependency on the
EU that has severely restricted the scope of action for Switzerland to the autonomous adaptation of
EU regulations and bilateral agreements (Armingeon and Emmenegger 2007: 196). 
Following Imhof (2007), Swiss identity is strongly shaped by a self-conception of being a special
case (Sonderfall). This self-conception is strongly linked to the great extent of ethnic, religious,
cultural and linguistic diversity and to the consequent lack of a common language or other elements
that are typically present and shape the identity of a nation. In 2000, around 64% of the Swiss
population of roughly eight million inhabitants were German-speaking, 20% French, 6.5% Italian,
0.5% Rhaeto-Romanic and another 9% did speak other, non-official Swiss languages (Swiss Federal
Statistical  Office  2012b).  However,  linguistic  research  has  found  that  one  has  to  distinguish
between multilingualism on institutional or societal level on the one hand, and on the individual
level on the other. In fact, Swiss institutional and societal multilingualism does not automatically go
together with individual multilingualism of Swiss citizens (Haas 2010: 22). Furthermore, among the
Germanic population, the use of local Alemannic dialects is very widespread. They represent the
everyday speech of  all  social  environments  (Widmer et  al. 2005:  41)  and are  even  present  in
Germanic Swiss television and electronic media (Widmer et al. 2005: 282). For Germanic Swiss
people, the practice of local dialects is also linked to their local identity and consciously used to
distinguish themselves from  other German-speaking people like Austrians or Germans (Christen
2008).  In  a  recent  newspaper  article  published  in  the  Feuilleton of  the  Neue  Zürcher  Zeitung
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(Rumjanzewa 2013), the author reported on the increasing use of dialect in written communication
like  SMS and e-mails.  This  especially  applies  to  the  younger  generation,  even if  there  are  no
orthographic rules in place yet. It seems that dialect conquers more and more domains that have
traditionally been reserved to standard German – a fact that the author explained by an emotional
distance that Swiss Germanic people feel towards standard German.
The great amount of internal heterogeneity in Switzerland led to the adoption of the idea of unity in
diversity, including multiple belongings (Imhof 2007: 31). Citizens of a federal state or canton are
thus equally belonging to a linguistic and cultural  group and at  the same time may integrate a
federal political party that bridges linguistic, religious and cultural divides. In this way, differences
between single  cantons  or  linguistic  groups could  effectively be bridged and potential  tensions
avoided by equally adopting a consociational democratic political culture (Andeweg 2000). Another
element that helps keeping together this heterogeneous state and its citizens is their common wish to
keep up their independence and self-determination, which are constantly perceived to be externally
threatened. While in earlier decades this threat was seen in much bigger, expanding German, French
or Soviet empires, it has been argued that nowadays the European Union seems to occupy this place
in the eyes of conservative Swiss politicians of the political right wing (Boucher and Wickham
2003: 26; Imhof 2007: 46). 
The country's internal heterogeneity is mirrored in the Swiss state organization and political system.
The Swiss state is strictly federally organized on three levels: the municipalities, the cantons and the
Confederation. The Swiss Confederation is unifying 26 constituent states or cantons that are highly
autonomous and reflect the country's internal cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity. Braun
(2003)  distinguished  Swiss  from  German  federalism  in  classifying  the  Swiss  variant  as
decentralised federalism, whereas the German case corresponds to the model of unitary federalism.
In Switzerland, cantons have their own constitutions, legislations, financial resources, health care,
tax and educational systems, as well as justice, police and social assistance (Trampusch and Mach
2011: 15). The high degree of autonomy of the cantons and the weakness of the Swiss federal state
can be illustrated with the fact that the cantons have the privilege to raise their own taxes, and that
the Confederation obtains only roughly one third of public incomes, whereas the  cantons receive
two fifths and the municipalities around one fourth (Kriesi 2007: 83; Linder 2003: 489). Under
these circumstances of very reduced financial scope, the Swiss federal state has never been able to
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conduct any kind of successful anti-cyclical fiscal policy (Armingeon and Emmenegger 2007: 181).
Equally,  the Swiss federal  state does not  have a conceptually applied,  long-term economic and
industrial policy, and hence, has reacted pragmatically, short-dated and on a sector level on industry
demands (Linder 2003: 508). 
This form of state organization has historically allowed for a high degree of self-regulation for the
confessional communities and hence, for peaceful coexistence (Kriesi 2007: 85). In this way, this
multicultural nation is held together through a common political culture of the federal state that is
marked by the principles of federalism, direct democracy and neutrality (Kriesi 2007: 87) as well as
the construct of a nation created by its own will and united by choice (Willensnation) (Imhof 2007:
31).
Within  the  Swiss  political  system,  powers  are  separated  in  legislature,  judiciary and executive
authority. Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity “pervades the Swiss political system” (Kriesi
and Baglioni 2003: 6) and corresponds to the weak federal state (Linder 2003: 490), since the latter
only assumes tasks like external affairs and national defence that neither municipalities nor cantons
can accomplish. 
Still another distinctively Swiss element is the existence of far-reaching direct democratic rights of
co-determination for the citizens concerning all important or vital political questions without any
general exceptions. These rights are exercised through the systematic use of referenda (Linder 2003:
494–498). The Swiss consociational democracy is also distinctive in that all linguistic groups are
strictly proportionally represented (Linder 2003: 492). Also a unique feature of the Swiss political
system is the absence of a single head of state. The Swiss executive has for decades been made up
of  a  great  coalition  government  consisting  of  seven  Federal  Councilors  on  an  equal  footing,
integrating  members  of  all  bigger  political  parties.  The  office  of  the  President  of  the  Federal
Council,  who  leads  the  sessions  but  does  not  dispose  of  any right  to  issue  directives,  rotates
regularly between the colleagues, and all decisions are taken by a simple majority vote (Linder
2003: 490–492).
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The state and economic coordination
The Swiss state is usually described as basically liberal concerning its own relations with, and the
regulation of relations between, private actors (Bergmann 1994: 79; Christen 2006: 320). Though,
as  we  have  seen  above,  at  the  same  time  there  are  selective  protectionist  policies  for  certain
industries in place, leading authors to speak of a “dualist structure” (David and Mach 2006: 3; Mach
1998: 32). David and Mach (2006: 9) follow Katzenstein (1985) in considering the Swiss state as
liberal version of a corporatist state. This variety can be distinguished from the social corporatist
model in that it exposes strong and centrally organized interests of the economy on the one hand,
that are combined with a rather decentralised and weak labour and union movement on the other
hand  (Mach  2006).  This  type  of  corporatism  which  is  similar  to  the  Japanese  system  of
“corporatism without labour” (Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979) has been argued to be atypical (Freitag
2003: 941) in that it  does not concentrate on the regulation of the conflict  between capital and
labour.  In  this  respect,  also  Linder  (2003)  underlines  the  fact  that  in  Swiss  corporatism,  the
workforce side is more weakly represented than in Austria or Norway. David and Mach (2006: 9)
point out that the consensus achieved in Switzerland has often been dominated by parties of the
political right and the umbrella associations of the economy. In this connection, Freitag (2003: 939,
941) speaks of a dominating “bourgeois bloc” that is accompanied by weak unions and socialist
ideologies, together with a general predominance of conservative thinking. As we have seen in the
case  of  Germany,  a  central  characteristic  of  corporatist  states  is  their  incorporation  of
intermediaries, particularly associations, into the state, and the delegation of public tasks to private
actors. Strongly related to this feature is the concept of “private interest government” (Streeck and
Schmitter  1985:  127),  which  very much  applies  to  the  case  of  Switzerland.  According  to  this
concept, associations represent an additional form of social order, besides the community, markets
and  the  state.  While  the  leading  principles  of  coordination  and  allocation  in  a  society  are
spontaneous solidarity for the community form of social order, dispersed competition for markets
and hierarchical control for the state, for the associational form of social order it is inter- and intra-
organizational concertation (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 122,125). Concerning Swiss corporatism
and the relation between the state and associations, it has been noted that the weak or lean Swiss
federal state has always been interested in the assistance of associations for the implementation and
enforcement  of  laws,  leading  to  a  partial  delegation  of  state  prerogatives  to  private  sector
associations8 (Armingeon 2001: 413–414; Farago 1987; Linder 2003: 490, 500). Furthermore, the
8 A reform of economic policy on the federal level has not been undertaken before 1947 with the introduction of the
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ability of these associations to mobilise their members and start a referendum campaign to achieve a
popular vote on laws that contradict their vital interests  represents another important reason for
their integration into the process of policy formulation (Armingeon 2001: 411). In this connection,
Linder (2003: 507) observes that it is rather the intermediary associations than government who are
guiding policy development. Especially in the field of social and economic policy, also Mach (2002:
4) states that “(t)he parliament does not play a significant role in the definition of these policies”.
Although, it has been argued that there has been a decline of concertation in the 1990s in the field of
social and labour market policy “leading to a shift of decision-making from the sphere of interest
groups to partisan politics and parliament” (Häusermann et al. 2004). The particularly strong role of
associations in the Swiss political system was also confirmed by our unionist interviewee:
“Well,  it  is  in  the  work  of  commissions  where  politics  is  finally  done.  And  there,  business
associations have very strong positions. The influence, well I'd say that, when the biggest business
associations, employee and employers' associations agree on certain issues, then politics has little
chance to oppose them. Then it's just autonomous adaptation” (UNIA: 149, own translation)
Relating to the form of this cooperation between the state and associations, Armingeon (2001: 414)
distinguishes  three  types:  consultation  during  the  notification  procedure,  cooperation  in  joint
commissions, as for example in the case of militia administration, and delegation, where tasks and
duties  of  the state  are  outsourced to  associations.  Areas  where delegation  can  be observed are
vocational  eduction and training,  the implementation of  agricultural  policy,  or  the definition of
legally binding technical norms as for example in the machine industry. In our expert interviews, we
could find a specific example of such delegation of state prerogatives that can serve to illustrate the
working of this system: 
“... well, when it comes to the examination of a firm in order to decide on whether or not that firm
may obtain the permission to train apprentices, they ask us whether we can do it. The cantons don't
have the specialists – who else could do it? So, we surely play a very important role.” 
(Aprentas: 77, own translation).
Similar principles to those of state organization also apply to the organization of Swiss associations.
These are organized either as parallel partner organizations on a regional, often cantonal level, who
„economic article“ in the federal constitution Linder (2003: 489). Art. 147 of the new federal constitution provides
for  an institutionalised and constitutionally guaranteed access  of  interest  groups to the political  system and an
authorization of their instrumentalization for public purposes. The rights of interest groups thus comprise hearing
before enactment and involvement in execution of economic measures Armingeon (2001: 406).
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are then integrated on the federal level in an umbrella organization, or there is a single national
association whose structures then publish their resolutions and publications in at least two or even
three of the national languages (Armingeon 2001: 408, 413). 
The state and labour market regulation
Institutions governing the Swiss labour market are especially important since Müller (1999b: 140)
hypothesized that “[i]t is not unreasonable to assume that only if there is institutional pressure on
companies will they follow a pluralist HRM approach.  Such a condition  may well be fulfilled in
Europe, as European concepts of HRM need to reflect key va1ues such as plura1ism and tolerance,
a ba1anced stakeholder phi1osophy and the concept of social partnership“. As we have seen earlier,
in  Germany,  firms do face considerable institutional  pressure to  adopt  a pluralist  or  negotiated
(Wever  1995)  HRM  approach,  whereas  such  pressures  are  widely  absent  in  the  US  NBS.
Institutional pressures in Germany are primarily stemming from co-determination and collective
agreements on industry level. These have been repeatedly identified, together with the system of
dual VET, as the key institutions governing the German labour market (Giardini et al. 2005; Guest
and Hoque 1996; Müller 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002). While the Swiss
education and training system as well  as industrial relations will  be treated in separate sections
below, we will first draw a picture of other elements of Swiss labour market regulation.
While the German system of labour market regulation has been described as legalistic, demanding
compliance with an important amount of legal regulations, in this respect, Switzerland differs in
important ways. In Switzerland, there are  significantly less legal regulations governing the labour
market. This is clearly reflected in the low level of employment protection legislation, which is
below OECD average and represents the lowest level throughout continental Europe (Bonoli and
Mach 2001: 89–90; Nollert 2007: 161; Pelizzari and Schief 2008; Sousa-Poza 2004: 34; Venn 2009:
8). Swiss labour law is governed by private law and hence the code of obligations. Thus, apart from
a three months notice period, Swiss law leaves employers with significant scope when it comes to
the dismissal of employees  (Bonvin 2007: 37).  Mahon (2000: 13) underlines that Swiss law is
marked by the  sacrosanct principle of freedom of dismissal, so that even abusive or unjustified
terminations are effective and put an end to the employment contract (Aubert 2005; Pelizzari and
Schief 2008; Velo Roessl 2003: 45; Venn 2009: 8).
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Our discussion of Swiss labour law would be somewhat incomplete without reference to Swiss
equal pay legislation. In Switzerland, there is no comparably strong combination of legislation and
law enforcement authorities in the field of diversity as there is in the USA. However, the Federal
Act on Gender Equality prescribes that employees must not be discriminated against on the basis of
their  sex,  and prohibits  sexual  harassment (1995).  Furthermore,  article 8 of the Federal  Act on
Public Procurement (1994) inter alia prescribes that Swiss contracting authorities may only award a
public contract to providers who guarantee gender equality and equal pay among their employees.
Apart from the overall significantly more liberal labour law, there is a further important difference
distinguishing  Switzerland  from  Germany.  In  Switzerland,  there  is  no  legal  equivalent  to  the
German  Works  Constitution  Act. Consequently,  although  Swiss  law is  based  on  Civil  Law of
German origin and Swiss companies also have a two a-tier board structure, there is no employee
representation in supervisory bodies like in Germany (Perlitz and Seger 2004: 2–3). Most of all, in
Swiss  firms  there  are  no  works  councils  that  would  be  endowed  with  far-reaching  legal  co-
determination  rights.  The  only  Swiss  law  on  the  issue  of  employee  consultation  and  co-
determination is the  1993 Workers' participation Act (Mitwirkungsgesetz)  (Bundesgesetz über die
Information  und  Mitsprache  der  Arbeitnehmerinnen  und  Arbeitnehmer  in  den  Betrieben
(Mitwirkungsgesetz)  1993).  The  latter  stipulates  mainly  information  and  consultation  rights,
whereas co-decisional rights remain strictly confined to pension fund-related issues. 
Moreover, in Switzerland, there is no legal obligation to draw up a social plan in the event of mass
dismissals, and even if legal minimum requirements of consultation are not respected, the dismissal
decision remains  valid  (Bonvin 2007:  37).  Though,  the Swiss  Act  on unemployment  insurance
AVIG  (Bundesgesetz  über  die  obligatorische  Arbeitslosenversicherung  und  die
Insolvenzentschädigung (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz, AVIG) 1982) proposes an alternative to
collective  dismissals.  It  allows  short-time working schemes or  partial  unemployment without  a
break of the working contract. In this case, benefits paid amount to 80% of the wage for a period of
12 months maximum, including the possibility of subsidizing working time reduction. However, the
decision of whether or not to resort to such a mechanism is entirely left to the employer and there
are no legal means at the hands of unions or workers' representatives to impose the adoption of such
measures (Bonvin 2007: 38–39).
Therefore, while Germans heavily rely on statutory regulation such as strict employment protection
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legislation and the provisions of the Works Constitution Act, a basic difference can be seen in the
fact that Swiss „[e]mployers and workers share to a large extent a distrust towards legal solutions
and a preference for voluntary collective bargaining“ as means of social regulation (Bonvin 2007:
38). Bonvin (2007: 39) therefore concludes that “Swiss law is characterised by the almost complete
absence of mandatory provisions seeking to impose a strict regulation of the labour market in a top-
down manner. Issues related to labour market regulation are left to the firm-level actors or social
partners, in line with the principle of subsidiarity”. 
Under these circumstances, an utterly flexible, extremely well-performing labour market emerged.
The latter is characterized by very low levels of unemployment9, one of the highest employment
ratios  among  OECD  countries  and  moderate  levels  of  earnings  inequality,  together  with a
comparatively small public sector (Bonoli and Mach 2001: 83). This great performance has been
attributed to the interplay of several factors such as a strong level of part-time workers, a low degree
of employment protection legislation, and sector specific regulative frameworks that are combined
with a low tax wedge for low-skill employment (Armingeon and Emmenegger 2007: 185; Bender
et al. 2007: 172–173; Bonoli and Mach 2001: 88–89; Nikolai 2005: 194–196). The comparatively
generous  unemployment  compensation  system  results  in  a  relatively  high  reservation  wage.
Together with effective and widely accessible vocational training that produces a workforce which
is more likely to obtain decent salaries (Bonoli and Mach 2001: 89), this high reservation wage
constitutes a de facto  minimum wage for workers (OECD 1996: 95). These factors are hence at the
origin of the moderate earnings inequality in Switzerland in comparison to the USA. In this respect,
Switzerland  can  be  considered  an  exceptional  case,  since  states  with  a  liberal  welfare  regime
(Esping-Andersen 1990a) and flexible labour markets like the USA, that are conducive to high
employment ratios, usually expose high wage inequalities. On the other hand, Scandinavian states
with social democratic welfare regimes bought high employment ratios and low wage inequalities
with  a  considerable  expansion  of  employment  in  the  public  sector.  Therefore,  under  the
contemporary economic conditions, there is a jobs-equality trade off, that does not seem to apply to
the Swiss case (Bonoli and Mach 2001: 85). Nollert (2007: 163) argues that Switzerland shows
many elements of a  flexicurity concept,  similar to Denmark and Ireland, where high flexibility
through a low level of employment protection is  combined with a high level of social  security
through generous  unemployment  benefits.  While  in  the  1980s,  Switzerland was  classified  as  a
liberal welfare state, a cluster analysis of welfare state indicators for the year 2002/03 revealed that
9 The official unemployment rate was 3.1 per cent in 2011 Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2012a)
188
6.1 Salient features of the Swiss national business system and domestic HRM
by then, the Swiss welfare state appeared to be located in the European cluster of conservative
welfare states, being closest to the German model (Nollert 2007: 166).
A further interesting outcome in this highly flexible Swiss labour market that “gives management in
Switzerland considerable discretion to pursue 'hire-and-fire' strategies” (Sousa-Poza 2004: 34), is
the fact that comparative data on employment stability and job tenure in Switzerland show that job
relations are stable and job insecurity is relatively low in Switzerland. These features are manifest in
average completed job tenures of 20 years for men and 16 for women in 2001 and mainly voluntary
job separations (Sousa-Poza 2004: 37-38, 44). The fact that a relative shortage of labour on the
Swiss labour market has been identified as a challenge for MNCs (Naville et al. 2007b: 37) seems
to  underline  the  disciplining  effect  of  a  tense  local  labour  market  with  low unemployment  on
employers. The “exit option” for employees who are not satisfied with their employer, as discussed
by Meardi and colleagues (2007: 511–512; 2009: 508) in the context of Central Eastern European
labour markets, seems to be even more applicable to the situation in Switzerland in a sense that
“current labor market conditions affect the contemporary power balance in workplaces” (Meardi et
al. 2009:  506).  Furthermore,  Souza-Poza  (2004:  44–46)  recalls  the  consensual  and  trust-based
industrial and political relations, including their codification in labour peace clauses as we will see
below, and rather stable management practices. The latter may be linked to the educational system
which strongly revolves around an apprenticeship system and produces well-trained workers who
are able to work autonomously, and who are held in high regard and trusted by employers (Sousa-
Poza  2004:  44–46).  Therefore,  Switzerland  seems  to  be  a  case  where  we  can  find  “powerful
incentives on both sides of the labor market that tend to preserve the continuity of the employment
relationship“(Wanner and Neumark 1999: Siv).
Industrial relations
Swiss industrial relations can be described as cooperative and hence exposing a very low level of
industrial conflict. The outstanding performance of Swiss cooperative industrial relations becomes
clear in international comparison. While the OECD average of annual working days lost per 1 000
employees due to strikes for the period of 1970-2001 was 219 days, the already cooperative German
system of industrial relations reported 28 days lost. The latter is still excelled by Switzerland that
lost only one day (Lesch 2003: 31). Even if the freedom of strike has been formally included into
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the Swiss Constitution in 1999 (Armingeon 2001: 405), we can say that in Switzerland, “collective
conflicts  in  strikes  and  lockouts  are  exceptional”  (Bonvin  2007:  38).  Switzerland  keeps  this
comparative top position of the least conflictual IR system also in a historical comparison, even if
also on an international level the incidence of strikes has declined markedly during the last decades
(Scheuer 2006). 
Historically, the Swiss Peace Agreement of 1937 has strongly shaped Swiss industrial relations in
the sense of behavioural norms of social partnership (Siegenthaler 1986: 250). As Broussolle (2009:
286) shows, this intensive form of cooperation between Swiss social partners is based on a high
level  of  mutual  trust,  good  faith  and  expectations  of  reciprocity  with  a  mutual  exchange  of
behavioural guarantees (Schmid 2001: 452). These elements are similar to the concept of Treu und
Glauben in German civil law, and hence include ethical obligations that far exceed economic or
juridical  rationales.  Furthermore,  concerning  enforcement  of  the  Peace  Agreement,  Broussolle
(2009: 292) underlines the important role of social control “whether based on a legal framework, or
on the action of the organizations upon their members, or even on their action upon their immediate
environment”.  Moreover,  he  notes  that  a  “cooperative  ethos  (…)  assuming  reciprocity  and
incorporated in a 'good faith' pledge, was also part of the formula” (Broussolle 2009: 292). Aubert
(2005:  150–151)  describes  Swiss  industrial  peace  as  a  socio-cultural  rather  than  a  legal
phenomenon,  with  most  important  collective  agreements  containing  unconditional  or  absolute
industrial peace clauses. As distinct from relative industrial peace, when absolute industrial peace
has  been  agreed  upon,  during  the  term  of  the  collective  bargaining  agreements  strikes  are
categorically excluded, including issues that are not covered by the collective agreement (Aubert
2005: 150; Schmid 2001: 451). Compliance with rules on minimum wages, that are fixed in certain
collective  agreements,  is  controlled  and  enforced  via  the  classical  corporatist  arrangement  of
tripartite  commissions.  In  case  of  repeated  violation  of  contractual  obligations,  the  latter  may
impose monetary fines (Oesch 2007: 353).
In comparative perspective, the Swiss system of industrial relations can furthermore be analysed in
terms of union density, collective bargaining coverage and bargaining level.  In political sciences,
Switzerland  is  generally  classified  as  a  neo-corporatist  state  since  institutionalised  forms  of
coordination between the organized interests of capital and labour are in place (Oesch 2007: 337). A
distinctive feature of Swiss neo-corporatism is that, on the one hand, in comparison to other  neo-
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corporatist states, Swiss unions are rather weak in their negotiations with employers. This weakness
in collective negotiations with employers is due to a low union density (19% in 2002 Lesch 2004:
3)  and  collective  bargaining  coverage,  the  decentralised  and  heterogeneous  system  of  wage
bargaining, and to the fact that there is no works council system or other form of co-determination
as  for  example  in  Germany.  On  the  other  hand  though,  Swiss  unions  are  politically  stronger
integrated  than  their  German  counterparts.  Similar  to  other  associations,  the  referendum threat
represents an important institutional power resource, guaranteeing access to the political arena and
policy formulation process in expert commissions (Armingeon 2001: 416; David and Mach 2006;
Pelizzari and Schief 2008). However, due to the structural weakness of the political left and the
union movement in a system where corporatist institutions work strongly in favour of the business
community, Pelizzari and Schief (2008: 5) described Swiss trade unions and employees to be in a
state of “prosperous powerlessness”. 
The possibility of launching a referendum in order to exercise political influence was also clearly
confirmed by our unionist interviewee:
“We have the power to launch initiatives and referendums (…) Basically we can exercise the role of
the opposition [in society]. We can positively influence on the legislative process or at least put the
breaks on negative issues. And I believe that, in the political mechanism, this is utterly important.
Switzerland is also called a referendum democracy. And of course, in this mechanism, unions play a
central part” (UNIA: 151, 155, own translation) 
As  we  have  seen,  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  is  present  in  Swiss  IR,  where  more  flexible
agreements  between social  partners  are  generally  preferred  to  legal  regulations  (Bonvin  2007).
Following  this  principle,  the  Swiss  system  of collective  bargaining  is  significantly  more
decentralised than in Germany, and bargaining solutions are close to company level (Aubert 2005:
149). In comparison to Germany, especially collective wage bargaining is much more decentralised
and usually takes place on the level of the firm, and not on industry level. On the other hand, this
decentralization of wage bargaining is combined with a high degree of informal coordination of
managerial wage policy through employers' associations (Flanagan 1999: 1152; Soskice 1990: 41).
It is because of this informal coordination, and hence centralization, of Swiss wage bargaining that
Switzerland has been grouped together with Germany into the fourth category of the Kenworthy
wage coordination index, where 1 stands for fragmented bargaining and 5 for highly centralised
bargaining (Kenworthy 2003: 41). Yet, a key difference between Switzerland and Germany lies in
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the fact that central issues such as the wage level or the organization of the working week are often
negotiated  at  the  level  of  the  firm  (Bonvin  2007:  38).  Streckeisen  (2007)  has  analysed  the
developments towards further decentralization during the 1990s for the case of the Basel chemical
industry.  He  could  show that  there  has  been  a  clear  development  where  content  of  collective
agreements was reduced to the definition of rules of procedure and framework conditions, whereas
issues such as the automatic annual allowance for inflation have been abolished, wage negotiations
have been taken out of the collective agreement to be negotiated on firm level, and daily or weekly
working time regulations have been replaced by annualised working hours (Streckeisen 2007: 89,
94). However, starting in the mid-1990s, there has been a contemporaneous trend reversal towards a
rise in collective bargaining coverage or a renaissance of collective agreements (Oesch 2007: 344).
During  this  period minimum  wages  were  established  and  included  into  certain  collective
agreements and since 1996, the government has declared more and more collective  agreements
generally binding. Therefore, the federal government extended the provisions of selected collective
agreements on the whole sector where they apply also for foreign or non-signatory firms. Since
2003, the number of generally binding collective agreements that inlcude provisions on minimum
wages has sharply risen so that in 2007, three quarters of all employees who were covered by a
collective  agreement  were  protected  by  minimum  wages  (Fumagalli-Senn  2009:  9–10).  Such
provisions on minimum wages especially concern the accommodation and food service, and the
construction industry (Ackermann 2008). This practice represents an innovation within the Swiss
system of IR, where there are no legally defined minimum wages (Aubert 2005: 151). It can be
considered  part  of  the  accompanying  measures  that  have  been  accorded  to  unions  in  political
bargaining processes in order to prevent the risk of social dumping with the entry into force of the
agreement  on  the  freedom of  movement  of  people  between  Switzerland  and  the  EU  in  2002
(Fischer 2003; Oesch 2007: 348). This interpretation could also be validated in our interview with a
labour market specialist from the SECO:
“(...) starting maybe 10 years ago, the interest in negotiating collective agreements rose on the
employers' side. Maybe until the early-mid 1990s, there was a certain tendency on the employers'
side  to  dissolve  agreements,  but  with  the  accompanying  measures,  with  the  free  movement  of
persons, interest rose again. (…) this is mainly in order to include the foreign competition. When a
collective agreement has been declared generally binding and foreign firms come to Switzerland,
they also have to respect the minimum wages that have been fixed in the collective agreement”  
(SECO: 191, 193, own translation)
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Overall  collective  bargaining  coverage  is  around  50%  in  Switzerland  (Ackermann  2008:  4;
Flanagan  1999:  1152;  Vernon  2006:  199;  Visser  2000:  18),  while  only  35% of  all  collective
agreements have an influence on wages (Maillard 2010: 6). This is due to the fact that collective
agreements in important sectors like the chemical and mechanical industries do not contain any
provisions on wages (Aubert 2005: 150). In view of the comparatively low collective bargaining
coverage  rate  and  union  density,  Ebbinghaus  and  Kittel  (2006:  230)  note  that  in  this  respect,
Switzerland is clearly closer to Anglo-Saxon states like the USA, Ireland or the UK than to other
corporatist states.
Education and training system
The Swiss education and training system is the last of the three key institutions governing the labour
market that we have introduced above. A thorough analysis  of the local education and training
system  is  especially  important  in  order  to  find  out  about  the  existence  of  institutional  props
(Edwards and Rees 2006d: 92) or supporting institutional environments (Streeck 1997b: 243-244,
252;  Tempel  2001:  57)  for  certain HR practices  that  are  linked to  the  German system of  dual
vocational education and training. A first notable feature of the Swiss education and training system
is the fact that it is similarly organized as the state, that is,  strictly federal. The responsibility for
education and training mostly lies with the cantons and leads to the coexistence of  26 different
school systems within the Swiss Confederation (Markees 2002). Furthermore, there are ten cantonal
universities, seven federally recognized technical colleges of higher education  (Fachhochschulen)
offering studies that lead to a Bachelor's or Mater's degree like in other European countries. The
influence of the federal state in this respect is mainly restricted to the running of the two federal
institutes of technology at Zurich and Lausanne and the co-financing of cantonal universities and
technical institutes of higher education. Only recently, the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers
of Education as inter-cantonal coordination body has elaborated a concordat on a harmonization of
obligatory education called HarmoS that entered into force in August 2009 (Swiss Conference of
Cantonal Ministers of Education 2007).
Concerning vocational education and training, Switzerland has a highly developed, comprehensive
system of dual VET that shows striking similarities with the German one (Schmid 2001: 451).
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According to the distinction that has been introduced by Maurice et al. (1986a) and which is applied
also  by  Whitley  (2000a:  50),  we  can  clearly  identify  the  Swiss  system as  dual-specialised  as
opposed to unitary-generalist ones. Vocational training courses of a duration of three to four years
are jointly organized by cantonal vocational schools and apprenticing companies. The content of
corresponding  curricula  is  negotiated  in  a  tripartite  arrangement incorporating  employer  and
employee associations and the state (Gonon 1999: 48, 2005; Hanhart and Bossio 1998: 485–486;
Meunier  2007:  11;  Schröter  and  Davoine  2009).  At  the  same  time,  a  similarly  high  level  of
standardization of skills across the country as in Germany is achieved through the application of a
federal law governing dual vocational education (Federal Act of 13 December 2002 on Vocational
and Professional Education and Training 2002). Following Winterton (2007: 284), the Swiss system
of dual VET can therefore be attributed to the same category of workplace-focused, state-regulated
systems as  the German one. An interesting development in Switzerland in this field are regional
central training facilities and cooperative training schemes, which are usually sustained by larger
firms. Examples of such facilities are Aprentas in the canton of Basel, CIMO in the canton of Wallis
and AZW Winterthur in the canton of Zurich. Although recently there has been a tendency towards
more  general  education  leading  to  the  Abitur (similar  A-level  or  SAT-exam),  dual  vocational
training is still important and highly appreciated by employers (Gonon 1999: 53). In 2002, a total of
64% of  young Swiss  people have undergone dual  vocational  training,  while  there  are  regional
differences. In the German-speaking part of the country, this part was highest with 68%, while the
French  and  Italian-speaking  regions  showed  significantly  lower  levels  of  52%  and  55%,
respectively (Amos et al. 2003: 34, 38). This strikingly high degree of similarity with the German
system of dual VET is  an interesting feature of the Swiss host  country.  Contrary to other  host
countries for German MNCs that have been researched until present, in Switzerland qualification
profiles and institutional support infrastructures largely correspond to those present on the German
labour market and should support German-style dual VET practices. Institutional distance (Kostova
1999: 312) between the German country-of-origin and the Swiss host country national business
systems is hence minimal in this respect.
Conventions governing trust and authority relations
As done for the USA and Germany, the strength of formal institutions generating and guaranteeing
trust between potential business partners will be assessed on the basis of the reports provided by
Transparency  International.  In  the  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  (Transparency  International
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2011a), Switzerland is ranked eighth out of 183 states with a value of 8.8/10, being part of the
second best group of countries,  near the best ones. A look at  the Global Corruption Barometer
(Transparency International 2011b) data reveals that 53% of the citizens asked thought that the level
of corruption has increased during the last three years, while 41% perceived it to be unchanged.
While a majority of people felt corruption has increased, the figures are still  much better when
compared to Germany or the USA, where this rate was 70% or above. These rather positive data,
that are also confirmed by the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2012/13
(Schwab and Sala-i-Martin 2012: 390–394), can also be further sustained. When regarding further
information on which institutions are perceived to be the most affected by corruption on a scale
ranging from one for not at all corrupt to five for extremely corrupt. In Switzerland, business  is
perceived to be most affected by corruption with a still admissible value of 3.3, while the central
institutions  police,  public  officials  and judiciary were judged fairly well  with 2.1,  2.6 and 2.3,
respectively. We can therefore say that Switzerland has a very low level of corruption and central
institutions  for  conducting  business  are  generally  perceived  to  work  very  well.  These  overall
positive evaluations are also confirmed by research on social capital in Switzerland (Freitag 2001:
103). Furthermore, when discussing trust in formal institutions, in the case of Switzerland we also
have to stress the country's outstanding history of political and institutional stability and continuity.
As distinct from many other European states, Switzerland never underwent a fascist, communist or
national socialist regime (Christen 2006: 319). This historical dimension is referred to by economic
historians in order to explain the utterly good reputation of Switzerland as a  solid, reliable and
comfortable financial centre (Bergier 1990: 337, 340; Siegenthaler 1986: 270).
Another important aspect relates to Swiss civil society more in general. Here, we can point out the
high level of participation and membership in associations, clubs etc., leading to remarkable social
networking (Armingeon 2001: 408; Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 283). Moreover, since the Swiss
state  does  not  have  a  similar  tradition  of  public  administration  and  a  civil  service  system
comparable to those of France or Germany, the assumption of honorary or avocational offices is
widespread,  following the  principle  of  a  militia  administration  (Linder  2003:  508–509).  Social
networking and corresponding formal social integration via membership in associations (Freitag
and Buehlmann 2009: 91–92) is an important indicator for the amount of social capital in a society,
which in turn is an important factor fostering trust and community-based values (Gabriel 2002: 25).
In this connection, social capital can be understood as individual relational resources, or as systemic
capital of a society (Esser 2000: 237). The economic relevance of social capital lies in its reducing
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transaction costs (Freitag 2004: 88). The concept of social capital is hence strongly linked to social
integration and interpersonal trust. In this respect, Kriesi and Baglioni (2003: 9) have pointed out
the positive effect of the small size of Swiss municipalities, especially in the central Swiss cantons.
Here,  Freitag  (2004:  113)  underlines  the  law  of  multiple  encounters  in  life  (Gesetz  des
Wiedersehens) and hence the possibility of strongly personalised social control. Furthermore, the
fact that Swiss administrative authorities are perceived to be uncorrupted, that institutions of the
welfare state reduce income inequalities, and that political interests are proportionally represented
has been identified as further factors sustaining forms of generalised trust (Freitag and Buehlmann
2009: 20–21).
Relating  to  authority  relations,  we  will  again  draw on  culturalist  contributions  in  the  field  of
international comparative management in order to discuss these issues for Switzerland. Switzerland
is  part  of  the  Germanic  countries  and  shares  several  elements  with  Germany  and  Austria.  In
Hofstede's (2001: 377) matrix of implicit models of organization, Switzerland therefore belongs to
the same category of the well-oiled machine-type of organization. Small power distance and strong
uncertainty  avoidance  are  leading  to  the  definition  of  formal  rules  and procedures,  and  a  low
distance between leaders and led (1994: 89; Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 282) in the egalitarian
Swiss society (Bergmann 1986: 367; Chevrier 2009: 176). In Swiss firms, subordinates enjoy a
fairly high degree of autonomy and independent status within the realm of their job duties. In this
respect, Chevrier (2009: 176) concludes that “(t)he quest for equality legitimates collegial power or
the authority of a primus inter pares, that necessarily goes through consultation processes before
making any decision, as the presidents of the numerous councils ruling Swiss political life actually
do. Egalitarianism leads to consensus, endeavours to conciliate views, and search for concord”.
Erten  et  al.  (2004:  106)  remark  that  Swiss  leaders  are  managing  “by  consensus  and
understatement”.  Bergmann  (1990:  368)  termed  Swiss  managerial  style  “management  by
persuasion”, which is marked by vertical consultation and horizontal consensus as central elements
of Swiss decision-making. This predominantly egalitarian,  consensus-oriented managerial attitude
can further be led back to the fact that concordance may be considered a core element of Swiss
constitutional patriotism (Imhof 2007: 28). In this connection, Erten et al. (2004: 103) also point out
the great coalition government on Federal State level. Later research on national leadership styles
confirm these elements. For instance, Weibler and Wunderer (2007: 272) identified autocratic and
non-participative  leadership  as  negative  factors  for  successful  leadership  in  Switzerland.  Still
another element that has been found to influence on Swiss leadership style with its low formal
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distance is the role of Swiss militia army. The latter has been argued to improve  social mix and
integration, whereby consensus and low distance between leaders and led are furthered thanks to the
fact that during military service, the hierarchical position can be completely opposite as in civilian
professional  life  (Erten et  al. 2004:  120–121).  The  conception  of  the  organization  as  role
formalization  system  is  even  more  marked  in  Switzerland  than  this  is  the  case  for  Germany
(Laurent 1985: 50). The findings of later research into the Swiss way of  management (Bergmann
1986, 1990, 1994) point into the same direction. Bergmann (1994: 32) found that in Switzerland, an
instrumental  conception  of  the  organization  is  dominant,  where  hierarchy exclusively exists  to
assure rational task performance. But also Chevrier (2002: 149) describes that the Swiss principle of
subsidiarity (Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 256) is accompanied by a clear definition of tasks and
responsibilities. This feature is in line with Trompenaars (1996: 53; Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner  2012) classification of Swiss culture as strongly universalist,  where people expect  rigid
adherence  to  clearly  formulated,  formally  implemented  rules  and  laws  that  are  applicable  to
everyone without consideration of personal relationships or kinship. 
All these findings strongly suggest the presence of a formal political culture in Switzerland, while
Bergmann (1994: 32–33) further highlights that Swiss people tend to view the firm as a partnership
of convenience, including the vision of common interests and the rejection of the logic of class
struggle.  Common  interests  can  hence  be  successfully  invoked  in  claims  for  compliance  with
superior's  instructions  and  in  negotiations  between  the  social  partners  in  the  field  of  IR.
Institutionally, these features are reflected in the unique Swiss institution of industrial peace, which
would not be feasible if employers and employees were not convinced of their commonality of
interests. 
In  Switzerland,  where  a  Germanic  career  model  is  predominant  (Davoine  2005),  authority  of
superordinates is legitimated through detailed technical knowledge (Bergmann 1990: 368, 1994: 92;
Tixier 1994: 18). Underlining these findings, also Avery et al. (1999: 19) note that “[c]ommon to the
German-speaking nations is  the predominant  image of the manager  as “master  craftsman” who
really knows the field thanks to thorough vocational training and extensive experience (…) It is
assumed that  vocational  training and technical  mastership also qualify a  person for  managerial
tasks”.
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Financial system and corporate governance
To complete  our analysis  of  the Swiss  host  country institutional  arenas  following the typology
proposed  by Whitley (2000a),  we will  provide  some basic  information  on  the  Swiss  financial
system and corporate governance. Although we do not believe that Swiss financial markets exert a
direct host-country influence on HRM practices in Swiss subsidiaries of German and US-American
MNCs, the analysis of this last institutional arena might nevertheless allow us to learn something
about the Swiss managerial mindset. The latter might well be influenced by host country actors'
“socialised rationality”  and  institutionally “embedded managerial  ideological norms” (Almond
2011a: 260, 265), that may well be shaped to some extent by local financial markets and corporate
governance practices and frameworks.
Concerning the Swiss corporate governance code, following Weil et al. (2002) we may distinguish
between several categories following the criteria of a) board structure, b) employee representation
in supervisory body and c) separate supervisory and managerial leadership. As we have seen earlier,
Switzerland shares the legal origins with Germany and belongs to the group of states applying Civil
law of German origin (Perlitz and Seger 2004: 2). Also similar to their German counterparts, Swiss
companies  have  tow-tier  board  structures  with  separate  managerial  and supervisory leadership,
though with the important difference that there are no employee representatives on the supervisory
body (Perlitz and Seger 2004: 2–3). Thus, although several authors emphasize the strong consensus
orientation of Swiss management  (Bergmann 1990, 1994; Chevrier  2002, 2009; Davoine 2005;
Davoine  and  Schröter  2010,  2009;  Tixier  1994),  this  is  not  manifest  in  its  legal-institutional
framework representing the regulatory pillar of institutions (Scott 1995). In this respect,  Davoine
(2005: 93) underlines an important difference between German and Swiss consensus: whereas in
Germany,  consensus  is  the  result  of  sometimes  fierce  confrontation  that  is  watered  down  by
institutional  mechanisms  and  devices  for  conflict  resolution  between  social  partners,  Swiss
compromise  is  more  connected  with  the  democratic  practice  in  small  states.  In  this  case,  less
intermediary institutions stand between the government and the individual, and industrial relations
are more personalised and individualised. As we have seen above, informal institutions (Helmke
and Levitsky 2004: 727) such as behavioural norms of goodwill and reciprocity are at the basis of
mutual trust between social partners, thus supporting the institutionalised Peace Agreement. In this
connection, also the important role of personalised social control has been stressed.
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More generally, we can distinguish between the Anglo-Saxon and the Rhineland model. While the
latter is more bank-oriented, insider-dominated and stakeholder-focused and based on a network
structure of different insider groups and banks, the Anglo-Saxon model is more market-oriented,
outsider-dominated and shareholder-focused (Weil 2002: 32). Switzerland as a coordinated market
economy has traditionally been classified as Rhineland-oriented, especially due to the important
weight  of  family  or  majority  stock-ownership,  and  the  significant  influence  of  controlling
shareholders together with important legal restrictions on voting rights and free transferability of
different  kinds  of  shares.  Following  Bergmann  (1994:  76,  79),  these  financial  and  corporate
governance structures were basically aiming at equity finance of firms disposing of major reserves
and legal structures making hostile takeovers nearly impossible. Under such conditions, a market
for corporate control like in Anglo-Saxon states developed only slowly during the 1990s, although
“there have  been serious attempts by many firms to adopt internationally  recognised governance
principles in recent years” (2006: 251). Following Ledentu (2007: 43), there is still considerable
ownership concentration in Swiss companies with 73% of firms having a single stock owner who
holds at least 20% of voting rights, compared to 37% in the UK and 90% in Germany. In about two
out of three cases, this principle shareholder is a family or a non-quoted company, and in a further
10%  of  cases,  it  is  the  state.  These  more  recent  data  largely  confirm  earlier  conclusions  of
Bergmann (1994: 128) who attributed an important role to owner families as majority shareholders.
In a study on corporate governance of Swiss firms, Ethos (2005) found that  firms with a single
shareholder  who  controls  more  than  33%  of  voting  rights  have  an  overall  worse  corporate
governance rating than firms without such a controlling stockholder. Faccio and Lang (2002: 379)
established that 48.13% of Swiss corporations were under family control10, and for for 27.57% of
companies shares are widely held.  Comparing this  Swiss ownership pattern to the German and
British ones, who are located at opposite ends of the scale with ratios of 64.62% family-controlled
and 10.37% of widely held companies in Germany, and 23.68% to 63.08% for the UK, we can see
that  Switzerland is  closer  to  the  Continental  European model,  although to  a  lesser  extent  than
Germany.  Furthermore,  the  Ethos  study  points  out  some  important  shortcomings  of  Swiss
regulations as compared to Germany or the USA. Under Swiss law, share registers are considered to
be of private character, thus leading to difficulties in finding more detailed information on the kind
of  shareholders,  institutional  or  private  investors,  as  well  as  on  classification  of  shareholders
according to their shares. Even when considering only companies that are listed in the SMI, only
10 These data are based on the assumption that 20% of voting shares are sufficient to ensure control Faccio and Lang 
(2002: 369). 
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31% of them publish more detailed information on their capital structure (Ethos Stiftung 2005: 13).
But there are also diverse legal options to decouple voting rights and capital stock, for example via
voting  limitations,  registered  shares  with  restricted  transferability  or  share  certificates  (Ethos
Stiftung 2005: 23). In line with the results of the Ethos study, also Faccio and Lang found that more
than 50% of Swiss firms used dual  class shares,  leading to their  conclusion that  there is  more
“substantial  discrepancy between ownership and control” in Switzerland than elsewhere (Faccio
and Lang 2002: 367). We can therefore conclude that elements consolidating majority shareholders'
influence at the dispense of minority shareholders are still present in Swiss Corporate Governance,
although Mach et al. (2006) already detected various changes in this domain that have been caused
by new actors and new preferences of already well-known old ones, which are due to international
developments.  According to the authors, the old, bank-centred insider model has begun to soften
starting  in  the  1980s  under  the  pressure  of  international  developments  and  the  appearance  of
institutional investors – especially pension funds –, financial analysts  and auditors (Mach et al.
2006: 27). Such changes induced the strongly internationally oriented Swiss MNCs to modify their
traditional practices and mechanisms of control which had increasingly lost their efficiency and
legitimacy. This is the reason why the Swiss framework of corporate governance rules has been
increasingly aligned with requirements of capital markets and minority shareholders in favouring
greater stock market liquidity and transparency of accounting. Such changes are also visible in a
recently conducted network analysis. It shows that banks, occupying a central position in a closely-
meshed network of  interlocking directorates until  the late 1980s,  have lost  this pivotal  position
during the 1990s, and overall network density has declined in a significant way (Schnyder  et al.
2005). 
The results of a recent KPMG-study (2008) on the strategic financial focus of Swiss companies and
OECD data provide additional information on Swiss corporate finance. KPMG asked chief financial
officers of 85 mid- and big-sized companies with turnovers between 50 million and 10 billion Swiss
Francs about the importance of equity capital, credit financing and external rating agencies and the
signals they send to capital markets. An interesting result of the study is that bank policy is still seen
as important qualitative criteria pertaining to the financial structure (KPMG 2008: 17). Furthermore,
the rating of Swiss banks represents the third most important financial metric, while external rating
and requirements of capital providers appeared to be less important (KPMG 2008: 17, 21). These
results may be closely linked to another finding, that 60% of interviewees described their company
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as cash rich, which at the same time was  the most frequently cited reason for the absence of an
officially  approved,  written  financing  strategy (KPMG 2008:  3,  14).  Being  well  aware  of  the
limitations of this study, it still seems to point to a certain importance attributed to bank financing.
This finding is further supported by OECD data on sources of funds raised for private equity and
venture capital as average for the period 1995-2000 (OECD 2004). These data confirm that, while
banks are not equally important in Switzerland as they are in Germany, the Netherlands or Austria,
their weight is still considerable, even if not overwhelming. This is especially true when comparing
Switzerland with Anglo-Saxon countries like the USA, the UK or New Zealand, where pension
funds play the most important role (OECD 2004: 20). At the same time, Switzerland has a highly
developed capital market ranking first concerning the relative size of the latter measured in terms of
market capitalization as a proportion of GDP, and second concerning its liquidity measured as the
ratio of total value of shares to GDP (OECD 2004: 19). 
Therefore, we can conclude with Theurillat et al. (2008) that Switzerland is paradoxical in that it is
generally considered Rhenish, with banks and families taking a leading role in controlling business
(Faccio  and  Lang  2002),  whilst  developing  a  pension  fund  system  that  has  been  attracting
considerable funds since the mid-1980 and is still growing.
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6.2 A comparison of salient features of the US, Swiss and German national 
business system
The present section shortly sums up salient features of the US-American, Swiss and German NBS
and directly compares the corresponding feature characteristics for each institutional arena. We can
hence make the point on our initial affirmation that Switzerland is in some respect in a middle
position  between  the  collaborative  German  and  the  compartmentalised  US-American  business
system. In this direct comparison, we can now clearly discern which institutional arenas of the
Swiss NBS are close to Germany and which ones are more similar to the USA. 
As we have seen, the Swiss business system may be considered a sort of hybrid, merging some
elements  that  are  typical  for  coordinated  market  economies,  with  others  that  would  rather  be
associated  with  liberal  market  economies.  This  hybrid  character  is  particularly  evident  in  the
institutional arena of skill formation and control. On the one hand, the Swiss IR environment may
clearly be classified as permissive, just as the systems in liberal market economies like the USA and
the UK. In absence of strong statutory regulations  and laws comparable to  the German Works
Constitution Act, structurally weak unions are faced with strong employers' associations and wage
bargaining is highly decentralised. On the other hand though, Swiss IR are very cooperative and
marked  by  the  unique,  institutionalised  industrial  peace  agreement  that  has  been  continually
renewed and included in collective agreements since the late 1930s. Such cooperative industrial
relations and low levels of industrial conflict are a typical feature of coordinated market economies
that  have  often  developed  in  corporatist  states  such  as  Germany  and  Austria.  Considering
employment protection legislation (EPL), in turn, Switzerland has the lowest level of EPL of all
Continental European states, and hence, is much closer to liberal market economies like the UK
than  to  classic  coordinated  ones  such  as  Germany.  As  we  have  seen,  in  most  liberal  market
economies that are characterized by flexible labour markets and low EPL, average job tenure tends
to be lower. Furthermore, such systems are typically rather combined with skill formation systems
focusing on general skills. However, in Switzerland, a low EPL and flexible labour markets are
combined with comparatively high job security,  long average job tenures and a skill  formation
system that  is  very close  to  the  German model  and strongly evolves  around a  comprehensive
system of dual VET that provides employees with job-specific professional skills.
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Another interesting blend of features becomes evident when analysing the Swiss state. As already
the notion of a liberal version of a corporatist state implies, a generally liberal stance of the state
regarding the regulation of relations between economic actors is manifest in a significantly less
legalistic environment that might infleunce on the management of human resources when compared
to Germany. On the other hand, the characteristic feature of the incorporation of well-organized,
centralised business and employers' associations into the state and political decision-making is very
present  in  Switzerland.  The  concept  of  private  interest  government  with  public  responsibilities
being delegated under state licence to associations might even be argued to be more present in
Switzerland than in other corporatist states like Germany. The utterly weak position of the Swiss
Federal State with its unique tradition of a militia administration and strongly restricted financial
scope and manning has led the latter to search the expertise and administrative capacities of strong
associations. These organized business interests, in turn, have for long strongly shaped the political
agenda in important fields like competition law and corporate governance, leading to a historically
high tolerance for domestic cartels.  This element stands in sharp contrast to the strict  anti-trust
legislation passed early on in the United States, and to the weakly organized and politically not
incorporated U.S. associations. Furthermore, the Swiss welfare state model has developed since the
early 1980s from a clearly liberal model towards the European model of a conservative type of
welfare state.
Regarding the Swiss financial system, we have seen that the traditionally bank-centred system has
undergone  important  developments  with  a  pension  fund  system  and  highly  developed  capital
markets standing side-by-side with banks that still continue to play an important part in corporate
financing. Furthermore, family or majority ownership of firms is still widespread in Switzerland.
These  features  seem to  suggest  that  Switzerland has  traditionally  been  more  of  a  stakeholder-
society,  rather  trying  to  balance  the  needs  of  different  social  groups  than  pursuing  a  strict
shareholder value philosophy. In this respect, Swiss firms seem to be closer to their German than
U.S. counterparts.
Lastly,  referring to  norms governing trust  and authority relations,  we have seen that  the Swiss
society possesses important social capital and high levels of generalised trust, which is typical for
collaborative business systems. Long-term, trustful relations between business- and social partners
are going hand in hand with communitarian authority relations in Switzerland as in Germany. This
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stands once more in sharp contrast to the contractual authority relations, generally low levels of
trust among business partners and arm's length relations in Anglo-Saxon business environments. 
Though, an important difference between Germany and Switzerland lies in the mechanism leading
to and sustaining trust and communitarian authority relations. On the one hand, in Germany, laws
and institutional constraints act as a control-in-being that force actors to behave in socially accepted
ways. On the other hand, in Switzerland, extensive local networks of personal acquaintances and
the law of multiple encounters in life in a small society (Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 283) seem to
act as social constraints of a different kind compared to those found in Germany.
The following table sums up and provides an overview of key features of the three business systems
ordered  by  institutional  arenas,  with  skill  formation  and  control  being  subdivided  into  IR,
employment  protection  and  education  system.  It  is  has  been  designed  to  allow  for  a  direct
comparison of these spheres at a glance.
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Table 20: Overview of key characteristics of the US-American, German and Swiss national business systems (NBS)
institutional
arena (Whitley
2000a: 47) 
USA 
compartmentalised NBS
liberal market economy
Switzerland 
collaborative NBS
coordinated market economy
Germany 
collaborative NBS
coordinated market economy
Skill control:
IR
Permissive
conflictual IR (Lesch 2003), 
low  union  density  of  11.8%  in  2009  (against
OECD  average  of  17.9%  in  2009)  (OECD
2012c)
no  legal  equivalent  to  German  works
councils and co-determination rights, right to
manage-ideology (Brewster 1995) and 
unilateral style (Wever 1995)
collective bargaining coverage very low around
13% (Hayter et al. 2011: 227; Venn 2009: 18), 
decentralised wage bargaining,
widespread  anti-union  ideology  among  firms,
comparatively weak unions
Permissive
cooperative IR (Lesch 2003), 
industrial  peace and consensus orientation as
socio-cultural  rather  than  legal  phenomena
(Aubert  2005;  Davoine  2005;  Schmid  2001;
Siegenthaler 1986)
enforced  through  social  control  (Broussolle
2009)
moderate  union  density  comparable  to
Germany of 17.8% in 2009, in line with OECD
average (OECD 2012c), 
no  legal  equivalent  to  German  works
councils and co-determination rights, yet
rather negotiated style (Wever 1995)
collective  bargaining coverage  approx.  45%
(Hayter et al. 2011: 227; Venn 2009: 18),
wages  excluded  from  important  collective
agreements and  negotiated  on firm level  but
informal  coordination  via  employers'
association, 
unions comparatively weak in their negotiations
with employers,  but strongly integrated into the
Constraining
cooperative IR (Lesch 2003), 
institutionally  forced  into  consensus  (Davoine
2005)
ethos  of   works  community
(Betriebsgemeinschaft)(Calori and Dufour 1995:
64; Ferner et al. 2001: 109; Ferner and Varul
2000b:  82;  Schlie  and  Warner  2000:  35;
Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992)
union  density  higher  than  in  USA  and
Switzerland, 18.8% in 2009 slightly higher than
OECD average (OECD 2012c)
German  Works  Constitution  Act  gives  far-
reaching co-determination rights in the field of
HR to works councils, 
negotiated style (Wever 1995)
collective  bargaining on  industry  level  still
covering important  parts  of  industry,  coverage
around  65%  (Hayter et  al. 2011:  227;  Venn
2009: 16), 
wages  included  in  collective  bargaining
agreements  although  recently  more  opt-out
clauses, comparatively strong unions
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principle of contract (Meardi et al. 2009: 492;
Streeck 1987)
political  system  (Kenworthy  2003;  Soskice
1990)
rather principle of contract (Streeck 1987) principle  of  status  (Meardi et  al. 2009:  492;
Streeck 1987)
Skill control:
Employment
protection
legislation
Lowest among OECD countries with EPL-index
of 0.21 in 2008 (OECD 2012b; Venn 2009)
employment at will doctrine (Clark and Almond
2004:  550;  Edwards  and  Rees  2006a:  292;
Muhl 2001)
easy  to  pursue  hire-and-fire  strategies,  near
absence of legal minimum standards (Phelan et
al. 2007: 351)
average job tenure in January 2010: 4.4 years
(Bureau of Labor Statistics BLS 2010)(US data
on  average  job  tenure  not  included  in
OECD.Stat database)
Low with  EPL-index  of  1.14  in  2008  against
OECD  average  of  1.94,  lowest  among
Continental European countries (OECD 2012b;
Venn 2009)
individual as well as mass dismissals are easy
from a legal  point  of  view since Swiss labour
law is based on the  principle of  freedom of
dismissal (Aubert  2005;  Pelizzari  and  Schief
2008; Velo Roessl 2003: 45; Venn 2009: 8), 
no  legal  obligation  to  draw  up  social  plans
(Bonvin 2007), 
hire-and-fire strategies are possible  but do not
seem to be practised (Sousa-Poza 2004)
average job tenure in 2010: 9.7 years (OECD
2012a)
Higher than OECD average with EPL-index of
2.12  in  2008,  especially  high  for  regular
employment (OECD 2012b; Venn 2009)
just cause rules for dismissals, 
lengthy  and  onerous  mass  dismissals  due  to
legal obligation to draw up and agree upon a
social  plan  together  with  works  council
(Harcourt et  al. 2007:  964;  Morin  and  Vicens
2001: 51)
average job tenure in 2010: 11.4 years (OECD
2012a)
Skill
formation:
Education
and  training
system
Focus on general skills, 
very  low  standardization  of  skills  (Kerckhoff
2001), 
no  equivalent  to  Swiss  or  German-style
comprehensive dual VET system
strongly  evolving  around  a  comprehensive
state-regulated, workplace-focused type of dual
VET system (Winterton 2007: 284) and  task-
specific professional skills, 
high  standardization  of  skills  (national  legal
framework for dual VET)
Strongly  evolving  around  a  comprehensive
state-regulated, workplace-focused type of dual
VET system (Winterton 2007: 284) and  task-
specific professional skills, 
high  standardization  of  skills  (national  legal
framework for dual VET)
State Federal state organization, rather unitary (Braun
2003)
Decentralised federal state organization (Braun
2003), 
federal state without tradition of civil service but
militia  administration (Linder  2003:  508–509),
reduced  capacity  of  federal  state  to  actively
formulate economic or industrial  policy  due to
principle  of  subsidiarity and  small  budget
Unitary federal state organization (Braun 2003)
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exceptional  antistatism  of  US  employers
(Godard 2002: 259)
associations  and  trade  unions  are  weak
(Hollingsworth 1997a)
market  form  of  social  order  (Streeck  and
Schmitter 1985)
liberal state  and  strong  reliance  on  market
relations  (Clark and Almond 2004: 540; Ferner
and Müller-Camen 2004: 66; Hall and Soskice
2001a:  27) leaving  much  scope  to  individual
entrepreneurs
strong anti-trust legislation  (Ferner and Müller-
Camen 2004: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31)
important  equal  opportunity  and  diversity
legislation (Ferner et al. 2005a)
classic  case  of  a  liberal  welfare  state  regime
(Esping-Andersen 1990b)
(Armingeon and Emmenegger 2007: 181; Kriesi
2007: 83; Linder 2003: 489)
important direct democratic elements in political
system (Linder 2003)
liberal  version  of  a  coporatist/neo-
corporatist  state (Christen  2006;  David  and
Mach  2006:  9;  Hall  and  Gingerich  2004:  14;
Katzenstein 1985; Kenworthy 2003: 11; Linder
2003),
private interest government and associational
form  of  social  order  (Streeck  and  Schmitter
1985) involving straight cooperation with strong
associations  that  are  exercising,  under  state
license,  delegated  public  responsibility
(Armingeon 2001)
generally  liberal and  less  legalistic  than
German  state  in  terms  of  IR/HRM-related
legislation (Avery et al. 1999: 22)
high  tolerance  for  cartels (Armingeon  and
Emmenegger 2007; Baudenbacher 2001; David
and Mach 2006)
formerly  liberal,  now  Continental  European
conservative  type  of  welfare  state  regime
(Esping-Andersen 1990b; Nollert 2007)
corporatist/neo-corporatist  state (Hall  and
Gingerich  2004:  14;  Kenworthy  2003:  11;
Streeck 1997b; Streeck and Schmitter 1985)
private interest government and associational
form  of  social  order  (Streeck  and  Schmitter
1985)
definition  of  strong  legislative  safeguards
governing the employment relation (Royle 2004;
Williams and Geppert 2006a: 48)
certain  tolerance  for  cartels,  cooperation
between  economic  actors  of  the  same
sector/industry  encouraged  (Wächter  and
Stengelhofen 1992: 22)
Continental  European  conservative  or
corporatist-statist  welfare  regime  (Esping-
Andersen 1990b; Nollert 2007)
Financial
system  and
corporate
Capital-market based (OECD 2004),
strong shareholder-value philosophy (Almond et
al. 2005)
Traditionally  bank-centred,  banks  do  still
occupy  an  important  role  but  capital  markets
are also highly developed (OECD 2004)
Traditionally bank-centred (OECD 2004)
stakeholder-society (Ferner  and  Varul  2000a;
Schlie and Warner 2000)
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governance stakeholder society, 
many  family-  or  majority-owner-controlled
firms (Faccio and Lang 2002; Ledentu 2007)
many  family-  or  majority-owner-controlled
firms (Faccio and Lang 2002)
Conventions
governing
trust  and
authority
relations
Contractual  authority  relations  (Hollingsworth
1997a)
generally  low  trust  between  employers  and
employees  as  well  as  between  business
partners, 
competition  and  short-term  arm's  length
relations  (Ferner 2000a: 8; Ferner and Müller-
Camen 2004: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29–
30; Redding 2005: 142)
formal  institutions  overall  trustworthy and only
moderately affected by corruption (Schwab and
Sala-i-Martin  2012;  Transparency  International
2011a, 2011b)
Communitarian authority relations in a small
people-networking  society  (Avery et  al. 1999:
22) that is  marked by strong  social constraints
(Durkheim 1997) and the possibility of personal
behavioural  control  because  of  multiple
encounters in life (Davoine 2005; Freitag 2004;
Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 283)
high  generalised  trust between  social-  and
business partners, 
collaboration with  competitors,  long-term
relations and important amount of social capital
(Freitag  2001,  2003,  2004;  Freitag  and
Buehlmann 2009)
excellent  trustworthiness  of  formal  institutions,
among best  in the world (Schwab and Sala-i-
Martin 2012; Transparency International 2011a,
2011b)
Communitarian  authority  relations
(Hollingsworth  1997a:  272–275)  with
institutional  constraints and  labour  law  as
control-in-being  (Streeck  1997a;  Wächter  and
Stengelhofen 1992)
high  generalised  trust between  social-  and
business partners, 
collaboration with  competitors,  long-term
relations (Hollingsworth 1997a)
trustworthiness of formal institutions better than
in USA though lacking behind excellent level of
Switzerland  (Schwab  and  Sala-i-Martin  2012;
Transparency International 2011a, 2011b)
Source:  own  compilation  based  on  sources  as  indicated  within  table;  similarities  between Swiss  and  US-  or  Swiss  and  German national  business  system
emphasized in bold letters.
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PART IV: THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Chapter 7 Methodology and research design
In the following chapter, we will provide information about the research paradigm underlying the
present  investigation  and  important  methodological  choices.  Furthermore,  a  final  research
framework will be established. In this framework, important key insights of the precedent chapters
will  be summarized.  Furthermore,  propositions will  be formulated, referring to our expectations
about  the  behaviour  of  German  and  US  MNCs.  These  expectations  concern  their  respective
concrete approaches towards transfer, and ways of relating to the Swiss host country environment. 
7.1 Research paradigm, ontology and epistemology
Following Guba and Lincoln (1998: 195), a paradigm can be defined as “the basic belief system or
worldview that guides the investigator,  not only in choices of method, but in ontologically and
epistemologically  fundamental  ways”.  These  same  authors  present  four   paradigms  that  are
competing  for  acceptance  in  qualitative  inquiry:  positivism,  postpositivism,  critical  theory  and
constructivism. Postpositivism is also known as realism (Krauss 2005), critical realism (Hunt 1991)
or  neopositivism  (Manicas  and  Secord  1983)  and  contains  elements  of  both,  positivism  and
constructivism  (Krauss  2005:  716).  All  of  these  viewpoints  have  then  consequences  for  the
researchers ontological assumptions and epistemology. Following Bisman (2010: 5), “[o]ntological
assumptions affect the way a researcher views the world and what he or she considers to be 'real'”,
and  hence,  involve  the  philosophy  of  reality.  Epistemology  is  the  philosophy  or  theory  of
knowledge,  its  nature  and  limits,  and how we  acquire  and  accept  knowledge  about  the  world
(Krauss 2005: 758). 
Basic beliefs that are associated with the four alternative paradigms may be shortly resumed as
follows (Guba and Lincoln 1998: 204–207; Healy and Perry 2000): 
Positivist  ontology assumes that there is an objective external reality that is driven by immutable
natural laws and mechanisms that can be observed and understood, and truth can finally be found.
In  this  positivist  ontological  view,  there  is  hence  a  single,  concrete  reality  (Bisman  2010:  9).
Following a dualist and objectivist epistemological position, the investigator and the investigated
object are assumed to be independent entities, and the researcher can hence study the object while
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eliminating mutual influences. The associated methodology is experimental and manipulative with
hypothesis and questions being formulated prior to empirical testing for verification, where possible
confounding contextual influences must be controlled for carefully. 
Postpositivism adopts a critical realist ontological position where an objective external reality is
also  assumed  to  exist.  However,  postpositivist  or  realist  researchers  assume that  this  reality  is
difficult to discern and to understand because of flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the
complex and intractable nature of phenomena. Their ontology is therefore termed critical realism
since they argue that claims about reality have to be critically examined in order to apprehend
reality  as  close  as  possible,  while  a  perfect  understanding  of  reality  is  nevertheless  excluded.
Adopting  a  modified  dualist/objectivist  epistemological  understanding,  dualism  is  considered
impossible to maintain, while objectivity is considered an ideal with a corresponding emphasis on
external controls for objectivity. The latter may consist of a comparison with previous findings and
the discussion with the critical  community of editors,  referees  and professional peers.  Findings
obtained are considered to be probably true, while always subject to falsification.
Critical theory takes up the ontological stance of historical realism. Accordingly, an apprehendable
reality that once was plastic is viewed to be the outcome of a shaping over time by a series of
political, social, cultural, economic and other factors that finally have been crystallised into a series
of structures that are now considered as real. The epistemology is transactional and subjectivist,
where  researcher  and  investigated  object  are  considered  to  be  interactively  linked.  In  this
constellation, the values of the inquirer inevitably influence the inquiry, leading to value-mediated
findings.  Methodologically,  the  transactional  nature  of  inquiry  requires  a  dialectical  approach
involving a dialogue between the researcher and the subjects under investigation. Such a dialogue
has  to  be  dialectical  in  order  to  transform ignorance  and  acceptance  of  historically  mediated
structures as immutable into more informed consciousness about possible change of these structures
and corresponding action that would be required to achieve such change.
Constructivism adopts a relativist view. Realities are seen to be discernable as multiple, intangible
mental constructions that depend on the individual persons or groups holding these constructions.
Such constructions are hence not considered as more or less true or real, but rather more or less
informed  or  sophisticated  and  changeable,  just  as  their  associated  realities.  Epistemologically,
constructivists adopt a transactional and subjectivist stance where the investigator and object of
investigation  are  assumed  to  exert  mutual  influence  so  that  findings  are  created  during  the
investigation. Thus, the distinction between ontology and epistemology disappears. Hermeneutical
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and  dialectical  methodology  is  used  here  since  the  variable  and  personal  nature  of  social
constructions suggests that these may only be discerned through interaction between and among
researcher and respondents. Constructions are then interpreted using hermeneutical techniques, and
compared and contrasted with the aim of achieving a more sophisticated consensus construction. 
Table  21  below  summarizes  ontological  assumptions,  epistemology  and  methodology  that  are
linked to the four different research paradigms.
Table 21: Basic beliefs of alternative inquiry paradigms
Positivism Postpositivism Critical theory Constructivism
Ontology Naive realism:
a single “real” reality 
that is apprehendable
Critical realism:
multiple perceptions 
about a “real” reality that
is only imperfectly and 
probabilistically 
apprehendable – 
triangulation of sources
Historical realism:
virtual reality 
shaped by social, 
political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic, 
and gender values; 
crystallised over 
time
Relativism:
multiple, local and 
specific constructed 
realities
Epistemology dualist/objectivist; 
findings are true 
(absolute truth)
Modified 
dualist/objectivist; critical
tradition/ community; 
findings are probably 
true – value-awareness 
of researcher, 
triangulation of 
perceptions
Transactional/
subjectivist; value-
mediated findings
Transactional/
subjectivist; 
created findings
Methodology Experimental/ 
manipulative; 
verification of 
hypothesis; chiefly 
quantitative methods
Modified experimental/
manipulative; critical 
multiplism; falsification 
of hypothesis; may 
include both quantitative
and qualitative methods
Dialogic/
dialectical
Hermeneutical/
dialectical
Character-
istics  of  the
qualitative-
quantitative
continuum
quantitative: 
explanatory, 
positivist/
mechanistic, 
nomothetic – 
experiment, quasi-
experiment, survey
quantitative and 
qualitative:
postpositivism, critical 
realism – survey, depth 
interview, case study
qualitative:
exploratory, 
interpretive, 
idiographic – case 
study, ethnography, 
historical
qualitative:
exploratory, 
interpretive, 
idiographic – 
ethnography, 
historical
Source: Guba and Lincoln (1998: 203), Healy and Perry (2000), Bisman (2010), Krauss (2005), Sobh and
Perry (2006).
The present investigation is based on a postpositivist or realist paradigm. This choice is informed by
the important limitations associated with the positivist paradigm (Guba and Lincoln 1998: 197–200)
such as context-stripping and exclusionary designs that restrict applicability of research findings to
other truncated or contextually stripped situations. Concerning the transfer of HRM practices within
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MNCs, such  stripping of context is firstly practically impossible, and secondly, not useful since
highly complex and relevant contextual factors that are linked to the organizational and  external
institutional  context  will  always  be  present  and  exert  their  influence.  On  the  contrary,  our
investigation is especially concerned with the identification and understanding of such contextual
factors. Furthermore, in purely positivist research,  meaning is excluded. Yet, the purposes human
actors attach to their activities, or in our case HRM practices, is highly relevant for the aim of our
study.  Still  another  important  shortcoming  of  positivist  inquiry  concerns  the  exclusion  of  the
discovery dimension and induction through the emphasis on verification of  a priori hypothesis
(Sobh and Perry 2006: 1197). The aim of the present investigation is rather the development of a
model or theory on HRM practice transfer towards Switzerland than the testing of theoretically
derived  a priori hypothesis.  Neither  are  experimental  designs  conceivable in  the organizational
context  of  a  MNC,  where  each  and  every  situation  is  not  reproducible  under  the  same
circumstances. The aim of our inquiry is about explanation and knowledge accumulation on cause-
effect linkages in the external “real” reality. Knowledge in our case consists of the formulation of
non falsified hypothesis as probably true facts or laws, and is gained through a process of accretion,
adding to the edifice of knowledge. These aims are consistent with a postpositivist stance, but much
less  so  with  critical  theory and constructivism.  Critical  theory searches  for  structural-historical
insights and individual constructions or historical revisionism, and constructivism aims to achieve
sophisticated reconstructions of multiple realities (Guba and Lincoln 1998: 210–217). Therefore,
for researchers following these paradigms, especially constructivism, “reality is perception” and
hence, analytical generalization of research findings to theoretical propositions, or merely to another
person's theory about reality, cannot be done (Sobh and Perry 2006: 1195). This, however, is exactly
what the present study hopes to achieve. Earlier  research into international HRM that has been
conducted within this framework has already generated promising results (Nakhle 2011; Napier and
van Vu 1998; Rowley and Benson 2002) and we hope to contribute to the knowledge about the
phenomenon under investigation in the same fashion. 
An  important  characteristic  of  research  conducted  under  a  postpositivist  paradigm  is  the
applicability of conventional criteria for the judgement of rigor being internal validity, construct
validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity (Guba and Lincoln 1998: 213; Healy and Perry
2000). These criteria will be discussed in the following sections.
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7.2 Selection of the research approach
With our research question asking for the “how” and “why” of the phenomenon under investigation,
i.e. transfer  and local  adaptation of  HR practices  towards  Swiss  affiliates  of  MNCs,  this  study
follows  a  qualitative  approach (Yin  2009:  8).  While  the  “how” refers  to  the  understanding  of
processes, the “why” relates more to meanings. As we have seen, within the postpositivist or realist
framework,  basically  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  methodologies  are  considered  to  be
appropriate (Healy and Perry 2000). Thus,  case studies involving unstructured or semi-structured
in-depth interviews are acceptable and relevant within this paradigm (Bisman 2010: 9; Sobh and
Perry 2006: 1195). Qualitative approaches involving multiple case study designs currently appear to
be  the  most  commonly  used  in  the  field  of  research  into  the  cross-national  transfer  of  HRM
practices in MNCs based on comparative institutionalist theory (Almond et al. 2005; Dickmann
2003; Edwards et al. 2007b; Edwards and Tempel 2010; Ferner and Müller-Camen 2004; Ferner et
al. 2001; Ferner and Varul 2000a; Tempel et al. 2006a; Wächter and Peters 2004; Wächter et al.
2003)
Case studies help the researcher “to go deep in complex matters, which are not wholly understood”
(Stewart et al. 1994: 13) and allow for a detailed analysis of motives for behaviour, which cannot be
achieved  with  survey  research  (Wächter et  al. 2003:  7).  As  we  have  shown  in  our  research
framework, the phenomenon under investigation is highly complex, which is due to the multiplicity
of influences to be taken into account. A multiple case study approach therefore suggests itself as
appropriate research strategy. According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007: 26), case studies allow
to draw a relative exhaustive set of factors explaining a complex social phenomenon, thus helping
to produce inductive hypothesis, or giving illustration and validation to a theoretical model to “offer
insight into complex social processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal”. Furthermore, they
argue that theory built from multiple cases is more robust, generalizable and testable than single-
case  research.  This  is  because  multiple  cases  allow  for  comparisons,  thus  clarifying  whether
findings are simply idiosyncratic to a single case or consistently replicated by several cases. In
addition, the propositions derived from a multiple case study are more deeply grounded in varied
empirical evidence. Gibbert et al. (2008: 1468–1469) argue that the particular strength of the case
study as a research strategy lies in its internal and construct validity, which represent a conditio sine
qua non for external validity and reliability (Cook and Campbell 1979: 83; Scandura and Williams
2000: 1261).
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In order to improve the validity of qualitative research, Sinkovics et al. (Sinkovics et al. 2008: 696)
follow Creswell (Creswell 1998) in advocating the approach to build on established theory and to
build on and extend proven research design. We follow their advice in that our investigation is
based  on  and  strongly  guided  by  comparative  institutional  theory  that  has  been  identified  as
promising theoretical framework for research into HRM practice transfer in MNCs (Tempel  et al.
2005;  Wächter  2004;  Wächter et  al. 2003).  At  the  same time,  we  do  not  completely  exclude
culturalist contributions from our study, which are considered complementary rather than mutually
exclusive with institutional approaches (Koen 2005: 5). This, in turn, allows for theory triangulation
as a suitable means to increase internal validity of qualitative research (Gibbert et al. 2008: 1467).
As we have seen in the introduction, the comparative institutional approach has been identified as a
new fourth “distinctive line of inquiry within the international HRM field” (Quintanilla and Ferner
2003: 363; Tempel et al. 2005: 182) that has already been successfully used in an important number
of investigations into this subject (see chapter 5) and may therefore be viewed as an established
theory in the sense of Sinkovics et al. (2008).
Concerning the issue of proven research design, until present, the majority of work in this field is
based on  qualitative research methods,  with  case studies representing the most  commonly used
research strategy (Chang 2004, 2006; Dickmann 2003; Dörrenbächer 2004; Ferner and Quintanilla
1998; Ferner et al. 2001; Ferner and Varul 2000a; Koen 2005: 12; Nakhle 2011; Royle 1998, 2004;
Tempel 2001, 2003; Tempel et al. 2006a; Wächter and Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003).  In this
field of research, Ferner et al. (2012: 182) attribute a critical role to in-depth case studies since they
allow  for  deeper  exploration  of  both,  process  of  transfer,  and  how  transferred  practices  are
implemented  in  the  subsidiary.  According to  them,  case  studies  are  therefore  more  suited  than
surveys to develop nuanced operationalizations and “more appropriate for exploring in depth the
way transferred practices operate in reality” (Ferner et al. 2012: 182). Also Gooderham et al. (2006:
1508) brought into consideration the fact that the application of certain HRM practices does not
indicate whether and to what degree of intensity or rigour similar practices are used in different
contexts. In this connection, in his PhD thesis, Samer Nakhle (2011: 291) has provided illustrations
of how a standardized performance management system has been differently implemented in the
Lebanese setting.  Dickmann (2003: 279) added another important argument concerning “subtle,
informal  influences  that  support  a  'German  way'  abroad”  that  are  usually  not  picked  up  in
quantitative studies since these generally look at clearly formulated policies and practices.
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We are also grateful to Hartmut Wächter who provided us with the interview templates used by his
research  team in  previous  research  based on the  same theory and methodological  approach  to
investigate into the transfer of HRM practices of US-American MNCs towards Germany (Wächter
and Peters 2004; Wächter et al. 2003). This material was very helpful in following the advice of
Sinkovics et al. (2008) to effectively build on and extend proven research design.
According to Hartley (2004: 323), a case study is not a method but a research strategy. This research
strategy involves a design that consists of “a detailed investigation, often with data over a period of
time, of phenomena, within their context” with the aim “to provide an analysis of the context and
processes  which  illuminate  the  theoretical  issues  being  studied”  (Hartley  2004:  323).  In  this
connection, Gibbert et al. (2008: 1466) point to a key difference distinguishing case studies from
other research strategies.  This difference is that “case studies seek to study phenomena in their
contexts,  rather  than  independent  of  context”.  Therefore,  the  researcher  faces  a  “technically
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points” (Yin
2009:  18).  This  strategy  is  most  appropriate  to  answer  how  and  why  questions about  a
contemporary set of events over which the  researcher has little or no control  (Yin 2009: 13), and
where standard experimental or survey designs and criteria are hence not appropriate (Hartley 2004:
324). In our case, we are are facing exactly such a research situation, with our research questions
asking for the how and why of observed  phenomena, and contemporary events that are beyond our
control.
Within this broad research strategy then, a number of methods may be used. Case studies usually
include several methods of data collection and sources of evidence such as observation, interviews
and documentary analysis, with researchers being able to pursue both opportunistic and planned
data collection (Hartley 2004: 324; Yin 2009: 18).
While the overall  approach of case studies  has been described as “generally inductive analysis
focusing on processes in their  social  context” (Hartley 2004: 323), Yin (2009: 16) nevertheless
reminds that case study inquiry “benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to
guide data  collection and analysis”.  According to Johnson (2004:  165),  the notion of  induction
refers to “the processes by which observers reflect upon their experience of social phenomena and
then  attempt  to  formulate  explanations  that  may be  used  to  form an  abstract  rule,  or  guiding
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principle, which can be extrapolated and predict new or similar experiences”. Analytic induction
then involves  the extensive  examination of  a  selected number of  cases  in  order  to  empirically
establish the causes of a phenomenon, and hence, the attempt to uncover causal relationships. In this
connection,  Johnson  (2004)  contrasts  analytic  induction  with  deductive  procedures, where  a
conceptual  and theoretical  structure is  constructed prior  to  observation,  and then  tested  against
empirical facts. Hartley (2004: 324) strongly argues for the value of theory in case study research,
since the researcher needs a theoretical framework to inform and make sense of the data, to allow
for their systematic examination for plausibility during the study, and to provide a sense of what is
of more general relevance and interest. A case study conducted without a theoretical framework
may provide interesting details, though without any wider significance. Adopting a purely inductive
approach, it  would hence be difficult  if  not impossible  to  achieve analytical generalizability of
research findings.
The present research is strongly guided by an approved theoretical framework exposed in chapters
2, 3 and 4, that has been defined prior to observation. This framework is further supported by an in-
depth review of relevant literature undertaken in chapters 5 and 6. This approach allowed for the
development  of  theoretical  propositions that  are  exposed in  our  research framework.  Based on
these propositions and key insights from theory, we can formulate sharp and insightful questions in
our empirical investigation (Yin 2009: 14). 
7.3 The research framework
In the previous six chapters, we have developed the building blocks of a comprehensive framework
for research into the cross-national transfer of HRM practices within MNCs. In the introduction, we
have presented a graphic illustration for an institutional perspective on HRM and cross-national
HRM practice transfer within MNCs (Wächter et al. 2003: 6 based on Tichy et al. 1982: 48). A
simplified form of this graphical illustration then led us through the six precedent chapters of this
investigation and served as a graphic guide or thread for the reader. In the present chapter, we will
take these graphical illustrations up again and put the single parts together to build the final research
framework of  the  present  investigation.  Furthermore,  we will  summarize  some  central  insights
derived from our theoretical discussion and literature review of the previous chapters. 
In  a  first  step,  chapters  two,  three  and  four  focused  on  a  presentation  of  the  institutionalist
theoretical framework and organization-level variables influencing on HRM practice transfer. These
two perspectives have been integrated into a comprehensive framework for research into HRM
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practice transfer in MNCs. In a second step, this theoretical framework has been complemented
with an in-depth analysis of the German, US-American and Swiss NBS, together with a literature
review of HRM practice transfer in German and US MNCs towards different host countries. This
was  in  order  to  gain  a  sound,  theory-guided  and  empirically  validated  knowledge  bases  and
understanding of  the  respective  institutional  rationalities  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  167)  of  the  three
business systems involved, of how NBSs have shaped domestic HRM in US and German MNCs,
their respective approaches towards transfer, and ways of relating to different kinds of host country
environments.
In the following, we will take up selected elements of the previous chapters as key insights, and
point out why they are considered to be important for the present investigation. Furthermore, we
will phrase some theoretical propositions that will guide our own empirical analysis in order to
formulate sharp and insightful questions (Yin 2009: 14). However, these theoretical propositions are
not to be mistaken for hypothesis. The latter are formulated in order to be submitted to deductive
testing in quantitative studies. Since such deductive testing of hypothesis would a priori require
much bigger numbers of organizations or data points, this is neither feasible with, nor the aim of
this multiple case study that involves only a limited number of cases. 
However, as our research framework is clearly derived from theory and literature, the additional
formulation of propositions helps to establish a clear link between the available literature and our
own research, and hence allows to  strengthen internal validity through pattern matching. Pattern
matching  refers  to  a  procedure  during  data  analysis  where  researchers  compare  empirically
observed patterns in their own data with either theoretically predicted ones, or patterns that have
been established in previous studies and in different contexts (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Eisenhardt
1989; Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010: 714, 717; Gibbert et al. 2008: 1466).
Chapter two started out with a detailed presentation
of  two  strands  of  institutionalist  organization
theory,  Northern  American  new  institutionalism
(DiMaggio  and  Powell  1983;  Meyer  and  Rowan
1977; Scott 1987, 1994, 1995, 2003; Zucker 1988)
and the European business systems approach (Lane
1994;  Whitley  1994b;  Whitley  2000a,  2000b,
2008). Following suggestions made by Tempel and
Walgenbach (2007), we have combined these two institutionalist strands of theory in order to step
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up  the  explanatory  power  of  our  theoretical  framework  to  explore  what  we  have  called  the
institutional macro-level. Key concepts and ideas of institutionalist organization theory have been
presented, and the influence of institutional environments on HRM within organizations and MNCs
has been discussed. 
A first important insight for the present investigation can be drawn from Scotts (1994: 213, 215)
argumentation that  decentralised,  fragmented and federalised state structures would give rise to
more complex linkages among organizations in a sector, and that the state provides geographically
variable arenas of political access to societal actors with distinctive clusters and conditions. Similar
points  have  been  made  by  Whitley  when  discussing  the  role  of associations  in  collaborative
business systems. Whitley explains that in such systems, associations are acting as intermediaries
between the state and private actors, and that they are key actors in establishing and maintaining
comprehensive systems of vocational education and training (Whitley 2000a: 60, 84, 2000b: 859).
Furthermore, associations are important  forums where exchange between HR professionals takes
place, and hence, where normative as well as mimetic isomorphic processes (DiMaggio and Powell
1983) might be observed. We can now link these institutionalist theoretical arguments with insights
derived from our in-depth analysis of the Swiss national business system. In this respect, especially
the highly decentralised federal state structure (Braun 2003) and liberal corporatism (Armingeon
2001; David and Mach 2006; Katzenstein 1985) as well as the presence of a comprehensive, highly
developed dual VET system are important feature characteristics. These imply that we should duly
explore the role of local Swiss associations, membership of HR managers as well as their activities,
since such information may hold promising insights. Therefore, we have integrated questions about
membership in, role and activities of local Swiss associations in our interview guide.
Secondly Scott's  (1994:  208,  211, 212) argument  about  the exclusiveness  of  the jurisdiction of
belief systems and the closely related idea of  competing socialised rationalities (Almond 2011a:
260; Edwards et al. 2007b: 202) holds further potential for our investigation. Due to the very nature
of MNCs that straddle organizational fields and national institutional environments (Westney 1993:
60) or business systems, it is very likely that different belief systems or socialised rationalities of
involved actors are present  in our study.  This assumption seems to be even more likely as the
institutional  rationalities  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  167)  or  rationales  (Redding  2005:  136)  of  the
compartmentalised U.S. business system on the one hand, and the collaborative business systems of
Germany and Switzerland on the other, are quite different. In this connection, probably contrasting
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views of different actors might be notably due to the pervasive market mentality and short-term,
contractual  authority  relationships  in  the  USA (Hall  and Soskice  2001a:  29–30;  Hollingsworth
1997a: 271; Redding 2005: 142), that stand in sharp contrast to the more cooperative attitudes and
long-term  communitarian  obligations  (Hollingsworth  1997a:  272–275;  Streeck  1997a)  in  the
collaborative German and Swiss NBSs, as we have seen in chapters five and six. Which beliefs and
rationalities are present among MNC actors is an interesting question for our research, since these
shape their attitudes towards corporate HR practices. Again, actors' beliefs about what constitutes
professional behaviour, their espoused norms and cognition or socialised rationalities and embedded
ideological  norms,  are  strongly  influenced  by  their  interaction  with  peers  in  professional
associations via a process of acquisition (Scott 1987: 505). Exploring the role and activities of local
associations and the beliefs, norms and attitudes of HR managers is thus promising in order to learn
about local actors' socialised rationalities and finally to explore questions related to the power of
meaning when two sets of institutional rationalities collide in the event of HR practice transfer
(Ferner et al. 2012: 166). The exploration of meanings, in turn, demands a qualitative approach just
as the one underlying the present research (Krauss 2005: 763). The socialised rationality of actors or
belief systems are constituting the  embedded managerial norms (Almond 2011a: 265) which, in
turn, are underlying HRM practices, and incorporate managers' beliefs about desirable outcomes of
practices (Almond 2011a: 258–259). To try and understand this socialised rationality of local Swiss
as well as US-American and German actors is important since it may allow us to understand how
the  potential  of the country-of-origin effect for shaping the transferred practices actually shows
through  in  reality.  The  example  of  local  adaptations  in  the  implementation  of  a  standardized
performance management system in a US MNC in Lebanon (Nakhle 2011: 291) provides a good
illustration to theoretical arguments about actors assuming the role of interpreters between diffused
practices  and  local  institutions,  norms  and  rules.  Here,  institutions,  norms  and  rules  may  be
interpreted  in  contrasting  ways  (Lane  and  Wood  2009:  532).  Much  information  on  such  an
institutional rationality has already been gained from the in-depth analysis of NBSs and typical
HRM practices in  German and US-American MNCs, for example concerning attitudes  towards
unions, unilateral or negotiated approaches (Wever 1995), as well as calculative or collaborative
HRM (Gooderham et al. 1999). It is hence interesting to find out about how patterns of embedded
managerial norms show through and materialise in the Swiss setting.
Questions  about  such  differences  including  the  relationship  with  unions  or  the  presence  of
calculative HRM practices and a unilateral approach are hence part of the interview template and
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were systematically discussed with our interviewees. 
Thirdly, as we have seen, in recent contributions further arguments have been worded concerning
the  need to  focus more on sub-national  levels  of embeddedness of  international HRM. In this
respect, especially the competitive provision of supports for MNCs by sub-national actors, and the
advantages of spatial proximity have been highlighted (Almond 2011b: 533; Lundvall and Johnson
1994). It has been argued that under conditions of spatial proximity, personal relationships with
frequent  face-to-face  interaction  between  various  actors  may  stimulate  the  growth  of  trustful
personal relations and the development of shared conventions (Cooke and Morgan 1998; Porter
1998).  Where  MNC subsidiaries  are  located  in  an environment  where  subsidiary managers  are
personally linked to multiple external actors through a network of trustful personal relationships, the
latter may lead to deeper local embeddedness of the subsidiary. Such embeddedness, in turn, may
allow the whole MNC network to  capitalise on geographically specific inter firm relations (Lane
and Wood 2009: 543; Meyer et al. 2011: 246–247). 
Our in-depth analysis of the Swiss host country collaborative business system showed that the latter
is  marked  by  relatively  high  levels  of  generalised  trust.  Trust,  in  turn,  is  sustained  in  the
decentralised  and  linguistically  heterogeneous  Swiss  host  country  with  its  people-networking
society  (Avery et  al. 1999:  22)  through  the  law  of  multiple  encounters  in  life  (Weibler  and
Wunderer 2007: 283) that are due to the small cantonal societies, where people know each other
personally.  We  may  hence  argue  that  it  seems  very likely  that  we  will  find  forms  of  local
embeddedness  of  subsidiary units and local  Swiss  managers,  who may engage in  “information
shaping”  (Morgan and Kristensen 2006: 1478) within their organization. Furthermore, we might
expect to find certain forms of locally provided competitive supports for MNCs, since the latter are
economically extremely important for the Swiss economy (Erten et al. 2004: 102; Naville et al.
2007a: 8). 
Thus,  in  our interviews, we have included questions about  local managers'  participation in and
activities of local external networks, the perceived benefits of membership in local networks, and
the existence and use of locally provided supports for MNCs. Furthermore, we consciously tried to
find out whether out interviewees had corporate or local career orientations.
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Chapter  three  focused  on  what  we  have  termed  the  organizational  micro-level  and  hence  the
interplay and mutual influence of corporate structure and strategy as well as contingency factors on
HRM practices. In this respect, different notions of
strategy (Whittington 2001), inter alia the systemic
one that is present in the work of Richard Whitley,
have  been presented  and discussed.  Furthermore,
organizational forms (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998),
mechanisms, structures and forms of coordination
and control (Harzing and Sorge 2003; Scullion and
Starkey 2000) and their influence on and interplay
with  HRM  have  been  discussed.  Still  another
important issue that has been treated in this chapter
is aspects of power and agency within MNCs (Delany 2000; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2006,
2011;  Morgan  and  Kristensen  2006).  In  this  respect,  especially  different  subsidiary  roles  and
associated power resources (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011) within the MNC network and
related challenges of coordination and control (Greenwood et al. 2010; Meyer et al. 2011; Mudambi
and Navarra 2004; Taylor et al. 1996) of locally embedded subsidiaries with high knowledge in-
and  outflows  (Gupta  and  Govindarajan  1991;  Harzing  and  Noorderhaven  2006)  have  been
presented.
Therefore, a fourth important insight obtained from our theoretical discussion concerns the need to
develop  a  sound  understanding  of  issues  related  to  corporate  strategy,  structure  and
configuration.  For  example,  we need  to  gather  information  on corporate  HQ's  role  as  a  field
dominant  (Ferner et  al. 2012:  171; Levy 2008).  Therefore,  relevant  information that  should be
sought  and analysed includes  the  extent  of  concentration of  activities  in  the home market  and
country,  as well  as centralization and HQ dominance in policy formulation. This information is
crucial in order to evaluate the degree of home country embeddedness of the MNC. This, in turn,
may allow us to infer on the possible strength of the country-of-origin effect and home-country
managers' rationality. Furthermore, an understanding of whether a company is evolving towards the
transnational form (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998) or competes in  global markets and industries as
opposed to multidomestic ones (Porter 1986a) allows us to understand to what degree the respective
MNC needs to  achieve  internal  consistency (Evans et  al. 2002:  55),  and hence,  to  design  and
transfer  standard  corporate  practices.  The  same  is  true  for  diversification  strategies  and  the
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connected  logics  of  synergistic  or  financial  economies.  As  we  have  seen,  companies  with
synergistic linkages via diversification into new markets, replication and standardization may be
assumed to have the highest  degrees of standard HRM policies and practice transfer  (Edwards
2011). Further points can be made about  contingency factors such as size, since larger companies
are usually marked by higher degrees of standardization and formalization which, in turn, represent
processual channels for HRM practice transfer (Edwards and Ferner 2002; Ferner et al. 2004b: 366;
Quintanilla et al. 2008: 682). Greater standardization and transfer of HRM practices may also be
expected in large companies exposing intermediate structures such as global divisions or regional
headquarters (Ferner et al. 2012: 500, 503). But also the company's  growth history and preferred
market  entry  mode plays  an  important  role,  as  HRM practices  were  found  to  be  more  easily
transferable towards greenfield sites that are more frequent in global companies, when compared to
brownfield operations which are more common in multidomestic firms (Edwards et al. 2010: 618;
Harzing  2002;  Tempel  2001:  117).  Though,  concerning the  role  of  the typologies proposed by
Bartlett  and Ghoshal (1998) and Ferner and Edwards (1995),  it  has been argued that these are
empirically difficult to disentangle (Coller and Marginson 1998). Furthermore, the design of the
present research with its clear focus on external institutional environments considerably restricts the
extent to which the strategies and structures of, and relations in, the MNCs under investigation can
actually be observed. Therefore, we follow Tempel (2001: 143) who, rather than trying to apply
these  typologies  as  an  empirical  framework,  used  them  as  an  important  reference  point.  This
facilitates the identification of company level factors that may influence the extent to which, and
how HRM practices are transferred in MNCs. 
A first part of our questionnaire therefore deals exclusively with company-level factors in order to
identify  important  corporate  characteristics  of  strategy,  structure,  size,  growth  history  and
integration  that  are  supposed  to  influence  on  the  extent  of  standard  practice  transfer.  Further
information on geographical diversification, corporate structure and strategy as well as decisional
power of HQs and other MNC units have been obtained from interviews as well as from the internet
and document analysis.
A fifth  point can be made about certain HR functional areas that we expect to be generally more
integrated than others. Such propositions can be derived from arguments about varying degrees of
integration and differentiation of different HR activities and practices. The need for internal HR
consistency can be expected to be more or less strong depending on the degree of integration and
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differentiation of the respective HR domain (Evans et al. 2002: 465; Ulrich 1997). Issues such as
high  potential  development  and  management  training  with  high  degrees  of  integration  may
generally  be  expected  to  be  highly  standardized,  just  as  performance  management  and  global
recruitment process design or employee information and surveys. On the other hand, in line with the
findings of previous empirical research, HR issues with low levels of integration but high levels of
differentiation such as IR, collective bargaining, recruitment, compensation and shop floor technical
training may be expected to be treated more locally with certain adaptations (Ferner et al. 2011:
500; Myloni et al. 2007: 2066, 2069; Nakhle 2011).
A sixth understanding  has  been  obtained  from  recent  contributions  that  have  repeatedly  and
strongly argued for the need to duly account  for the critical  role of  organizational actors and
aspects of power and agency in the event of HRM practice transfer (Almond et al. 2005; Edwards
et al. 2010; Edwards and Rees 2006c; Ferner et al. 2012; Tempel et al. 2005; Wächter and Peters
2004; Wächter et al. 2003). As we have seen, we can distinguish between  three levels of agents
being the individual  manager,  the MNC subunit  or  subsidiary,  and the  MNC organization as  a
whole.  Issues of agency are,  in turn,  strongly interrelated with corporate structure and strategy.
These are important factors defining the role of the local subsidiary as well as strategic objectives
and the approach in the host country environment of the company as a whole. Again, as we have
argued earlier, in a coordinated or collaborative host country environment, managers are more likely
to be  locally embedded. This  local embeddedness of managers may be conducive to long-term,
local  career orientations  (Morgan and Kristensen 2006). Furthermore, local embeddedness may
grant privileged access to important location-specific resources and information for the MNC as a
whole. However, it may also create problems in controlling and coordinating the activities of such
locally embedded managers or whole units, especially when these are integrated players or global
innovators (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991). As we have seen, Switzerland is a coordinated market
economy or collaborative business system. In such environments, we might expect to find more
locally embedded subsidiaries and managers (Morgan and Kristensen 2006). It has been further
argued that such locally embedded managers are more likely to be  subversive strategists  than to
adopt  boy  scout  behaviours  within  the  MNC  network  (Delany  2000;  Dörrenbächer  and
Gammelgaard 2006; Morgan and Kristensen 2006). The framework of four  sources of subsidiary
power proposed  by  Dörrenbächer  and  Gammelgaard  (2011)  with  micro-political  bargaining,
resource-dependent,  systemic  and  institutional  power  can  serve  as  another  important  reference
point. This is especially true when combined with the contribution on power and agency made by
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Ferner et al. (2012), that allows us to better understand how aspects of agency influence on HRM
practice transfer in MNCs. Therefore, we sought to understand the role and relative position of the
Swiss  subsidiary within  the  company  network  of  the  MNC,  its  market  orientation,  local
embeddedness and knowledge in- and outflows in order to get a picture of its power resources that
may  be  mobilised  in  negotiations  with  HQ.  To  develop  such  an  understanding  of  the  power
resources  Swiss  local  subsidiaries  and  actors  can  draw on  to  defend  their  interests  within  the
corporate network, an analysis of previously discussed corporate-level factors linked to strategy and
structure as well  as host  country factors  such as local  networks and access to  location-specific
resources and supports, is highly important. Furthermore, the issue of embedded managerial norms
and the role of local managers as interpreters of practices and desirable outcomes comes again into
play. In this connection, Ferner et al. (2012: 174) emphasize that “[m]ore subtle and tacit cognitive
and normative elements of institutional frameworks are even more subject to insider exegesis”. As
we  have  seen  in  chapter  6,  Switzerland  is  by  far  less  legalistic  than  Germany, although
institutionalised practices like industrial peace and a generally cooperative, consensual management
style and long-term, stable employment relations imply the presence of  strong social constraints
(Davoine 2005; Durkheim 1997; Streeck 1997a: 202). We have further argued that these, in turn, are
based on exactly such cognitive and normative elements of the local context that may remain
invisible for outside actors like managers at US or German HQs as well as expatriates occupying
key positions in subsidiaries.
In  our  interviews  we  hence  consciously  tried  to  collect  information  and  evidence  of  local
embeddedness of managers.  We searched for  concrete  examples  of how  local  embeddedness is
linked with access to locally available resources, if and how these are used as power resource for
subsidiaries and subsidiary management in internal negotiations, and if and how insider exegesis of
local  cognitive-normative  frameworks plays  a  role  in  the  event  of  practice  transfer  and
implementation of standard practices. Another important aspect concerns the  MNC as actor  who
may actively engage in  negotiations with local authorities in order to gain legitimacy, following
ideas  proposed by Kostova  et  al.  (Kostova et  al. 2008,  2009).  Therefore,  we also  consciously
searched for evidence of such negotiation of legitimacy that might lend support to Kostova et al.'s
theoretical suggestions.
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In  Chapter  4,  we  integrated  the  macro-
level  institutional  factors  discussed  in
chapter  2  and  the  micro-level
organizational factors exposed in chapter 3
into  a  comprehensive  framework  for
research into cross-national HRM practice
transfer  in  MNCs.  We  have  summarized
recent  key  contributions  in  the  field  of
research that have identified  five key factors influencing on international HRM practice transfer.
The three macro-level factors are country-of-origin effect, dominance effect and host country effect,
whereas the two micro-level factors are the international integration effect, that can be linked to
corporate strategy, structure and issues of coordination and control, and political aspects of power
and agency (Almond et al. 2005; Edwards et al. 2007b; Edwards and Ferner 2002). Furthermore,
we have distinguished between direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. Direct mechanisms consist
of procedural channels and include guidelines, structures, rules and best practice schemes that are
used  to  transfer  codifiable  knowledge.  Indirect  mechanisms  relying  on  people-based  channels
include socialization mechanisms linked to corporate culture and international transfer of managers,
and are rather employed to transfer tacit knowledge (Edwards et al. 2010; Liu 2004). Associated
measures to secure practice transfer include, on the one hand, coercive comparisons, benchmarking
and formal systems of control that are largely based on the resource power of corporate HQ. On the
other hand, international management training and international project groups are used outside
these formal power relations. As we have seen, these transfer mechanisms might actually be viewed
as corporate coordination, communication and control practices.
Thus,  a  seventh  insight obtained  from  our  theoretical  discussion  is  that  it  is  necessary  to
understand  how  communication, coordination and control takes place in the MNC in order to
single out transfer mechanisms, international channels (Edwards et al. 2010: 618) and associated
measures used by the MNC. 
Therefore,  a  whole  section  of  our  questionnaire  is  dedicated  to  obtaining information  on these
issues.  We  also  asked  explicitly  about  the  existence  of  best  practice  schemes,  guidelines  and
manuals for standard processes and practices as well as socialization practices, international transfer
of managers and systematically undertaken comparisons between plants.
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In chapter five we have analysed the key institutional features or arenas of the US American and
German  NBSs.  For  this  analysis,  we  closely
followed the structure of the theoretical work
of  Whitley  (2000a).  The  in-depth  analysis  of
these two country-of-origin NBSs allowed us to
develop  an  understanding  of  how  domestic
HRM in German and US MNCs is shaped by
the  characteristics  of  their  respective  national
business  system.  Furthermore,  we could  gain
insights  into  the  relative  “institutional
rationality” (Ferner et al. 2012: 167) of our two
countries-of-origin. The latter, in turn, has been
argued to shape actors' “socialised rationality”
(Almond 2011a: 260) and to inform their global
approach towards  HRM and practice transfer.
In this  connection,  we notably recall  Bluhm's
(Bluhm 2001: 156) argument that “institutional
choice  is  a  matter  of  bounded  rationality.
Actors  can  change  their  policies,  but  they
cannot control entirely their expectations (and the expectations of others) or the social norms and
routine practices to which they are accustomed”. 
In a second step, we completed the analysis of these two country-of-origin NBSs with a literature
review of empirical studies of HRM practice transfer in German and US MNCs. We could thereby
obtain valid information on how and why German and US MNCs transfer certain kinds of HRM
practices cross-nationally. Further, we could find out how they deal with different types of host
country contexts with their specific constraints and opportunities. Based on this information, we can
now develop further concrete propositions to guide our empirical research.
An  eighth  key insight  of  this  discussion and review is,  that  we may expect  to  find important
differences  between  US and  German MNCs'.  As  we  have  learnt  from the  existing  literature,
German and US MNCs typically were found to adopt different approaches towards transfer and
towards dealing with different host country constraints and opportunities. General differences in
their  respective  approaches  towards  HRM  practice  transfer  reported  in  previous  studies  have
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already been discussed at length and summarized in tables 16 and 18. Thus, at this point we will
only recall some key differences that we would expect to play an important role for German and US
MNCs, their approaches towards HRM practice transfer, and their ways of relating to the Swiss host
country environment.
US MNCs  have been repeatedly found to be highly centralised,  formalised and standardized in
comparison to MNCs from other countries-of-origin (Almond 2011a: 261; Edwards et al. 2010:
615;  Ferner et  al. 2004b).  These  features  suggest  a  heavy reliance  on procedural  channels  for
transfer  of  mostly  codifiable  knowledge.  Furthermore,  probably  due  to  the  sheer  size  of  their
domestic market, many US MNCs were found to have a tradition of parochial, inward-looking HR,
are likely to fail to recognize differences and to under-emphasize international activities (Dowling
1999: 37; Ferner et al. 2004b: 378). We have also seen that, due to the dominant systemic position
of the USA throughout the twentieth century, US MNCs have grown in the dominant economy,
where they have developed numerous innovations including HIWSs with HR bundles in a very
liberal environment (Schuler and Jackson 2005: 20). These factors may explain, together with their
high  levels  of  formalization  and  standardization,  their  pronounced  will  to  transfer  standard
corporate practices downstream. These usually evolve around best practice schemes and standard
processes that are designed at HQ, and a pronounced corporate culture in order to obtain internal
consistency and  competitive  advantage.  On  the  host  country  side,  it  has  been  argued  that  the
dominant  systemic  position  of  the  USA and  the  performance  of  their  MNCs  led  to  a  high
receptiveness for US HRM practices (Clark et al. 2005: 508). Finally, subsidiaries of US MNCs
were found to have lower levels of autonomy and discretion in HR policy formulation than those of
other nationalities (Ferner et al. 2011: 495).
Concerning the institutional rationality of the US national business system, we have seen that US
organizations are isolated hierarchies in a compartmentalised business system. Market competition
is the central means of resource allocation in this utterly liberal system, where relationships between
market participants are generally short-term and arm's length in nature. Moreover, the US business
system does not provide major institutional supports for firms, and business as well as employers'
associations are fragmented and not incorporated into the political system. Furthermore, not only
business and employers' associations are weak, but also trade unions representing the employee
side. As we have seen, relations between employers and unions have historically been marked by
conflict  rather  than  by a  spirit  of  cooperation  and  social  partnership,  and  bargaining  between
employers and employees is highly decentralised and individualised. These factors may inter alia
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help us to understand why there is no encompassing system of vocational education and training in
place in the USA.
As  we  have  seen,  in  previous  studies  US  MNCs have  been  found  to  transfer especially
sophisticated  performance  management  systems  with  calculative  HRM  practices,  diversity
frameworks,  strongly  individualist  non-union  approaches  in  their  employee  relations  involving
direct  communication,  and  a  strong corporate  culture and associated socialization  mechanisms
(Ferner et al. 2004a: 117). We would therefore expect to find these broad characteristics of a 'US
MNC approach towards transfer' also in Switzerland.
German MNCs, in turn, show some important differences when compared to their US counterparts.
Structurally, German MNCs have been found to be usually more decentralised concerning HR and
IR policy making and definition of practices (Chang 2006; Ferner and Varul 2000b: 89; Guest and
Hoque 1996: 64, 69), leading to local adaptation and hence, greater similarity with host country
practices. Moreover, their overall approach towards transfer of country-of-origin practices in the
field of HR and IR has been described as more subtle and selective, and marked by differentiation
by choice. For instance, certain practices linked to the heavily institutionalised German IR system
like co-determination have not been transferred (Dickmann 2003: 274). On the other hand,  they
have tried to do so with other practices like dual VET, though with varying degrees of success.
Starting in the early 1990s, many lately internationalizing German MNCs have started to learn from
more advanced international MNCs of Anglo-Saxon origin and to adopt elements of Anglo-Saxon
HRM, leading to an Anglo-Saxonization “in the German manner” (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998:
724)  that  is  reflected in  their  HRM practices.  Such learning also involved upstream or reverse
transfer from Anglo-Saxon subsidiaries. The available literature suggests that German MNCs seem
to rely less heavily on the single use of formal mechanisms since they make some more use of
expatriates than their US counterparts (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: 725; Harzing 2001). 
In terms of German institutional rationality, German firms are typically collaborative hierarchies
that  are  deeply  embedded  into  a  collaborative  business  system.  In  such  systems,  long-term
cooperative relationships between market participants and especially between members of a sector
or industry are common, and resource allocation is secured not only by market forces, but rather by
associational coordination. Strong business and employers' associations are incorporated, together
with trade unions, into the state. Together with the state, collaborative social partners are able to run
an  encompassing  system  of  dual  VET,  and  industry  is  the  traditional  level  where  collective
bargaining takes place.
228
7.3 The research framework
The content of  transfer, then, may rather refer to a mindset and basic principles than to concrete
practices. Such a mindset concerns a cooperative, consensual style in IR, the ethos of the works
community, as well as some more use of collective representation and communication in ER/IR.
Furthermore, long-term developmental HR inspired by the German system of dual VET with heavy
emphasis on training, and internal careers based on increasing technical competence (Barmeyer and
Davoine 2008: 11; Calori and Dufour 1995: 68; Evans et al. 2002: 376–377; Glunk et al. 1997: 99;
Kristensen  2003)  have  been  identified  as  typically  German-flavoured  practices.  These  broad
features of German MNCs, and their distinct approach towards transfer, are expected to be present
also in Switzerland.
In  chapter six, we focused on the Swiss host  country
NBS  in  order  to  learn  about  possible  host  country
effects. As we have seen, host country effects consist of
locally  imposed  constraints  as  well  as  resources
(Almond et al. 2005: 281) that may influence on HRM
policy and practice. Our in-depth analysis of the Swiss
business system allowed us to systematically compare
the configuration of key institutional features or arenas
of Switzerland as host country with those of Germany
and the USA as countries-of-origin. This analysis  and comparison that has been summarized in
table 20 allowed us to make the point on our initial affirmation that Switzerland in some respect
takes a middle position between the cases of Germany as a classic example for a collaborative, and
of the USA as a compartmentalised business system. We have shown that on the one hand, the
Swiss  system of  IR is  permissive  and  lacks  an  equivalent  to  German  works  councils  and co-
determination rights. On the other hand, it is however marked by cooperative relations. Collective
agreements do exist and cover an important part of the Swiss workforce. Yet, these agreements are
concluded  between  institutionally  weak  unions  and  strong,  well-coordinated  employers'
associations, and wages are mostly excluded and determined at firm or plant level. Swiss labour law
is liberal with a low level of employment protection legislation, and labour markets are flexible.
However, these institutional features did not lead to short-term hire-and-fire policies with a strong
emphasis on external labour markets like in the USA, but employment relations are stable with long
average job tenures. Switzerland has a comprehensive system of VET emphasizing professional
skills,  that shows striking similarities with the one found in Germany. Relations between Swiss
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economic actors including public and business organizations as well as employers and employees,
are marked by high levels of generalised trust and communitarian rather than contractual Anglo-
Saxon style authority relations. Furthermore, also similar to Germany, associational coordination or
private interest government plays a central role in the Swiss economy. A lean, decentralised federal
and liberal corporatist Swiss state co-operates closely and on an institutionalised basis with, and
even delegates tasks to, private interest associations. In our analysis we have built on points made
by other authors about a Swiss people-networking society (Avery et al. 1999) where people in small
cantonal  communities  have  multiple  personal  encounters  in  life  (Freitag  2004;  Weibler  and
Wunderer 2007). This gives rise to strong forms of social control that are typical for small, direct
democratic societies (Davoine 2005). Moreover, it may explain outcomes like co-operative IR and a
consensual,  rather  negotiated  style  resembling  those  in  Germany,  despite  important  differences
between these two collaborative business systems. As we have seen, in Switzerland, there are no
comparable institutional safeguards or statutory rights such as employment protection legislation,
co-determination rights and strong unions in place. Such formal institutional elements that could be
considered as obvious, clearly defined “control in being” (Wächter and Stengelhofen 1992: 27), and
that are at the basis of coercive isomorphic pressures in Germany, are widely absent in Switzerland.
The somehow puzzling evidence in Switzerland is that outcomes are similar to those in Germany,
while at the same time, local coercive isomorphic pressures are widely absent. This points to the
existence  and  working  of informal  institutions  and  to  the  normative  and  cognitive  pillars  of
institutions.  Since  informal  institutions  refer  to  usually  unwritten  socially  shared  rules  that  are
created,  communicated  and  enforced  outside  of  officially  sanctioned  channels  (Helmke  and
Levitsky 2004: 727), it suggests itself to have a closer look at the presence and working of such
unwritten rules that may very well  be sanctioned,  though not through official  channels.  In this
respect, the local media and personal relationships, inter alia those between economic and political
elites, might probably play an important role in sanctioning infringements of unwritten rules in the
Swiss people-networking society.
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Our following propositions now concern expected differences in the ways German and US MNCs
will deal with the Swiss host country environment. Following Morgan (Morgan 2007: 139), we try
to  achieve  a  specific
understanding  of  how
these  organizations
relate  to  the  particular
institutional  settings  of
Switzerland and  how
they  take  advantage  of
local  resources  and  deal
with constraints.
Following  Lane  and
Wood  (2009:  542),  we
can expect different types
of MNCs to make greater
or lesser use of a range of alternative institutional supports. Furthermore, the ability of MNCs to
engage with high trust relations with local firms and governance actors has been argued to affect
their  sub-national host embeddedness, together with the degree of sub-national business system
autonomy (Almond 2011b: 281).
In tables 17 and 19, we have summarized findings of previous empirical studies illustrating how
German and US MNCs have dealt with other coordinated and liberal host country environments.
Putting together the findings of these empirical investigations with our information on key features
of the Swiss host business system, we can formulate some concrete questions and propositions
about expected German and US-American ways or forms of relating to the Swiss host country
institutional environment.
a) A first  question is about whether and how German and US MNCs locally engage in  symbolic
image building (Kostova et al. 2008: 1001), and if yes, which sources of legitimacy they use? Due
to the different institutional rationalities between Germany and the USA, we would expect to find
different approaches. We may speculate about a connection between the sources of legitimacy used
being somehow related to different perspectives on corporate social responsibility that might be
rather regulatory in Germany as opposed to a more managerial or shareholder perspective in the
USA (Bonvin 2007: 36–37).
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b) Secondly,  the  existence  of  an  encompassing  system of  dual  VET in  Switzerland  raises  the
question if and in how far German and US MNCs take advantage of corresponding locally available
institutional support structures? 
Contrary to other host countries that have been studied so far, the  presence of such structures  a
priori allows  German  MNCs to  reproduce  German-style  vocational  training  and  associated
practices in Switzerland. As we have seen, German MNCs have been found to transfer this system
or  to  establish  functional  equivalents  in  several  countries  for  several  reasons  and  with  mixed
success.  While  in  some cases,  management  aimed at  providing their  workers with broad-based
skills that were not available on local labour markets, in other instances, dual VET was rather used
as an efficient recruitment tool, or in order to establish early ties with their young workers through
socialization. Even in rather adverse environments like the UK, where the structure of the labour
market  and  career  patterns  are  highly  different  from Germany,  some  German  MNCs  tried  to
establish dual VET training schemes. We might therefore  expect German MNCs to engage with
much ease in dual VET also in Switzerland, since the Swiss training system and skill profiles that
determine the structure of the local labour market as well as career patterns are very similar to
Germany, and all necessary institutional supports are readily available. Also the Swiss associational
mode of governance of the dual VET system is very similar and should therefore be common to
German MNCs as collaborative hierarchies that are used to co-operate with other firms of their
sector or industry with the  coordinating and mediating role of associations.
For US MNCs, dual VET is a rather unfamiliar training practice from their home business system.
Yet, several of the US MNCs which are active in Switzerland might already know the system due to
a long international experience. For example, in Germany, survey findings suggest that dual VET is
considered a highly valued local resource among foreign MNCs (Vitols 2001: 14, 16, 17). We might
therefore speculate that internationally more experienced US MNCs might as well take advantage
of the apprentice system. However,  US investors showed scepticism about (Cooke and Morgan
1998: 13–14), and US MNCs were found to be reluctant to join employers' associations in Germany
(Singe and Croucher 2005: 133), a fact that might be explained by the overwhelming dominance of
big German firms in these associations (Wächter et al. 2003: 88). Yet, it is these associations that
play a central role in the coordination and working of the dual VET system in Switzerland as in
Germany.  This  argument  might  be  even  stronger  for  the  Swiss  regional  cooperative  training
schemes that are sustained by local networks of bigger employers. Such cooperative practices and
networking  with  competitors  involving  even  some  exchange  of  information  on  production
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techniques might arguably seem to be a suspect practice in the eyes of higher-level Anglo-Saxon
managers who are used to the strict anti-trust legislation, requiring every firm to stay on her own,
thus strictly confining the scope for cooperative practices. 
Furthermore, we may reasonably expect that the kind of activities performed in Switzerland, and
hence, the respective need for certain types of qualifications, will determine whether or not MNCs
will engage in apprentice training or not. Interesting in this respect are the findings of Hanhart and
Bossio (1998: 496–497) who suggest that there are several reasons to locally engage in apprentice
training, that might equally apply to foreign MNCs. These same authors found rational-economic as
well  as  social  reasons  for  Swiss  firms  to  invest  in  apprentice  training.  On  the  one  hand,  the
opportunity to secure labour with skills exactly matching the firms' needs, and a reduced risk in
recruiting were classified as rational-economic reasons.  On the other hand, the improvement of
training available in a region, the facilitation of transition between school and work, firm tradition,
and finally, corporate image, represented social reasons for training apprentices. Therefore, it seems
promising  to  explore  the reasons  of  German and US MNCs to  engage or  not  to  engage  in
apprentice training, and to find out in how far rational-economic versus social considerations and
corporate image play a role also for foreign MNCs. As we have seen in the precedent paragraph,
such social considerations might well be linked to MNC efforts of symbolic image building in order
to gain legitimacy locally, just as local Swiss firms do.
c) A third question, that is closely related to the precedent point, is about how US MNCs will deal
with the local associational mode of coordination and cooperative practices  in the Swiss host
country context.  Similar to the German one,  the latter  is supposed to demand for collaboration
(Saka-Helmhout  and  Geppert  2011:  573–574).  As  we have  seen,  evidence  from US MNCs in
Germany suggests not only a reluctance to join local associational networks, but even active agency
exacerbating tendencies  of  the system towards  disarticulation (Singe  and Croucher  2005:  123).
Based on theoretical grounds and the available empirical evidence, there is no reason to expect any
kind of deep embeddedness and sustained engagement of US MNCs with associations or other
kinds of local networks. 
For German MNCs, in turn, we would expect active membership in associations in order to obtain
information from other professionals, to engage in collective bargaining and in political lobbying,
corresponding to their country-of-origin practices.
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d)  Fourthly,  the  presence  of  a  strong  anti-union  ideology and  a  preference  for  direct
communication runs like a thread through US MNCs' approaches in the field of IR and ER. In cases
where unions where accepted, this was due to acquisitions of plants with a history of unionisation
combined with difficult market conditions, or to institutional pressures. However, in certain cases,
even institutional pressures for collective representation in Germany could successfully be fended
off by putting pressure on local management (Tempel et al. 2006a). Since in Switzerland, unions are
institutionally  weak  in  their  bargaining  relations  with  employers  (Armingeon 2001;  David  and
Mach 2006; Oesch 2007; Pelizzari and Schief 2008), we have no reason to expect any other policy
than union avoidance for US MNCs in Switzerland. Yet, collective agreements might well be used
as benchmark in order to offer higher standards, as US MNCs in the pharmaceutical industry did in
Ireland (Collings et al. 2008: 249). Generally, It seems rather likely that especially wage policy in
US MNCs will involve some kind of labour market benchmarking, involving wage surveys and a
positioning above the mean level.  This  has  also been identified in  Spain  as  part  of  preventive
measures adopted to keep unions out and to avoid industrial conflict. US MNCs seem to prefer to
pay higher wages if this allows them to keep unions out, and hence, to preserve a maximum of
managerial  prerogative.  We would overall  expect  US MNCs to be marked by rather top-down,
unilateral decision-making,  and emphasis  on managerial  prerogative  with  explicit  exclusion  of
outside actors such as trade unions.
On the other hand, as we have seen, German MNCs generally showed more cooperative industrial
relations and no comparable anti-union ideology as their US counterparts. Contrary to the USA, in
Europe, there has been a common acceptance of the idea that both government and unions should
play an active role in the regulation of the labour market and of the social state (Phelan  et al. 2007:
355). In fact, collective agreements between trade unions and employers' associations on industry
level have been repeatedly identified as one of the major institutions governing the German labour
market (Giardini et al. 2005; Müller 1999b; Wächter and Müller-Camen 2002). On the other hand,
in other host countries like the UK with permissive IR systems, German MNCs were found to free
themselves  from constraining  elements  of  their  home  business  system.  This  differentiation  by
choice (Tempel et al. 2005: 193, 2006b: 27) was especially evident in case of co-determination
rights  of  works  councils  and  employee  representation  on  board  level,  which  have  not  been
transferred abroad. As we have seen, also in the Swiss IR environment is basically permissive as
there are no comparable constraints like German co-determination rights. However, cooperative IR
are based on the notion of social partnership. These framework conditions in Switzerland are hence
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consonant with the German cooperative ethos. Furthermore, German MNCs were found to have
rather decentralised policies on IR (Ferner and Varul 2000a: 132, 2000b: 89; Guest and Hoque
1996:  64,  69),  with the  latter  being  commonly adapted  to  host  country practices.  Thus,  where
German  MNCs  employ  those  categories  of  workers  that  are  typically  covered  by  collective
agreements, we would expect especially larger German MNCs to engage in negotiations and to
entertain cooperative relations with unions and worker representatives, and to negotiate collective
agreements.  Corresponding  to  common  local  Swiss  practice,  wages  would  be  excluded  and
negotiated at firm or plant level. German MNCs might also combine collective employee relations
involving some kind of representative works committee and individual HIWSs as they did in the
UK (Tüselmann et al. 2006: 75). This approach might be especially viable where employees are
highly skilled knowledge workers. Furthermore, German MNCs might be expected to use local co-
operative ER and IR structures creatively in order to achieve local productivity coalitions, or to
introduce negotiated forms of flexibility such as working time schemes. Thus, we expect German
MNCs  to  be  marked  by  less  unilateral  and  more  negotiated decision-making  with  more
involvement of inside as well as outside actors such as works committees and unions, who are
generally considered as social partners. On the contrary, all available literature suggests that there is
no reason to expect German MNCs to transfer formal co-determination rights towards Switzerland. 
e) Fifthly, German MNCs were found to be marked by developmental HR with a heavy emphasis
on training and the development of technical knowledge, together with internal functional careers
that are based on the acquisition of technical knowledge (Barmeyer and Davoine 2008: 11; Calori
and Dufour 1995: 68; Evans et al. 2002: 376–377; Glunk et al. 1997: 99; Kristensen 2003). We
expect this approach with potential influences on personnel development and career planning to
inform their practices also in Switzerland. However, it is difficult to predict in which ways this
influence will concretely manifest itself. There might be a stronger focus on internal labour markets,
just in line with the German figures on long average job tenure, and a stronger training orientation
than in their US counterparts. Though, as Tempel (2001: 157) reminds, it is highly problematic to
find  meaningful  and  internationally  comparable  indicators  to  investigate  aspects  of  employee
development. Thus, we do not aim to undertake direct and quantifiable comparisons in this field. 
Concerning US MNCs, the available evidence suggests that internal labour market approaches with
intensive socialization practices were chosen especially  in difficult labour markets, which might
arguably be the case in Switzerland with its very low level of unemployment. Yet, we would not
expect functional careers or a nexus between a career progression and the acquisition of technical
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knowledge as this might be the case in German MNCs. Furthermore, contingent on corporate-level
factors such as corporate culture and history, some US MNCs might be more orientated towards
external labour markets than their German counterparts, while others might have developed internal
career approaches as part of a welfare capitalist heritage.
f) Our sixth proposition is about US MNCs that are expected to show elaborated diversity policies
and to transfer corresponding frameworks also towards Switzerland. These frameworks may or may
not  be  adapted  to  the  European  context,  where  they  might  potentially  focus  more  on  equal
opportunities for men and women.
In German MNCs, such diversity frameworks are not expected to play an equally important part in
their international HRM policy.
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7.4 Selection of the research sites and access to the field
It has been stressed that the provision of a clear rationale for the case study selection and details on
the case study context are of great importance. Such information is crucial as it allows the reader to
appreciate  the  researcher's  sampling  choices  (Cook  and  Campbell  1979:  83).  This,  in  turn,
represents an important criterion for the judgement of  external validity or generalizability of the
case study findings (Gibbert et al. 2008: 1468).  External validity refers to the belief that theories
have to be shown to account for phenomena in other settings than the one in which they are studied
(McGrath and Brinberg 1983). In fact, neither single nor multiple case studies allow for statistical
generalization, and hence, to infer conclusions about a population (Numagami 1998: 3). However,
case studies do not rely on statistical, but on analytical generalization, referring to generalization of
a set of results or empirical observations to theory rather than a population (Sobh and Perry 2006:
1195; Yin 2009: 43). To achieve analytical generalization, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that a cross-
case analysis involving four to ten case studies provides a good basis. 
We  have  followed  her  advice  and  selected  five  out  of  our  sample  of  19  firms  that  seemed
particularly interesting cases for closer observation of the phenomena under investigation. In these
firms,  we  have  conducted  more  in-depth  case  studies  with  further  participants  disposing  of
international experience within their organization and knowledge of corporate headquarters. This
was in order to obtain information from several points of view, especially from persons who were
able  to  compare  practices  back  at  home  and  in  the  Swiss  subsidiary.  Expatriates  and  other
employees  with  international  experience,  as  well  as  employees  occupying  other  positions  or
functions than HR have been consciously chosen to carry out additional interviews. This was done
in order to reduce negative effects on validity due to single source bias (Björkman 2006: 467; De
Cieri and Dowling 2006: 22). In a similar vein, we completed four external expert interviews in
order  to  further  triangulate  our  sources  of  information.  We  could  hence  compare  HR  insider
perceptions  within  MNC subsidiaries  with  those of  experts  working in  local  Swiss  institutions
concerning issues like dual VET, IR, and labour markets.
Referring to criteria for sample definition and recruitment of participants, “most qualitative studies
set a premium on diversity, because (...) they seek to show the range of ways that a phenomenon is
experienced  within  the  chosen  context”  (King  2004a:  16–17).  In  this  way,  the  sample  may
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encompass variations that are expected to be of theoretical and applied interest. In the following, we
will  resume the  criteria  used  to  define  our  sample  and to  choose  participants.  These  sampling
criteria follow the principle of a search for theoretically meaningful variations and are hence based
on the key insights and propositions presented in our research framework.
The  present  investigation  is  part  of  a  larger  research  project  conducted  at  the  chair  of  human
resource management and organization of the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. Starting in
2008, several PhD Projects, Bachelor's and Master's thesis have been dedicated to the investigation
into the cross-national HRM practice transfer in MNCs. Inter alia, a first PhD thesis on US and
European MNCs in Lebanon (Nakhle 2011) has been published, and several Master's thesis have
been completed that dealt with the subject of HRM practice transfer. For example, Master's thesis
on HRM practice transfer  in  French and US MNCs towards Switzerland (Python 2011),  HRM
practices in an acquired subsidiary of a French MNC in Switzerland (Stern 2010), cross-national
HRM practice  transfer  and  the  role  of  European  HQ of  US MNCs  (Diogo  2011),  and  HRM
practices of Swiss MNCs (Ganz 2012). Further investigations including a PhD theses on foreign
MNCs in the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Olga Novitskaya)  and in Switzerland (Christian
Schober)  as  well  as  Master's  thesis  on  the  transfer  of  HRM  practices  in  US  MNCs  towards
Switzerland  (Rebecca  Warburton)  are  currently  being  conducted.  Taken  together,  interviews  in
around  50  Swiss  subsidiaries  of  foreign  and  domestic  MNCs  have  been  conducted,  and  data
collection, analysis as well as results have been discussed with all participating researchers in order
to increase the validity of our data analysis through triangulation. The present researcher supervised
several of these Master students, accompanied the students to their interview appointments, and
discussed the analysis of their transcripts with them. Thus, the total number of MNCs the present
researcher has had the opportunity to get in tough with exceeds the nineteen cases presented in table
22, with the latter referring only to those cases he has analysed himself in depth for the present
investigation.
The focus of this research project lies on the Swiss host country and its influences on HRM practice
transfer, and on the different ways in which German and US MNCs relate to the Swiss institutional
setting.  Therefore,  a first  concern was to obtain  similar numbers of German and US MNCs as
participants in our investigation. Furthermore, as we have seen in chapter 6 and emphasized in our
research  framework,  Switzerland  is  a  country  that  is  marked  by strong  cultural,  religious  and
linguistic heterogeneity which is reflected in a highly decentralised state organization. Thus, the
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geographical location of our research sites was a second important criterion. We tried to collect
equal  amounts  of  data  in  French-  and  German-speaking  regions  and  cantons,  since  important
powers concerning schooling systems, including the delivery of the school-based part of dual VET,
and the imposition of taxes, are largely exercised on the cantonal level. Furthermore, in our research
framework and theoretical propositions, we have argued that the sub-national cantonal or linguistic-
regional level is the most important one for associational life and coordination of economic actors
and activities,  thus  representing  an important  factor  in  the Swiss  NBS. Last  but  not  least,  this
research design allowed us to include different cultural-linguistic backgrounds that are present in
Switzerland, and that might as well influence on local Swiss actors' perceptions of managerial styles
and HRM practices at their workplaces. Research sites in the German and French-speaking parts of
the country have been included, because otherwise, rich information linked to the highly diverse
contexts within Switzerland might have escaped and significantly reduced the richness of our data. 
As displayed in table 22, the objectives of obtaining similar numbers of cases and interviews in US
and German MNCs with a large geographical spread including subsidiaries in several German- and
French-speaking cantons could be achieved to a satisfactory degree. This should serve as a good
starting position to investigate the role and activities of local associations as well as issues related to
sub-national embeddedness and competitive provision of supports (Almond 2011b: 533) that have
been  discussed  and  identified  as  important  research  questions  in  our  research  framework.
Furthermore, comparable amounts of data for German and US MNCs should provide a sound basis
for a systematic comparison of differences and similarities. This comparison is done between the
two country-of-origin groups of MNCs with each group representing various kinds of organizations
and sectors, in order to learn about their ways of relating to the local Swiss institutional context.
However,  one limitation of  our  sample consists  in  the fact  that  it  does  not  include the Italian-
speaking canton of Ticino and hence, the third cultural-linguistic region of the country.
A third sampling criterion was related to company-level variables as discussed in chapter 3 and
summarized in the research framework. In this respect, our aim was to obtain interviews in a large
variety of companies including differences in size, structure, industry and competitive strategy. As
explained above, such diversity in the sample enables the researcher to include variations that are
expected to be of theoretical interest and to see how and in how far such company-level variables
influence on HRM practice transfer towards Switzerland. Relevant findings from our sample can
then be compared with those obtained in previous research, hence holding the potential to further
contribute to our understanding of interaction effects (Tempel et al. 2005: 197) between macro-level
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institutional and micro-level corporate influences.
Overall, we would argue to have achieved this aim to a high degree. Our sample encompasses small
MNCs with around 5 000 employees to very large ones with staff numbers of several hundreds of
thousands. A considerable variety of industries is covered, ranging from electrical engineering over
the chemical-pharmaceutical industry to consumer goods and food. Though, a clear bias of our
sample consists in the fact that it contains considerably more MNCs from industry than from the
service sector. Moreover, it does not contain matched pairs of German and US MNCs of the same
size and industry. For example, to our regret, we could not gain access to a German MNC of the
financial  services  industry.  However,  attempts  to  find  matched pairs  in  order  to  exclude  other
sources of variation between firms such as age, structure and strategy brings with it the danger of
missing  the  point.  According  to  Ferner  (1997:  23–24),  differences  in  phases  and  patterns  of
internationalization or organizational structures may themselves be typical of different NBSs. As we
have  seen,  the  fact  that  German  MNCs  started  to  internationalise  much  later  than  their  US
counterparts is illustrative of this argument. Thus, it strengthens the case for grounding the research
into differences between MNCs from different countries-of-origin in an analysis of the NBSs out of
which  they have  emerged.  This  is  actually  the  approach  that  has  been  chosen  for  the  present
investigation.  A further  important  argument  that  has been worded by Ferner  (1997:  24) in  this
connection is that “[f]eatures such as corporate size and structure “form part of a constellation or
cluster of features and acquire their significance in relation to the cluster as a whole”. Therefore, the
impact of small size in German companies may be different compared to small size in US MNCs.
Attempts to match pairs of US and German MNCs might hence even result in the investigation of
atypical companies. Similar arguments apply to the search for matched pairs of subsidiaries. An
additional problem concerns the practicability of such an approach, since in reality it  would be
highly  difficult  to  find  such  matched  pairs  of  operations  across  companies  possessing  similar
features (Tempel 2001: 149). Taken together, the arguments about the significance of constellations
or clusters of features once more justifies the choice of a multiple case study approach. In such
circumstances, the researcher typically faces “complex matters” (Stewart et al. 1994: 13) with a
multitude of influencing variables that are difficult to disentangle, and to understand how they are
interrelated. 
Furthermore, as already explained earlier, we carried out four external expert  interviews with a
member of the board of a major Swiss trade union, a specialist of the SECO (state secretary for
economic  affairs)  for  collective  agreements,  a  member  of  the  board  of  the  Swiss  employer's
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association, and a specialist of the collective regional training scheme of the Basel region called
Aprentas. These interviews helped us to gather additional information from the point of view of
actively involved actors on issues concerning important characteristics of the Swiss NBS such as
the system of dual VET, collaborative IR, collective agreements, and local supports for MNCs, that
have previously been discussed based on a comprehensive literature review.
Gaining access to the field, and hence to relevant interview partners in the organizations has for
long been recognized as “a special methodological problem of organizational  research” (Delany
1960:  448)  where  the  “inaccessibility  to  organizations  (…)  has  a  tendency  to  cause  serious
limitations in any study” (Beloucif et al. 2010: 18). In this respect, it has been argued that especially
in large profit-oriented enterprises, obtaining access can be more difficult “as their managers would
value the cost of time” (Johl and Renganathan 2010: 42). In this respect, three current problems that
are leading to access denial for researchers have been pointed out (Saunders et al. 2009: 172):
1. Many organizations deny access because they receive too many requests, and sometimes
access is denied only because someone else was faster
2. A harsher economic climate lets managers increasingly feel that they and their staff have
little  time  left  to  devote  to  academic  research  which  is  perceived of  as  non-productive
activity
3. The  researcher's  organizational  status  influences  on  access  to  company  documents  and
employees, and on how he or she is perceived by key informants
Although the problems of gaining access are well-known to business researchers, Laurila (1997:
409, 417) deplores that usually, research reports in management studies fail to provide systematic
descriptions of how good access to companies and individual managers was actually gained. In
order to do better, we decided to provide such a systematic description in the following section.
In order to obtain access, Bryman and Bell (2007: 445) advocate to “gain research through family
or friends”, thus advising the use of the researcher's own social network. Buchanan et al. (1988: 54)
recommend  an  opportunistic  approach  to  fieldwork  in  organizations,  arguing  that  “[w]hatever
carefully  constructed  views  the  researcher  has  of  the  nature  of  social  science  research,  of  the
process of theory development, of data collection methods, or of the status of different types of
data,  those  views  are  constantly  compromised  by  the  practical  realities,  opportunities  and
constraints presented by organizational research”.
Concerning the  strategy of  gaining  access  that  has  been adopted  for  the  present  investigation,
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personal contacts or contacts of a third party have been used wherever possible. In this connection,
we would like to emphasize the most helpful and crucial role of the author's doctoral supervisor.
Our personal experience in this respect is concordant with points made by Johl and Renganathan
(2010: 42, referring to Feldman et al. 2003). The latter affirmed that gaining access to individual
managers  may  require  years  of  preparation,  where  researchers  need  to  develop  reputation  for
consistency and integrity in order to be trusted. This work has been accomplished by the present
researcher's  doctoral  supervisor  before the  beginning of  the investigation.  By means of  regular
presence and presentation of research results in cantonal and regional HR professional associations
involving informal conversations, and sustained engagement in advanced training for managers, the
research  supervisor  has  been  able  to  establish  a  network  of  personal  contacts  with  managers
throughout the French-speaking part of the country. 
However,  concerning  German  MNCs  and  the  German-speaking  part  of  the  country  where  the
personal networks of the research supervisor were less developed, access proved to be considerably
more difficult. One interview could be obtained by contacting a head of HR via his professional e-
mail address, The latter was provided in an article that he had published on an issue closely related
to our research project in the HR trade journal of the German-speaking regions called Persorama.
Another interviewee could be recruited thanks to personal contacts of the researcher himself, and
the remainder  had to be found without  the possibility to  use existing networks.  The procedure
adopted in these cases was to establish a list with companies that would represent interesting cases
for the purpose of our research,  and that had a foreign subsidiary in a German-speaking Swiss
canton. Once a list with around three dozens of firms had been established, it was completed with
addresses and telephone numbers in order to contact these firms. A first, well-prepared phone call
was made where the researcher shortly presented himself, his institution and the matter of his call
and asked whether it would be possible to talk to the HR manager, or to obtain his or her name and
professional postal  address so that he could send an official  letter  from the university.  In cases
where the HR manager could be reached by phone, he was shortly informed about the research
topic and project, and asked whether he or she would be generally willing to participate and to
conduct an interview. In this case, a letter with additional information and contact details was sent.
In cases where the HR manager  was not  available  and the gatekeeper,  usually the secretary or
receptionist, could not give us the extension number for a later call, we asked whether we could
send an official letter with our interview request. Where we did not obtain any answer within the
following weeks, we took out follow-up calls. However, these attempts to gain access proved to be
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arduous and did not result in as many interviews as we would have hoped to obtain. Only around
one in ten HR managers accepted to participate. The remainder gave several reasons why this would
not be possible. Several managers referred exactly to the reasons cited above (Saunders et al. 2009:
172),  namely that  they had been deluged with requests  for research access,  and that  the harsh
economic  climate  made  it  impossible  for  them  to  gain  permission  of  their  boss  for  such  an
interview. Still others refused to participate because of current corporate restructuring activities or
simply because they were not interested in the research topic, indicating that they hardly had any
contact with corporate HQ and thus, HRM practice transfer was simply not an issue in their work. 
Table 22 below provides an overview of interviews, interviewees and MNCs included in the present
investigation.
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Table 22: Overview of interviews, interviewees and MNCs involved in the multiple case study
MNC name, sector/industry MNC size  
(EM)
Location (SU) Size of Swiss 
subsidiary (EM)
Number 
of inter-
viewees
Number 
of inter-
views
International market 
orientation
Local market 
orientation
D1 machine construction, electrical 
engineering
>> 100 000 CHD 1 200 3 4 X (Global HQ for
subdivision)
X
D2 chemical-pharmaceutical industry > 100 000 CHF
CHD
90 (SU 1, CHF)
450 (SU 2, CHD)
4
1
5
1
X (EMEA 
distribution HQ)
X
D3 electrical engineering 5 000 CHD 500 1 1 X
D4 commercial vehicles, power 
engineering
50 000 CHD 1 000 2 1 X
D5 Business Software 50 000 CHD 400 1 2 X
D6 IT services >> 100  000 CHD 450 1 1 X
D7 chemical-pharmaceutical industry 40 000 CHF 1 500 1 1 X
D8 chemical industry 15 000 CHD 60 1 2 X
D9 hospital and hygiene products and 
services
10 000 CHD 350 1 1 X X
US1 assurance, consulting, tax > 100 000 CHD 400 1 1 X
US2 Computer hard- and software 
technology, consulting
>> 100 000 CHD 400 1 1 X
US3 pharmaceuticals, medical equipment 50 000 CHF 500 2 3 X
US4 Heavy equipment, engines, financial 
services
> 100 000 CHF 500 2* 3 X (EMEA HQ)
US5 chemical industry 70 000 CHF 450 3 3 X (EMEA HQ)
US6 food processing, commodity trading > 100 000 CHF 170 1 1 X
US7 medical equipment 50 000 CHF 700 1 1 X (European HQ and
production site)
US8 banking, financial services >> 100 000 CHF 700 1 1 X X
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US9 consumer goods > 100 000 CHF 3 000 1 1 X (EMEA HQ)
US10 foods, beverages >> 100 000 CHF
CHD
70 (SU 1, CHF)
120  (SU 2, CHD)
1
1
1
1
X (EMEA HQ)
X (EMEA purchasing
HQ)
Total
19 - - 31 36 - -
External expert interviews
SECO, State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, Bern
- CHD - 1 1 - -
UNIA, largest Swiss trade union, Bern - CHD - 1 1 - -
Swiss employers' association, Zurich - CHD - 1 1 - -
Aprentas, joint cooperative training 
system of the greater Basel area
- CHD - 1 1 - -
Total
- - 35 40 - -
Source: own compilation, EM = employees, number of employees have been strongly rounded for reasons of anonymity, SU=subsidiary, CHF=French-speaking
region, CHD=German-speaking region; *the third interview was a non-registered intensive discussion after presentation of final results with a high-ranking US4 HR-
manager.
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7.5 The data collection process
According  to  King  (2004a:  11),  “[t]he  interview  remains  the  most  common  method  of  data
gathering in qualitative research”.  This method of data  collection has also been chosen for the
present investigation, where we have opted for the use of semi-structured realist interviews. In the
latter,  information  received  from  interviewees  is  considered  to  provide  “insight  into  their
psychological and organizational lives outside of the interview situation” (King 2004a: 12). The
semi-structured interviews with HR managers had a duration of between 90 and 120 minutes, and
those additionally conducted with expatriates and external experts between 60 and 90 minutes .  All
interviews listed in table 22 have been conducted face-to-face at the working place of interviewees
and were tape-recorded when explicit permission was obtained to do so. In the great majority of
cases, such permission was given and interviews could be transcribed for later analysis. In the few
cases where interviewees did not want to be tape-recorded, the interviewer took as extensive notes
as possible. Such notes as well as transcripts were systematically sent back to the interviewee for
validation  before  starting  the  analysis.  Additionally,  conducting  interviews  at  the  workplace  of
interviewees allowed for the collection of some additional observational data. Although we would
not dare to assert that we made sustained use of observations as a method of data collection, a
personal  visit  to  the  company  site  still  holds  some  potential  for  information  collection.  Such
observations may especially concern the company building, and striking elements that attracted the
researcher's attention. For example, the presence and layout of a company restaurant, the office
layout, the presence of posters showing the company values and vision, matrix displays for an LED
moving font informing employees and visitors in the reception area about the current share price of
the company, or a presentation of the product portfolio and/or obtained quality certificates are just
some examples of such elements that varied considerably between companies. 
Face-to-face interviews have important advantages for the present investigation since they facilitate
the clarification of important terminology used in the research. In fact, we had to clarify several
times  expressions  that  are  current  in  the  academic  literature  like  “best  practice  schemes”  that
otherwise would not have been interpreted or understood by practitioners in the same way. Thanks
to  the  possibility  of  direct  interaction  in  face-to-face  interviews,  we  hope  to  have  effectively
avoided the possible distortion of results caused by interpretation of terminology or whole questions
in  different  ways,  since  we were  able  to  provide  explanations  wherever  necessary.  While  this
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problem of interpretation basically concerns all  types  of investigation,  it  is  has been especially
discussed as a threat to validity in survey research (King et al. 2004) where qualitative in-depth
techniques have been advocated to strengthen validity (Mallinson 2002). 
However, similar to the PhD research carried out by Tempel (2001), a key challenge of the present
investigation lies in its cross-national and multilingual nature. As we have seen, the present research
project demands comparisons between three countries and two nationalities of ownership, with their
cultural-linguistic and institutional contexts. Even more importantly, Switzerland as host country
which is at the heart of the present investigation, is a country where three administrative languages
are officially recognized. Although our research was restricted to the German and French-speaking
regions and only a small minority of interviewees  preferred to conduct the interview in English,
this  already  implied  considerable  linguistic  challenges.  Even  though  the  presence  of  different
languages is rather common in research on MNCs and international business, Piekkari and Welch
(2006: 393) consider the use of foreign languages in interview studies to be “a neglected topic”,
thus  arguing  for  “a  better  appreciation  of  the  intersubjective  production  of  meaning  in  an
interview”. 
In  this  connection,  Hantrais  (1999:  104)  stresses  problems  of  equivalence  of  concepts  across
contexts and argues that “[i]n research that crosses cultural and linguistic boundaries (…) analysis
of the social construction of concepts is an essential component in the characterization of national
systems. Many concepts do not, however, travel well across national boundaries, and the question
of the equivalence of concepts in different contexts has become a central issue in cross-national
comparisons”. The 2011 special issue of the Journal of World Business where Rebecca Piekkari and
Susanne Tietze reach out to “set the agenda for language-sensitive research in international business
and  management”  (Piekkari  and Tietze  2011:  267)  is  illustrative  for  the  continuing  challenges
linked to the presence and use of multiple languages in international business research. Although we
believe that our approach of an in-depth analysis of the two country-of-origin NBSs and the attempt
to  understand  the  socialised  rationality  of  actors  provides  a  suitable  framework  for  a  deeper
understanding of different social concepts involved, we also faced linguistic challenges.
Therefore, following the suggestion made by Rubin and Rubin (1995: 173) to obtain acceptance, we
chose to conduct interviews in the interviewee's native language. This advice has also been repeated
by Welch and Piekkari (2006: 428) who found that the use of the interviewee's native language
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produces  “more  authentic  answers  that  exhibit  more  subtle  nuances”.  Furthermore,  these  same
authors  emphasized  the  use  of  the  interviewee's  native  language  as  “a  powerful  means  of
establishing rapport and a sense of connection” (Welch and Marschan-Piekkari 2006: 430). 
Conducting interviews in three languages requires the use of interview templates that are correctly
translated so that basic concepts are sure to be understood in the same way. As most of the relevant
literature used for the present investigation has been published in English, we did not face greater
challenges concerning the construction of our English interview template since basic concepts and
key expressions could directly be adopted from the relevant literature. Concerning the German and
French versions, the researcher first produced a German version, cross-checking translations of key
concepts  with  corresponding  expressions  used  in  the  templates  and  publications  used  by  the
research  team  around  Hartmut  Wächter  (Wächter  and  Peters  2004;  Wächter et  al. 2003).
Contemporaneously,  a French version of the template was elaborated,  where key concepts have
been  discussed  with  the  research  supervisor  whose  mother  tongue  is  French.  The  French  and
German templates have then been used and tested in our first interview series, where the feedback
of HR professionals indicated that they were viable and key concepts had been well understood.
37 out of 40 interviews were conducted in the native language of the interviewees being German or
French, while the remaining three interviews were carried out in English. In two of these cases,
English was the mother tongue of the Interviewee. Only in the third case where the interviewee had
a mother tongue that the interviewer could not speak, the interviewee chose English as interview
language, that was also the company language of the MNC. Thanks to the high level of English
proficiency of the respective interviewee and her long working experience in several MNCs using
English  as  corporate  language,  we are  however  confident  that  we  did  not  just  obtain  shallow
answers and “company speak”, but “rich” responses (Welch and Marschan-Piekkari 2006: 428). 
The  following  table  23  provides  an  overview  of  our  interviewees  and  interviews  including
information  on  interviewee  function,  nationality,  international  professional  experience,  mother
tongue and  interview language.
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Table 23: Overview of nationality, mother tongue, interview language and international professional 
experience of our interviewees
MNC Interviewee nationality,
status, function (if not 
HR)
Interviewee 
nationality
Interview language / 
= interviewee mother 
tongue (y/n)
Interviewee international  
experience (working and 
living outside Switzerland for 
a longer period of time)
D1 I1 Swiss German /y no
I2, expatriate, marketing German German /y yes
I3, expatriate, customs German German /y yes
D2 I1 French French /y yes
I2, expatriate, marketing German German /y yes
I3, expatriate, marketing German German /y yes
I4 Swiss German /y no
I5, assistant of the board Swiss German /y no
D3 I1 Swiss French /y no
D4 I1 German German /y yes
I2 Swiss German /y no
D5 I1 German German /y yes
D6 I1 Swiss German /y no
D7 I1 Swiss French /y yes
D8 I1 Swiss French /y no
D9 I1 Swiss German /y no
US1 I1 Swiss German /y no
US2 I2 Swiss French /y yes
US3 I1 Swiss French /y no
I2, plant director Swiss French /y no
US4 I1 Swiss French /y yes
I2 Canadian English /y yes
US5 I1 Swiss French /y yes
I2 Swiss French /y yes
I3, expatriate British English /y yes
US6 I1 French French /y yes
US7 I1 Swiss French /y yes
US8 I1 French French /y yes
US9 I1 French French /y yes
US10 I1 Bulgarian English /n yes
I2 Swiss English /y no
Source: own compilation.
249
Chapter 7 Methodology and research design
A further  issue  raised  by  Welch  and  Piekkari  (2006:  431–432)  is  the  use  of  what  they  call
“contextualization  resources”  in  order  to  produce  shared  understanding  and  intersubjective
meaning. One of these issues that the present researcher would argue to be of special importance for
investigations in Switzerland, is the association between nationality and language. The researcher
was born in the South-West of Germany, near the French and Swiss boarders, and grew up with the
use of the local Alemannic German dialect. While his local German version of Alemannic dialect
somehow  resembles  the  very  widely  used  dialects  in  Switzerland,  and  hence,  makes  an
understanding of local Swiss dialects fairly easy, it still sounds different to Germanic Swiss people.
This is to say that, while the nationality-language nexus could be to a certain extent neutralised in
the interviews conducted in French and English, it was very present yet in those that were carried
out in German. When interviewing German interviewees, the use of standard German language may
be argued to have fostered rapport by emphasizing common national identities. On the other hand,
when interviewing Germanic Swiss professionals, the author voluntarily encouraged interviewees to
feel at ease and speak in their everyday speech being regularly some version of Swiss Alemannic
German dialect (Widmer et al. 2005: 41). As we have seen earlier, the widespread use of local
dialect may be linked to local identity, and the eagerness of Germanic Swiss people to distinguish
themselves from Germans whom they do not wish to identify with (Christen 2008; Tixier 1994: 25).
While the interviewer himself could not mask his own nationality, he could at least try to make
interviewees feel more comfortable by encouraging them to speak in dialect, similar to the logic of
conducting interviews in their native language as discussed above. 
In fact, a feeling for the great importance of the use of local dialect in the Germanic regions as
central part of people's local identity is by no means evident for a foreign researcher and has been
learnt through a process of immersion in the history and contemporary life of the country during
several  years.  This  immersion  including  friendships  with  Swiss  people  from several  linguistic
regions finally allowed for an appreciation of the local community environment and the generation
of a “localised understanding” (Welch and Marschan-Piekkari 2006: 432) which, in turn, sustains
the process of meaning making in interview situations. Interestingly, and somehow illustrative of
the great importance Swiss people attach to local dialects and identities, one of the interviewees
who grew up in the Basel region even recognized right at the beginning of the interview that the
present researcher grew up in a geographically close region because of his accent. In fact, such
commonalities are a very pleasant means of establishing rapport with interviewees. In a similar
vein,  where interviews have been conducted together with a  Swiss German native speaker,  the
250
7.5 The data collection process
present researcher let the Swiss German introduce the researchers and the project in his own dialect,
thus giving the interviewee a more comfortable feeling of common identity.
Related to the underlying realist or post-positivist epistemological position exposed in chapter 7.1,
an approach involving realist face-to-face interviews implies a concern with the accuracy of data
gathered. In order to assure accuracy, King (2004a: 12) suggests to compare interview findings with
data obtained from other sources such as documentary analysis or quantitative survey data in terms
of triangulation. To allow for a systematic comparison of data, realist interviews, and hence, the
interview guides used tend to be more structured and to define more topics for discussion than other
qualitative interview types (King 2004a: 15). Data triangulation involving, inter alia, archival data,
interview data, direct observation and the review of transcripts and drafts by peers as well as key
informants, have been highlighted as important means to achieve construct validity during the data
collection process (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010: 713; Gibbert et al. 2008: 1467; Marschan-Piekkari et
al. 2010: 113–114; Yin 2009: 41). Construct validity as a quality criterion for judging the rigour of
case studies refers to the identification of “correct operational  measures for the concepts  being
studied” (Yin 2009: 40) or to “the extent to which a study investigates what it claims to investigate,
that is, to the extent to which a procedure leads to an accurate observation of reality“ (Gibbert and
Ruigrok 2010: 712 referring to Denzin and Lincoln 1994).
Therefore,  we triangulated data  obtained from interviews with other accessible sources  such as
company reports and relevant literature. Extensive use of additional sources of information was
especially indispensable for our systematic description of micro-level organizational factors of all
nineteen case study companies in chapter 8.1. Additional documents such as official company web
pages, annual reports, SEC Form 10-k documents for US MNCs, and published articles were used
to obtain relevant data on company history, total revenue and number of employees or geographical
distribution of turnover and staff.  This approach hence allowed us to compare and to complete
information  that  we  could  obtain  during  our  interviews  with  data  provided  through  official
documents. As we have seen in chapter 3 and in our research framework in chapter 7.3, we need to
develop a thorough understanding and correct appreciation of important micro-level organizational
characteristics.  These  are  essential  for  a  correct  interpretation  of  our  findings,  since  they have
theoretically been identified as factors that may heavily influence on a company's willingness to
engage in, and degree of, standardization and cross-national HRM practice transfer. Furthermore,
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micro-level factors are key to understand what kind of cross-national organizational conduits do
exist and how these are used. Relevant factors in this sense include company size, age, growth
history and current degree of internationalization, strategy and structure, year and mode of market
entry in Switzerland, the role of the Swiss subsidiary within the MNC network and its relation with
HQ, as well as the mode of HR co-ordination and control. 
While such information is essential to the current investigation, it could only partially be obtained
during our interviews. Partly, this is due to time constraints, but also to a lack of knowledge of
many  interviewees  concerning  questions  around  the  market  entry  mode  in  Switzerland,  the
percentage  of  sales  achieved  in  different  businesses  and  countries  or  employees  employed  in
different  world  regions.  Such  information  had  to  be  mainly  gathered  through  additional  data
sources.  Other  information  concerning  the  role  of  the  subsidiary and its  relations  with  HQ or
international  conduits  as  well  as  certain  HR practices  that  are  widely published,  e.g.  diversity
policies, corporate values and corporate codes of conduct, could be gathered during the interviews
and  cross-checked  with  corresponding  information  that  we  could  obtain  through  additional
information sources. 
Since we are obliged to respect the anonymity of participating companies, we could not reveal the
company name when referring to our additional data sources, including the links to their web pages.
For this reason, when citing such additional sources, we substituted the companies' names by the
same codes (D5, US8) used in our interviews. In this way, we achieved the highest possible degree
of transparency concerning our additional data sources, while at the same time making sure that
participating companies cannot be identified.
Furthermore,  interview transcripts  were  systematically  sent  back  to  key informants  via  e-mail,
reassuring  them  that  they  had  the  opportunity  to  read  through  and  undertake  any  necessary
modifications or delete information judged inaccurate or too sensitive to be used in any published
document.  When  sending  the  transcripts,  we  also  proposed  a  delay  of  around  three  weeks  to
communicate any changes or the intention to undertake changes to the researcher, indicating that we
would otherwise consider the transcript to be validated and accepted for further analysis  in the
present form. In fact, the great majority of interviewees explicitly expressed their consent, some did
not reply and were hence considered to agree, while only few of them undertook some changes.
Furthermore, our four additional external expert interviews allowed for the triangulation of different
views, especially those expressed in the literature against the perceptions of practitioners. In this
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way, we could discuss important elements that we found in the literature and in our HR expert
interviews with well-informed local Swiss actors who were not working in MNCs. Yet another,
third form of triangulation could be achieved by carrying out a research project involving domestic
Swiss  MNCs and their  HR practices,  following the distinction made by Farndale  et  al. (2008)
between foreign-owned and domestic MNCs. The present researcher supervised a Master's thesis
(Ganz 2012) investigating Swiss HRM practices in Swiss MNCs based on the same theoretical and
methodological approach, and had several in-depth discussions with the student on his findings on
HR practices that could then be compared with those of German and US MNCs in the researcher's
own sample.
Personal  contacts  of  the  research  supervisor  provided  the  starting  point  for  the  empirical
investigation,  through  which  ten  participants,  all  HR  professionals,  could  be  recruited  and
interviews  were  carried  out  between  December  2008  and  April  2009.  This  first  series  of  ten
interviews might be considered a qualitative pre-study (Marschan-Piekkari et al. 2010: 113) that
served to identify key issues for investigation through first direct contacts with HR professionals in
the  field,  and allowed for  further  development,  refinement  of  questions  and structuring  of  our
interview guide. In this first phases of fieldwork, we also undertook adjustments of the interview
guide  following  continuous,  contemporary  literature  analysis.  Results  of  our  literature  analysis
concerning the Swiss business system and suggestions derived from our first interviews have been
presented and discussed with pairs at the ARGH colloquium in summer 2009 at Toulouse (Schröter
and  Davoine  2009).  After  completion  and  analysis  of  further  interviews,  a  further  paper  with
intermediate results was presented and discussed with pairs at a faculty doctoral colloquium, and at
the summer 2010 EGOS colloquium Lisbon (Davoine and Schröter 2010). In summer and autumn
of 2010, key results were also presented to participants in order to keep them informed on the
progress of our research and to discuss our analysis. In this respect, we followed the advice of
Dorothy Leonard-Barton (1990: 263) who argued that organizations expect some interim report or
feedback, and that one should thus plan for research output already as the study proceeds, and not
only at the end. Further presentations and discussions of results followed throughout 2011 at the
Tutorat Grand Est at the École de Management de Strasbourg, at an event for HR professionals at
the International Chamber of Commerce Lausanne, and at a doctoral seminar in March 2013.
Several authors have underlined the importance of two principles borrowed from Grounded Theory
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(Glaser and Strauss 2010) as widely accepted quality criteria for qualitative case study research:
constant  comparison  and theoretical  sampling.  While  constant  comparison refers  to an iterative
process  of  data  collection and analysis,  theoretical  sampling relates  to  a  continuous process  of
decisions on data collection according to the theory under construction (Fendt and Sachs 2007: 431;
Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010: 711; Hartley 2004: 329). Therefore, beyond practical reasons concerning
the expectations of participants, such a presentation and discussion of intermediate results with pairs
as well as key informants in the field, paired with continuing desk research and literature analysis,
corresponds to the principle of constant comparison. Moreover, this proceeding enabled us to follow
the principle of theoretical sampling in the sense of a theoretically well informed decision on further
data collection. In fact, these principles were extremely important for the present investigation since
this  proceeding  gave  the  researcher  the  chance  to  gather  important  additional  information,  to
validate intermediate findings, to discuss new or open questions, and to deepen rapport with key
informants.  Thus,  the  informants  could  be  kept  interested  in  the  research  project  while
contemporaneously strengthening the quality of our data analysis and collection decisions. Keeping
informants  interested,  in  turn,  is  essential,  since  “(i)t  is  important  that  (...)  the  informants  are
committed to help the researcher achieve his aims” (Laurila 1997: 411). In fact, these reunions
opened up the possibility to discuss the feasibility of obtaining further interviews with interested
and – in the sense of theoretical sampling – interesting employees for more in-depth case studies. In
this way, further interviews could be obtained in five participating MNCs, sometimes involving
access to an interviewee in a second Swiss subsidiary. A second series of interviews was conducted
between October and December 2010. This time both,  interviews involving further MNCs, and
additional managers working in MNCs that already participated in the first series of interviews,
could be obtained. A last series of interviews was conducted in May-June and October 2011, and
final results were presented in October 2011 to an audience of around 40 HR directors at a local HR
professional association in the canton of Geneva with which the research supervisor had established
a  research  partnership  for  carrying  out  the  present  investigation.  The  president  of  this  local
association, in turn, who himself participated in the investigation, was a key gatekeeper, to whom
we are most grateful for establishing the contact to further interested participants out of his network.
The fact that the research supervisor has obtained a good reputation and status in the local HR
professionals'  community  opened  up  further  ways  of  increasing  construct  validity  through
triangulation. It has been emphasized that the characteristics of individual researchers influence the
findings obtained in the field (Leonard-Barton 1990: 263) which has been attributed to the fact that
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“individual managers may be willing to address specific issues with one researcher but not with
another”  (Laurila  1997:  417).  While  some  interviews  were  conducted  solely  by  the  present
researcher, an important part was carried out together with either the research advisor or another
graduate student working on his or her Master's thesis. Furthermore,  the supervisor had several
informal talks with HR managers. We could therefore realise that in such informal talks with the
equal-status  research  supervisor,  interviewees  would  raise  issues  of  interest  for  the  present
investigation that they would not discuss in an interview with a graduate student. Discussing our
interviews and findings together with the research supervisor and participating students thus helped
us to gain a more complete picture of the organizations.
At this  point,  we can  establish  a  link with  certain difficulties  in  research  interviews that  King
(2004a:  18–19)  has  discussed  in  relation  with  certain  types  of  interviewees.  Especially
uncommunicative or high-status interviewees may be mentioned here, where it is likely that one
obtains too little or only surface-level information. In order to avoid such situations as much as
possible, we followed King's advice (2004a: 17–18) and assured confidentiality and anonymity to
every potential participant, delivered explanations about how the research is carried out and what it
hopes to achieve, and when and what kind of feedback participants would receive. Furthermore,
once an interview was granted, we asked for permission to tape-record the interview. In most cases,
interviewees gave their assent after specifying that they would obtain the transcript for validation,
and that we would strictly respect the anonymity of participating firms and managers. In those cases
where managers did not wish that the interview would be tape-recorded, extensive notes were taken
during the interview, and equally sent back for modification and validation to the interviewees. As a
doctoral student, the present researcher was usually in a situation where he faced senior managers
and hence, had to deal with a considerable difference in status between the interviewee and himself
as interviewer. In order to obtain as much interesting information as possible, we adopted tactics
described by King (2004a: 18–19) and Laurila (1997: 410–411). For example, when interviewing
high-ranking and internationally experienced managers we emphasized the view that they had the
chance  to teach the researcher as student in their discipline, asking them for help in solving an
intellectual  problem.  Especially  with  high-status  interviewees,  we also  consciously adapted  the
questions  to  the  interviewee's  experience  in  order  to  arise  personal  interest  and  to  show  the
researcher's  engagement  with the topic.  We tried to  set  the relationship at  an appropriate  level
somewhere in-between over-familiar and nervous or submissive by showing a certain expertise in
the field in order to be perceived as a serious interlocutor, while at the same time being highly
255
Chapter 7 Methodology and research design
respectful in regard to their areas of expertise. One technique that proved to work out well was to
draw on findings or opinions worded in previous interviews or research literature, and to ask the
high-status interviewee for his or her point of view and experiences, and for concrete examples and
situations he or she has experienced. Such questions referred to experiences with things that are not
commonly known, but with which the informant was probably familiar because it was part of his
professional  life.  In  many cases,  we  could  establish  rapport  during  the  interview with  such  a
technique, after having had a rather difficult start. At the end of the interview, several mangers even
expressed  that  they had quite  enjoyed  the  occasion  to  talk  and  reflect  on  such issues  of  their
professional activity.
7.6 Selection of the human resource management areas
Similar to the research project on US MNCs in Germany and other Western European countries
conducted by the group of researchers around Hartmut Wächter (Wächter et al. 2003, 2004), we
included  all  key  HR areas.  Therefore,  we  had  questions  dealing  with  recruitment,  managerial
training and development, high potential selection and career development including criteria for
promotion, performance appraisal and pay, industrial relations and social dialogue as well as forms
of employee communication. Furthermore, as we have seen earlier, due to the specificities of the
Swiss host country, we included questions about membership in, activities and importance of local
associations  and  other  networks.  Therefore,  opposed  to  the  approach  chosen  by Anne  Tempel
(2001)  when researching into  home-,  host  country and learning effects  in  British  and German
MNCs, we did not a priori focus on one or two particular areas of HRM. This choice is due to the
fact that, until present, comparatively few research has been conducted on HRM in Switzerland. As
we have seen in our research framework, it is therefore often hard to formulate concrete theoretical
propositions  on how German and US MNCs will  relate  to  the Swiss  host  country institutional
context, and what kind of HRM area and practice might be influenced in what ways by the Swiss
host country. Thus, restricting the focus of our research to a priori defined HRM areas would have
born the risk of missing important local influences that might  otherwise have been discovered. In
our research framework, we have pointed to some expected systematic differences between German
and  US  MNCs  that  encompass  such  different  areas  as  IR,  training  and  development,  career
progression and -planning or diversity policies. Furthermore, we explained general differences in
institutional rationalities that might favour negotiated partnership approaches in Germany on the
one hand, and unilateral approaches in the USA on the other. We have also pointed out that the local
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Swiss  context,  similar  to  the  German  but  contrary  to  the  US-American  one,  demands  for
collaboration (Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011). However, it is rather impossible to anticipate in
what  ways and in which HRM fields exactly such a local  demand for collaboration will  show
through and influence HRM practices and approaches in subsidiaries of German versus US MNCs.
7.7 The data analysis process
A  key  challenge  for  investigators  conducting  qualitative  research  and  using  semi-structured
interviews as a method for data collection is the following analysis of large quantities of rich data
(Waring  and  Wainwright  2008:  85).  One way of  dealing  with  these  data  is  to  apply  template
analysis, that has emerged from more structured approaches such as Grounded Theory (Glaser and
Strauss 2010) and makes use of codes and coding of data, although not being as descriptive as
Grounded Theory (Waring and Wainwright 2008: 86). Adopting a template analysis approach to
coding  and  analysing  data,  interview  transcripts  were  thematically  analysed,  following  the
principles outlined by King (2004b). This approach involves coding texts according to identified
topics.  Thus,    text  segments  dealing  with  one  topic  are  attributed  and  assembled  to  one
corresponding code so that the following interpretive process can be completed. A code, then, is “a
label attached to a section of text to index it as relating to a theme or issue in the data which the
researcher  has  identified  as  important  to  his  or  her  interpretation”  (King 2004b:  257).  For  the
present research project more than 6 000  thematic passages in our interview material have been
attributed to corresponding codes. In the following, we will use a short MAXQDA extract of our D6
interview transcript in order to illustrate how we concretely proceeded in our thematic analysis. We
will provide some example of how we identified topics or codes and attributed text passages to a
corresponding code. 
All interview documents were named with a code containing data on (1) the nationality of the MNC
(D or US) and the number of the company, (2) the location of the subsidiary in the German (CHD)
or French-speaking (CHF) part of Switzerland, (3) the number of the interviewee we met in this
MNC and the number of the interview we conducted with the respective person, (4) the nationality
of the respondent and whether he or she had work experience abroad (y/n), (5) his or her function
and (6) the date when the interview was carried out. The interview transcript that we will use for
illustrations therefore is named: D6-CHD_I1no1-CHn-HR_03.05.2010.
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Crabtee and Miller (1999: 167) suggested that “(...) researchers can develop codes only after some
initial  exploration  of  the  data  has  taken  place,  using  an  immersion/  crystallisation  or  editing
organising  style.  A common intermediate  approach is  when some initial  codes  are  refined  and
modified during the analysis process”. In the present investigation, we adopted such an intermediate
approach. We started with a first list of a priori defined codes, and proceeded to identify further
codes and sub-codes that have been derived by immersion/ crystallization through intense lecture
and analysis of the interview material, which was accompanied by regular returns to the research
literature. This manner of proceeding in the coding of interview material has been described as “a
deductive leading to an inductive research approach with sub-codes emerging from the data and
expressed in the particular discourse and language of the respondents” (Waring and Wainwright
2008: 90). 
Applied to our research, when starting with the thematic organization or coding of transcripts, we
firstly  used  topics  that  had  been defined  a  priori  according  to  those  included  in  the  interview
template. In this way, a first set of largely defined thematic codes had been established to which
corresponding information from our first  interviews could be attributed.  Roughly following the
issues listed on our interview guide, these first codes were named “information on interviewee”,
“micro-level variables”, “HR practice transfer”, “HR practices” and “typical elements” referring to
country-of-origin or host country influences. At the beginning of our analysis, this coding system
also contained some first sub-codes. For instance, the code “micro-level variables” had a first level
of sub-codes distinguishing between micro-level information concerning the MNC network, and
information on the Swiss subsidiary. A second and third level of sub-codes had been defined to
attribute  relevant  information on organizational  and structural  variables.  As we can see,  at  this
stage, our coding system followed closely the thematic structure of our interview guide with codes
being largely defined and descriptive.
Micro-level variables
Facts MNC
organization (Divisions, regions, matrix, int. integration)
Structural variables
Decisions
Coordination
Communication
Control
Facts Subsid
New topics respectively codes have then been successively defined and adapted by means of the
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relevant literature, through immersion as well as through discussions with the research supervisor,
peers  and  research  participants.  In  the  following  research  process,  the  coding  system  has
successively and constantly been developed.  This  process  included the  definition  of  essentially
descriptive as well as interpretive codes that are usually harder to define. Hierarchical coding served
to define groups of codes that are clustered together to produce more higher-order codes. Parallel
coding was done where the same segment of text can be classified within two or more different
codes at the same level. Furthermore, the initial template has been successively revised by inserting
new codes, by grouping codes into groups on a higher analytic level, by deleting old codes, by
changing the scope of a code and, finally,  by changing higher-order classification (King 2004b:
258–263).
In the following, we can illustrate this process based on the initial code “typically German” that had
been defined as a code in our initial list of codes in MAXQDA. To this code, we attributed text
segments  where  (a)  the  interviewee  spoke  about  what  he  or  she  considered  typically  German
influences, behaviours and practices, or where (b) information given by our respondent on specific
features, behaviours and practices could be identified as typically German based on our knowledge
of the literature. In the following, several sub-codes and more interpretive codes have been defined.
For  example,  we  defined  a  first-level sub-code called  “institutional  D-NBS  effects” to  code
evidence in our interview material  on German country-of-origin effects  that  could be linked to
distinctive features of the German NBS. This first-level sub-code is an example of an interpretive
code since it goes beyond the mere description of facts or practices in establishing a link towards
theory and extant literature. In this way, empirical evidence is not only described, but explained and
hence, first causal relationships are established. Our second-level of sub-codes now suggests itself
as a nice example to illustrate how our coding system was further developed based on the relevant
literature. As we have seen, in the extant literature co-determination through works councils, dual
VET and collective bargaining have been identified as key institutions governing the German labour
market and having strong effects on HRM and IR (Giardini et al. 2005; Müller 1999b; Wächter and
Müller-Camen 2002). Furthermore, in several interviews, the experts directly referred to the strong
influence  of  German  works  councils.  We therefore  decided  to  define  a  set  of  codes  to  which
pertinent segments in our interview material could be attributed. Our corresponding second-level
sub-codes  are  therefore  called  “works  council  effects”,  “labour  market  institutions  (collective
bargaining, VET, labour law)”, and “CSR (see Schlie/Warner 2000, Kieser 2004)”.  In case of the
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code “CSR” the same logic applies, with the relevant literature even figuring in our code. A range of
thematic text sequences that directly referred to German works councils, or where effects on HRM
could be clearly attributed to German works council influence, were now coded under the second-
level sub-code “works council effects”. In a next step, a third-level sub-code was defined called
“institutional  (forced)  consensus”,  with  a  fourth-level  sub-code  called  “works  council
mindset_institutional  influence  on  socialised  rationality”.  Finally,  a  fifth-level  sub-code  “rather
'humane'  performance  appraisal”  was  established,  to  which  seven  text  segments  have  been
attributed from our D1, D2, D3, D4, D6 and D7 interview material. 
Below, the code “typically German” as part of our list of codes in MAXQDA is displayed, together
with  the branch of  sub-codes  as  described above.  In  brackets  we can  also see the  numbers  of
codings, i.e. text segments, that have been attributed to the relative code. 
typically German [29]
institutional D-NBS effects [1]
works council effects [2]
institutional (forced) consensus [7]
Works council mindset_inst. influence on socialised rationality [20]
more sensibility for local differences, more moderate than 
US-MNCs [2]
rather "human" performance appraisal [7]
labour market institutions (collective bargaining, VET, labour [105]
CSR (see Schlie/Warner 2000; Kieser 2004 [39]
Based on this example, we can see how the level of abstraction increases from the final-level sub-
code towards the first-level code, and vice-versa, how the sub-codes get more and more concrete.
In our D6 interview extract below, we asked about practices that our interviewee considered to be
typically German.  The interviewee suggested that  there were German influences  in  the area of
performance management, where he argued that practices like forced distribution as they are known
from certain US MNCs would not be feasible in Germany. In this same context, our interviewee
also  mentioned  the  fact  that  German  HQ regularly checked  whether  the  Swiss  subsidiary had
respected potential regulations referring to co-determination. Therefore, we first attributed a bigger
text segment to the second-level sub-code “works council effects”, and within this code, we further
attributed those smaller text segments that deal with performance management to our final-level
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sub-code “rather 'humane' performance appraisal”.
The segments 409 and 410 below provide a nice example for parallel coding. As we can see, these
segments have been attributed to three or four different codes. While still coded under the second-
level sub-code “works council effects”, we have additionally attributed these segments to the third-
level sub-codes “Works council mindset_institutional influence on socialised rationality” and “more
sensibility  for  local  differences,  more  moderate  than  US  MNCs”.  While  the  term  “socialised
rationality” has been adopted directly from the relevant literature (Almond 2011a: 260), the second
code  about  more  sensibility  for  local  differences  emerged from the  interview material  through
immersion and crystallization.
Segment 410 has been attributed to still  another code named “local practices (why?)” which is
marked  in  yellow,  and  within  this  category  of  codes  to  the  sub-code  “local  agency,  power
resources”. In this case, the interviewee provided a concrete example of a situation in Switzerland
where  he  felt  the  absence  of  co-determination  or  comparable  institutional  power  resources  as
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described by Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011: 34), so that we defined a new sub-code for
such evidence.
To achieve reliability in a qualitative interview-based multiple case study, Gibbert et al. (2010: 715;
2008:  1467–1468) advocate  the  construction  of  a  case study protocol  and database  to  increase
transparency. In doing so, they follow Yin (2009: 45), who explains that reliability means that “(...)
a later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions”. To facilitate information
retrieval  for  later  investigators,  and  hence,  enable  replication  of  the  study based  on  the  same
material,  the present researcher thus followed the advice to establish a case study database and
protocol. Moreover, in doing so we followed the advice of Sinkovics et al. (2008: 699) who argued
for the use of computer assisted qualitative data analysis software to add rigour to the qualitative
research process. According to them, the use of such software “helps and supports researchers in the
analytical  process  of  coding  and  analysing  textual  data,  makes  data  easily  accessible  to
collaborators and thus strengthens credibility, replicability and substance of research results” (2008:
709).  Also  King  (2004b:  266)  suggests  that  template  analysis  is  particularly  well-suited  to
computer-assisted analysis thanks to the central role of the template structure. Therefore, our case
study database  and protocol  is  not  paper-based,  but  digital,  since  we used MAXQDA 10 as  a
powerful  computer  assisted  qualitative  data  analysis  software  which  enormously  facilitates
information retrieval. Sinkovics et al. (2008: 706) strongly argue for the use of such programmes
due to their potential to facilitate theorising about content by search processes. Computer assisted
qualitative data analysis software hence “enables researchers to trigger virtually unlimited searches”
since  “the  software  responds  immediately  with  those  text  sequences  which  are  related  to  the
keywords” (Sinkovics et al. 2008: 706). Since this powerful search function is accessible not only
to the present researcher, but also to later investigators, transparency and information retrieval for
later  replication  can  be  optimized  by  using  such  a  software.  In  appendix  A2,  the  complete
MAXQDA coding system is printed out so that the whole thematic analysis can be reconstructed by
other researchers.
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After having accomplished our research framework based on theory and a comprehensive literature
review,  we will  now proceed  to  the  presentation  of  results  of  the  empirical  investigation.  The
following chapter is organized into several parts. Corresponding to the structure of our literature
review, the presentation of results is thematically ordered and subdivided into two groups according
to the country-of-origin of the MNCs. This choice has been made in order to allow for a systematic
comparison and discussion of issues raised in our research framework between the two country-of-
origin groups.
The first part of this chapter provides important background information on the nineteen companies
of  our  sample.  As  we  have  seen  in  chapter  3,  such  information  firstly  concerns  micro-level
organizational factors  such as size, sector, market
entry and growth history, as well as structure and
strategy of the companies. Furthermore, additional
information  on  the  share  of  their  sales  or  sales
revenue generated, and employees located in- and
outside  their  home  country  will  be  reported.  In
order  to  achieve  higher  validity  and  a  more
complete  overall  picture  of  the  case  study
companies, information provided on these issues on
official  corporate  web  pages  and  commonly
accessible company reports will be complemented with information obtained from our interviewees.
Such information has primarily been obtained in the first part of our interview template dealing with
issues of organizational structure and strategy, decision-making, coordination, communication and
control. As we have seen, such information is highly relevant for our understanding of the nature
and richness of procedural or people-based international transmission channels or organizational
conduits between HQ and subsidiaries (Edwards et al. 2010: 618). In this first part, we will also
provide relevant information on the role of the Swiss subsidiary within the MNC corporate network.
Although our interest is primarily focused on macro-level institutional influences, these micro-level
factors are highly important and an indispensable basis against which institutional influences have
to be discussed. In this respect, we have to keep in mind that earlier investigations found that, in
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certain  cases,  organizational  micro-level  factors  and  effects  may  even  override  macro-level
institutional ones (Tempel 2001). As we have seen in our theoretical discussion and subsumed in
our  research framework,  such information on micro-level  organizational  factors is  necessary to
understand and interpret the how and why of HRM practice transfer. This information on the MNCs'
respective approaches towards transfer may, in turn, be revealing about their ways of relating to the
particular Swiss institutional setting. 
In chapter five, we have summarized results of earlier empirical investigations on characteristic
traits and differences concerning HRM in German and US MNCs, and their respective approaches
towards  cross-national  HRM practice  transfer.
This review, together with theoretical reasoning
and an in-depth analysis of the two country-of-
origin  NBSs,  this  information  represents  an
important  background  to  our  own  empirical
investigation. The following parts two and three
of the present chapter will report the findings of
the  present  investigation  against  this
background.  The  second  part of  this  chapter
will  build  on  the  micro-level  information
presented  in  part  one  in  order  to  report  our
findings on the issue of HRM practice transfer. 
Information will be presented on the origin of
HRM practices and policies, whether, to what
extent  and  why  the  company  is  willing  to
engage in international HRM practice transfer,
what  is  the  direction  of  transfer,  how  the
transfer  process  looks  like,  how  strict  the
company  is  on  implementation,  and  whether  there  is  a  certain  margin  of  manoeuvre  for  the
subsidiary or not. We will then see a) whether common tendencies, patterns and similarities can be
identified among the MNCs of our sample, and b) whether and how German and US MNCs differ
systematically in their overall approach towards cross-national HRM practice transfer. These results
are then discussed against the corresponding propositions formulated in our research framework.
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A third part goes more into the details of single HRM practices. Here, our findings on transferred
standardized HRM practices are reported, and we will see in which domains or areas these are to be
found. Once more, general tendencies, similarities and differences between German and US MNCs
are  analysed  and
discussed  against  the
propositions made in our
research  framework.
Furthermore, evidence of
institutional  macro-level
and organizational micro-
level influences on cross-
national  practice  transfer
is  discussed  against  the
background of theory and
findings  of  previous
empirical  investigations.
Therefore, this part deals with our second research question about differences between German and
US-American  MNCs  concerning  their  respective  approaches  towards  transfer  and  international
standardization. Furthermore, it presents first elements of an answer to the question of whether there
is a German versus a U.S. way of relating to the Swiss host country institutional context.
The same analysis is then undertaken in a fourth section for those HRM practices that are local or
locally adapted. At this point, especially the underlying
reasons  for  local  practices  or  adaptations will  be
analysed in more detail. Therefore, this part especially
deals with our first research question concerning Swiss
host  country  effects.  Once  more,  we  will  discuss
empirical  evidence  against  the  specific  propositions
formulated in  our research framework about  expected
differences between German and US MNCs regarding
their HRM practices and distinct ways of relating to the
Swiss host country institutional setting. 
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Chapter 8 Results of the empirical study
8.1 Micro-level organizational factors of the case study companies
In this section, we will present relevant information on organizational characteristics of the nineteen
MNCs and their subsidiaries involved in the present case study. As we have seen in chapter 3, there
are several micro-level organizational factors that
may have an important influence on cross-national
HRM  practice  transfer.  Such  factors  concern
company strategy, size, industry, history and degree
of  internationalization,  but  also  structural
characteristics. In this way, we can learn about the
MNC international HR architecture that we need to
understand in order to find out about mechanisms,
channels or conduits and measures associated with
cross-national HRM practice transfer as illustrated
in our integrated conceptual framework in table 15. The same is true for the Swiss subsidiary. As we
have seen,  subsidiaries can have different  roles within the corporate network. Different roles can
then be associated with different degrees of local embeddedness and power resources that may be
engaged in negotiations with corporate HQ. Therefore, we present corresponding key information
for every MNC and the Swiss subsidiaries involved in this investigation. This information is based
on publicly available data including web pages, annual reports or codes of conduct, as well as our
interview material. As with the following chapters, micro-level factors are presented in two separate
sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter deals with the German, and the second with the US-American
MNCs. Information on every company is presented following the same structure. A first section
starts with a short presentation of the MNC including information on industry, size, age and degree
of internationalization. In a second step, the Swiss subsidiary, its role and relation with HQ are
described. In a third part, the mode of HR co-ordination and control is discussed. At the end of each
sub-chapter,  a  table  summarizes  key  data  on  German  and  US MNC structural  characteristics,
respectively.
At this point though, we would like to underline once again that such micro-level organizational
factors  are  not  at  the  centre  of  the present  investigation.  As we have  already discussed in  our
theoretical framework, typologies of different types of MNCs (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998; Ferner
and Edwards 1995) are  empirically difficult to disentangle  (Coller and Marginson 1998). This is
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especially  true  for  our  research  design  with  its  clear  focus  on  institutional  environments.  This
research design, and our limited information on each company, represent major restrictions for our
capability to correctly observe strategies and structures of the MNCs under investigation. However,
being well aware of these limitations, we are convinced that it is highly useful to try and draw at
least a rough picture of organizational structures and strategies as far as this is possible, and to use
relevant typologies as an important reference point (Tempel 2001: 143). This procedure may then
facilitate  the identification of company level  factors that can actually have an influence on the
extent to which, and how HRM practices are transferred in MNCs. 
8.1.1 German MNCs
D1 is  a  very  large  MNC founded  in  the  1880s  in  Southern  Germany.  Active  in  machine
construction,  mechanical  and  electrical  engineering,  D1  has  several  hundreds  of  thousands  of
employees who generated a sales revenue of more than 50 billion Euros in 2012. D1 has more than
350 subsidiaries in some 60 countries and is represented in around 150 countries on all continents.
More than three quarters of D1's sales revenue is generated outside Germany, where nearby 40% of
employees are located. The company's geographical division comprises the three regions Europe,
Americas  and  Asia-Pacific.  With  some  30  billion  Euros  of  sales,  Europe  represents  the  most
important regional market for D1 (D1 group 2011: 41). The company is grouped into three big
product divisions: automotive technology, industrial technology, and consumer goods and building
technology, which are subdivided into seventeen business units  (D1 group 2012). The founding
family still directly holds shares and voting rights of 7%. Among the strategic objectives of D1 are
sustainable and profitable growth, and thereby to reduce dependence on the automotive technology
branch  through  growth  in  other  product  divisions.  Our  second  D1  interviewee  emphasized  an
excellent screening within the D1 strategy department, where potential acquisitions are planned.
This is another important element of D1's strategy, as explained by one of our interviewees, since
“... to be honest, D1 also buys in many innovations. That is to say, they acquire many SMEs... some
of D1's central innovations have unfortunately not been developed by D1 itself, but by SMEs that
have been acquired...” (D1_I2no1: 188, own translation).
D1 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
D1's presence in Switzerland dates back as long as 1904, and today comprises eleven entities with
more  than  3  000 employees.  Most  of  these  entities  have  been acquired,  several  of  them only
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recently.  The D1 subsidiary we could access (D1 big subsidiary) has been acquired in 1954, is
firmly integrated into the D1 business unit power tools and employs more than 1 000 people who
are located at two different sites. In 1986,  D1 Switzerland big subsidiary has taken over global
responsibility  for  the  power  tools  accessories  business.  Its  structure  is  therefore  divided  into
development and production of power tools on the one hand, and a global head office function for
the accessories business on the other. The two sites of D1 Switzerland big subsidiary are part of a
global production network comprising facilities in the USA, Brazil, Malaysia, China and India, as
well  as further sites  in Germany,  the UK, Italy,  Netherlands and Hungary (D1 Switzerland big
subsidiary 2013).  This  fact  has  also  been underlined  by our  first  interviewee,  the  country HR
director  “At D1 we very much refer to cross-national product divisions” (D1_I1no1:  23,  own
translation). The development and production section of D1 Switzerland big subsidiary is a supplier
of D1 with 90% of its output going to international markets. The accessories business structure
represents the global centre for the entire product management and logistics, and co-ordinates the
distribution  and  controlling  of  other  foreign  subsidiaries  in  China,  Germany  and  Italy.  D1
Switzerland  big  subsidiary  holds  certain  core  competencies  in  the  fields  of  development  and
manufacture of components, and the know-how concerning product management in the accessories
business,  including  the  private  label  business.  Especially  D1  Switzerland  big  subsidiary's
competences in the accessories business have also been underlined by our second interviewee, a
German expatriate marketing specialist  “... the whole accessories business is concentrated here.
And this is a very important pillar” (D1_I2no1: 33, own translation). Important business decisions
are normally made at the level of the D1 business unit. The room for manoeuvre for D1 Switzerland
big  subsidiary  is  considerably  larger  in  the  accessories  section  than  it  is  in  development  and
production. This can be directly explained by the head office function in the accessories business on
the one hand, and by the integration into an international production network in development and
manufacturing on the other. Generally, the process of decision-making at D1 has been described as
transparent and comprehensible since it follows clearly defined authorization schemes.
D1 HR co-ordination and control
Co-ordination and communication is intense within the D1 business unit HR structures, including
weekly consultations and controls. Additionally, HR activities of business units are co-ordinated via
meetings  of  HR  country  directors  on  a  regional  level.  Structured  personal  meetings  are
supplemented with regular conference calls. Control is exercised primarily within the business unit
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line, usually taking the form of structured monthly business reports. Though, sometimes there are
also direct inquiries from staff units at corporate HQ. Subsidiaries are compared and quality prizes
are  attributed  to  well-performing  manufacturing  plants.  Finally,  every  four  years,  the  internal
revision controls intensively every subsidiary. The introduction of a common corporate HR-IT is
another measure that has been put in place in order to facilitate certain kinds of reporting. Overall,
control is felt to be rather strict  “It's a bit of an illness here” (D1_I1no1: 90, own translation).
Interviewees have partly explained this fact by recent compliance scandals in other big German
MNCs that are listed on the German DAX index , and partly it as been attributed to the sheer size of
the  company.  Another  interesting  fact  is  the  strong  presence  of  German  expatriates  at  D2
Switzerland big subsidiary, especially at higher managerial levels, and in recently acquired Swiss
firms.  Our  expatriate  interviewee explained that  there  was a  very strong corporate  culture  and
German presence at D1. The working languages are English and standard German, so that there is
no Swiss dialect spoken in meetings, and that the subsidiary was led quite in a German manner.
“(...) The president is German (…) and out of five members of the board, four are also Germans
(…). So, there is that saying 'fish always begins to stink at the head' (…) there is much German
influence  at  the  top,  and  the  same  is  true  for  the  department  level.”  (D1_I2no1:  54,  own
translation).  On the  other  hand,  the  same  manager  told  about  a  great  degree  of  international
presence in his own team “(...) here in my team, I have a Brazilian, a Russian, and a Dutchman
(...)” (D1_I2no1: 14, own translation). The presence of many expatriates may well be linked to D1
career development practices. These oblige managers to acquire some international experience in
order to reach a certain rank “There is a clearly defined, consciously formulated programme: they
want people to go abroad” (D1_I2no1: 20, own translation).  In fact, D1 has been described as a
German pioneer in terms of its intercultural personnel development and corresponding trainings,
that may well be linked to D1's long-lasting history of internationalization. Already in 1913, D1
generated around 80% of its sales volume outside Germany (Barmeyer and Davoine 2012: 771–
773). D1 has several thousands of long-term assignments, with 40 % of them being impatriations of
foreign employees towards Germany. Due to this fact,  Barmeyer and Davoine (2012: 779) argued
that the underlying model of coordination mostly corresponds to the geocentric model described by
Perlmutter (1969; Perlmutter and Heenan 1974). This model is further supported by one of seven
well-defined corporate values being “cultural diversity”. On this issue, we can find on the corporate
web page the following statement: “We are aware of our company's regional and cultural origins
and at the same time regard diversity as an asset, as well as a precondition of our global success“
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(D1 group 2013). The strong emphasis on international mobility has also been acknowledged at D1
Switzerland big subsidiary, as the business unit's HR balanced scorecard contains clear goals on a
doubling of international incoming mobility to Germany and Switzerland (D1_I1no1: 172). 
The regional HR meetings on European level serve as a major forum or organizational conduit.
Here, HR professionals from different countries throughout a region and from different business
units can exchange on best practices, evaluate HR practices when establishing HR maturity models
and discuss which measures should be adopted. Though, best practices presented in this regional
forum normally serve rather as an inspiration than as mandatory practice for the subsidiary HR
professionals. 
Staring in 2005, D1 has introduced the D1 HR system prescribing certain global standards.  Even
before the introduction of the D1 HR system, HR policy guidelines were already in place. These
prescribed  general  principles  like  the  will  to  develop  and  promote  managers  from within  the
company, to give employees insight into several functions and units, and to promote international
experience of managers. With the introduction of the D1 HR system, standardization went further,
and now comprises also international trainee programmes and a global framework for personnel
marketing, employer image and core competences. Furthermore, requirements for promotions like
international experience have been clearly defined. In 2007, D1 has edited a corporate Code of
Business  Conduct  with  a  heavy emphasis  on  compliance,  thus  completing  D1's  earlier  defined
corporate vision and values. Based on the latter, corporate leadership principles have been declined
that are also written down in corporate manuals. 
D2 is a large MNC active in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. It was founded in the 1860s in
North-Western Germany and employs more than 100 000 people who generated sales of some 35
billion Euros in 2011. Some more than 30% of D2 employees are located in Germany (D2 group
2011a). The D1 group consists of three independently operating subgroups or divisions representing
the company's business areas health care, crop science and material science, as well as three service
areas (D2 group 2013b). Geographically, D2 has defined the four major regions  Europe, North
America, Asia-Pacific and Latin America/Africa/Middle East. Among these regions, Europe is by
far the most important market. Here, nearly half of all employees are located who generated more
than 14 billion Euros of sales. Furthermore, around 140 out of some 280 subsidiaries are located in
Europe (D2 group 2013a). 
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Strategically, D2 focuses on investment in its innovative capability and in emerging markets(D2
group  2011b:  5).  Further,  D2  searches  growth  in  health  care,  nutrition  and  high  performance
material  markets while  contemporaneously realizing efficiency gains.  Currently,  the health  care
division accounts for around two thirds of total sales.
D2 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
D2's presence in Switzerland dates back to  1954 when a first  distribution unit  was founded in
Zurich (D2 Switzerland 2013). Today, D2 employs some 900 people in three legal entities. We
could access two different entities, D2 international in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, and
D2 Switzerland in Zurich. 
The roots of today's D2 Switzerland subsidiary are going back to D2's first Swiss greenfield site, the
distribution  unit  of  1954.  It  is  D2's  largest  entity  in  Switzerland  with  around  450  employees,
including  one  production  unit  that  has  been  acquired  in  2000.  Apart  from the  steering  of  the
production site, D2 Switzerland is responsible of the Swiss market cultivation and distribution of
D2 products comprising all  three major product divisions.  D2 international originally emanated
from an acquisition and employs some 100 people. From this  unit, products of the material sciences
division  are  sold  to  important  growth markets  in  Eastern  Europe,  the  Middle  East  and Africa.
Therefore, D2 has high-ranking managerial staff and is marked by an important part of expatriates
among its managers. “I have an important population of expatriates mainly from Germany (…) If
you look at the key functions, nearly all of them are occupied by expatriates except for HR and
administration  and  finance/controlling,  the  latter  has  also  been  an  expatriate  until  recently”
(D2_I1no1: 76-77, own translation). D2 international's specific competence resides in the in-depth
knowledge  of  products  and  strategically  important  emerging  markets  of  the  D2  international
managers. “With their input, the D2 marketing and sales managers as delegates or expatriates, by
means of their regular contact with corporate HQ, make sure that superiors at HQ may develop the
necessary  understanding  for  how  these  markets  can  be  cultivated”  (D2_I2no1:  16,  own
translation).  Furthermore,  following our interviewees, the smallness of the D2 structure and its
local SME-like working atmosphere allows for a great deal of informal communication between
managers selling different products on a large variety of markets. Such information is then fed back
to corporate HQ and helps improving corporate strategy. “There is a long table in our staff cantine
where everybody comes together. Even the subsidiary director regularly joins in” (D2_I3no1: 28,
own  translation). Decisions  on  pricing  are  made  by  local  D2  international  managers,  but  the
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business is co-ordinated from HQ in Germany. A further advantage that D2 international holds for
the D2 group is the possibility to benefit from the local tax regime.
D2 HR co-ordination and control
At  D2 international,  coordination  and  control  in  the  field  of  HR is  primarily  done  within  the
corresponding business units of the material science division, and once a year there is a personnel
conference for the whole material sciences division. Here, different categories of high performing
employees are reviewed, and succession planning as well as career development for managers are
discussed. The HR director of D2 Switzerland has the function of a country HR business partner, as
well as business partner for the business units involved. The HR manager of D2 international is HR
business partner for the material sciences business unit. On a national Swiss level, the three legal
entities additionally have a  common employee  manual  in  HR, which is  partially influenced by
collective agreements. These three Swiss entities are also co-ordinated via regular meetings of their
common country council where CEOs, CFOs and HR directors meet twice a year. The director of
D2 international has also the function of country speaker and thus represents the three Swiss entities
towards  the  HQ.  Discussing  the  HR coordination  model  of  D2 against  the  background  of  the
Perlmutter (1969) typology, it is hard to make a clear-cut statement. On the one hand, Global HQ
has clearly been identified as the important central hub where HR centres of expertise are located,
and subsidiaries like D2 international are marked by a strong presence of expatriates coming from
HQ. “Basically, for me as HR, of course the HR head office at HQ plays a central role since there
(…) is  the  centre  of  expertise”  (D2_I4no1:  101,  own translation). On the  other  hand,  the  D2
international HR manager noted a great change concerning the international mindset and orientation
within the company during the last  years.  “We have an anglophone manager at the top of the
material science division. I would say that there has been a very strong turn five or six years ago.
And you also feel this when it comes to communication, which used to be exclusively in German six
or seven years ago. Now everything is in English. I only have German-speaking colleagues around
here, but all the manager meetings are in English. So to be polite with me, but also because this is a
corporate practice.  The mindset has changed a lot.  (…) I  have known different generations of
managers coming in from Germany. You might call it arrogance (…). No, but now there is much
less of it around. I don't feel that arrogance. 'We are the best' (…) I think this has become much
more sane. (…) there is a willingness to be an international enterprise” (D2_I1no1: 223-227, own
translation). We might conclude that there is a historical presence of an important central hub at HQ
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and managers traditionally used to have a rather ethnocentric mindset. This historic legacy is still
manifest  in  the  great  part  of  employees  being located  in  Germany and the  strong presence  of
German expatriates at D2 international. Yet, in recent years, the company seems to have undergone
important changes in its international orientation towards a more regiocentric mindset (Perlmutter
and Heenan 1974: 123, 127), which is also structurally reflected in the strong European focus of D2
in terms of employees and sales.
D3 was founded in the early 1950s and is a wholly family-owned and not quoted MNC from
North-Western Germany active in electrical engineering. With around 5 500 employees at year end
2011, D3 has generated sales of some 560 million Euros and represents by far the smallest MNC of
our sample. It may be seen as a representative of German Mittelstand, medium-sized businesses that
successfully internationalised and represent an important part of Germany's national economy. D3
has two major sites in Germany accounting for roughly 50% of total staff (D3 group 2013). The
company is organized into two product divisions called electrical interconnections and automation,
and has production facilities in Germany, China, France, India, Japan, Poland, Switzerland and in
the USA. Moreover, D3 sells its products on all continents via a network of around 80 commercial
agencies or representative offices (D3 group 2012a). Concerning D3's strategy, our interviewee was
not  implicated  in  strategic  questions,  and  the  firm  does  not  publish  much  publicly  accessible
information on this issue. Though, on the corporate web pages, D3 proudly presents itself as being
part  of  a  regional,  officially  distinguished  innovation  cluster  in  electrical  engineering  at  HQ's
location. Furthermore, the company's history is presented exclusively in terms of landmark product
innovations, and D3 recruits with reference to distinctions like being one of the top 100 employers
for engineers in Germany. These facts suggest that there is a strongly engineering- and innovation-
driven  strategy,  which  is  combined  with  sustained  presence  on  many  emerging  markets.  This
presence not only includes the commonly referred-to big threshold countries China, India, Brazil
and Russia, but also countries such as Columbia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Pakistan or Ukraine. 
D3 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The Swiss subsidiary of D3 has been established in 1977 as a greenfield site. It is one out of nine
production sites worldwide with some 500 employees at year end 2011. Roughly 95% of the parts
that are produced in Switzerland are exported, either directly to major customers around the world,
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or to the second German site who then sells the products globally. The Swiss subsidiary has specific
competencies  in  production,  following  strict  quality  standards,  inter  alia  those  of  ISO  9001.
Furthermore, our interviewee told about continuous improvement schemes where Swiss employees
in production are encouraged to feed in their input and ideas, which are then treated at the research
and development department at HQ. “I know that there have been ideas originating from our local
Swiss employees that have been put in place afterwards” (D3_I1no1: 93).  Otherwise, in terms of
daily  business  as  well  as  decisions  on  HR,  the  D3  Swiss  subsidiary  was  described  as  very
independent site, apart from financial consolidations. “We are independent a priori. Of course, we
have  to  report  to  Germany  to  consolidate  the  numbers  of  the  group” (D3_I1no1:  65,  own
translation).
D3 HR co-ordination and control
Concerning  international  HR  co-ordination,  the  case  of  D3  clearly  stands  out  because  of  the
particular absence of such mechanisms. As our interviewee puts it: “(...) on the group level, maybe
there is  some exchange done,  but  in any case this  is  not concerning HR. We do not have any
particular exchange” (D3_I1no1: 100, own translation). The local HR manager is also very aware
of this lack of personal contact and of the problem of reinventing the wheel: “(...) this is something
that is missing because I can very well imagine what is going on in Germany. I know that we do not
have the same Employment Act etc. - but I am absolutely sure that we are drawing up forms twice
(…). We have to invent something that surely already exists in Germany. I also know that forms that
I had created somehow have been transmitted some way or another to an HR manager who then
asked me for the file. So, for sure, there are things that could be improved” (D3_I1no1: 131, own
translation).  Basically,  all  co-ordination  and  communication  between  the  Swiss  subsidiary and
corporate  HQ  in  Germany  passes  via  the  plant  directors  (D3_I1no1:  184-185).  There  are  no
common  international  guidelines  in  terms  of  HR  in  place,  and  the  only  commonly  shared
procedures for example concerning recruitment are those prescribed by ISO (D3_I1no1: 169-177).
Within the Swiss subsidiary of D3, there is a great deal of informal communication and a nearly
familiar style and short distances “(...) we are all in the same building, our directors regularly go
through the different departments. This also stimulates discussion (…) I would really say that the
employee who wants to pass a message can really do so” (D3_I1no1: 120, own translation). On the
other hand, there seems to be hardly any structured communication between all three directors and
the  HR manager,  since there are  no regular  planned meetings  (D3_I1no1: 124).  The  local  HR
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manager  reports  to  the  financial  director  with  one  formal  annual  feedback  and  very  frequent
personal meetings and discussions. At the time of our interview, there was no integrated IT system
for consolidation and reporting installed (D3_I1no1: 163-165). Concerning a qualification of the D3
Swiss subsidiary according the Perlmutter (Perlmutter 1969) typology, we would therefore place it
clearly in the category of a polycentric model where contact between HQ and subsidiary is reduced
to a minimum, at least as far as HR is concerned. This may be surprising as the products of D3 are
sold  on  global  markets,  thereby  realizing  synergistic  economies  that  may  be  achieved  by co-
ordination of international activities by HQ (Coller and Marginson 1998; Marginson 1992; see also
chapter 3.2.3). Though, certain contingency factors might help to explain this absence of HR co-
ordination. D3 is a rather young, completely family-owned internationalizing Mittelstand firm that
seemingly has not yet reached a sufficiently big size to demand more HR process and practice
standardization.
The historical roots of D4 date back to the 1750s in South-Eastern Germany. With more than 50
000 employees and a sales revenue of around 16 billion Euros in 2012, it is one of Europe's leading
manufacturers  of  commercial  vehicles,  engines  and mechanical  engineering equipment.  75% of
D4's shares are owned by another,  still  greater German industrial  group (D4 group 2013a: 23).
Approximately 20% of sales have been generated on the German market, where some more than
55% of  D4  employees  are  located  (D4  group  2012).  D3  is  organized  into  four  operationally
independent divisions: commercial vehicles, power engineering, special gear units and propulsion,
and D3 Latin America.  With some 35 000 employees,  commercial  vehicles  is  by far  the most
important division, followed by power engineering with nearby 15 000. D3 Latin America leads the
commercial  vehicle  business  in  the  emerging  markets  of  South  America  and  Africa  from  its
divisional HQ in Brazil. As of December 2012, the D4 group had 136 consolidated subsidiaries, 33
of  them  being  located  in  Germany  (D4  group  2013a:  110).  Apart  from  Germany,  important
subsidiaries  are  located  in  Poland,  Austria,  Denmark,  Brazil,  Turkey,  France,  South  Africa,
Switzerland,  Great  Britain,  China,  Spain,  Russia,  USA and India.  D4 has  a  remarkably strong
concentration of employees in Germany, although the significance of the German market alone is
more  modest.  In  turn,  Europe  as  a  whole,  where  around  80% of  employees  are  concentrated,
accounts for 57% of total order intake followed by the Americas with 23% and Asia with 14% (D4
group  2012,  2013a:  36).  Strategically,  the  D4  group  focuses  on  technology  leadership  in  the
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growing markets for transportation and energy with the BRICS countries as geographical core areas
(D4 group 2013a: 8–9). Furthermore, D4 continues to strengthen its after sales service business and
customer orientation including the provision of new value-added services around D4 products (D4
group 2013a: 32–33).
D4 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The Swiss subsidiary of D4 has more than 1 000 employees and has been acquired in 2001 from a
Swiss competitor. It is part of the D4 power engineering division and tightly integrated into an
international  production  network  that  serves  a  global  market  for  certain  products.  Within  this
international  production  network,  D4  Swiss  subsidiary  has  certain  key  competences  that  are
complementary to those of the other sites of the engineering division. Engineering, production and
sales are therefore done within an integrated production network, with 90% of products being sold
on a global market. “We have a distribution of competences concerning market cultivation. We have
a  distribution  of  competencies  in  engineering.  And  we  have  a  distribution  of  competences  in
production. Let's say every unit has a focused expertise. Even though the process chain is complete,
there are specific investments done in these areas” (D4_I1no1: 61).  There is an interesting detail
about D4 Swiss subsidiary, that is linked to its brownfield history. A very large proportion of local
employees, including the highest managerial level except for the head of HR, are employees that
had already been working for the acquired company before 2001. Furthermore, the head of the
strategic business unit oil and gas is located at D4 Switzerland. Overall, our interviewees told us
that central control was not very intense and that every unit of D4 has a great deal of autonomy and
its own culture.“Well, let's say the subsidiaries have a great deal of autonomy” (D4_I1no1: 259);
“The units are all very different. I'd say that there is no original D4 culture, these are distinct firms.
(D4_I1no1: 228) ; “We don't have a strong control culture here” (D4_I1no1: 241).
D4 HR co-ordination and control
As we have seen above, according to our interviewees, there is no common D4 culture, and hence,
no or at least a low level of cultural integration, and control is felt to be reduced to a minimum.
Only the headcount has to be co-ordinated between the plants of an international product division
(D4_I2no1: 113).  The head of HR of the D4 Swiss subsidiary is HR co-ordinator for the plants
belonging  to  the  subdivision  oil  and  gas,  covering  plants  in  Germany,  Switzerland  and  Italy
(D4_I1no1: 13). Though, our interviewee emphasized that HR communication between facilities is
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rather a matter of information and co-ordination (D4_I1no1: 149). The global head of HR of the D4
group provides an impetus and defines the strategic direction but is not involved in control of single
heads of HR at the facilities. And local reporting is rather done with the local managing director
(D4_I1no1: 198-202). Until recently, the heads of HR had a structured meeting every two months
together  with  the  managing  directors  and  commercial  managers  of  the  other  plants  of  their
production network in order to discuss common HR issues. Though, due to the great autonomy of
each plant, the number of common HR issues was rather limited (D4_I1no1: 259). During a recent
internal reorganization,  two formerly independent business divisions have merged. This internal
reorganization has also affected the Swiss subsidiary, where new forms of HR co-ordination and
processes within the now significantly enlarged international production network with fifteen plants
including China, are just emerging. Currently, the heads of HR of the fifteen facilities that are part
of the now enlarged division have regular conference calls every two weeks, where one is only for
the German plants and one international  (D4_I1no1: 123). SAP IT systems are not yet integrated
and the single plants still have a declaration procedure of key figures (D4_I1no1: 204). Also, there
are no coercive comparisons between plants in place (D4_I1,I2no1: 224-225). It somehow came as
a surprise that D4 seems to follow a rather polycentric mode of HR co-ordination. Due to the fact
that  markets  for  commercial  vehicles  and  power  engineering  might  be  considered  global,  and
maybe even subject to transnational pressures (Evans et al. 2002: 30), we would have expected
more need for international HR co-ordination.  However,  the products of the power engineering
division are not standardized, but highly customized, and every plant involved in the production
network is fairly specialized and has its own processes in place. In such a setting, there is hence
little incentive to diffuse practices since there would be little advantage in developing standardized
employment practices. Still  another  explanation  might  be seen in  what  Brewster  (1995:  3)  has
termed “restricted autonomy” in the European HR setting, where  “[a]t a general level in Europe
substantial firm autonomy and weak trade unions is the exception rather than the rule” (Gooderham
et al. 2006: 1496). As we have seen, German MNCs have historically grown in an institutional
environment that is marked by important constraints on their individual  HRM. The same is true for
several continental European countries like France or Italy, where the D4 group has major plants,
and which is the continent where approximately 80% of total employees are located. Furthermore,
having  a  look  at  the  long  D4  history,  we  can  see  that  there  have  been  several  mergers  and
acquisitions within Germany and abroad (D4 group 2013b). As we have discussed in chapter 3.2.4,
such an international growth history that is marked by several brownfield  acquisitions often goes
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together with a multidomestic strategy and lower degrees of integration and central control in the
field of HR (Björkman 2006: 466; Evans et al. 2002: 179; Harzing 2002; Rosenzweig and Nohria
1994: 234). We may therefore suppose that HR co-ordination in such a setting has always implied
major difficulties and little advantage, leading to the adoption of a polycentric model. However,
compared to D3, one important difference lies in the fact that at D4, important coordination and
communication takes place between several plants on an international level, which guarantees a
regular exchange of information between plants of the production network.
D5 is a young MNC that was founded in the early 1970s in South-Western Germany. Today, D5 is
one of the world's leading providers of business software with more than 50 000 employees and a
sales revenue of some 14 billion Euros in 2011 (D5 group 2011c). Some more than 40% of revenues
have been generated in the EMEA markets, followed by the region Americas with around 37%, and
nearby 20% in Asia Pacific (D5 group 2011b). In 2010, some more than 15% of total revenues had
been generated in Germany (D5 group 2010: 116) where 29% of employees were located in 2011
(D5 group  2011a).  The  D5  group  is  currently  active  in  some  130  countries.  The  company is
organized into five functional areas: technology and innovation platform, products and solutions,
global customer operations, chief operations office, global finance and administration, and human
resources. These functions are complemented by a regional and subregional structure that groups
together  for  example  the  German-speaking  countries  within  Europe,  which  leads  to  a  matrix
structure.  Strategically,  D5 focuses  on the  use  of  new technologies  like  In-Memory and Cloud
Computing,  the  on-demand  market,  and  on  an  expansion  of  its  ecosystem.  Thereby,  D5's
international growth strategy remains primarily focused on organic growth (D5 group 2010: 160–
161). Furthermore, D5 strengthens its activities in geographical growth markets like Russia and
China.
D5 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The presence of D5 in Switzerland dates back to 1985 when its first foreign subsidiary at all had
been established in Switzerland. Today, D5 employs some 650 people based on four different sites
in Switzerland. The Swiss subsidiary is focusing on distribution, marketing, training, and consulting
around the product portfolio of the D5 group in Switzerland. The country subsidiary unit we could
access has been a greenfield investment, and is by far the greatest among the four, employing some
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400 people. Specific competences of the D5 Swiss subsidiary lie in a close sub-research partnership
with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and the University of St. Gallen. Even if
Switzerland is actually not a research and development site for D5, such partnerships, together with
the local, utterly stable client relations in a very advanced IT market allowed D5 Switzerland to
develop  and  introduce  a  special  retail  solution  for  the  two  local  big  players.  Our  interviewee
especially emphasized the stable relations with local clients as a factor that really distinguishes D5
Switzerland from other subsidiaries.  “(...) considering the whole D5 portfolio, I think that we are
having an incredibly stable customer base. (…) This is something we really notice, that people are
coming to us again and again from other D5 countries to see how we achieve these sustainable,
long-term client relations. How do you do that?”  (D5_I1no1: 136, own translation). Such stable
client  relations  are  furthermore  paired  with  extremely  low  risk,  like  the  one  associated  with
customers that cannot pay their maintenance any more. Our interviewee explained the role of the
Swiss subsidiary as follows: “In Switzerland, we have a very high market penetration and it is one
of  the  most  profitable  subsidiaries.  This  is  the  role  that  Switzerland  plays:  cross-financing  of
emerging markets” (D5_I1no2: 6). Apart from joint planning and budgeting as well as clearly fixed
amounts for each hierarchical rank to determine the need for approval, co-ordination and control of
the Swiss subsidiary's activities is primarily assured through sophisticated, IT-supported processes.
In each area, certain KPIs (key performance indicators) have been defined. These might concern
indices about customer satisfaction, or time to fill in recruitment for HR. Dashboards are generated
from the system where completion rates, for example concerning the annual feedback talks, can be
easily  tracked.  “Basically  it's  a  mixture.  It  is  a  control  tool,  but  these  instruments  are  rather
process-specific. So it is less of a control tool like 'Do you accomplish all your duties?', but rather
referring to processes” (D5_I1no1: 152, own translation).
D5 HR co-ordination and control
At D5, HR is a global corporate function that is combined with a concept of a double solid line
matrix with the geographical market units (D5_I1no1: 17-18). Our interviewee therefore has a first
reporting line towards the HR director EMEA, and a second towards the country managing director
(D5_I1no1: 151). There are basically three pillars in the D5 HR organization which are the centre of
excellence and expertise, operations as a delivery channel that is aggregated in a shared service
centre, and the HR business partner organization as a face to the customer (D5_I1no1: 22). Within
this global HR function and with the geographical matrix organization, there are regular meetings,
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calls, web conferences or video conferences, as well as management team meetings on the different
levels (D5_I1no1: 143). Once a month, there is a global all-heads-call where all HR managers are
invited to get the latest informations and to discuss with the global HR leadership team, which is
also done on a fortnightly basis for the EMEA region, and on a weekly basis within the subgroup of
German  speaking  countries.  These  calls  are  further  supplemented  by project-specific  calls,  for
instance weekly calls during the three-month period of the talent review process (D5_I1no1: 146,
149). Our interviewee described D5 as a “people-driven network company” (D5_I1no1: 140) where
there is a great deal of consciously informal communication, including topic-specific communities
within D5 who use word-base communication tools. As we have seen in our discussion of German
and  US-American  MNCs,  such  a  high  degree  of  formalization  and  process-drivenness  in  co-
ordination and control typically would have been expected with US-American MNCs. Though, the
fact that this German MNC produces the kind of IT that is used by many large MNCs to control and
co-ordinate  their  global  activities,  may  explain  D5's  own  IT-organization.  Furthermore,  the
executive  board  of  D5  is  rather  international,  with  a  US-American  CEO  since  2008.  Our
interviewee told us  that  until  a few years  ago, D5 had a  very decentralised structure with full
autonomy  for  country  subsidiaries.  While  products  have  always  been  global,  the  service  and
consulting functions have always been strongly decentralised (D5_I1no1: 96-98). Today, the lines
of business of D5, including the HR organization, are globally integrated to a high degree, the board
is  international  and markets  as  well  as  products  are  global  to  a  great  extent.  Our  interviewee
described D5 as follows  “Yes, we are a global firm. Surely, one with strong German roots and
German values” (D5_I1no1: 57, own translation).
D6 is a formerly state-owned enterprise active in the IT and telecommunications services business
where it is one of today's global leaders (Festing et al. 2008: 591). By the end of 2011, D6 has had
several hundreds of thousands of employees and has been present in around 50 countries (D6 group
2011: 60). Total revenues of D6 amounted to nearly 60 billion Euros, out of which some more than
50% have been generated outside the German home market (D6 group 2011: 60). D6 is organized in
four operating segments, and within these segments there are functional reporting lines. While the
first three segments' business activities are aligned according to  geographical regions, the fourth
segment is aligned according to customers and products. The first  and second segments are fixed
network  and  mobile  telecommunications  Germany  and  Europe,  the  third  is  mobile
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telecommunications United States. The Germany operating segment accounted for some more than
40% of revenues and some 30% of global employees (D6 group 2011: 94–95). The fourth segment
is  systems solutions,  bundling  business  with  ICT (information  and communication  technology)
products  and solutions  for  large  MNCs under  a  separate  brand that  we will  call  “D6 systems
solutions”. D6 systems solutions has had nearly 50 000 employees with subsidiaries in 20 countries,
and generated a revenue of more than 9 billion Euros in 2011 (D6 systems solutions). Strategically,
D6 systems solutions focuses on innovation, developing new solutions for connected life and work,
focusing especially on the energy, healthcare, automotive and media industries. The operation of
major SAP applications, dynamic platforms and cloud computing are further key strategic areas,
together with the will to establish more innovation partnerships and joint ventures (D6 group 2011:
66–68, 2013a).
D6 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The D6 subsidiary has a history in Switzerland of some 50 years. At the beginning, there was an
acquisition of a data processing centre by a predecessor of D6 systems solutions, that has been
followed  by several  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  meantime  (D6_I1no1:  54).  Currently,  D6
employs some 650 people on several sites across Switzerland (D6 systems solutions Switzerland).
The Swiss subsidiary of our sample is part of D6's systems solutions operating segment and has
some  450  employees.  At  the  time  of  our  interview  in  mid  2010,  there  has  not  yet  been  an
internationally integrated HR IT system in place  (D6_I1no1: 192). Even though, certain process
performances,  security-related  topics,  employee  satisfaction  and compliance-related  issues  were
monitored and compared internationally (D6_I1no1: 188),  following a central integrated planning
process (D6_I1no1: 198). During the last years, our interviewee has noted important changes in the
relation  between  D6  HQ  and  D6  Switzerland.  These  changes  refelct  a  transformation  from a
multinational to a more global strategy, that is accompanied by increasing control and less local
room for manoeuvre. “[Our relations with HQ] have been more trusting in the past. We have lived
a time when we used to be a subsidiary that had a budget and a profit to deliver, and D6 didn't care
much  about  other  stuff.  And  during  the  last  few  years,  the  issue  of  top-down  strategy
implementation  has  become  much  more  dominant.  All  that  verticalization  with  the  functional
organization being similarly designed and controlled internationally,  all  this  has become much
stronger.  Compliance  also has  become extremely  important.  (…) So here  we really  notice that
entrepreneurial freedom, and the overall freedom of how to conduct your business, has sharply
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declined” (D6_I1no1: 105, own translation). This is basically in line with the information provided
by  Festing  et  al. (2008:  594)  on  international  HRM  at  D6.  The  latter  report  an  increase  in
international assignments from 250 in 1999 reaching nearly 400 at year end 2007, whereas at that
time, there were only 15 impatriates in Germany. Festing et al. (2008: 594) cite from the objectives
of international assignments listed in the D6 international assignment policy. Here,  inter alia, the
implementation of the international strategy through the nomination of key positions in strategic
focal areas is listed. In the Swiss subsidiary, two members of the board are German expatriates
(D6_I1no1: 353). On the Swiss market, D6 has no private consumer business and provides services
via D6 systems solutions Switzerland only to large MNCs and public institutions. On this local
market, D6 systems solutions Switzerland focuses on two large segments of clients: Swiss MNCs,
and  big  local  Swiss  players  such  as  the  Swiss  railway  company  or  cantonal  banks.  Specific
competences of D6 systems solutions Switzerland reside in the knowledge of the local market: “Of
course, we know the market, and maybe we have also developed a certain expertise concerning
some  specific  technologies  (…)  where  we  also  support  D6  when  centres  of  competence  are
established, but this concerns certain niche technologies”(D6_I1no1: 116-117, own translation).
Certainly, the most important aspect about D6 systems solutions Switzerland for the D6 group is the
attractiveness and the great potential of the Swiss market: “The most interesting thing is surely the
Swiss market. There is a great potential and there are many interesting firms that exactly match the
criteria: European DNA, big firms with international activities, successful, financially strong, so it
fits in quite well” (D6_I1no1: 119, own translation).
D6 HR co-ordination and control
At D6, there is an international HR function where a country-area steering manager co-ordinates the
HR function of several countries. To this  manager, the local Swiss HR director reports his key
figures and the progress against plans on a quarterly basis, using a standardized form (D6_I1no1:
148, 154, 156). There is an international HR strategy with yearly priorities, as for instance diversity
and a fixed quota for women in middle and senior management positions (D6 group 2013b), that is
formulated centrally and rolled out globally. With a yearly international roadmap, the corporate HR
function defines and presents new processes that are to be rolled out, together with the follow-up
that has to be done by the subsidiaries. According to our interviewee, this international roadmap is
more important than the few KPIs in HR like HR budget and size (D6_I1no1: 204). Within the HR
functional line, there are fortnightly calls with much top-down communication  (D6_I1no1: 124).
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Furthermore, there is a geographic group of Western European countries within the HR function,
where co-ordination happens via a monthly conference call, and a personal meeting twice or thrice a
year (D6_I1no1: 136, 138). There is a central competence centre for HR development where new
practices are defined and rolled out. Our interviewee did not know about any new practice that
would have been defined together with some involvement of international subsidiaries, for example
in a project team (D6_I1no1: 482, 520). In the eyes of our interviewee, the D6 culture and mindset
is  not as global as many other MNCs:“Well,  it  is  not yet-  we are by far not as global as (…)
Accenture or many other firms where this is part of their DNA that you are on your job for three
years and then go abroad (…). Culturally, we are not like that until present. We do have global
assignment policies etc. but this is not the great mass of people. In Switzerland, we are having two
or three expatriates” (D6_I1no1: 351).
The historical roots of D7 date back to the founding family in the 1660s in Southern Germany. The
founding family still controls a majority of 70% of shares. Today, D7 employs approximately 40
000 people in 67 countries (D7 group 2013a) who generated total revenues of more than 10 billion
Euros  in  2011  (D7  group  2011).  The  D7  group  is  organized  into  the  four  product  divisions
pharmaceuticals, consumer health care, life sciences, and performance materials (D7 group 2011:
175,  2013b).  The pharmaceuticals  division  is  by far  the  biggest,  accounting  for  nearly 17 000
employees and total revenues of nearby 6 billion Euros in 2011 (D7 pharmaceuticals division 2013).
Nearly 11 000 employees or around 25% of total employees are located in Germany, where nearly
14% of total revenues have been generated in 2011 (D7 group 2011: 126, 176). Strategically, D7
strives for further growth including acquisitions and organic growth, maintaining their focus on
specialty businesses within chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Research efforts are mainly centred on
oncology, neurodegenerative diseases and on autoimmune and inflammatory diseases, where the
company also strives to strengthen its position as a leading biotech innovator. Regionally, D7 wants
to expand its pharmaceuticals business in the USA, Japan, China and India, and the consumer health
business predominantly in Latin America and Asia (D7 group 2013c).
D7 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The presence of D7 in Switzerland dates back to 1929 when a first representation had been opened
(D7 Switzerland 2013). In 2006/07, D7 acquired a majority of stocks of a Swiss family-owned
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biotechnology company that we will call “BioteX” (Manager Magazin Online 2006), giving rise to
the forming of a new pharmaceuticals division at D7. This acquisition is to be seen in context of
D7's strategic aim to access new competences in biotechnology, and until today is the biggest in a
series of such acquisitions (Knyphausen-Aufsess and Schweizer 2008: 691–693). Divisional HQ of
this division used to be in Geneva with some 1 500 local employees. Reporting lines follow the
functional HR line within a corporate HR function at D7. Our interviewee had been working for a
US MNC before joining BioteX, and told about a more relaxed and by far less formalised and
standardized controlling culture with much leaner processes at BioteX and D7.  “Thank God I do
not have to do a monthly reporting! I know that from other companies. (…) We are rather dynamic
than static, not too much procedural. So, we're on the move, we are advancing quickly. This is just
to say that we don't have that need to fill any archives. Of course we are taking notes and things
like that during local meetings with the HR VP [vice president] since we have to formalise the
decisions. (…) Local directors will see these notes, but it's more of a light formula. Personally I
have seen significantly more cumbersome procedures with headcount before-after and all that”
(D7_I1no1: 112-113, own translation). Members of the owner family are still actively involved in
important decisions. Our interviewee explained by this fact that decision-making is rather slow,
risk-averse and centralised at D7. In 2012, D7 decided to close down divisional HQ in Geneva and
to relocate activities mostly to corporate HQ in Germany, thereby heavily reducing its number of
employees in Switzerland (24 Heures 2012; D7 group 2012; Le Matin 2012; Swissinfo.ch 2012)
which had been around 2 300 by year end 2011 (D7 group 2011: 176). The D7 site we could access
was the now dissolved  divisional HQ of D7 pharmaceuticals. According to our interviewee, this
acquisition has led corporate management to  open up to the international and to move a step from a
rather  ethnocentric  towards  a  more  geocentric  mindset.  “Until  present,  the  D7  group  lets  its
subsidiaries rather undisturbed. My feeling is that the D7 group has noticed when acquiring BioteX
in 2007 – this is maybe a bit overconfident to say – that they had to open up to the international. In
fact, even if it is a multinational group, culturally it is not an international group. And I believe they
have  understood the necessity to become more international, and they are on that way. It's not
accomplished yet,  but  things  are  developing” (D7_I1no1:  171,  own translation).  One may see
certain  parallels  between  the  tendency  towards  international  opening  observed  by  our  D2
international interviewee and the current tendencies at D7. Both companies are in a similar industry,
and they share a strong history of a conservative, rather ethnocentric corporate culture that is slowly
changing. The specific competences of D7 pharmaceutical division in Switzerland for the D7 group
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resided in  its  research  and development  activities,  and in  the  knowledge of  the whole product
history held by BioteX employees.  “(...) there is a R&D department. There are all the persons
knowing the history of BioteX products that have been taken over by D7. It's not only the history of
these products, but also the patents, the licences, the lawsuits, the brand protection“ (D7_I1no1:
74, own translation). “Yes, it is a centre of intellectual competences. It is the brains, the know-how.
(…) You can write down all the instructions in manuals. But once you loose the people who are
capable of quick reasoning on the subject, you have lost the know-how. (…) also managerial know-
how, since it is the divisional HQ” (D7_I1no1: 76-80, own translation). We might add still another
competence  of  interest  for  D7,  that  is  biotechnological  production  know-how  and  production
facilities of the BioteX plants that  still  continue to  produce in Switzerland after divisional HQ
management and R&D at Geneva had been relocated to Germany.
D7 HR co-ordination and control
There are written international HR guidelines in place at D7 (D7_I1no1: 153) and certain functional
HR KPIs.  There is  a regular  weekly conference call  with the head of the global  corporate  HR
function at HQ, and once a month with four further heads of HR of the support functions of which
our interviewee was HR business partner (D7_I1no1: 94). Furthermore, there is close co-ordination
of dates and practices between corporate HQ and the three or four most important subsidiaries in
Switzerland, the USA and Italy “Well, there are three main hubs where we co-ordinate dates and
practices. Because we have managers in all these countries. We really have a global organization.
So we try  to  match together  since  otherwise the  managers  who have  teams in  Switzerland,  in
Germany, in Italy and in the USA get crazy if everybody has a local practice, this is not possible
any more” (D7_I1no1: 453).
D8 is a very young MNC active in the specialty chemical industry, that was born as a spin-off from
another big German chemical industry MNC in 2005. D8's core business entails the development,
manufacture and sale of plastics, rubber, specialty chemicals and intermediates. With more than 15
000 employees on 48 sites in 31 countries, D8 achieved nearly 9 billion Euros of sales in 2011 (D8
group 2013b). In this same year, nearby 50% of total staff were located in Germany, where around
18% of sales were generated. D8's greatest market with nearly 30% of sales is the EMEA region
without Germany, followed by Asia-Pacific with around 23%, Germany with 18%, North America
285
Chapter 8 Results of the empirical study
with nearly 17%, and finally, Latin America with nearly 14% (D8 group: III). D8 is organized into
fourteen  operational  business  units  which  are  grouped  into  the  three  segments  performance
polymers, advanced intermediates, and performance chemicals (D8 group 2013a). HR is a D8 group
function and serves the different business units. Furthermore,  the D8 organization distinguishes
between the three regions NAFTA, Europe, and Asia-Pacific (D8_I1no1: 54). Somehow similar to
the case of D7, also in D8 our interviewee told that there was comparably few control “There are
very few, there is few requirement for control. There are controls anyway since we also have a
group function internal audit, which is there and controls us. But every person has a great deal of
autonomy” (D8_I1no1: 98, own translation).  Strategically,  D8 has embraced a global approach,
with a focus on international growth markets, especially the BRICS countries, and just recently has
constructed  new  plants  in  Singapore.  At  the  same  time  though,  D8  explicitly  emphasizes  its
sustained commitment to invest and to create jobs in Germany (D8 group: 4–7). D8's international
growth strategy also comprises selected acquisitions of SMEs and well-selected single product lines
of competitors in order to strengthen its market position (D8 group: 16–17). Our interviewee had
been working for the big German chemical MNC where D8 originated from as a spin-off in 2005.
When comparing the old big MNC with the new and smaller D8, he pointed out a remarkable
change  in  corporate  culture.  It  became  more  dynamic,  more  Anglo-Saxon  inspired  and  more
international,  just  in  the sense of a  more geocentric  mindset.  “Although both corporations  are
German firms, one had a more Anglo-Saxon culture than the other. The old big MNC had a rather
conservative organizational culture, the same that it has had for a century. And D8 wanted to be
more dynamic, more active. (…) Moreover, the members of the board, there weren't only Germans
(…)  the  head  of  HR  was  of  Chinese  origin  (…)  there  was  a  great  international  openness.”
(D8_I1no1: 11-12, own translation).
D8 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The Swiss subsidiary of D8, D8 international, has a brownfield history including one acquisition
and a spin-off since the early 1990s. A great proportion of the local staff had already been working
for the predecessors of D8 international, with tenures of between 20 and 30 years. D8 international
is  a  small  management  structure  employing some 60 people,  including the  head of  the  rubber
products  business  unit  with  a  global  responsibility  for  marketing  and  sales.  For  example,  D8
Switzerland international  was involved in  the construction of a  new production facility for  the
business unit in Asia. According to our interviewee, within D8, every business unit operates quite
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independently and differently  (D8_I1no1:  90).  Hosting  the  head of  a  global  business  unit,  D8
international  has  an  overall  high  level  of  autonomy,  decisional  processes  are  transparent  and
relations with HQ are marked by trust (D8_I1no1: 94,100). “On the strategic level, concerning the
market,  the  responsibility,  I  would  say  that  90% is  decided  here.  Change  of  price,  change  of
strategy, things like that. A great deal of autonomy.” (D8_I1no1: 88, own translation). The value of
D8 international for D8 lies in the high level of competence and experience of its employees who
are often multilingual and at ease with doing business internationally, and in local tax advantages
(41,  104,  114).  The HR manager  of  D8 Switzerland reports  to  the  local  head of  business  unit
(D8_I1no1: 141).  
D8 HR co-ordination and control
At D8, there is a global HR meeting once a year  (D8_I1no1: 178),  and concerning certain HR
functional areas like expatriation, the local Swiss HR manager is in direct contact with the corporate
team that is in charge of expatriates at HQ (D8_I1no1: 136). Recently, the D8 group has introduced
SAP HR to co-ordinate personnel  development  including competence profiles  (D8_I1no1: 175-
177). Our interviewee had knowledge of certain corporate practices being designed centrally, where
this is usually done by international project teams (D8_I1no1: 433-436).
With nearly 10 000 employees and sales of approximately 1.7 billion Euros at year end 2011, D9 is
one of the smallest MNCs of our sample. Though, its history dates back to the early 19 th century in
South-Western  Germany,  where  the  founder  took  over  a  cotton  mill  that  he  developed  into  a
healthcare product firm, which was converted into a joint stock company in the early 20 th century
(D9 group 2012: 20, 2013b). D9 operates in the field of medical and healthcare products, where
system  solutions  are  proposed  in  three  key  segments:  Wound  Management,  Incontinence
Management and Infection Management (D9 group 2013a). With  around one third of total sales,
Germany is by far the most important single market for the D9 group, where nearly 40% of total
employees were located in 2011 (D9 group 2012: 12). It is  followed by the rest of Europe with
nearly 55% of sales and some more than 40% of employees. Europe therefore clearly represents the
focal point of D9 activities. Africa, Asia, Oceania accounted for some more than seven per cent, and
America for less than four per cent of sales by year end 2011 (D9 group 2012: 5, 14, 2013a). Today,
the group has some 35 subsidiaries in more than 30 countries on all continents except for Latin
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America (D9 group 2012: 24–26). D9 is organized according to the three business units described
above. Furthermore, there is a functional organization, and in some product areas, the organization
follows  different  distribution  channels  (D9_I1no1:  389-399).  Strategically,  the  D9  group  faces
decreasing public spending on health and has thus focused on medical core and complementary
products as well  as customer-oriented total  solutions.  These group together customized services
with a wide range of products, following a process-oriented approach. D9 continues to consider
Europe  as  its  core  market,  while  contemporaneously  expanding  international  business  outside
Europe  through  the  establishment  of  subsidiaries  in  new  Asian  growth  markets  and  selective
acquisitions (D9 group 2012: 5, 2013c).
D9 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The Swiss subsidiary of D9 has had a history of its own for some 140 years. In 1993, the D9 group
acquired some 60% of stocks of D9 Switzerland, that until then had belonged to a Swiss competitor.
D9 Switzerland is still listed on the Swiss stock exchange (D9 Switzerland 2012, 2013). In 2011,
D9 Switzerland employed some 350 people and is one of the three most profitable subsidiaries of
the D9 group (D9_I1no1: 63). Within the D9 group, D9 Switzerland is a centre of competence for
the production of medical patches containing active ingredients. It is the only subsidiary within the
group  that  holds  a  manufacturing  authorization  for  medical  products,  and  one  out  of  two
subsidiaries that is specialised in the production of sterile medical sets for wound management. D9
Switzerland sells D9 products and services on the Swiss market, and delivers medical sets as well as
medical patches to the D9 group. Around 40% of the products sold by D9 Switzerland are produced
locally (D9 Switzerland 2012),  and 15% of  its  local  production  are  exported  to  the  D9 group
(D9_I1no1: 145). A further particularity of D9 Switzerland is the fact that the current CEO of the
D9 group had been the CEO of D9 Switzerland before, and is still in very regular personal contact
with his successor at D9 Switzerland.  Furthermore, according to our interviewee, D9 Switzerland
sets  the  pace  within  the  D9  group,  and  some  HR practices  have  been  introduced  first  at  D9
Switzerland before HQ has rolled them out globally. “(...) We are somehow setting the pace for the
group. There are some things that we have introduced already during the last two to four years, and
now  the  group  is  gently  starting.  Code  of  behaviour,  that  was  us  who  first  introduced  it”
(D9_I1no1: 317, own translation).  The local CEO of D9 Switzerland is part of the international
management board of the D9 group, where group activities are co-ordinated and strategic decisions
are taken. The HR manager of D9 Switzerland reports to the local CEO within the finance function
288
8.1 Micro-level organizational factors of the case study companies
(D9_I1no1: 385).  According to our interviewee, the only real interface with the D9 group is in
finance via the reporting line, which is supported by an SAP application. The only reporting in HR
that is done from D9 Switzerland to D9 HQ is the number of staff (D9_I1no1: 437). “(...) we are
managed really in a decentralised manner, giving as much autonomy as possible to the subsidiary
(…)  I  think  that  D9  Switzerland  also  has  some  kind  of  special  status,  we  just  get  our  EBIT
objectives and then it is rather left to us how to achieve that. The only big interface with the group
is in finance via the monthly or quarterly reporting (…). But decision-making or investments, this is
all done here” (D9_I1no1: 213). Furthermore, the CEO of D9 Switzerland also seems to have the
strategic desire to maintain the greatest room for manoeuvre possible for his subsidiary:  “When
formulating my [local Swiss] HR strategy, our connection to Germany also was an issue. Because
they actually have certain things that might be useful. So I went to my boss with one or two issues
to ask him how he thought about it. And he answered 'Well, OK, go ahead, ask them. But don't
overdo it.' Like in the sense of not passing too much information to them. I've had the impression
that  the  fewer  contact  we have,  the  better  it  is.  The  fewer  they  know,  the  less  they  interfere”
(D9_I1no1: 452-454, own translation).
D9 HR co-ordination and control
Particularly in the field of HR, the D9 group is still very loosely integrated, and there are currently
no common D9 group HR meetings (D9_I1no1: 457). “(...) if I had not taken initiative after three
months  of  staff  membership and called  HQ just  to  say  'Hello,  I'm the  new HR manager here'
[OS: ...nothing would have happened?] then I got a nice invitation for a management meeting
where I met some people. But that's it. I haven't heard of them since” (D9_I1no1: 439-441, own
translation); “To be honest, I do not even know whether the D9 group has a formulated personnel
policy” (D9_I1no1: 665). Therefore, at D9 there is not yet a formally integrated and sophisticated
international  HR  structure  or  policy  in  place  that  would  be  supported  by  an  integrated  HR
information system. Nevertheless, communication and co-ordination between D9 Switzerland and
corporate HQ is intense. Yet, it does not rely on internationally integrated SAP systems, and neither
on formally defined common HRM policies. CO-ordination and exchange are guaranteed through
structured exchange via the regular and frequent personal meetings between the local Swiss CEO
and the group CEO. Personal exchange takes place during the international management  board
meetings  or  when  the  D9  CEO  personally  visits  his  former  working  place  D9  Switzerland
(D9_I1no1: 442-443). SAP HR is in place at HQ, but subsidiaries are not integrated in the system
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until present (D9_I1no1: 446-450). “Our contact with the D9 group HR organization is good, but
loose. There are hardly any group-wide standards and the interface is rather restricted to reporting.
Until  present,  the  group  refrains  from  a  close  integration  of  the  HR  organization  of  its
subsidiaries”(D9_I1no1: 504).
Table 24 below provides a summary overview of important micro-level variables of the 9 German
MNCs involved in the present investigation.
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Table 24: German MNCs – overview of important micro-level variables
MNC MNC organization 
and strategic 
orientation
Degree of 
internationalization of 
structure and markets
HR co-ordination mode Swiss subsidiary
type
Subsidiary role,  
competence/ 
value for MNC
Particularities, local 
embeddedness, agency
D1 Global product 
market, 
ethno-/geocentric 
organization & 
orientation
> 75% of  revenue generated
outside Germany,
40% of employees located in
Germany,
60% of revenue generated 
on European markets
Ethnocentric concerning strong 
role of HQ in decision-making on 
strategy, HR policy and system 
design; geocentric in personnel 
development and HR co-ordination
Integrated player Sub-business unit 
head office, 
mastering 
sophisticated 
production 
techniques
Brownfield history, many 
German expatriates with 
corporate career 
orientation, partly family-
owned MNC
D2 Global product 
market, strong 
ethnocentric 
heritage, opening 
up internationally, 
Anglo-Saxonization
~30% of employees located 
in Germany,
~50% of employees located 
in Europe, 
40% of revenue generated 
on European markets
Ethnocentric to some extent 
concerning the strong role of 
global divisional HQ in Germany 
and hence decision-making on 
strategy, HR policy and system 
design – though, head offices for 
some business units are located 
outside Germany;  more and more 
geocentric in personnel 
development and HR co-ordination
Integrated player market knowledge, 
local tax 
advantages
Brownfield history, local 
presence of many German 
expatriates with corporate 
career orientation
D3 Global product 
market, polycentric/
multidomestic 
organization/ 
orientation
~50% of employees located 
in Germany, no information 
on geographical breakdown 
of sales published
polycentric Implementor Production plant Greenfield, total absence 
of HR co-ordination, by far 
the smallest MNC in size, 
family-owned, 
internationalizing 
Mittelstand firm
D4 Global product 
market, polycentric 
organization 
/orientation, 
separate division 
for developing 
markets in Latin 
America and Africa
~20% of revenue generated 
in Germany, where ~55% of 
employees are located, 80% 
of employees are located in 
and 57% of order intake 
comes from Europe
Polycentric concenring decision 
making in HR and HR, 
regiocentric in HR co-ordination
Integrated player Engineering and 
production, 
important 
subsidiary as 
complementary 
part of integrated 
production network
Strong own local Swiss 
brownfield history and 
identity, overwhelming 
presence of local 
employees with local 
career orientation and 
socialization in acquired 
Swiss firm
D5 Global product ~30% of employees located Ethnocentric concerning the strong Implementor/ Local market Greenfield site, local 
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market, strong 
Anglo-Saxon 
influence in 
organization & co-
ordination
in Germany; ~15% of 
revenues generated in 
Germany, 40% in EMEA 
region, 
role of global HQ in Germany and 
hence decision-making on 
strategy, HR policy and system 
design;  geocentric in HR co-
ordination and  structure
integrated player knowledge: 
important, attractive
lead market that is 
highly developed 
and profitable
partnership with 
universities and long-
standing client relations
D6 Global services, 
ethnocentric 
heritage, 
“Germany” as 
operating segment 
very present in 
organizational 
structure
~50% of revenue generated 
outside Germany, the 
“Germany” operating 
segment accounted for 
>40% of revenues and ~30%
of employees
Ethnocentric Implementor Knowledge of 
highly attractive 
local market
New top-down corporate 
global strategy 
implementation led to 
some mistrust in relations, 
subsidiary room for 
manoeuvre concerning 
local market strategy has 
been considerably reduced
D7 Strong ethnocentric
heritage, global 
market, opening up 
internationally
~25% of employees located 
in Germany,  <15% of 
revenue generated on 
German market
Ethnocentric concerning strongly 
centralised decision-making on 
strategy and HR policy;  more and 
more geocentric in HR co-
ordination
Global innovator R&D, product 
history, managerial 
decision centre, 
advanced 
production 
techniques
Strong own local Swiss 
brownfield history and 
identity of a former family-
owned business, 
family-owned German 
MNC with a very long 
history
D8 Global market, 
geocentric 
orientation/
organization
Nearly 50% of staff located in
Germany, <20% of revenue 
generated in Germany, in 
rest of EMEA region another 
30% of revenue
Fairly geocentric in structure, HR 
co-ordination and personnel 
development, some head offices 
are not located in Germany, 
although Germany is still by far the
most important location in terms of
employees
Integrated player Market knowledge, 
local tax 
advantages
Brownfield history of Swiss
subsidiary, 
very young MNC born 
global as a spin-off
D9 Strong strategic 
focus on European 
market
>30% of revenue generated 
on German market, nearly 
40% of employees in 
Germany, Europe without 
Germany accounts for >50% 
of sales and >40% of 
employees
Polycentric Local innovator 
with capacity to be
Global innovator; 
though the latter is
reduced due to 
limited 
international 
conduits in HR
Corporate centre of
competence for two
products, advanced
HR management
Former CEO of D9 
Switzerland is now CEO of 
D9 group and has strong 
personal ties, partially 
owned subsidiary with own
local Swiss brownfield 
history and identity, very 
profitable and active
Source: Own compilation based on interview transcript analysis and available company information (for more details on additional sources see case descriptions).
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8.1 Micro-level organizational factors of the case study companies
8.1.2 US MNCs
US1 is  a  special  case among the  MNCs of  our  sample.  This  company is  rather  a  network of
separate legal entities than a classical, vertically ownership-integrated MNC (US1 group 2013b),
corresponding to the federal international type of firm described by Ferner and Edwards (1995:
243).  Furthermore,  we may as well  critically ask whether US1 can really be considered a US-
American  firm,  or  whether  it  should  rather  be  viewed  as  an  Anglo-Saxon  conglomerate  of
companies.  In fact,  the earliest  historical  roots of US1 can be traced back to  the late  1840s at
London. Later on, the US1 history is marked by a serious of mergers throughout the 19 th and 20th
centuries. The US-American part of today's US1 group was created in the late 1890s, and also
merged with British and Canadian firms in the 1950s. In the early 1990s, two of the predecessors of
today's US1 group merged with two local Swiss auditing and trust companies. Finally, today's US1
group was born from a global merger of two big UK and US-based auditing and consulting firms in
the late 1990s (US1 group Switzerland 2013). The US1 group currently employs significantly more
than 100 000 people worldwide in nearly 160 countries, where US1 is present with nearly 800
locations (US1 group 2012a:  2).  US1 is  one of the big global players in the auditing,  tax and
consulting business, with gross revenues of some more than 30 billion Dollars. Approximately 25%
of total employees are located in Northern America, around one third in Western Europe, and some
more than 20% in Asia. Further 7% of employees are located in Southern America, 6% in Africa
and the Middle East, and the remainder is in Central-Eastern Europe and Australasia-Pacific (US1
group 2012a: 2, 47, 48). The biggest part of gross revenue was generated in Western Europe, which
accounted for nearly 40% of the total. It is followed by Northern America with approximately 35%,
and Asia with some 12% (US1 group 2012a: 42, 2012b). Some 47% of gross revenue has been
generated in the assurance business, followed by 28% in consulting, and 25% in the tax business
(US1 group 2012a: 43). The US1 network has a common governance structure that is made up of
four global elements. First, the Global Board represents the interests of all network members and
has overall responsibility for the governance of US1 international. It is the common nodal point of
the global network, and oversees the Network Leadership Team. The latter represents the second
element of the global governance structure and is in charge of the definition of a common strategy
and standards for the whole network. A third element is the Strategy Council consisting of senior
partners of some of the most important US1 entities. These agree on strategic direction and ensure
alignment and execution of the global strategy. Lastly, the Network Executive Team is in charge of
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key  service  lines  and  functional  areas  across  the  US1  network  and  reports  to  the  Network
Leadership  Team (US1 group  2013a).  Strategically,  US1 focuses  on  a  further  improvement  of
quality  in  its  assurance  business,  and  on  growth  in  the  dynamic  and  competitive  consulting
business, including selective strategic acquisitions (US1 group 2012a: 43).
US1 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
As we have explained earlier, today's US1 has been existing since the end of the 1990s, while the
two predecessors had already been active on the Swiss market through their mergers since the early
1990s. US1 Switzerland currently employs nearly 2 800 people on 15 locations throughout the
whole country (US1 Switzerland 2012). Our HR interviewee reports to the Swiss CEO on strategic
HR projects, discusses European or global issues, and agrees with the latter on annual objectives
and budgets. Furthermore, there is a dashboard with certain HR key figures that are discussed on a
monthly  basis  on  the  management  board,  from where  certain  figures  are  also  reported  to  the
international level (US1_I1no1: 117, 125, 131, 135). US1 Switzerland is clearly the number one in
the  respective  business  on the local  Swiss  market  (US1_I1no1:  27),  and it  is  one of  the  most
advanced country organizations in terms of HRM. Accordingly, much know-how is fed back into
the network: “Well, I guess we are among the leading countries in HRM and we feed in very much
know-how into the network. For example, we have developed a succession management tool that
has been deemed to be the best and clearest on a global level. Concerning several policies, our
examples have been adopted” (US1_I1no1: 105).
US1 HR co-ordination and control
Although there is no central hub, co-ordination of HR policies and activities is well structured and
intense throughout the US1 network. Our interviewee is part  of a team that constitutes the HR
executive  board  Western  Europe.  The latter  monitors  the  US1 HR strategy implementation  for
twenty Western European countries and meets eight times a year (US1_I1no1: 12, 115). In line with
the US1 presentation on its global web pages, our interviewee emphasized that there is actually no
US1 corporate  HQ, but only virtual  networks.  Like all  the rest  of  the global  US1 group,  US1
Switzerland is a non-listed partnership organization where all stocks are held by the partners. This
means that, while there is an international board, national organizations are highly independent and
autonomous:  “In  Switzerland,  there  is  an  executive  board,  and  there  is  one  for  the  [Western
European country] cluster. But if a country somehow does not want to comply with the rules – they
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are  independent”  (US1_I1no1:  41).  Therefore,  decisions  concerning  investments,  the  range  of
product or service offerings, managerial practices and budgets are exclusively decided upon by the
Swiss  management  board  (US1_I1no1:  45).  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  commonly  defined
network standards every entity has to comply with, and the national business plans are approved on
a  global  level,  too.  Such network standards  prescribe  certain  minimum standards,  for  example
concerning  employer  branding,  corporate  identity,  and  define  job  profiles  and  corresponding
qualification requirements for recruitments (US1_I1no1: 137). Yet, it is upon the country entities to
decide how much they want to spend (US1_I1no1: 49-50). Overall, on the global level, usually a
group of countries develop certain policy frameworks that should be implemented, for example a
competence framework that allows to have a common understanding of what is meant by high
performance in their performance management system. However, which kind of HR IT system the
single  entities  use  to  implement  this  framework  cannot  be  prescribed  (US1_I1no1:  56).  As  a
consequence,  there  is  no  common  integrated  HR  information  system  in  place,  since  different
countries have historically invested large sums in different systems that cannot be changed any
more  (US1_I1no1:  123).  A further  international  co-ordinating  structure  is  the  international  HR
steering board, again for country clusters, which meets four times a year  (US1_I1no1: 115). This
board prepares the agenda, sets priorities which are binding to a certain degree, but national HR
action plans and concrete measures are designed and implemented locally (US1_I1no1: 70-73). The
question  of  where and how new common guidelines,  frameworks and practices  are  developed,
which  countries  are  involved,  and  how  the  development  is  financed  within  the  international
network, is largely a matter of negotiations. Often bigger country organizations take the lead since
they face the biggest challenges, and then informal networks play an important part  (US1_I1no1:
90-99). “It is rather bottom-up. On the one hand, this has the advantage that we are organized in an
efficient and effective way. On the other hand, we face the disadvantage that we always need very
much discussion and negotiation – it's a Bundesratsphänomen11 (…) It's the networks. When you
have good and positive relations, many things are done much easier. And we can only lead this
network  on  a  relational  basis,  because  there  is  no  formal  power  or  possibility  of  a  brutal
crackdown” (US1_I1no1: 95, 99). Furthermore, there are networks that meet on a less regular basis,
like the HR professional network and global mobility.
11  a phenomenon well known from the Swiss Federal Council that works as a collegial body and where decisions are 
taken by consensus; see also chapter 6 on Swiss state organization.
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US2 is a very big MNC that was created in the early 20th century and operates in computer hard-
and software technology as well as consulting. With several hundreds of thousands of employees,
US2 operates in 170 countries and has generated more than 100 billion Dollars of revenue in 2011
(US2  group  2011:  16,  63,  2013a).  During  2011,  some  more  than  40%  of  total  revenue  was
generated in the Americas, followed by around 30% in the region Europe/Middle East/Africa, and
nearly 25% in Asia-Pacific (US2 group 2011: 32). US business alone accounted for 35% of total
revenue  (US2  group  2011:  139).  US1  has  stopped  to  publish  a  geographic  breakdown  of  its
employees in 2009. Therefore, we can only speculate about the current number of staff located in
the USA. Though, it is well known that the overall strategy of US2 is to sharply reduce its U.S.
workforce (Bulkeley 2009). Latest official data that we could find reported a headcount of some
100 000 employees in the U.S. by the end of 2009 (Jinks 2012; Thibodeau 2010). As of 2012 it
might be around 90 000 (Slashdot 2012), accounting for some 20% of total staff. The company is
structured  into  the  five  business  divisions  global  technology services,  global  business  services,
software, systems and technology, and global financing. With roughly 30% of total revenue, global
technology services was the most important division, followed by software with around 20% and
global business services with nearly 18% (US2 group 2011: 139). A central part of US2 strategy has
been a transformation to become a globally integrated company, with implementation of a globally
consistent set  of processes and standards  (US2 group 2011: 25),  and a strong focus on growth
market presence (US2 group 2011: 32). The company has also shifted its business mix towards
higher-value  areas  such  as  services,  software  and  integrated  solutions,  including  over  120
acquisitions within the last ten years or so in order to complete its portfolio. A further tenet of US2
strategy is to deliver value to enterprise clients through integrated business and IT innovation (US2
group 2011: 21). Besides the sustained focus on growth markets, US2 has launched three further
growth initiatives called cloud, business analytics and smarter planet, referring to the infusion of
digital intelligence into the world's systems (US2 group 2013b).
US2 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The  presence  of  US2  in  Switzerland  dates  back  to  the  1920s.  Today,  US2  employs  several
thousands of people on seven sites in Switzerland, including a major research centre (US2 group
Switzerland 2013a, 2013b). The site we could access was a greenfield site created in the 1950s in
the Lake Geneva region that has some 300 employees. The subsidiary serves the local market, with
clients  comprising  all  sorts  of  organizations  from  SMEs  to  other  big  MNCs  like  Nestlé
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(US2_I1no1: 15, 22, 24). For US2, the rule of the Swiss subsidiary is to generate revenue on the
Swiss  market  (US2_I1no1: 68).  The  Swiss  subsidiary is  controlled  directly from the  U.S.  HQ,
following the line in each division. Furthermore, spanning a matrix with business divisions and
geographic regions, Switzerland is put together with Austria to form an integrated market team
within  the  European  region:  “Decisions  are  taken  following  the  line  within  the  [divisional]
organizations. (…) They are accountable for the strategy they develop in Switzerland. They will
also receive their directives from the U.S. passing via the European level” (US2_I1no1: 41, own
translation); “(...) There is also a centre for Switzerland and Austria, they are grouped together to
form an IMT, an integrated market team (…). So this makes Switzerland together with the IMT, then
the IMT passes to the European level, and then to the U.S.” (US2_I1no1: 51, own translation).
Generally, autonomous decisions are also confined by certain amounts of money that each manager
on a certain hierarchical level can dispose of independently (US2_I1no1: 59). 
US2 HR co-ordination and control
According to our interviewee, decisions in the field of HRM are generally taken at a high level at
the U.S. without implication of local staff  “Decisions are taken at a rather high level where you
don't have access, then they are rolled out top-down” (US2_I1no1: 55, own translation). When
asked  whether  the  internal  climate  at  US2  was  marked  by  trust  or  mistrust,  our  interviewee
explained the following: “Control. Just that. (…) control, although it's not mistrust. There are just
processes which are there to be applied, so it's not linked to a person. When speaking of mistrust,
its rather that you do not trust a person. Here, we have processes that have to be followed through”
(US2_I1no1:65, 66, own translation ). Communication within US2 is regular and rather structured,
depending  on  the  function,  the  rank  and  current  projects,  and  comprises  the  whole  range  of
conference calls, e-mails and meetings (US2_I1no1: 72, 74). Our interviewee personally meets his
superior once a month (US2_I1no1: 86) and reports to Zurich where the main office for Switzerland
as well as European HQ is located (US2_I1no1: 90). Furthermore, there are several IT-based control
systems in place at US2, including HR issues like salaries, working time, or performance: “There is
a whole range of tools used by HR or by managers that allow to control your life, finally, the work
of  an  employee” (US2_I1no1:  94).  Generally,  HR is  rather  co-ordinated  through  standardized
processes than by means of directives, and HR processes can be global, regional or country-specific
(US2_I1no1:  123).  Much  emphasis  is  also  put  on  IT-supported  knowledge  and  competence
exchange that is meant to enable work in virtual teams (US2_I1no1: 173). 
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The history of US3 dates back to the early 1930s when the company started as a manufacturer of
commercially  prepared  intravenous  solutions  (US3  group  2013b).  Today,  US3  is  a  diversified
healthcare company, with expertise in medical devices, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. US3
has some 50 000 employees who generated sales of around 14 billion Dollars in 2012 (US3 group
2013a). Geographically, some more than 40% of sales have been generated in the U.S., followed by
Europe with 29%, Asia-Pacific with 16%, and finally Latin America with 12%. Nearly 40% of
employees are located in the U.S., 30% in Europe, 16% in Asia-Pacific, and the remainder in Latin
America (US3 group 2013a).  US3 is  organized into the two business  divisions  Bioscience and
Medical products which contributed around 55% and 45% respectively to total sales (US3 group
2013a).  The  company  operates  more  than  50  manufacturing  facilities  in  27  countries  on  all
continents and conducts business in over 100 countries (US3 group 2011: 1,18, SEC Form 10-K
section). Strategically, US3 focuses on geographic expansion with select investments in growing
markets.  This  is  combined  with  enhanced  investment  in  the  company's  R&D  including  the
expansion of facilities, pilot manufacturing sites, and laboratories. Furthermore, US3 has a multi-
year initiative to implement a global enterprise resource planning system in order to consolidate and
standardize business processes, data and systems (US3 group 2011: 30, SEC Form 10-K section). 
US3 Swiss subsidiary relations with HQ
The Swiss subsidiary of US3 has been created in the mid 1990s as a greenfield production plant.
Today,  there  are  500  employees  on  this  site  who  are  producing  US3's  flagship  product,  a
medicament  for  the  treatment  of  haemophilia,  which  is  produced  through  biotechnological
processes for the global market. “This plant is, or so far has been, the only one where this product
is produced (…) there is a second one in California that soon will be able to sell its output as well,
a product that sells extremely well and which is effectively the flagship product of the whole US3
group” (US3_I1no1: 23, own translation). For this reason, the Swiss production facility is of central
strategic importance for the US3 group “To cite my former colleague, the ancient plant manager,
who said: 'when the Swiss production facility has a cough, US3 corporate has the flu'. So, due to
this fact, I can really say that we are a highly visible facility” (US3_I1no1: 73, own translation).
Room for manoeuvre for the Swiss facility is restricted to operational issues, since decision-making
takes place at divisional HQ back in the U.S.  (US3_I1no1: 62). At US3, comparisons are made
between plants to trace and encourage productivity (US3_I1no1: 212).
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US3 HR co-ordination and control
The HR manager of the Swiss production facility reports directly some commented key figures to
the European HR director located in Austria, and co-ordination is also assured together with the
latter through frequent calls (US3_I1no1: 37, 94). Furthermore, there are regular international HR
conference calls and two or three HR meetings a year on a European level  (US3_I1no1: 86-88).
Major decisions in HR are taken and budgets approved directly by divisional HQ (US3_I1no1: 50-
54). Yet, a local Swiss initiative concerning local leadership principles that complement the global
corporate ones have met approval of divisional HQ  (US3_I1no1: 64). Furthermore, US3 has an
integrated HR information system running that allows divisional HQ to directly control certain key
figures like headcount and payroll  (US3_:I1no1: 97, 99).  There are internal and external audits,
including HR issues like the traceability of staff qualifications levels and trainings  (US3_I1no1:
109-110).  Generally,  much  emphasis  is  put  on  process  traceability,  where  US3  even  provides
mandatory trainings on good document management (US3_I1no1: 160).
US4 is  a large industrial MNC active in design,  manufacturing,  marketing and sales of heavy
equipment,  engines  and  financial  services.  US4's  historical  roots  can  be  traced  back  to  the
beginning of the 20th century, when the founder of today's US4 started to produce steam traction
engines and tractors. By year end 2012, US4 had more than 100 000 employees worldwide, with
nearly 45% of the latter being located in the USA, where some 30% of sales have been generated in
2012 (US4 group 2013: 8). Total sales equalled more than 60 billion Dollars in 2012 (US4 group
2013: 1). Some 20% of employees are located in the EMEA region and in Asia-Pacific respectively,
and 13% in Latin America (US4 group 2013: A-130). In terms of sales by geographic region, North
America is the most important market, representing some 35% of total sales It is followed by Asia-
Pacific with some more than 25%, EMEA with nearly 25%, and Latin America with nearly 14%
(US4 group 2013: A-102). US4 operates a worldwide dealer network serving some 180 countries
(US4  group  2013:  7).  The  company  is  organized  into  the  following  four  reportable  strategic
business units construction industries, resource industries, power systems, and financial products.
These  represent  the  company's  two  large  categories  of  business  being  machinery  and  power
systems, and financial products (US4 group 2013: 1–5). Around 95% of total sales is generated in
the three strategic business units belonging to the machinery and power systems category, which are
contributing nearly equal parts to total sales (US4 group 2013: A-102). After having experienced a
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severe crisis in 2008-09, the company has formulated and implemented a strategy that is based on
increased investments in R&D to develop next generation products, further increase quality and
improve after sales services. Furthermore, geographically, a strong focus is put on China as the
world's currently most dynamic region in terms of construction, quarry and aggregate industries
(US4 group 2010, 2011: 9).  US4 also continues  to deploy common global systems in order to
support growth and to achieve improved labour utilization (US4 group 2011: 42).
US4 Swiss subsidiary relations with HQ
The US4 site we could access is the EMEA HQ which was created as a greenfield investment in
Switzerland in 1960 and today hosts around 500 employees  (US4_I1no1: 13, 22). The role of the
Swiss site is therefore that of “a strategic and political centre. Major decisions are made here for
the  whole  region.  There is  finance,  legal,  tax  and there  are  several  business  units.  It's  also  a
marketing centre (…) a great part of our employees are doing marketing. (…) US4 doesn't sell
directly to the clients. In every country there is a dealer to whom we sell, and the dealer sells to the
client.” (US4_I1no1: 17, own translation); “The local vice president is in charge of everything
concerning the EMEA regional  dealer  network (…) managing the distribution network for our
products” (US4_I1no1: 44, own translation). As we have seen in our discussion of US MNCs and
their  typical  characteristics  (see  table  18),  these  usually  have  been  found  to  be  marked  by
comparatively high degrees of centralization. US4 represents a somehow typical case of such a US
MNC in so far as major decisions are made at a strong corporate centre being US HQ: “The big
decisions are made in the U.S.. We are the only site outside the U.S. that has a certain number of
important persons. The no. 2 of US4 is located here” (US4_I1no1: 27, own translation). Decisions
are being taken at corporate HQ and then cascaded, passing through the regional HQ down to the
single plants: “The great bosses make the great decisions concerning strategy and vision which is
then cascaded down.  (…) There is  always the same elaborate model  of  construction based on
corporate values” (US4_I1no1: 79, own translation).  The role of EMEA HQ then, especially in
HR,  is  to  make  general  guidelines  compatible  with  local  rules  and  laws  (US4_I1no1:  105).
Communication  with  corporate  HQ  is  intense,  especially  in  times  of  crisis  there  were  daily
conference calls and same time sessions (US4_I1no1: 65). Generally, the performance of plants is
monitored and compared in order to foster internal competition (US4_I1no1: 94). As we have seen,
the EMEA region is one of the most important geographical markets outside the U.S., yet it is also a
highly heterogeneous region. In fact, the case of US4 EMEA HQ represents an interesting case of
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power and agency within MNCs. According to our interviewee, in recent years, European countries
have built a kind a HR federation to achieve a stronger position and negotiating power in their
relations with U.S. HQ. “In HR, since two or three years, we have a strong and thorough common
understanding in terms of HR Europe. That's something that took many years because we never
were capable of coming to an agreement in Europe. We were like competitors: we didn't talk to
each other and exchanged very few information. It just took two or three personalities who broke
through and so, for some years now we really have been forming a team that works together on a
European level, to such an extent that the Americans are getting scared. The Americans are starting
to get scared from us because we are starting to impose ways of doing, to tell them what does not
work. We are beginning to be united and they are afraid of that unity. All of a sudden, they have to
listen to us when we are speaking on a European level, because this is getting important for them
(…) We have understood in Europe that, if we align ourselves on a certain number of projects, we
have more weight with the U.S. (…) Currently, we are having about ten common projects, and we
have even set up things against the will of the Americans” (US4_I1no1: 246, own translation).
US4 HR co-ordination and control
Being the EMEA regional HQ for US4, the Swiss site has a central role in co-ordinating activities,
and in the field of HR, it serves as a regional centre of competence (US4_I1no1: 46). To achieve
this  co-ordination on a  European level,  the HR managers  meet  several  times a  year  to  discuss
regional projects (US1_I1no1: 110). Generally, our interviewee noticed a current tendency towards
a more centralised way of organizing business activities and HR at corporate HQ or EMEA regional
level, leading to a decline in business unit autonomy in order to avoid the downside of control
losses and parallel costs  (US4_I1no1: 25). In line with this centralization, the HR solid reporting
line goes directly from EMEA HQ to corporate HQ (US4_I1no1: 81). Decisional power is limited
according to the managerial hierarchical rank (US4_I1no1: 37) and many processes, especially in
finance and accounting, are SOX compliance-driven (US4_I1no1: 72). Individual objectives of HR
managers are defined within the framework of a performance management system, using an HR
balanced scorecard with an annual review (US4_I1no1: 74). Furthermore, US4 uses Peoplesoft as a
common integrated HR information system and an additional talent management system to support
international succession planning (US4_I1no1: 102-103). Certain processes are then run in global
shared service centres from India :“In HR, we have PeopleSoft as a global system. There is a pretty
strong development  in  global  systems.  Certain  things  are processed  in  India,  for  example  call
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centres or guarantee management. We try to manage the day-to-day business from global centres”
(US4_I1no1: 100, own translation).
The historical roots of US5 can be traced back to a gunpowder production facility that had been
created by the founder in the beginning of the 19th century (US5 group 2013a). Today, US5 is a
diversified chemical company that employs some 70 000 people and achieved net sales of nearly 35
billions of Dollars in 2012 (US5 group 2013c: 16). The company operates more than 300 sites on all
continents, half of them being located in the U.S. and Canada (US5 group 2013c: 11). The company
is organized into thirteen businesses that are grouped into the following eight reportable segments:
agriculture, electronics & communications, industrial biosciences, nutrition & health, performance
chemicals, performance materials, safety & protection, and pharmaceuticals. These segments are
further organized into the geographic regions U.S. and Canada, EMEA, Latin America and Asia-
Pacific (US5 group 2013c: 11, F-46). Around 60% of US5's revenue is generated outside the U.S.,
with developing markets representing approximately one third of total revenue (US5 group 2013c:
9). In 2012, 40% of total sales were generated in the U.S. and Canada, followed by EMEA and
Asia-Pacific  with  around 23% each,  and Latin  America  with  approximately 13  % (US5 group
2013c:  18).  Unfortunately,  we  could  not  find  any  officially  published  information  on  the
geographical breakdown of US5 employees. According to our interviewees, there are approximately
15 000 employees in the EMEA region (US5_I1,I2no1: 22). Strategically, US5 focuses on growth in
developing  markets,  and  seeks  to  build  a  world-leading  position  in  agriculture  and  nutrition,
industrial biotechnology and advanced materials. This strategy is backed up by sustained efforts in
innovation,  together  with  differentiated  portfolio  management  including  disciplined  resource
allocation on high-growth businesses (US5 group 2013b). The company expands its product and
service offerings in the areas of safety, environment, energy and climate challenges, and develops
and  commercialises  renewable,  bio-based  materials,  advanced  biofuels,  energy-efficient
technologies, enhanced safety and protection products as well as alternative energy products and
technologies (US5 group 2013c: 7, 17).
US5 Swiss subsidiary relations with HQ
We could access  the US5 EMEA HQ based in  the Lake Geneva region,  that  was created as a
greenfield site in 1959, and hosts some 450 employees (US5_I1,I2no1: 24, 36, 53). Therefore, the
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regional directors of the various businesses are located there, together with the support functions
including HR, finance  and operations,  and an HR centre  of  expertise  (US5_I1,I2no1:  28,  31).
Strategic decisions are generally taken centrally and implemented top-down, while the autonomy of
single managerial ranks is defined through a detailed list of activities for which the single manager
can make decisions, and corresponding spending limits (US5_I1,I2no1: 58). Final decisions on the
allocation of budgets are taken by the heads of business division who are mostly located in the U.S.,
after having agreed on a plan in an iterative process of dialogue (US5_I1,I2no1: 66). Although there
is a certain level of transparency in decision-making, a strong degree of hierarchical centralization
in the U.S: is clearly felt at US5:  “(...) let's say that there is some degree of openness, a certain
transparency, we are participating. But do we always participate up to the level we would like to,
maybe not. There is a hierarchy anyway concerning this matter. We are an American firm, HQ is in
the  U.S.,  and  this  element  is  present”  (US5_I1,I2no1:  73,  own  translation).  Each  division  or
function receives four to six annual global objectives from HQ that are then developed into concrete
action plans on a regional or divisional level  (US5_I1,I2no1: 42, 44). EMEA HQ's role in this
process is to formulate propositions, to feed in the knowledge held by European directors who know
well the potential of the regional markets, and to make sure that regional demand for the different
products can be satisfied (US5_I1,I2no1: 61). “The reason why we are here is our knowledge of the
markets and the clients in Europe” (US5_I1,I2no1: 62, own translation); “Anyway, we still have
some flexibility and a certain bargaining power in Europe. Again, because the competences are
here, our managers are well-placed to know exactly what is good for US5 in Europe. And as far as I
know, the U.S. are totally overt, at least to discuss. It's not just a plan arriving every year, saying:
here is what will happen to Europe, thank you for implementing it. There is some bargaining done”
(US5_I1,I2no1: 68, own translation).  Similar to the situation described for US4, also at US5, our
interviewees  told  about  a  strengthened role  of  Europe in  its  bargaining  relations  with  US HQ
because of its important share in total revenue, and because of the strategic aim to further develop
markets outside the U.S.:  “(...) and certainly in times of crises like the one we are experiencing
today in the U.S., they are very inclined to communicate and to develop their markets outside the
U.S. So, in this  respect,  we have the Eastern European countries which represent a formidable
reservoir. And here, we effectively have a strategic competence for these markets (…) and we are
also developing the African markets” (US5_I1,I2no1: 80, 83, own translation).  The performances
and especially cost structures of single subsidiaries are closely monitored and compared in order to
establish benchmarks and to foster some internal competition within the US5 group, although our
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interviewees emphasized that overall, a logic of co-operation predominates that is also reflected in
the compensation system (US5_I3no1: 134-137).
US5 HR co-ordination and control
HR has a direct functional reporting line going from EMEA HQ straight to the vice president HR at
corporate  HQ  in  the  U.S.,  while  there  are  only  dotted  lines  to  businesses  and  regions
(US5_I1,I2no1: 104). In Europe, there has already been set up an SAP HR information system that
is being integrated with the U.S. system as a powerful control tool in order to achieve visibility of
all global employees  (US5_I1,I2no1: 124).  Furthermore, the HR organization is working on the
introduction of an additional functionality that allows for the management of competence profiles of
the global workforce  (US5_I1,I2no1: 132).  There are frequent global audio conferences together
with representatives from other regions who are working on similar projects  (US5_I1,I2no1: 94).
Three  to  four  times  a  year,  the  members  of  the  European HR network,  including country HR
partners and the centre of expertise, meet personally for two days in order to discuss the critical
operating tasks and to do reviews (US5_I1,I2no1: 95). Furthermore, all global HR has the same IT
tools that are well aligned on global vision, mission and principles (US5_I1,I2no1: 143). Strong co-
ordination  needs  and efforts  at  US5 can be explained by the  regional  approach to  HR service
delivery: “We have always had a kind of regional approach to the delivery of HR services. So each
region has  its  own regional  director  who has  look  to  take  care  of  the day  to  day operational
running of our business and support of the businesses we serve. The director here reports directly to
the  senior  vice  president  of  HR in  the  United  States  and  they  have  regular  communications”
(US5_I3no1: 34).  Important competences of the EMEA HQ reside in the concentrated functional
expertise also in the area of HR. EMEA HQ management effectively takes the role of an interpreter
of  local  legal  provisions  etc.  when  trying  to  implement  corporate  strategy  in  the  different
subsidiaries located throughout Europe:  “(...) also at the functional level you can find important
competences here (…) the U.S. need to turn to our European teams in order to validate what they
intend to set up, to know if one can have global programmes, and where things have to be defined
on a local level. We have this competence here concerning HR. (…) For example, the setting up of
restructuring plans. The different European subsidiaries clearly have total and complete control
over the implementation of this plan in the field of HR” (US5_I1,I2no1: 87, own translation); 
“There is an escalation route of course from matters of policy and matters of exceptions to policy
which pass through here on its way to the United States for approval” (US5_I3no1: 35).
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The historical roots of US6 can be traced back to a grain storage facility that was created by the
founder in the 1860s, and today it is one of the world's largest privately owned firms (US6 group
2013a)  as  one  of  the  biggest  food  and  commodity  producers  and  traders.  In  2012,  US6  had
significantly more than 100 000 employees in 65 countries (US6 group 2013b) and generated some
130 billions of Dollars of sales (US6 group 2013c). Nearly 40% of employees are located in North
America which corresponds to the part of revenue generated in this region. North America is then
followed by Asia Pacific with 25% of employees and sales, Europe with 15% of employees and
20%  of  sales,  Latin  America  with  18%  of  employees  and  12%  of  sales.  The  remainder  is
attributable  to  Africa  and the  Middle  East  (US6 group 2012:  2).  US6 is  organized  around the
following five segments:  agriculture services,  food ingredients and applications, origination and
processing, risk management and financial, and industrial. Each segment then regroups a number of
related business units (US6 group 2013d). Strategically, US6 aims at an adjustment of its resource
planning system in order to further connect data, processes and technologies, paired with growth
plans. The latter include a major acquisition of a big animal nutrition firm and sustained investment
in Latin America and Asia-Pacific. US6 intends to profit from increasing worldwide demand for
food,  especially meat  consumption in  China,  and focuses on the possibilities for  production in
Brazil (US6 group 2012: 2–5). Furthermore, US6 develops materials based on renewable feedstock
(US6 group 2013d).
US6 Swiss subsidiary relations with HQ
The  Swiss  subsidiary  of  US6  that  we  could  access  is  part  of  the  company's  animal  nutrition
business. The Swiss subsidiary has a brownfield history of a former family business, including three
grain mills in different parts of the country, that has been sold to US6 in 2002. The facility we
visited has some 170 employees including the management  (US6_I1no1: 23) and serves the local
Swiss market with flour and animal nutrition (US6_I1no1: 32). Specific competences of the Swiss
subsidiary therefore lie in the well-qualified staff and the mastership of production techniques, ISO
norms etc. in order to produce high-quality and even innovative products (US6_I1no1: 81-83). As
seen in most other MNCs, decision-making autonomy is determined by a grid defining amounts of
money that can be spent autonomously, or prescribing a procedure that local management has to
follow  (US6_I1no1:  38).  For  larger  investments  as  for  example  a  new truck or  more  strategic
decisions, local management would have to make a proposition to the president of the business unit
at corporate HQ back in the U.S. who would make the final decision  (US6_I1no1: 56). Financial
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control  of  the  Swiss  subsidiary  is  intense  and  utterly  frequent  as  they  have  to  report  weekly
estimates for  the month:  “All  that  concerns financial  results,  we report  every week directly  to
[corporate HQ] to the animal nutrition division. It is our financial director who has to send these
reports. We have to do an estimation every week for the month. This makes you calculate forecasts
that are sometimes random – we base ourselves also on historical data” (US6_I1no1: 109, own
translation). Internal audits are frequent and concern the respect of standard processes such as those
prescribed by ISO or those of US6 in terms of security at the working place (US6_I1no1: 117, 141).
Somehow startling  in  this  context  is  the  fact  that  the  local  Swiss  subsidiary used  to  be  more
advanced than US6 in terms of IT system integration. The Swiss subsidiary was already operating
an integrated SAP information system which they had to abandon for a technically outdated US6
system at the time of the acquisition:“Concerning finance, there is a rather old system in place.
US6 is currently (…) setting up a big project, reorganizing everything, starting with informatics.
The project is to introduce SAP, because at the moment we have old things. There has also been a
revolution because we used to be more advanced than that. We already had SAP and had to go
back. It's a bit like going back from a Mercedes automatic to a 2CV with double-declutching to shift
gears. This has created some dissatisfaction (...)” (US6_I1no1: 62, 119, own translation). At US6,
performances of countries and plants in terms of return of gross investment are closely monitored
and compared  (US6_I1no1: 62,  124-127).  Furthermore,  the plant  director  who arrived after the
acquisition of the Swiss subsidiary is an American expatriate with some 25 years of tenure at US6
who came to Switzerland to culturally integrate the subsidiary:  “(...) when US6 has acquired the
Swiss firm, they came with a director. He came here because he had been working for US6 for 25
years, so he knew the processes, the way of working and the culture of US6. (…) From one day to
the next we had to change. People who are in the factory had to put on their helmets. That was
nothing but a revolution” (US6_I1no1: 62, 134, own translation).
US6 HR co-ordination and control
Co-ordination in the field of HRM is done within the US6 business unit animal nutrition, where a
European HR group integrates several countries from Portugal to Poland: “We meet regularly, and
once we had a meeting with all the heads of HR on a global level for the animal nutrition division.
We  were  around  thirty  people  and  met  at  [corporate  HQ in  the  U.S.]”  (US6_I1no1:  7,  own
translation). Communication with HQ and with the European HR group is regular and is primarily
assured via e-mails and conference calls (US6_I1no1: 87-88). The European HR group also meets
on a yearly or biannual basis (US6_I1no1: 94). The local Swiss HR director reports to the European
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HR director of his business unit that is located at corporate HQ in the U.S. (US6_I1no1: 62, 107).
Thus, there is no hierarchical level or a real organizational unit for Europe, but only a co-ordination
in HR, while decisions for the region are being made at the business unit level in the U.S.: “(So it is
people at [corporate HQ] who make the decisions?) Yes, there is no European division, it's not a
unit, it's a co-ordination. It's just to facilitate. Europe also has its culture and ways of doing, and
these are different from one country and from one canton to the other. (Where is this European co-
ordination unit located?) At [corporate HQ in the U.S.]. It is now a Frenchman who has been
nominated, but before it used to be Americans at [corporate HQ in the U.S.]. (So this European
level is located in the U.S.?) Yes” (US6_I1no1: 73-79, own translation).
US7 was founded in 1949 as a medical equipment repair shop (US7 group 2013b). Today, US7 is
the world's largest medical technology company with nearly 50 000 employees. These are located in
some 270 locations in more than 120 countries and generated a revenue of 16 billion Dollars in
2012 (US7 group 2013c, 2013d). The company's activities comprise nine businesses falling into the
three  groups  cardiac  and vascular,  restorative  therapies  and diabetes.  The cardiac  and vascular
group is by far the most important, contributing some more than 50% of total revenue, followed by
restorative therapies with nearby 40%, and the diabetes group with less than 10% (US7 group 2012:
2012 Highlights, 2013a). Geographically, 55% of revenue are achieved in the U.S., followed by
25% that are generated in Europe and Canada, and 10% in Asia-Pacific (US7 group 2012: 2012
Highlights). A geographical breakdown of employees is unfortunately not published. Concerning
the  organizational  structure  of  the  US7  group,  it  is  basically  a  matrix  structure  made  up  of
geographies  and businesses.  In  this  respect,  a  particularity is  the factorage organization,  where
single country subsidiaries aren't subsidiaries in a strict sense, but commission agents paying fees
for  the  products  sold to  US7  (US7_I1no1: 31).  Strategically,  US7 is  directing  its  research  and
development  efforts  towards  maintaining  or  achieving  technological  leadership  in  each  of  the
markets it serves, and it is reallocating resources into driving growth in emerging markets. These
strategic aims are pursued in relying not only on its own R&D efforts, but also on acquisitions and
alliances (US7 group 2012: SEC Form 10-K section, 9-10).
US7 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The US7 subsidiary in Switzerland that we could access has around 700 employees and hosts the
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European HQ and a plant for the production of pacemakers and heart defibrillators  (US7_I1no1:
16-19, 27). This Swiss HQ and production structure is one out of five entities in Switzerland, and it
has been constructed in 1998 as a greenfield plant  (US7_I1no1: 16-21, 35, 37). There are around
400  employees  working  in  the  HQ  structure,  and  some  300  in  production  (US7_I1no1:  44).
Therefore, there are several competences united at the Swiss European HQ facility. The reasons for
locating not only the regional management HQ structure but also a production plant for pacemakers
and  heart  defibrillators  in  Switzerland  was  the  Swiss  high  quality  image,  additional  to  the
favourable local tax regime (US7_I1no1: 30). The HQ structure also hosts the global legal function
of  US7  covering  all  countries  except  for  the  U.S.  This  structure  allows  for  the  realization  of
synergies and for a better control of compliance with legal requirements in the field of medical
equipment  and  with  the  principles  of  the  corporate  code of  conduct  (US7_I1no1:  47-50).  The
production  plant  serves  worldwide  markets  and  is  one  out  of  three  facilities  within  the  US7
organization that are manufacturing these products (US7_I1no1: 54). Concerning decision-making
autonomy  of  the  European  HQ  structure,  once  the  divisional  budgets  for  Europe  have  been
validated by corporate HQ, investments and expenditures are done locally. Yet, validation is done
down to a certain level of detail, comprising for example new headcounts. Furthermore, clear ratios
are defined for spendings as a ratio of revenue, that are complemented by fixed amounts that may
be engaged for example by a vice president (US7_I1no1: 39, 42, 56). Overall, the budgeting process
follows the five year strategic planning where corresponding projects are reviewed, validated and
justified.  Furthermore,  results  are  reviewed  weekly  via  a  conference  call  with  corporate  HQ
(US7_I1no1:  67).  Financial  results  are  also closely monitored through the SAP finance system
where they are updated and visible on a daily basis (US7_I1no1: 75, 81-82). Though, according to
our interviewee, such comparisons do not seem to be made in a sense of coercive comparisons
(Sisson  2006:  247;  Tempel  2001:  137)  in  order  to  foster  competition  for  investment  between
countries and business units, but rather in order to foster transparency of performances. Though,
such comparisons may very well be viewed as a way to exercise some form of unobtrusive control
(Coller 1996: 167–168) “Between countries there is fairly little competition. I would rather call it
emulation than competition. A certain emulation to know who has the best results. But there is no
competition  meaning  that,  if  there  is  one  who  wins,  there  is  not  the  other  one  who  looses”
(US7_I1no1: 82). 
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US7 HR co-ordination and control
Co-ordination may be seen as a central part of the European HQ function, and is done via regular
meetings of the head of HR at HQ with the country HR managers in a certain area  (US7_I1no1:
15). Furthermore, weekly conference calls are done with the businesses throughout the European
countries to cover the geographic regional level, and on business unit level with corporate HQ in the
U.S. to ensure co-ordination and control on a business-level (US7_I1no1: 62-64). Furthermore, US7
operates  PeopleSoft  as  a  powerful  integrated  IT-based  control  tool  (US7_I1no1:  75).  Our
interviewee sensed still another control tool being the centralised management of expatriation and
stock options from corporate HQ: “Everything in terms of stock options and expatriation is being
managed from the U.S. This is not to our greatest delight. There is a notion of control behind that.
At the beginning, there is a justification in terms of synergy, referring to a single service provider
for insurances etc.  But this is not a significant reason, it's just for control” (US7_I1no1: 129).
Though  overall,  our  interviewee  considered  that  there  were  comparatively  few expatriates  and
international exchange for an MNC of this size: “When I compare us to other MNCs, we still have
relatively few exchange (…) we don't have hundreds of expatriates (…) we have twenty expatriates
in Europe (…). In fact I think this is something that calls us into question. From an HR point of
view, we would like to create more exchange and connection between the different silos that we
have” (US7_I1no1: 69). Due to the strong role of centralised decision-making at corporate HQ in
the U.S. and to the very limited international exchange of staff between international US7 facilities,
we  would  rather  tend  to  classify  this  MNC  as  ethnocentric.  Although  there  are  around  40
nationalities present at European HQ, awareness of local differences and needs seems to be rather
limited  as  the  following  interview  extract  shows:  “(...)  we  have  42  nationalities  here  at  HQ.
Besides, this  also rises a certain number of problems. One and a half  years ago, we've had a
restructuring. I was the only one to highlight the fact that if  we were to lay off more than ten
persons, relating to the size that we had, we had to consult our employees. There is very little
conscience about what this means” (US7_I1no1:  163).
US8 is the only MNC of our sample that is operating in the financial services sector, with a history
of its earliest predecessor firm dating back to the end of the 18 th century. The recent history of US8
is marked by multiple important mergers and acquisitions during the 1990s and 2000s, that gave
birth to today's US8, which currently is one of the world's largest financial institutions (US8 group
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2013b). In 2011, US8 had several hundreds of thousands of employees in more than 60 countries
and achieved a total net revenue of nearly 100 billion Dollars (US8 group 2011: 62, 2013a). US8 is
organized into six segments that are each regrouping several businesses. The six segments where
US8 is operating are investment banking, retail finance services, card services and auto, commercial
banking,  treasury  and  securities  services,  and  asset  management  (US8  group  2011:  79).  An
interesting  detail  may be  seen  in  the  fact  that,  within  the  segment  asset  management,  private
banking is divided into private banking USA and private banking international for the rest of the
world (US8_I1no1: 108). Such an organization with a division into business U.S. and business rest
of the world may be seen as a sign of ethnocentric organization that is due to the sheer size of the
domestic U.S. market (Dowling 1999: 37–38). Having a look at US8's credit exposure to get an idea
of the degree of internationalization of its activities, we can see that the U.S. alone account for some
47% of total credit exposure (US8 group 2012: 108), with a similar picture for commercial and
industrial  loans,  whereas real estate loans are nearly exclusively concentrated in the U.S. (US8
group  2012:  204).  Approximately  one  quarter  of  total  revenue  is  generated  in  and  50%  of
employees  are  part  of  retail  financial  services  (US8  group  2012:  85–86).  Considering  the
consolidated financial statements for the year 2011, international operations outside North America
accounted for 25% of total revenue, with nearly 17% being attributable to the EMEA region (US8
group 2012: 268). Overall, less than 15% of employees are located outside the U.S., whereof 6%
are working in the EMEA region, and another 7.5% in the Asia-Pacific geographic area (US8 group
2011: 109). Strategically, US8 has launched specific growth initiatives. One part of these initiatives
is the wholesale business, where the company has strengthened its global presence in the rapidly
expanding markets of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, US8 follows
its clients like MNCs or sovereign wealth funds, who are expanding globally (US8 group 2011: 10).
Another  strategic  aim is  to  further  integrate  US8's  consumer businesses  that  historically ran as
independent  company  (US8  group  2011:  14)  and  to  establish  long  quality  relationships  with
customers (US8 group 2011: 48).
US8 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
US8 is  present  with two offices  in  Switzerland,  one in  the Zurich-region and one in the Lake
Geneva region. We could gain access to the office in the Lake Geneva region, where US8 employs
around 700 people in its asset management branch, particularly in private banking (US8_I1no1: 7,
32). The Swiss subsidiary came into being in 2001, following a merger of two financial institutions
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that  had  already  been  present  in  the  country  before  (US8_I1no1:  43).  The  Swiss  subsidiary
represents the greatest private banking office throughout Europe and hosts the EMEA director of
this business (US8_I1no1: 12): “(...) the central hub, where most of our staff is located and where
most revenue is passing through in European private banking, yes, that's Switzerland” (US8_I1no1:
17, own translation). Concerning the role and competences of the Swiss subsidiary, our interviewee
was quite clear: “Let's say that Swiss bank secrecy is essential. (…) Swiss people know how to keep
a  secret.  (…)  I  think  this  is  something  inherently  Swiss,  to  respect  peoples'  anonymity,  the
confidentiality.  And this  makes it  fertile ground to apply bank secrecy” (US8_I1no1: 172, own
translation). Strategic decisions are made at a very high level in operating committees located at
U.S. corporate HQ:  “Of course we have a way of doing, a know-how coming from the U.S. (…)
There are many things arriving from the U.S. that we integrate and add our little Swiss flavour if
this is necessary for legal reasons (…). It's true that there is a certain number of things that are
really coming from the centre of activity in HR, of those who are at the centre of activity in private
banking. There is a head of HR private banking at [corporate HQ in the U.S.].(...) I think it's really
at  this  level  where decisions  are made.  And we are receivers  of  the fruits  of  their  reflections”
(US8_I1no1:  46,  own  translation).  Decision-making  is  generally  rather  top-down,  though
employees  always  have  the  possibility  to  express  themselves  and  to  voice  their  opinions
(US8_I1no1: 58-60, 146).
US8 HR co-ordination and control
Our interviewee is  part  of  business  embedded HR in private  banking international  and reports
within the private banking business line HR to London (US8_I1no1: 15, 104, 106). Furthermore, at
London,  there  is  a  big  corporate  HR  function  where  certain  HR  areas  like  compensation,
recruitment and expatriation are allocated, and of which the greatest part of HR managers on the
European continent are part of  (US8_I1no1:  104, 106). Co-ordination of European activities in
business as well as in HR is done between Geneva and US8's greatest European centre at London,
where the private banking HR director Europe is located. An interesting issue in HR at US8, that
may well be linked to the financial industry, is the existence of a risk team that controls and makes
sure that all HR processes are water tight in terms of risk on a monthly basis. Such processes cover
a whole range of issues ranging from the pay process over documents and matters linked to Swiss
bank secrecy and the corporate code of conduct to crisis management and information protection in
case of fire (US8_I1no1: 118, 122-125). There are several corporate-wide globally integrated HR IT
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systems  installed  at  US8,  comprising  a  common  recruitment  system,  training,  performance
management  with  succession  planning and compensation-benefit.  Furthermore,  certain  common
policies or country policies and employee handbooks may be consulted on intranet  (US8_I1no1:
131-135). International co-ordination is ensured by a monthly conference call of the HR community
in the asset management business (US8_I1no1: 85). These calls are supplemented by yearly off-site
meetings of all European HR directors (US8_I1no1: 92), by daily phone calls with the superior at
London  (US8_I1no1: 81)  and abundant e-mail communication in all directions  (US8_I1no1: 83).
Overall,  our  interviewee  reported  that  the  corporate  culture  of  US8  is  very  supportive  of
information sharing and mutual assistance (US8_I1no1: 96).
The corporate history of US9 starts with the signing of a partnership agreement between the two
founders of the firm in the 1830s, who produced soap and candles (US9 group 2012c). Today, US9
is  one  of  the  worlds  leading  companies  in  the  consumer  goods  industry  with  some  100
manufacturing facilities.  Out  of  these,  around 70 are located outside the U.S.  in  more than 40
countries (US9 group 2012d: 7). US9 products are sold worldwide in more than 180 countries (US9
group 2012d: 2). In 2012, the company had more than 100 000 employees and achieved net sales of
some 80 billion Dollars (US9 group 2012d: 11). Nearly 40% of sales have been generated in North
America, some less than 20% in Western Europe and Asia respectively, 10% in Latin America, and
nearly  15%  in  Central-Eastern  Europe,  the  Middle  East  and  Africa  (US9  group  2012a:  16).
Unfortunately, we could not find any published data on the geographical breakdown of headcount.
US9 is organized into the two global business units beauty and grooming, and household care,
which are subdivided into the five reportable segments beauty, grooming,  healthcare, fabric and
home care, baby and family care (US9 group 2012d: 13). Furthermore, there are specialised market
development organizations, shared global business services, and corporate functions (US9 group
2012a:  73,  2012b).  HR  is  one  of  the  corporate  functions  but  has  a  transversal  or  matrix
responsibility for the business units  (US9_I1no1: 50).  Strategically,  US9 is  targeting growth of
earnings per share of high single to low double digits and growth of organic sales of one or two per
cent above market average. In order to achieve these financial and growth targets, US9 implements
a focused resource allocation to its biggest and most profitable businesses, and on the innovations
and developing markets that offer the greatest growth opportunities. Therefore, the company defines
core businesses as a combination of country and category which achieve the highest annual level of
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sales and profit. Furthermore, US9 implemented cost-saving measures that include a reduction in
overhead spending and sustained investment in research and development in order to achieve more
discontinuous innovation (US9 group 2012d: 14–15). 
US9 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
The US9 site in Switzerland that we could access is a large EMEA HQ structure in the Lake Geneva
region. It has been established as a greenfield operation in 1956, first as HQ for Africa and the
Middle-East, that later has been transformed into the regional HQ for the whole EMEA region in
2000,  hosting  currently  some  3  000  employees  (US9_I1no1:  40).  Major  decisions  concerning
product  and  market  strategy  are  made  on  the  level  of  the  global  business  units.  The  second
hierarchical level are then the regional business units for Western and Eastern Europe. The locus of
decision-making differs between different segments or products, and depends on where the vice
president is  located.  For instance,  the global  vice president  for hair  care products is  located in
Switzerland and strategic decisions are made at Swiss EMEA HQ, whereas decisions for grooming
are made in the U.S.  (US9_I1no1: 45-47). Concerning the market development organization, the
locus of decision-making for the whole EMEA region is the Swiss EMEA HQ (US9_I1no1: 50).
Generally, decision-making is governed by a well-defined, standardized process called PACE. P
stands  for  the  process  owner  who makes a  proposition,  A is  the  approver  who takes  the  final
decision, C are contributors who will be consulted, and E are the executors who will implement the
decision once it has been made. In case of doubt, there is table that clearly defines who is the
approver  (US9_I1no1: 62-68).  Generally,  our interviewee viewed the decision-making style and
process  as  fairly  teamwork-driven  and  consensual,  though  “(...)  there  is  always  an  A behind
because often decisions have to be made quickly” (US9_I1no1: 68). Furthermore, our interviewee
told that these processes of decision-making were marked by mutual trust, since trust was part of
the US9 corporate values, and US9 had a corporate culture that was heavily based on these values
(US9_I1no1: 69). 
US9 HR co-ordination and control
The reporting line for HR follows the corporate HR function line, going from the HR staff in the
market development organizations on country-level straight to EMEA HQ HR  (US9_I1no1: 49).
Generally, there are three important levels for decision-making in HR: the global business units,
where decisions are taken following established guidelines, HR corporate HQ and HR corporate
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EMEA, and then HR on country-level. When HR at EMEA HQ thinks a certain decision might have
a  global  impact,  they will  discuss  the issue with  corporate  HQ HR  (US9_I1no1:  53-57).  Such
strategic decisions or any other far-reaching decision in the field of HR and ER/IR are co-ordinated
through a global HR team and a global ER/IR team, each having one video conference per month
(US9_I1no1: 58-60). On a business-level, there is also an integrated information system in place
where action plans with precisely defined deliveries are established and checked on a monthly basis
(US9_I1no1:  77-78). HR  is  steered  with  a  scorecard,  and  standardized  surveys  are  conducted
annually (US9_I1no1: 79). The global HR team defines a global HR action plan which is translated
into  regional  action  plans  and  so  on,  until  reaching  the  individual  level  (US9_I1no1:  80).
Communication in HR is intense, with regular and frequent flows in all possible directions, using all
kinds of communication technology, including video conferences. Personal meetings are reduced as
far as possible due to the important costs (US9_I1no1: 71-73). Furthermore, corporate culture may
be viewed as a central management tool at US9 to achieve co-ordination and control of its global
workforce:  “Corporate culture plays an important role, it's very strong. This is supported by our
recruiting practice: normally we only engage young university graduates who start at level 1. A
priori we recruit people for an in-house career with a strong US9-socialization” (US9_I1no1: 76).
This practice of purposeful, intensive socialization using corporate values and corporate culture as a
management tool (Wächter et al. 2003: 82) at US9 can be considered an indirect-cultural control
mechanism (Harzing and Sorge 2003: 198). Moreover, as we have seen earlier, US MNCs have
generally been found to rely on corporate culture as a management tool that is also transferred
cross-nationally (see tables 13 and 16), making the case of US9 a typical illustration of this practice.
The earliest roots of US10 can be traced back to the end of the 19th century, when the oldest of the
companies that merged to form today's US10 was founded by a pharmacist. A first big merger took
place in the 1960s, when the company roughly took its present-day form (US10 group 2012). In
2012, US10 as one of the biggest MNCs operating in the food and beverage industry had several
hundreds of thousands of employees whereof some less than 40% are located in the U.S. (US10
group 2013: 9). US10 is organized into the following four business units: US10 Americas foods,
US10 Americas beverages, US10 Europe including beverages and food business and US10 Asia,
Middle-East and Africa (AMEA). These business units or segments are comprised of six reportable
segments, whereof three are subunits of US10 Americas Foods (US10 group 2013: 3). The company
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achieved a total net revenue of some 65 billion Dollars in 2012, whereof 20% have been generated
in Europe, 10% in the AMEA business unit and nearly 12% in the Latin America Foods subunit
(US10 group 2013: 52). In 2011, 50% of total net revenue was generated outside the U.S. (US10
group  2011:  7).  Unfortunately,  US10  does  not  publish  a  geographic  breakdown  of  its  global
headcount. An important element concerning international strategy of US10 is its growth through
acquisitions. US10 bought in market shares, first in Western European countries, and more recently
also  in  Russia,  through  the  acquisition  of  pre-existing  sizeable  companies.  This  fact  has  been
strongly underlined by both of our interviewees:  “US10 has grown very much through acquiring
other companies. It is more or less a composition of small or big companies. You take [brand 1],
[brand 2]. This is basically how US10 became a huge company“ (US10_I1no1: 66); “(...) US10
was a conglomerate.  They had all  these companies,  each company did what they did best and
reported back” (US10_I2no1: 218). Therefore, effects of this growth history on corporate structure
and organization are strongly felt in HR, representing a nice illustration of our previous discussion
of micro-level organizational variables on HR structures and practices:  “(...) at  the moment it's
really, really difficult to get anything done across countries. Because they use different systems, they
use different time lines” (US10_I2no1: 212).  Starting only recently, US10 is going through some
major organizational-structural changes. Structurally, this development is manifest in the creation of
a European purchasing HQ once European markets were great enough to justify such a regional
structure. This centralised purchasing structure was then  only very recently followed by a European
management HQ. Fortunately, we could access both of these structures that will be presented in the
following section.
US10 Swiss subsidiary and relations with HQ
In Switzerland, US10 has two sites, both of them having a HQ function. We were able to access
both sites and to conduct interviews with HR managers first in the European HQ structure located in
the Lake Geneva region, and then at European purchasing HQ in the Bern region. The European
HQ structure is a fairly young and small site that has been established in the mid-2000s and hosts
some 70 employees  (US10_I1no1: 7, US10_I2no1: 31).  The European purchasing HQ has been
created first in 1998 (US10_I2no1: 26-27). Before Eastern and South-Eastern Europe had started to
grow, the European market was too small to justify a European HQ structure, and subsidiaries used
to report directly into HQ  (US10_I2no1: 31). European HQ has a classic role of communication
channel between the countries of its region and corporate HQ, and makes sure that frameworks that
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have  been  defined  by  global  HQ  are  implemented  and  guidelines  followed  in  the  countries
(US10_I2no1: 43-48).  Furthermore, European HQ has a limited, though present role in strategy
formulation and a strong co-ordinating role: “(…) They may have some strategic input when it has
a regional influence on things. We are talking of processes and initiatives that are fairly global. The
regional actors will be acting as a coordinator (...)”(US10_I2no1: 78). Furthermore, European HQ
also has an important role in internal two-way knowledge transfer. It spreads information, expertise,
common practices and corporate culture downstream to the countries, and takes up information on
what happens on a local level to feed it back upstream towards HQ: “Regional headquarters has
the role towards the subsidiaries to bring expertise at a European level rather than just at a country
level. (…) really to bring a European perspective, common practices or a way of thinking and doing
things. Regional headquarters play a role of sensibilisor, educator to a certain extent about what is
happening locally, what makes sense in terms of local awareness and consideration” (US10_I2no1:
78). Furthermore, our first interviewee at EMEA HQ made an important point on different roles of
European HQ depending on the stage of development of a company and of business operations of a
given country subsidiary: “It very much depends on the stage of development of a company and on
the stage of business operations. If it is developing markets maybe regional headquarters plays a
different role in terms of bringing knowledge and in terms of being a centre of expertise versus
more developed subsidiaries,  where regional  headquarters  will  be seen more as  a coordinator
rather than bringing expertise” (US10_I1no1: 177). A further interesting detail concerning the role
of European HQ of US10 is its systematic use for personnel development: “To explain the nature of
[European]  headquarters  is...  I  call  it  a  "hatching  hub".  You  put  people  in  headquarters'
environment to gain critical experience. A headquarters environment is different than having direct
operational regional responsibility. People would come to [European HQ] for an assignment of 3
to 5 years. They can stay longer depending on the role they have, then go back to an operational
job, probably to a bigger region.” (US10_I1no1: 10).
US10 HR co-ordination and control
A we have seen, European HQ has a strong role in co-ordinating HR activities across the continent:
“(...) I would say regional headquarters are the first coordinating point, the first contact point for
the subsidiaries.  Subsidiaries will  not go direct  to  the world headquarters for things.  It  would
happen through the regional headquarters. It would happen through that channel of communication
and coordination” (US10_I1no1: 76). A further tool or mechanism for co-ordinating HR activities
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cross-nationally are international HR guidelines that are formulated on a global and on a European
level:  “There  are  policies.  There  is  always  the  international  policy  and  then  there  is  the
corresponding  European  policy”  (US10_I2no1:  148).  In  this  process  of  transforming  global
guidelines from U.S. HQ into European ones, European HQ has a strong role to play, apparently
disposing of a great deal of autonomy or margin for manoeuvre:  “(...) from what I hear, a lot of
those  programmes,  trainings  and things:  they  come from the  US and then  the  first  thing  that
happens is that they are getting revamped in Europe. And then they are rolled out.  So that also
means that usually we are half a year or a year behind. Once it's rolled out in the US it takes some
time,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  something  that  is  really  relevant”  (US10_I2no1:  194-195).
Communication  in  HR is  intense  and  ongoing  in  Europe,  normally  ad  hoc,  or  taking  a  more
structured form of  weekly calls  when certain processes  are  running like during the assessment
period  (US10_I1no1:  72,  74).  European  HQ  also  actively  encourages  interaction  between
subsidiaries through meetings and trainings in order to establish strong networks  (US10_I1no1:
120).  Reporting  in  HR is  done  within  the  sector  HR functional  line  (US10_I2no1:  118)  from
country via European HQ towards corporate HQ (US10_I1no1: 56), and comprises some key data
like headcount and financial information, though there is also much informal personal control in
place at US10:  “The reports usually come through global, more than anything else. So there is
definitely headcount, there is so-called AOP, annual operations plan, which needs to be reported.
But those are sort of the standard things that happen regularly and we are working very strongly
with the finance function as well to get everything together. But largely reporting again is sort of
talking to people” (US10_I2no1: 129). A surprising element for a US MNC having the size of US10
is the absence of an integrated information system which is just currently being implemented. The
fact that single countries operate different systems is felt to make the regional reporting procedure
fairly difficult: “(...) we don't have any global system. It is a big surprise because we don't have any
global HR system at the moment. There is a SAP platform but it is still very much in progress. It has
just started, even in Europe we don't have one system. We have one system which is used for the
majority of the employees but countries may have their pipeline systems which are not necessarily
linked to this major system. You could imagine that global reporting is not an easy task or even
regional  reporting  is  not  an  easy  task.  It  requires  a  lot  of  coordination  and  a  lot  of  manual
intervention to come up with a regional reporting altogether” (US10_I1no1: 58).
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Table 25: US MNCs – overview of important micro-level variables
MNC MNC organization and strategic 
orientation
Degree of 
internationalization of 
structure and markets
HR co-ordination 
mode
Swiss 
subsidiary  
type
Subsidiary role,  
competence/value 
for MNC
Particularities, local 
embeddedness, 
agency
US1 Strong local legal requirements and 
locally different demands, absence of a 
corporate centre
~25% of employees are 
located in Northern 
America, around one third 
in Western Euope, ~20% in 
Asia; Western Europe 
accounted for ~40% of 
revenue, North America 
~35%, Asia 12%
Polycentric 
concerning  
dependence on 
HQ and legal 
independence of 
subsidiaries; 
geocentric 
concerning locus of
decision-making, 
strength of flows 
and co-ordination 
needs
Integrated 
player/Global 
innovator in 
HRM
Local market 
knowledge and 
cultivation, advanced 
HRM
History of mergers 
and acquisitions, 
including the Swiss 
country entity
US2 Global market and organization, 
although recently sharply reduced U.S. 
workforce, strategic decision-making is 
strongly centralised at HQ
35% of revenue generated 
in the U.S., ~30% in EMEA 
region, nearly 25% in Asia-
Pacific;
probably ~20% of 
employees located in the 
U.S. (not officially 
published) 
Ethno-/geocentric Implementor Local market 
cultivation
In recent years sharp 
decline in U.S. 
workforce, building up
capacities in 
emerging markets like
India
US3 Global market and organization, 
strategic decision-making is strongly 
centralised at U.S. divisional HQ
>40% of sales generated in 
the U.S., ~30% in Europe; 
nearly 40% of employees 
located in U.S., ~30 in 
Europe
Ethno-/geocentric Implementor Production facility, 
mastering highly 
complex 
biotechnological 
production processes 
for the flagship 
product
Greenfield site, plant 
director and HR 
manager are both 
local Swiss managers
US4 Global market and organization, 
strategic decision-making is strongly 
centralised at U.S. HQ with a tendency 
towards more centralization in recent 
years; though the EMEA region has also 
45% of employees located 
in the U.S.,  ~30% of sales 
generated in U.S.; Asia-
Pacific second most 
important region with >25% 
Globally rather 
ethnocentric; 
though
strongly 
regiocentric co-
Integrated 
Player
EMEA HQ, 
management of 
European distribution 
dealer network
Greenfield site, HR 
director is local Swiss 
manager deeply 
embedded in local 
networks and actively 
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experienced increasing internal micro-
political bargaining power
of sales, EMEA also ~25% ordination mode in 
EMEA HR
taking initiative on a 
European level to 
strengthen internal 
bargaining power of 
EMEA HQ
US5 Global market and organization, 
strategic decision-making is strongly 
centralised at divisional HQ though 
decision-making is an iterative process 
with strong involvement of regional HQ; 
EMEA HQ has experienced greater 
bargaining power through the increased 
importance of regional growth markets
40% of sales generated in 
the U.S. and Canada, 
EMEA and Asia-Pacific 
each >20%
Overall somewhere
in-between ethno- 
and geocentric; in 
EMEA region 
rather regiocentric 
mode of HR co-
ordination 
Integrated 
Player
EMEA HQ, HR centre
of expertise
Greenfield site, HR 
director is local Swiss 
manager who is firmly
embedded in local 
networks
US6 Global market and organization, 
strategic decision-making highly 
centralised at corporate HQ where even 
regional area managers for Europe are 
located
~40% of sales generated in 
North America, ~40% of 
employees located in North 
America; second most 
important region in terms of 
sales and headcount in 
Asia-Pacific with ~25%, 
Europe 15% of employees 
and 20% of sales
Ethnocentric Implementor Production facility for 
flour and animal 
nutrition for the local 
Swiss market
Brownfield site, HR 
director has been 
living in Switzerland 
for the last 40 years
US7 Global market and organization; 
strategic decision-making highly 
centralised at corporate HQ on a 
business divisional level; EMEA HQ has 
fairly restricted strategic room for 
manoeuvre and autonomy
~55% of sales generated in 
the U.S., 25% in Europe 
and Canada, 10% in Asia-
Pacific; no geographic 
breakdown of headcount 
published
Ethnocentric Integrated 
player (HQ) / 
Implementor 
(production)
Production facility for 
high-precision, high-
quality medical 
equipment and 
European 
management HQ
Greenfield site, head 
of HR is the only 
Swiss in European 
HQ structure with 400
employees
US8 A priori global market for financial 
products, though strong focus on U.S. 
also mirrored in organizational structure; 
strong centralization on a business level 
at U.S. HQ with restricted room for 
manoeuvre for regional or country-level 
facilities
International operations 
outside the U.S. accounted 
for ~25% of total revenue, 
thereof 17% in EMEA 
region; 
less than 15% of employees
located outside the U.S.,
 6% in EMEA and ~7,5% in 
Asia-Pacific
Ethnocentric Implementor Important subsidiary 
on a European level 
in terms of revenue 
and number of 
employees, activity 
firmly linked to Swiss 
banking secrecy
Co-ordination of the 
European part of the 
asset management 
business is done 
between Switzerland 
and London
                                                    319
US9 Global products on local markets, 
strong EMEA structure, organizational 
structure with global product divisions 
and local market development units 
probably closest to the transnational 
form
~40% of sales generated in 
North America, Western 
Europe and Asia accounted 
for 20% each, 10% Latin 
America, 15% Central-
Eastern Europe, Middle-
East and Africa;
no geographical breakdown
of headcount published
Rather geocentric Integrated 
player
Very important EMEA 
HQ structure where 
strategically relevant 
decisions are being 
made for an important
market, for some 
businesses even 
global decision centre
Greenfield site that 
has grown steadily 
and assumed more 
and greater 
responsibilities during 
the past decades
US10 Several global and local products on 
local markets, in organizational structure 
North American market divisions are 
very visible; 
strongly marked by growth history of 
acquisitions; 
local organizations on a country-level 
play a very important part and are 
presently still rather loosely integrated 
although efforts to integrate the company
to some greater extent are under way; 
regional European structures have only 
recently been put in place, together with 
the growing importance of regional 
markets and complexity due to further 
external growth in Eastern and South-
Eastern markets
Nearly 40% of employees 
located in U.S., 50% of 
revenue generated in the 
U.S.
Polycentric, 
currently 
developing 
regiocentric 
structures in HR 
and some more 
global integration.
Integrated 
player (both HQ 
structures)
European HQ 
structure intensively 
used for personnel 
development
Important history of 
international growth 
through acquisitions; 
very young European 
co-ordination 
structures
Source: Own compilation based on interview transcript analysis and available company information (for more details see case descriptions).
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In this chapter, we will report evidence on the transfer of HRM practices found in German and US
MNCs. The two country-of-origin groups of MNCs will be compared in order to establish whether
and to what  extent systematic differences  and
similarities  in  their  approaches  may  be
identified.  In  this  respect,  the  findings  from
previous research presented in chapters 5.1 and
5.2 and first insights gained from our analysis
of  organization-level  characteristics  in  chapter
8.1  serve  as  a  background  to  analyse  and
discuss the MNCs' approaches towards transfer.
The presentation of our empirical  findings  on
transfer will largely follow the structure that has
been  pre-defined  in  our  literature-based
integrated  conceptual  framework  for  HRM
practice transfer (see table 15). Again, the two
country-of-origin  groups  will  be  analysed
separately  in  order  to  establish  whether  the
MNCs  of  our  sample  fit  into  the  picture  of
previous  studies  on  country-of-origin  effects
concerning  differing  approaches  towards
transfer. This structure allows us to clearly see whether and to what extent the MNCs of our sample
match the pattern of systematically identified differences between German and U.S. MNCs in terms
of willingness to transfer, and the transfer process. For each of the two country-of-origin groups of
MNCs, we first discuss and summarize general willingness and reasons for transfer, and second the
transfer  process,  with reference to  the different  mechanisms,  channels  and associated measures
identified in the literature. A third section concludes the chapter with a comparison and discussion
of transfer willingness and processes in German and US MNCs, and summarizes key results in a
table.
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Chapter 8 Results of the empirical study
8.2.1 Transfer of HRM practices in German MNCs
The available information on cross-national HRM practice transfer summarized in table 16 suggests
that German MNCs have an overall subtle, selective approach towards transfer, and traditionally are
more  decentralised  in  HR  and  IR  policy  formulation  and  practice  design  than  their  U.S.
counterparts. In this section, we will summarize our empirical findings on willingness and reasons
for and against transfer as well as the transfer process based on the propositions worded by our
interviewees. These findings can then be discussed against the findings of previous studies.
8.2.1.1 Willingness to and reasons for transfer in German MNCs
A first group of German MNCs with a low willingness to transfer are unsurprisingly the ones
with a rather decentralised mode of functioning in HR, thus highlighting once again the important
role of micro-level organizational factors for the understanding of practice transfer. This first group
consists of the MNCs D3, D4 and D9.
The most remarkable or extreme case of non-transfer is the family-owned MNC D3. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, D3 is by far the smallest MNC of our sample and has not put in place
any kind of international HR co-ordination mechanisms. Consequently, local HR managers are not
even aware of what practices are in place at corporate HQ: “[willingness to transfer?] No, because
currently we do not know what the others do, there is no transfer taking place. First we would have
to know what kind of things we are duplicating or not in order to transfer something (D3_I1no1:
189, own translation). The question of whether and to what extent the absence of international HR
co-ordination, and hence, international conduits for HR practice transfer, is owed to the comparable
smallness in size or recent history of internationalization of D3 may not be definitely answered.
Though, it seems plausible to argue that formalization of practices and organizational complexity at
large  increase  proportionately  with  organizational  size  and  internationalization.  The  need  for
corporate-wide standardized and formalised practices may then very well increase partly as a result
of a critical size and organizational complexity that maybe has not yet been reached at D3. 
D9 as the second-smallest MNC of our sample is still another case of an MNC where no formalised
mechanisms  for  international  HR co-ordination  are  in  place.  Though,  as  we have  seen  in  our
presentation  of  micro-level  variables,  personal  communication  between  the  CEO  of  the  Swiss
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subsidiary and the CEO of the D9 group within the international management board is intense.
Furthermore,  as  distinct  from D3,  at  D9  there  are  first  signs  pointing  into  the  direction  of  a
standardization of certain practices, even though there aren't any formalised, structural conduits in
HR yet.  Moreover,  until  present,  there  is  no  commonly  known  corporate  HR policy,  guiding
principles or HR philosophy (D9_I1no1: 304-305, 665).  As our interviewee puts it  “[citing from
the local Swiss HR strategy]: Relations with the corporate HR organization may be described as
good but loose. There are hardly any corporate-wide HR guidelines and the common interface is
mostly restricted to reporting. Until present, the corporation dispenses with a strong connection of
the HR organization of its subsidiaries, and there are hardly any corporate guidelines or global
policies in place.  One exception is the introduction of the performance management system for
executives in 2004, where the Swiss subsidiary introduced the corporate system” (D9_I1no1: 504,
own translation). As we will see in some more detail in the following chapter, standardization at D9
in the field of HR or HR-related issues concerns also a corporate code of conduct and a corporate
sustainability policy (D9_I1no1: 686-697).  The common performance management system covers
only the executives of the group. This distinction between hierarchical levels, or between executives
and non-executives at D9 is an important aspect that has also been identified in many other MNCs
with much higher degrees of standardization throughout our sample. As we will see in the following
chapters,  several  MNCs  had  standardized  corporate  HR  practices  in  place  for  higher  ranking
managers  only.  A very  interesting  aspect  at  D9  is  the  pronounced  willingness  of  the  Swiss
subsidiary CEO to  develop  HR practices  and tools  independently from HQ:  “We also  have  a
different  culture  here.  We  are  much  more  performance-oriented  than  the  D9  group.  And
accordingly, my boss is eager to restrict interference of the group as much as possible. He just
follows the philosophy that we do it, and if the group then comes up with something better, we can
still follow them” (D9_I1no1: 361, own translation). Structurally, this was made possible through a
redefinition and upgrading of the Swiss HR function: “(...) formerly, the job that I have now was
not occupied by a personnel manager. I'd say in terms of know how and experience, this position
has  been  upgraded.  Formerly,  this  was  merely  operational,  personnel  administration,  payroll”
(D9_I1no1: 235, own translation). As we have seen in our theoretical discussion, such an increase
in resources available to the local subsidiary HR function is important for the possibility of reverse
transfer to happen since “the more resources are controlled by the local HR function, the better
placed will be the subsidiary to supply practices to the rest of the group” (Edwards et al. 2010: 619).
Endowed with sufficient local resources, the Swiss CEO could now draw on these resources  to
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engage in internal bargaining on the international management board, where he used advanced local
tools and practices to further increase the reputation and role of his subsidiary as a pacemaker unit
for  the  whole  D9 group:  “Of  course,  he  wanted  to  do  that,  and (…) he  pushed this  into  the
organization.  And  when  you  look  at  the  results  now,  you  see  that  this  was  something  highly
valuable. So now, in this international team he is the one who tells the others 'OK, this is what you
must have” (D9_I1no1: 428, own translation). Again, we can link the behaviour of this local Swiss
agent back to our theoretical discussion. In fact, this case represents a fantastic illustration of a
subsidiary with sufficient resource endowment, that develops practices and feeds them back into the
corporate network in order to strengthen its own position. In the literature, this form of agency has
been described as follows: “Being the source of new innovations that are subsequently transferred
to  the  heart  of  the  multinational,  reverse  diffusion  is  one  mechanism  through  which  foreign
operating units may enhance their status and claim on resources”  (Edwards and Tempel 2010: 19;
Ferner and Varul 2000a).
D4 is the third German MNC of our sample that is still rather decentralised in HR and IR. There is a
willingness to standardize certain practices, for example the use of a common recruiting tool and
issues related to employer branding, and an estimated 10-15% of trainings (D4_I1,I2no1: 265-267).
However,  according  to  our  interviewees,  in  many  instances  the  decision  of  whether  to  adopt
common corporate practices or whether to stick to local systems and tools was left to site managers:
“Well, until now it was own initiative. (…) for example, as a site manager at [site in Germany] I
have introduced the appraisal interview tool from Switzerland because I better liked it than the one
at [other German site]. And this was OK. It very much depended on what regulation you had (…)
what conditions, and for what reason you did it. How strong harmonizing ambitions will be in the
new corporation [after internal restructuring: merger of two product divisions], best practice, I
guess you can't tell by now. As I said, it has just started” (D4_I1,I2no1:544-545, own translation).
Generally,  our  interviewees  viewed  harmonization  with  a  critical  eye  due  to  their  personal
experiences: “And the problem with harmonization is (…) you always have to look very closely to
know who has what kind of process, and why? The same thing that we are now doing here: to
establish what is best practice under the given circumstances. And if you start harmonizing you
mostly end up at a level which isn't necessarily best practice any more. And so it hasn't been done
any more in major areas. (…) The effort to roll out and implement such a thing is sometimes so big
that input isn't commensurate with output any longer” (D4_I1,I2no1: 555, 557, own translation).
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Even though, our interviewees expressed the view that cost and efficiency pressures, and the related
internal restructuring would lead to changes in processes, and thus, to a new wave of harmonization
initiatives (D4_I1,I2no1: 308).
A second  group  consists  of  German MNCs that  expose  a  marked  willingness  to  transfer
standardized corporate practices. Throughout our sample, the tendency towards standardization and
transfer  is  a  rather  recent  development  that  goes  hand in  hand with  a  swing of  the  pendulum
towards  overall  greater  centralization.  This  second  group  of  comprises  the  greater  part  of  the
German MNCs of our sample and includes D1, D2, D5, D6 and D8, while D7 might be viewed as a
case in-between the two groups.
At  D1, overall willingness to transfer standardized corporate HR practices has sharply increased
with the implementation of the D1 HR system in the mid-2000s. “Starting with HR IT, where they
want to have certain global standards, it continues with global trainee programmes, a worldwide
common presentation in personnel marketing, and it includes also organization. (...) Yes, in recent
years this has been very strong” (D1_I1no1: 124, 128, own translation). Our interviewee saw the
main reasons for this drive towards standardization in the greater facility of reporting (D1_I1no1:
263-265) and in reduced costs: “(...) it's also a cost factor. They want to get away from different IT-
solutions in every single country” (D1_I1no1: 267).
The situation at D2 is somehow similar to D1 concerning recently increased willingness to transfer.
Although  at  D2,  this  willingness  can  be  clearly  linked  to  an  internal  restructuring  called
transforming HR. This programme was guided by a  U.S. management consultancy aiming at  a
centralization  of  processes  and  a  transformation  of  HR  managers  into  HR  business  partners
following the example of many Anglo-Saxon MNCs.  “The project is called transforming HR. In
fact, to put it simple, I believe it is the [large US MNC] model. A centralization of processes on [IT
company X] systems including tools for HR managers who have changed their function, who are
transforming into HR business partners. That's the concept. Also with tools, many tools on intranet
(…) It applies to all the three divisions of the group. So we have the same processes (...). And this
brings very much transparency. It's very hard to put in place” (D2_I1no1: 86-87, own translation). 
Concerning  the  reasons  behind  this  pronounced  will  to  standardize  and  to  transfer  uniform
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corporate  practices  and processes,  our  interviewee  mentioned  the  will  to  optimize,  to  improve
efficiency and profitability, but also transparency and control. “Transparency. You may as well call
it control. (…) Today it is very difficult to find out about the headcount. Not all sites are on the same
system. So this is a big problem. Finally, we are doing work twice or thrice. So there is a need for
efficiency (…) today, the HR manager doesn't have to formulate a job description. The forms are
already disposable (…) and sufficiently well structured to evaluate the job and to define a salary
band” (D2_I1no1: 195).  Furthermore,  another reason for such standards was seen in improved
equity between  the  plants  and sites  (D2_I1no1:  237).  During our  first  presentation  to  validate
results, our interview partners emphasized a negative impact of such transparency that consisted in
very rigid budgets “The subsidiary looses in flexibility” (D2_I1no2, I5no1: 19).
D5 is  an  MNC that  formerly  had  rather  decentralised  structures,  especially  in  consulting  and
distribution,  but  then  “(...)  starting  for  years  ago,  the  pendulum began to  swing  in  the  other
direction (…) so that we didn't say we want to centralise, but we want to harmonize” (D5_I1no1:
98-99). In this connection, at D5 the great influence of the introduction of HR shared service centres
and concomitant reduction of local resources in HR was evident as an element of the structural
organization of the HR function and delivery: “(...) for example the billing of bonuses is done in a
shared service centre. And this is an activity we cannot perform locally any more because we don't
have  sufficient  capacities  (…)  We  don't  have  the  resources  any  more” (D5_I1no2:  308,  own
translation) “It's also because (…) otherwise we wouldn't have any efficiency gains in the end. We
want to avoid that every country is doing its own thing” (D5_I1no1: 319, own translation). But also
global clients were seen as a driver for standardization (D5_I1no2: 16). 
Furthermore,  in  our  validation  session  our  interviewee  also  emphasized  the  fact  that  conflict
between subsidiary and HQ often arises from a time lag between the learning curves of HQ and
subsidiary  “There  is  always  some  oscillation  between  emancipation  and
centralization/standardization. Though, learning curves in corporate HR and subsidiary are not
running parallel. This is a source of potential conflict. Currently we are just undergoing a swing
back towards empowerment of subsidiaries” (D5_I1no2: 9, own translation). Another interesting
fact concerning D5 is the fact that in this already highly standardized MNC, the current tendency is
back to subsidiary empowerment, which is the opposite trend compared to the situation at D1 and
D2. Our D5 interviewee was also very aware of different views on standardization, depending on
whether the perspective is local or global:  “(...) so the introduction of global systems has always
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been viewed as a loss of quality, although the latter absolutely make sense in the context of the
whole D5 group since they allow to get also less developed countries extremely fast on a high level
of sophistication as regards content” (D5_I1no2: 105, own translation).
D6  may be seen as a case where the strong willingness to engage in cross-national transfer of
standard corporate HR practices is very much driven by a centralised organization and strict top-
down implementation of a global strategy in a firm that is serving global clients. “We have a (…)
verticalised organization where functions are controlled throughout all the countries. For example,
we  have  near  shore  locations  in  Hungary  and  (…)  in  the  Czech  Republic,  we  have  delivery
organizations that serve a client like Shell worldwide. And of course, if you have only local HR
practices  there,  practices that  have nothing to  do with what  is  happening in the neighbouring
country, on the same account, or within the same service tower, then it doesn't work. So, in the end
it's  also  the  internationalization  strategy  behind  that”  (D6_I1no1:  220,  own  translation).
“Formerly we worked to improve and roll out our own practices, and to invent new things. Now we
have  partly  reduced  services  and  complied  with  global  guidelines   (D6_I1no1:  253,  own
translation).  Once again,  efficiency gains  were mentioned as a main reason for standardization
(D6_I1no1:  218),  together  with  improved  control  of  global  implementation  of  guidelines
(D6_I1no1: 219). Furthermore, the case of D6 clearly illustrates the imperative for coordination in
HRM that results from a global strategy and global clients.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, D8 was born as a spin-off of another big German chemical
company operating on every major global market. This fact may explain why this comparatively
small MNC in terms of its number of employees it still strongly internationalized and has engaged
in international practice transfer. At D8, there is a willingness to manage centrally, and for example
to conclude certain service contracts centrally for the whole firm (D8_I1no1: 192). Furthermore, a
new SAP system has been implemented and our interviewee thought it was very likely that payroll,
fringe benefits and bonuses would be centralised in the short term (D8_I1no1: 197). Furthermore,
there  is  a  willingness  to  optimize  not  only payroll,  but  also  job  descriptions  and competences
(D8_I1no1: 391).  In this  respect,  our interviewee mentioned two main reasons for transfer and
centralization.  While  the  first  reason  is  the  well-known issue  of  improved  control,  the  second
concerns improved communication for the development of a common HR philosophy, which is
facilitated when HR is centralised in one building (D8_I1no1: 391). 
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The situation at D7 seems to be less clear-cut than for instance at D6, and might be seen as a case
in between the very decentralised and the very centralised German MNCs. While there is a certain
willingness to transfer standard corporate practices in specific areas like talent management, yet
apparently there is still considerable room for manoeuvre for local decisions in the field of HR:
“until  present,  the  D7  group  leaves  its  subsidiaries  rather  alone”  (D7_I1no1:  171,  own
translation). “I haven't had any problem. Until now we're lucky since the D7 group lets us use our
current  tools  (...).  (D7_I1no1:  365,  own  translation).  Though,  the  interviewee  knew  that  the
introduction  of  an enterprise  resource  planning system had already been decided,  and that  this
would probably be implemented within the next two to five years (D7_I1no1: 366). Also corporate
HR structures were already being aligned to  match the corporate  model  “Because if  you have
different structures, this doesn't correspond” (D7_I1no1: 185, own translation) Moreover, the fact
of there being three main hubs in Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. in the pharmaceutical division
of  D7 made important  co-ordination efforts  in  HR necessary in  order to  facilitate  management
across these countries and sites (D7_I1no1: 453). Another feature underlining the middle position of
D7 in terms of transfer willingness is the fact that there are shared service centres in place, though
only  in  Switzerland  and  not  on  a  European  or  on  a  global  divisional  level  (D7_I1no1:  191).
Although our interviewee sensed that there was a willingness to more strongly centralise and to
establish shared service centres, until present there were no concrete signs that such centres were to
be created in the near future (D7_I1no1: 197, 201).
Table 26 below provides a short overview of willingness to and reasons for transfer in the German
MNCs of our sample according to our interview partners.
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Table 26: Willingness to and reasons for transfer in German MNCs
MNC Willingness to transfer Reasons for transfer
D1 Strong  in  recent  years
(introduction  of  “D1  HR
system”)
Reporting, cost reductions
D2 Strong in recent years (project
“transforming HR”)
Efficiency gains, transparency and control, equity
D3 - Avoiding duplications
D4 Low for downstream transfer, 
fairly  high  for  flow  diffusion
and reverse transfer
Efficiency gains and cost reductions through new processes
D5 Strong,  although  recently
again  some  more  autonomy
for subsidiaries
Serving global clients, efficiency gains through reduction of local
HR resources together with shared service structure, very fast
way  to  put  in  place  sophisticated  HR practices  in  developing
country subsidiaries
D6 Strong Internationalization  strategy  /  serving  global  clients,  top-down
global strategy implementation and imperative for co-ordination
D7 Medium,  might  significantly
increase  with  introduction  of
ERP system
Efficiency, co-ordination needs
D8 Strong Establishing a common HR philosophy, efficiency gains
D9 Low for downstream transfer, 
high  for  upstream  /  reverse
transfer
Efficiency gains, avoiding duplications, 
reverse  transfer  driven  by  Swiss  subsidiary  CEO's  agency  to
strengthen  the  subsidiary's  relative  position  and  bargaining
power in internal negotiations within the MNC network
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis.
8.2.1.2 Transfer process: channels, mechanisms and measures in German 
MNCs
At D1, mandatory standard practices are usually rolled out from staff units at corporate HQ where
project leaders are in charge of planning and control. Secondly, the weekly calls within the business
unit HR play an important part in communicating and controlling the rollout of new practices and
processes  (D1_I1no1: 302-306). Important channels are regular HR meetings where examples of
best  practices  are  presented.  “And what  we are  currently  focusing  on is  HR maturity  models.
Though, this is not necessarily best practice but rather to measure oneself and to see what measures
to take in order to achieve a higher level of maturity” (D1_I1no1: 257, own translation). 
On the other hand, the use of mandatory best practice schemes is currently rather the exception
„[best practice schemes?] Currently this is rather seldom (...) There are certain international HR
meetings where one says: 'Look, there was something awesome, present it!' But this is more sort of
an input, an idea. It is still  rather the exception that they say: it has to be like that. There are
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individual  cases,  but  these  are  rare“  (D1_I1no1:  259,  own  translation).  Although  the  use  of
mandatory  best  practice  schemes  is  cautious,  D1  nevertheless  heavily  uses  direct  transfer
mechanisms such as common HR guidelines, structures and rules as those involved in the D1 HR
system (D1_I1no1: 121-124). Furthermore, these formal channels and mechanisms are backed up
with informal ones. These include great numbers of international transfers between different sites
throughout the D1 group, and a sustained corporate culture and corporate values that are at the basis
of  leadership  principles,  core  competences  and  corporate  vision  (D1_I1no1:  131). Concerning
corporate culture at D1, our expatriate interviewee explained the following:“I suggest that the D1
culture is very strong. That's why I think that this investigation is very difficult, since I believe that
the D1 culture is more dominant than national culture – also because the two are intermingled [OS:
D1  also  defines  itself  as  a  German  firm]  A  Swabian  one!  (laughs)”  (D1_I2no1:  62-65,  own
translation). „In my view, this is a very technology driven firm with an utterly strong engineering
culture  and  a  strong  competence  in  manufacturing“ (D1_I2no1:  82,  own  translation).  These
statements seem to suggest that the D1 culture our interviewee refers to apparently is based on a
German concept of corporate culture as an organic whole that has historically grown (Wächter et al.
2003: 82). Even if also formalized corporate values are used as management tools, yet it seems that
the kind of D1 corporate culture described by the above-cited expatriate is qualitatively distinct
from the notion of an engineered corporate culture as it is typically associated with US corporations
(Alvesson  2002:  47–48).  In  fact,  D1  corporate  culture  not  only  comprises  typically  German
engineering technology-related values, but also explicitly refers to regional traits and heritage in the
company values  as  elements  that  would  not  typically be  associated  with  US MNCs'  corporate
values and cultures.
Also at D2, there is a structured and well-defined transfer process in place. There are project groups
who are in charge of the rollout, which is done through workshops in each region and followed up
by telephone-  and same time  conferences  that  are  coupled  with  presentation  slides.  Here,  HR
managers can chat and post questions, and comprehensive documentation and support material is
provided to the HR business partners  (D2_I1no1: 318-319).  Successful rollout of new standard
practices and tools is also fixed as an individual objective for HR managers (D2_I1no1: 320- 321).
Concerning the transfer process, our interviewee from the D2 Switzerland subsidiary emphasized
the utmost importance of using people-based channels together with the procedural ones in order to
correctly implement new tools:  “During all the implementation, D2 has also done meetings with
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HR. (…) This was in 2007. First they didn't want to do that. But then they realised that they had to
explain. You cannot lead through e-mails and Powerpoint attachments. First of all, not everybody
throughout Europe and the world has sufficient proficiency in English to be able to understand
everything  immediately.  Hence,  certain  things  just  get  lost  because  of  interpretation.  So  they
corrected this and there were lots of conference calls. Same time conferences (…) but also one
meeting a year were people meet personally” (D2_I4no1: 295, own translation).  Referring to our
integrated conceptual  framework for  HRM practice transfer  (table  15),  such “interpretation”  of
formally transferred  practices  and  tools  might  in  fact  reduce  the  degree  of  internalization  and
functionality of transferred practices as important dimensions of cross-national practice transfer. An
innovative element at D2 may be seen in the use of a change management team “(...) there is a very
strong change management team. These three days of workshops at Zurich for the 50 countries of
Middle and Eastern Europe. (...) Half of the time we passed doing change management. We've done
a piece of theatre. They sold the project to us so that we could sell it locally” (D2_I1no1: 337, own
translation). Furthermore, the local presence of expatriates on key positions at D2 international with
their networks at corporate HQ was seen as another mechanism facilitating transfer “Actually they
are playing the role of vectors (…) you have to make sure that the person in place has this network
with Germany in order transfer, this is extremely important” (D2_I1no1: 349, own translation). The
idea of expatriates as vectors has also been validated by one of our expatriate interviewees who
explained that structures were fairly German although there were 17 or 18 different nationalities
present. Because after all, all of these people had a sustained working experience at corporate HQ,
and  thus,  underwent  a  thorough  socialization  to  German  HQ  ways  of  doing  (D2_I2no1:  26).
Furthermore, a formalised best practice scheme is in place, where internal surveys are conducted in
order to find out what is done in certain areas of HR like variable pay for sellers in order to identify
best practices that would be transferred afterwards (D2_I1no1: 294-295, 298).  Shared HR service
centres as a structural expression of standardized practices currently do exist at D2, but they do not
cover all the countries. The model of the U.S. consultant firm that has been implemented at D2
prescribed a gradual aggregation of activities according to the size of operations in a country. Only
in countries with more than 1000 employees, the system was fully rolled out, whereas countries like
Switzerland were partly exempt from certain standardizations where shared services are involved
(D2_I4no1: 24-28).  
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Due to the fact that until present, no transfer of HR practices has taken place at D3, we could not
find any information on transfer processes. Unfortunately, the introduction of a corporate code of
conduct in May 2012 (D3 group 2012b) came to late for our investigation to see how the latter was
transferred and implemented internationally. As we have seen, there are no formal guidelines of
integrated IT systems in place in the field of HR. Furthermore, there are no meetings or regular
conference calls between HR managers of different countries, so that there are no formal transfer
channels in place. The only means of a minimum standardization in the field of HR are prescribed
in  ISO  9001,  that  has  been  implemented  throughout  the  D3  group  (D3_I1no1:  167).  Our
interviewee recalled that once someone from HQ called and asked for some forms that had been
created at D3 Switzerland, though without any follow-up or further information: “They asked me
once for some forms since we had created some things that I guess were interesting for them. I don't
know what they have done with it. There was no callback. And I didn't care about whether they had
kept our form or not or adapted something, I don't know (D3_I1no1: 368). Corporate culture at D3
apparently has a lot  of typical  elements  of  a  family-owned SME, though we couldn't  find any
evidence of a clear link to corporate ways of doing or even to concrete HRM practices that would
be transferred using this indirect mechanism (D3_I1no1: 477). 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, at D4 there are especially meetings as a form of people-
based channels in place. Though, until present, there was no formalised and systematic system of
best practice identification and transfer in place. Existing people-based channels were rather used
for exchange on certain practices, but also to meet and support collaborators working on other sites
of D4. Overall, there was no strong corporate centre in HR that would have defined and rolled out
global practices, but it was rather  “only partially harmonizing impulses” (D4_I1,I2no1: 571) that
might come from HQ, but as well from other plant managers. As we have also seen in the previous
chapter, a common corporate culture is not present at D4, and therefore not used as an indirect
transfer mechanism  (D4_I1,I2no1: 226-230). Also, there is no integrated HR IT-system in place
(D4_I1,I2no1: 224), and hence, IT-based tools and heavy use of procedural channels are not an
option for HR practice transfer at D4. Yet, in view of the current internal restructuring with the
merger  of  two formerly independent  product  divisions,  our  interviewees  underlined  that  future
developments in the direction of more harmonization including the use of best practice schemes was
not excluded (D4_I1,I2no1: 545). In any case, the required conduits for more formalised exchange
and  transfer  of  HR practices  doubtlessly  do  exist.  This  is  manifest  in  the  presence  of  multi-
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directional or flow diffusion, as well as reverse transfer at D4. For example, based on her own
initiative,  our  German  interviewee  took  the  decision  to  transfer  the  appraisal  interviews  from
Switzerland to the German plant, where she used to work before (D4_I1,I2no1: 544). This transfer
did not pass from subsidiary through HQ in order to be spread out globally, but only from one
subsidiary to another, and hence, may be seen as an example for multi-directional or flow diffusion
rather than as reverse transfer. A further interesting detail about this case of flow diffusion of an HR
tool is the possibility to illustrate a profoundly German issue of agency. In fact, still another, much
greater German facility of D4 would have liked to introduce these Swiss appraisal interviews, but
they couldn't because they were blocked by local works council who did not give its consent: “(...)
[at facility O] they would have liked to introduce the appraisal interview as well, but it didn't work
with their works council.  They wanted another practice since this one would have required too
much investment (D4_I1,I2no1: 566, own translation). Therefore, this failed flow transfer towards
another German site gives an illustration of how local German works councils as central actors have
sufficient institutional power resources to block such HR initiatives in Germany. However, there is
also an example of successful reverse diffusion of a Swiss practice, the exit interview, that has been
identified and adopted throughout Germany as a best practice (D4_I1,I2no1: 565).
At D5, global standard practices are communicated top-down trough a process owner, the executive
board or the regional management board, and regularly followed by feedback rounds. These are
giving local subsidiaries the possibility to feed back information on local problems with the new
standard processes and to suggest changes (D5_I1no1: 142-143, 303). International conduits are in
place and comprise meetings and frequent, regular conference calls  (D5_I1no1: 148).  Especially
when  compared  to  D4,  D5  makes  strikingly  extensive  use  of  direct  transfer  mechanisms  and
procedural channels that are coupled with explicit formal control systems. As we have seen in the
previous  chapter,  these  channels  are  also visible  in  the  HR architecture  of  D5 with  centres  of
excellence and expertise for instance in the area of rewards, and shared service centres, where the
transactional part of HRM such as payroll, mobility and recruiting is centralised using standardized
global tools  (D5_I1no1: 21-22). New corporate standard practices are usually centrally designed
within the global HR function, and then, country subsidiaries are invited to give some feedback
before  new  systems  are  rolled  out.  “(...)  in  all  areas  including  HR  we  are  really  heavily
harmonized. This resulted in a net decline of local decisional power of single country subsidiaries.
So, in many instances it was just: execute. Decisions were taken as follows: a global corporate
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function designs and presents, country subsidiaries give feedback. Then the changes suggested in
the  feedback  are  implemented  or  not.  If  there  are  legal  restrictions  this  is  a  must  for
implementation. And then it was just: roll it out and use it. Replace your local systems” (D5_I1no1:
100). Transfer in HR functional areas where shared service centres are involved basically happens
through new standard processes in the integrated HR IT-system. Such standard processes are in
place for instance for global talent review (D5_I1no1: 257).  Exchange between HR managers on
best practices is equally backed up by the integrated HR IT-system with dashboards being visible
throughout the whole EMEA region (D5_I1no1: 157).
At  D6, HR policy, practices and tools are developed and decided upon at a corporate centre of
competence  in  HR  which  is  located  in  Germany.  Practices  are  then  rolled  out  through  the
international  HR  functional  line  and  implemented  locally  through  the  HR  business  partners
(D6_I1no1: 482-484). Priorities in HR are formally defined in an international HR strategy and HR
roadmap. Transfer control is ensured through a close follow-up of activities that are defined in the
HR  roadmap,  and  inclusion  of  roadmap  targets  in  individual  objectives  of  HR  managers
(D6_I1no1: 204-206, 494).  During the design phase of new HR practices and tools,  there is  a
regular  and  structured  two-way  communication  taking  place  within  HR  communities,  where
concepts  are  presented,  feedback  is  given  and  taken  into  consideration.  According  to  our
interviewee, expatriates did not play any role in HR practice transfer (D6_I1no1: 498). The central
role of the German market for D6 is not only reflected in its organizational structure as we have
seen in the previous chapter, but also in the HR structure. Although there is a big shared service
centre for D6 Germany, other countries like Switzerland are not integrated into any shared service
structure  (D6_I1no1: 223-228).  Transfer  is  furthermore driven by core process  standardizations
including SAP HR  (D6_I1no1: 162, 306). This standardization of core processes is also closely
linked to the internal research for best practices. These might also be identified in some foreign
subsidiary,  as D6 wishes to standardize the best processes throughout the company  (D6_I1no1:
437-439). Concerning socialization mechanisms and the role of corporate culture, we would argue
that  even  though  there  are  common  values  and  guidelines  in  place,  their  role  as  a  transfer
mechanism seems to be somewhat  restricted.  Apparently,  internalization of such guidelines and
values seems to be significantly lower than in other firms, especially when compared to US MNCs,
as the following extract illustrates: “(…) there are so-called guiding principles, there are five (…)
or six? Actually I should  know that (…)” (D6_I1no1: 230, own translation). The seemingly low
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degree  of  internalization  of  these  guiding  principles  as  corporate  values,  which  are  however
formally integrated into the competence model and used for appraisal and selection, might also be
explained by the fact that they have been implemented only one and a half years before we made
our  interview  (D6_I1no1:  236).  Furthermore,  it  might  prove  comparatively more  difficult  in  a
formerly state-owned firm like D6 with its public service administrative heritage to implement this
kind  of  management  tools.  Apparently,  D6  has  intended  to  introduce  corporate  values  as  a
management tool similar to many US MNCs (Wächter et al. 2003: 82) in an attempt to deliberately
engineer D6 corporate culture. As far as our limited interview material suggests, this effort does at
leat not yet seem to yield the desired results.
At  D7,  standard policies are usually designed centrally,  but  “centrally customized” (D7_I1no1:
374, own translation) to local needs by a team which is very open for comments and feedback from
other facilities. New practices and tools are normally cascaded down the line from corporate over
divisional  to the local  level  (D7_I1no1: 468-470).  Though, our interviewee left  no doubt as to
where and how decisions on transfer are taken: “We would detect and report problems if there are
any, yes. But this is not perforce. It's just to say that this isn't a democracy” (D7_I1no1: 478).  Our
interviewee underlined the important role of the owner family for D7 corporate culture in a very
large sense. This is manifest in the strong centralization of strategic decision-making and in a very
long-term, rather risk averse approach to decision making (D7_I1no1: 411, 413, 421). The presence
of a sustained, strongly German-influenced corporate culture and the fact that half of the executive
board of the Swiss subsidiary of D6 is composed of either Germans, or people who underwent a
German socialization, may be viewed as indirect transfer mechanisms (D7_1no1: 177, 375, 444).
Additionally there is a best practice scheme in place, where potential best practices are regularly
presented during the annual international HR conference. Some of them are then institutionalised on
a global level upon decision of the global HR council and cascaded downstream (D7_I1no1: 432-
438). Yet, there is no common catalogue containing best practices that would be accessible to HR
managers facing a certain problem (D7_I1no1: 442).
Standard HR practices that should be rolled out globally at  D8 are usually developed by an HR
project group, where often HR managers from other sites or countries are involved  “(...) this is
done centrally. And for instance, an HR manager may have that mandate (…) who integrates other
HR managers from everywhere according to the area. And they will work on a project (…) Finally
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the central HR manager will ask for approval of the board for the rollout” (D8_I1no1: 434-436,
own translation; 488, 492).  Consultations are done with country HR managers during the design
phase, especially in order to take into account legal restrictions and to dissolve possible conflicts
already at an early stage of development  (D8_I1no1: 424, 451-458).  New practices and tools are
then transferred from central HR as an order to country HR and country representatives (D8_I1no1:
424). The implementation of the practice itself is done by the local HR manager, who often works
in close collaboration with the local country manager or head of business unit “(...) we will bring
together everybody and explain it verbally. Afterwards a document will be arriving. This is often
done in close collaboration with the general manager” (D8_I1no1: 438, own translation). Our
interviewee underlined the role of personal communication in the process of implementation at D8
Switzerland “Well, the advantage here is that it is small. This makes direct personal communication
possible  after  people  have been informed,  so it's  easier” (D8_I1no1: 486).  In some areas  like
compensation,  there  is  just  a  broad  framework  transferred  and  the  local  HR  manager  adapts
practices to local circumstances (D8_I1no1: 145). According to our interviewee, expatriates are not
directly involved in practice transfer (D8_I1no1: 459-460). However, a strong corporate culture is
currently developing that affects HR “(...) I think we are heading towards a firm philosophy in HR
that is very, very important” (D8_I1no1: 205, own translation). In fact, it is not astonishing that an
own corporate culture and HR philosophy are currently still under construction, since D8 was born
only recently as  a  spin-off  from another  big  German chemical  MNC,  as  we have  seen  in  the
previous chapter. Even though, having a look at staffing practices at D8, there is evidence of many
international assignments with staff going from HQ to subsidiaries and the other way round. When
asked about the reason behind this international transfer of employees, our interviewee answered
“The  purpose  is  often  a  growth  in  local  responsibility  (…)  It's  more  to  acquire  a  bit  HQ's
philosophy (…) And to diffuse it as well” (D8_I1no1: 274-278, own translation). This is why we
would  argue  for  the  presence  and  deliberate  use  of  indirect  transfer  mechanisms  involving
international transfer of managers and socialization practices at D8.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are no formal, regular and structured mechanisms of
international co-ordination, communication and control in place for the HR function at  D9. Thus,
basic  organizational  conduits  that  are  considered  to  be  central  for  cross-national  HR practice
transfer (Edwards et al. 2010: 618), are missing. However, as we have seen, direct channels in HR
are substituted to a certain extent by a strong people-based channel between the local Swiss and
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corporate CEO at HQ, who are both Swiss and members of the international D9 management board.
Furthermore, according to our interviewee, through his initiatives, the Swiss CEO made the Swiss
country subsidiary one of the most profitable ones of D9 during the past five years (D9_I1no1: 573-
575). Especially the fact that the Swiss CEO is a very active local agent may explain why transfer
of HR practices has nevertheless taken place at D9. Our information suggests that the Swiss CEO
consciously engages in the transfer of locally developed innovations in HR in order to improve his
own visibility and the relative position of his subsidiary within the D9 network. The first corporate-
wide standard practice and process was a common performance management system for executives
that  originated  from corporate  HQ and  had  been  introduced  already  in  2003-2004  before  our
interviewee has joined D9  (D9_I1no1: 227-231). Unfortunately, due to this fact we do not know
how this system was rolled out at that time. Nevertheless, what is interesting with the case of D9 is
the fact that even though there are hardly any international conduits in HR, there is still some HR
practice  transfer,  including  reverse  transfer,  happening.  Until  present,  such  transfer  was  rather
unstructured and did not follow a clearly defined process. For instance, a recent transfer involved a
broad framework concerning sustainability, where corporate HQ created a brochure and the Swiss
CEO charged his local HR manager with the development of a lean Swiss version of this brochure
and corresponding practices, as well as implementation through training of local staff (D9_I1no1:
687-693): “Now the group has created a wonderful, thick book on sustainability, a nice masterpiece
in  this  form [shows  the  book].  But  I  got  the  order  from my  boss:  'Do  something  concerning
sustainability. The group has done that, we must have that, too' (…) So I said: 'OK, then I will
contact Mr. M. on that issue who has thought seriously about these issues'. Just because I thought I
didn't have to reinvent the wheel, right. And then my boss answered: 'Well yes, you can, although
they didn't have further thoughts on it. They just created a brochure (…) So what am I supposed to
do with  that?” (D9_I1no1:  688,  691,  own translation).  A major  case  of  reverse  transfer  from
Switzerland to corporate HQ was the corporate code of behaviour. This code had been developed by
a working group around the Swiss HR manager and was laboriously implemented in Switzerland
with  a  road show and  trainings  throughout  2009  (D9_I1no1:  317,  325). Afterwards,  when the
corporate CEO took note of this code, he decided that this was something the whole group should
have,  and a  lawyer  was  mandated  to  elaborate  such a  code for  the  D9 group.  The Swiss  HR
manager  was  then  consulted  and  solicited  as  part  of  a  team  that  discussed  the  rollout  and
implementation of this code so that corporate HR could build on the Swiss experience (D9_I1no1:
327). Finally, when the corporate version of the code of behaviour arrived, the Swiss HR manager
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refused to implement this version, which was nearly the same as the Swiss one “Yes, this is a good
example where (…) I just said: 'I won't do that'” (D9_I1no1: 331, own translation). Similarly, HR
practices were fed into the corporate network from Switzerland in the field of leadership training,
where a sophisticated, lavish concept had been developed and implemented (D9_I1no1: 416-428).
Concerning implementation of corporate standard practices, somehow similar to the transfer process
there is no common standard in place, and implementation differs between countries: “It very much
depends on the respective corporate culture in that country how they generally deal with trainings.
Do they just send such a thing and say: 'Read it through, this is now effective', or do they really
train  it?”  (D9_I1no1:  522,  own  translation).  We  would  therefore  suggest  that  there  is  no
sufficiently strong socialization to a common corporate culture at D9 that it might be considered an
indirect transfer mechanism. Yet, international project groups as an associated measure for transfer
and development of practices seem to be just in the making. For instance, the team working on the
global rollout and implementation of the corporate code of behaviour seems to be a development
pointing into this direction.
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Table 27: Transfer process: channels, mechanisms and measures in German MNCs
MNC Transfer channel and mechanisms measures
D1 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: Business unit HR, project leaders of staff units at HQ,  HR maturity
models, exchange on best or innovative practices mostly non-mandatory
People-based channels and indirect mechanisms: international transfers, sustained corporate culture (though
not an “engineered” one), international meetings (business unit and geographic level Europe)
Explicit control of roll-out through staff units
and superiors within the business-line HR,
mailings
D2 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: guidelines, manuals, documentation, IT-based tools, best practice
scheme
People-based channels  & indirect  mechanisms:  change management  team, expatriates as vectors on key
positions at local subsidiary (D2 international)
Control  as  part  of  individual  objectives  of
HR managers, conference calls, same time
and international HR meetings
D3 Non existence of direct mechanisms and formal, procedural channels;  the only exception might be seen in
corporate-wide ISO standards
A certain  socialization linked to  a  familiar  corporate  culture  is  present  although not  directly  related  to  HR
practices
No measures are in  place to  transfer  HR
practices
D4 Direct as well as indirect mechanisms and channels rather weakly developed , best practice scheme is rather a
tool  for  exchange and gives  impulses to  local  HR managers than defining mandatory practices.  However,
international HR meetings serve as an efficient conduit for exchange on practices and enable flow and reverse
diffusion
International HR meetings, project groups
D5 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms are heavily used: new standard processes are centrally designed by
global corporate HR and then rolled out as new processes in the integrated HR IT-system; 
structurally, this kind of transfer mechanisms and channels are also reflected in the HR architecture with shared
service centres operating global processes, and centres of expertise and excellence that are leading process
design
Benchmarking  and  exchange  of  best
practices  is  utterly  transparent  throughout
the  EMEA  region  through  the  use  of
automatically  generated  dashboards  as
part  of  a  sophisticated  integrated  HR  IT-
system
D6 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms are heavily used to transfer via guidelines, the HR roadmap and
standard processes that are linked to a best practice scheme
People-based channels and indirect mechanisms: prescriptive corporate values are present although they do
not seem very much internalised
Control through formal systems
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D7 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms  are mostly used, including a formalised process of  international
exchange on best practices in HR, as well as certain standardized global processes (e.g. high potential/talent
identification and development), 
People-based channels and indirect mechanisms: presence of a marked corporate culture that is very much
influenced by the owner family and German culture and expatriates from German HQ in key positions
International  HR  meetings,  direct  control
through  expatriates  from  HQ  in  key
positions
D8 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms are used, although in Switzerland, the transfer process is heavily
backed up by personnel communication, 
Indirect mechanisms & people-based channels: even if D8 is a fairly young company where corporate culture is
not yet well-developed, indirect transfer mechanisms such as international transfer of managers and associated
socialization practices are used to a great extent
an  interesting  element  is  HR  practice
design through international project  teams
and an annual international meeting of the
HR group function
D9 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms are currently at a low stage of development: there are some large
frameworks for policies,  although local  implementation apparently differs widely between subsidiaries since
there are no standardized implementation processes in place,
People-based channels and indirect mechanisms: lacking formal, structured conduits in HR, a strong and direct
people-based channel consisting of the international management board serves as the most important transfer
channel – a channel that is controlled and deliberately used for micro-political reasons by one single local actor:
the Swiss CEO
International project groups seem to be in
the making: currently ad hoc teams are built
to facilitate the exchange of experiences
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis.
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8.2.2 Transfer of HRM practices in US MNCs
In our literature review on US MNCs' approaches towards transfer (see table 18), we have seen that
the latter  were regularly found to heavily rely on formalization and standard processes as their
privileged  transfer  channel.  Furthermore,  they  were  generally  marked  by comparatively  strong
centralization and showed a strong willingness to transfer country-of-origin practices as part  of
HIWSs. As we have seen in the description of our case study companies, in some of the US MNCs,
further integration of activities was even explicitly referred to as part of their strategic objectives.
Furthermore,  our  previous  analysis  of  micro-level  corporate  characteristics  revealed  fairly  high
degrees of centralization for the major part of our case study US MNCs.
As in the previous sections on German MNCs, we will start with a presentation of willingness and
reasons for transfer as viewed by our interviewees, to continue with the presentation of the transfer
process in some more detail in a second step.
8.2.2.1 Willingness to and reasons for transfer in US MNCs
As we have seen in our presentation of the micro-level organizational features of US1, this MNC is
an interesting case of a highly decentralised MNC that does not dispose of a strong HQ structure or
other comparable centre. While this organizational structure fits in quite well with the description of
a  decentralised  federation  (see  table  11),  international  co-ordination  through  a  multitude  of
organizational conduits  is  however  intense.  According to our interviewee,  there is  indeed some
willingness to standardize and transfer certain guidelines across the global US1 network. This is
done in order to achieve efficiency gains, and to make sure that certain quality and ethical standards
are  respected  throughout  the  network  (US1_I1no1:   137,  140,  142,  271).  Common  guidelines
therefore are in place for employer branding and a common corporate identity, but also for quality
standards. For instance, in recruiting, certain skill and competence requirements for candidates are
defined in order to be eligible for certain jobs. Furthermore, US1 has a common corporate code of
conduct  (US1_I1no1:  137, 140, 142). At the same time though, our interviewee was very clear
about  limitations  concerning the  ability  to  transfer  standard  practices,  that  are  due  to  the  US1
corporate structure. Since at US1, there is only networking, and no “networking within hierarchy”
(Edwards and Rees 2006d: 107; Edwards et al. 1999):  “(...)  we can only lead this network on a
relational  basis,  because  there  is  no  formal  power  or  possibility  of  a  brutal  crackdown”
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(US1_I1no1: 99, own translation); “(...) I believe that everything that global wants to push through
by force, telling them 'You have to do it exactly like that', this is doomed to failure from the outset. It
doesn't work” (US1_I1no1:  265, own translation).
US2 may be  viewed as  a  somehow typical  example  of  a  US MNC,  showing an  overall  great
willingness to  standardize:  “There are truly  global  processes.  There is  really  a willingness for
standardization and unification of the firm, and not to let every country do in their own ways”
(US2_I1no1: 126, own translation).  Moreover, as we have seen, US2 is also fairly centralised in
terms  of  HR  policy  making  and  design  of  practices,  processes  and  tools,  which  are  mostly
developed in the U.S. to be rolled out globally: “Why do I tell you this is very American? Because
many of our tools arrive from the U.S., so it's somehow the U.S. who are setting the pace and put in
place things” (US2_I1no1: 305, own translation).  One reason for  corporate-wide standards are
international  transfers  of  managers,  where  standard  processes  make  sure  that  for  instance  the
performance of transferred employees will  be evaluated in the same fashion all  over the world
(US2_I1no1: 134), and thus, guarantee equity and organizational justice through application of the
same rules (US2_I1no1: 136). Finally, efficiency gains have been forwarded as reason for transfer,
since the MNC can avoid that people reinvent the wheel (US2_I1no1: 140).
The willingness to transfer at US3 seems to be rather pragmatically inspired and does not follow as
much an overall philosophy as this is the case at US2. The willingness to have a common corporate
culture is one of the reasons for practice transfer (US2_I1no1: 128). However, it seems that global
equity and the will to facilitate international mobility of managers are the most important reasons
for the transfer of standard practices. For example, bonuses are fixed on a corporate level so that
people don't have to reinvent the wheel, and to enhance credibility of the group. Concerning global
talent management, a globally standardized and integrated system is meant to facilitate and promote
international career mobility (US2_I1no1: 130). However, our interviewee insisted on the fact that
there remains quite some room for manoeuvre for local adaptations, as with the example of locally
defined leadership principles that  are  even taken into consideration for the annual performance
appraisal  (US2_I1no1: 121): “[willingness to transfer?] Yes and no. For me, these two examples
[global bonus system and local leadership principles] are illustrative, as they say: yes, but you
cannot do anything else than locally. Although, of course there are also conventions for certain
trainings” (US2_I1no1: 123).
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At  US4,  according  to  our  interviewee  there  have  been  several  swings  of  the  pendulum from
centralization  in  the  1980s  to  decentralization  throughout  the  1990s  and  currently  back  again
towards more centralization at corporate HQ in the U.S. or at European HQ in Switzerland. The
reasons behind this recent recentralization with lower degrees of  independence for business units is
due to a major loss of control and a duplication of efforts. Along with this recent tendency towards
recentralization goes the pronounced willingness to transfer standard HR practices  (US4_I1no1:
107) that  have  been developed in  the  U.S.  towards  Europe: “(...)  currently  the  tendency  is  to
develop  everything  in  the  U.S.  and  to  transfer  it  to  us”  (US4_I1no1:  208).  However,  our
interviewee  explained  that  quite  often,  the  U.S.  team that  is  in  charge  of  the  development  of
standard  practices  integrates  some  European  or  local  representatives  already  at  the  stage  of
reflection  in  order  to  facilitate  later  rollout  (US4_I1no1:  227).  Furthermore,  there  is  a  strong
willingness to promote one common corporate identity and corporate culture at US4, which is seen
as another reason for transferring standard corporate practices: “One has to understand that we are
one firm at US4. In any case, the objective is to be as much unified as possible throughout the
whole world. This is reflected in many things: our products have the same colour, the same logo,
the same name everywhere in the world. Similarly, every employee of US4 has to have the aim to
'be US4', and this applies to wherever you are” (US4_I1no1: 112). Still another reason for transfer
is global equity in terms of performance appraisal as in many other MNCs (US4_I1no1: 218). As
we will see in the discussion of the transfer process and mechanisms in place at US4, the recent
tendency towards strong centralization has had a negative influence on reverse transfer of locally
developed innovations in HR.
US5 is an MNCs showing a strong desire to transfer the same HR tools and practices throughout its
global operations. This desire can directly be put down to the strategic aim of US5 to facilitate
knowledge exchange throughout the company.  With all  associated measures for implementation
being called “One US5”, transfer and harmonization is an integral part of the US5 HR strategy
(US5_I1,I1no1: 50). Therefore, as a matter of principle, US5 has the clear strategic desire to share
as  many practices  as  possible  in  all  areas  on  a  global  level  (US5_I1,I1no1:  288).  The  strong
willingness to harmonize HR practices is also structurally reflected in a European shared service
centre, where “The whole idea was to leverage the scale of the work and concentrate the know how
into a few bodies. Instead of having a company full of HR generalists we have a company full of
specialists with their expertise well developed” (US5_I3no1: 161). As part of this harmonization,
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US5 also deploys a sophisticated, integrated HR IT system with the intention to have common job
titles and descriptions, and to establish competence profiles for all employees (US5_I1,I1no1: 132).
Furthermore, in the US5 organization, where one manager may have collaborators who are located
in several  different  European countries,  certain common standards  facilitate  their  work.  This is
extremely important due to the HR business partner organization in place, where HR has only the
role of a facilitator, while the manager has the central role in people management (US5_I1,I1no1:
170).
According  to  our  interviewee,  at  US6 there  is  an  increasing  willingness  to  transfer  standard
corporate  practices  in  some HR areas,  though  in  other  areas  subsidiaries  are  rather  left  alone
(US6_I1no1: 157). This willingness to transfer standard corporate practices may be seen against the
background of the US6 strategy to work on its resource planning system in order to achieve greater
integration, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Some central directives, for instance in the
field of restructuring, were transferred in order to avoid damages to the image of US6. Such damage
might arise from a non respect of certain minimum standards when laying off employees on very
small sites without an HR manager or specialist (US6_I1no1: 160). Furthermore, as is the case with
most other MNCs, US6 also wants to profit from the benefits of greater unity (US6_I1no1: 329). 
At US7, there is a willingness to transfer practices in order to realise synergies, but also for reasons
of control. For instance, concerning compliance with the principles fixed in the corporate code of
conduct and with the multiple national legal requirements in the medical environment, the decision
has been taken to centralise the legal function (US7_I1no1: 47-50). HR shared service structures are
in  place  in  Switzerland  and  the  Netherlands,  and  one  in  the  U.S.,  but  not  on  a  European  or
international level (US7_I1no1: 87, 95). An interesting element with US7 is the fact that there has
been some reverse transfer  from European HQ to  US HQ concerning a  new system for  talent
management and merit increase that has been adopted by US HQ (US7_I1no1: 131).
Our financial services MNC US8 is no exception concerning the pronounced willingness to transfer
corporate standard practices. This is done in order to avoid duplications or to “reinvent the wheel” ,
and to avoid incoherent situations for expatriates who move between several countries (US8_I1no1:
188). Moreover, apart from additional effort for the development of local solutions, quality was
mentioned as an important reason for the reliance on corporate standard practices: “But apart from
344
8.2 Transfer of HRM practices: why and how?
the effort that is necessary to develop something else than the standard formula, this requires an
investment in time. And there is no guarantee that what has been developed is quite as good or
better than what has been developed by specialists who are (…) often located at the U.S. (...)”
(US8_I1no1: 188). 
Also at  US9 there is a desire to transfer corporate standard practices, while being aware of legal
limitations to what is feasible (US9_I1no1: 86). Local constraints as for instance those linked to the
presence of works councils in Germany, are therefore integrated already in the design phase of
global practices in order to avoid later problems in the rollout phase (US9_I1no1: 134). As a reason
for the transfer of standard practices, our interviewee indicated that this would make things easier
(US9_I1no1: 87). There is also at least one case of reverse transfer in the field of training, where a
whole curriculum in the area of employee relations was developed by EMEA HQ by taking up
elements  from various  Western  European countries,  which has  then  been taken up as  a  global
standard curriculum by corporate HQ (US9_I1no1: 107).
According to our interviewee,  US10 “(...) is not this usually huge centralised company like you
could see at [the interviewee's former employer]. US10 has given a great freedom so far to its
geographical divisions” although “As every big company, it realised that if we have more or less
harmonised processes it makes more sense because we're utilising the scale and we are conveying
the same message across the globe” (US10_I1no1: 34). As we can see, harmonization and transfer
of  corporate  standard  practices  is  a  fairly new subject  for  US10.  As we have seen earlier,  the
comparably great degree of decentralization in HR and IR policy and practice design is partly due to
US10's  growth history.  Several  acquisitions  of  already sizeable  companies  led  to  high  internal
heterogeneity  in  terms  of  different  IT systems  and  practices  used  throughout  the  company in
different countries and regions  (US10_I2no1_212). Though, in recent years, the reasoning around
greater leverage of scale effect, and hence, efficiency gains, as well as the issue of one corporate
identity,  have  led  to  some  harmonization  initiatives.  Furthermore,  the  willingness  to  facilitate
international mobility is a reason for standardization  (US10:I1no1: 35).  Such harmonization has
been implemented in certain core areas such as performance management, where a global process is
in place which has to be strictly followed (US10_I1no1: 112-115). The current tendency at US10 is
fairly  clear,  anyway:  “Basically  what  happens  is:  at  the  moment  everything  is  getting  more
centralised  than  it  was” (US10_I2no1:  159)  and  “There  is  a  strong tendency  to  standardize”
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(US10_I2no1: 208).  Nevertheless,  as we will  see in some more detail  in our discussion of the
transfer process, the logics of a decentralised corporation continues to be present and allows for
bottom-up initiatives and reverse transfer of practices.
Table 28 below summarizes our findings on willingness to and reasons for transfer in US MNCs
according to our interviewees.
Table 28: Willingness to and reasons for transfer in US MNCs
MNC Willingness to transfer Reasons for transfer
US1 Some Quality assurance, ethical standards, efficiency
US2 Very strong Philosophy of standardized processes, facilitating international
transfers,  guaranteeing  equity  and  organizational  justice,
efficiency
US3 medium-strong Efficiency,  equity,  common  corporate  culture,  facilitating
international careers
US4 Very  strong,  recently  strong
centralization  and  downstream
transfer;  formerly  more
decentralised and much reverse
transfer  from  European  HQ
towards corporate HQ
Control,  efficiency,  philosophy of  'one US4' corporate  identity
and corporate culture, equity
US5 Very strong Facilitating  knowledge  sharing  and  knowledge  leverage
throughout the global company network, leverage the scale of
the  work  in  shared  service  centres,  common  HR IT  system
including  competence  profiles  that  require  common  job
descriptions and job titles
US6 Medium, increasing Avoid damage to US6's image, realizing the benefits of greater
unity
US7 Medium;
some  reverse  transfer  from
European HQ to corporate HQ
Control, strict implementation of legal compliance in the medical
environment, efficiency
US8 Strong Avoid  duplications:  “reinvent  the  wheel”,  avoid  incoherence
between  countries  in  order  to  facilitate  international  mobility,
quality assurance for practices: global practices have a certain
level of quality that is guaranteed – if costly local solutions may
achieve the same quality is not sure
US9 Strong,  some  reverse  transfer
from EMEA HQ to corporate HQ
Making work easier, less complicated
US10 Moderate,  increasing  for
downstream transfer;
also  bottom-up  initiation  and
reverse transfer 
Leverage the scale/efficiency gains, assure common corporate
identity, facilitating international mobility
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis.
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8.2.2.2 Transfer process: channels, mechanisms and measures in US MNCs
Within the US1 network, there are basically two ways of how new HR practices are developed for
later global rollout throughout the whole network. Either they are developed on a global level by a
group of countries, or one country – usually a bigger one – has already developed a tool which is
taken up as a first prototype and then commonly defined as a network standard  (US1_I1no1: 56,
58). The initiative for the development of new practices and tools is often taken by bigger countries
that already face certain needs and provide the financing for such developments. Afterwards then,
“(...) it is basically a question of negotiating tactics” (US1_I1no1: 93); “(...) The disadvantage is
that ”we always need much discussion and negotiation – a phenomenon well known from the Swiss
Federal  Council” (US1_I1no1: 95).  HR country managers  who are formally and hierarchically
completely independent from any kind of global HR group will then seek information from the
global level. In their co-ordination meetings, the country managers then decide together which parts
of such globally designed practice should be implemented everywhere. Taking the example of the
new performance management system, country managers have agreed upon implementation of at
least a common responsibility frame that defines competences. The requirements and prescriptions
of  this  framework  will  then  be  implemented  independently by country  HR managers  who  are
operating different IT systems – be it SAP, Peoplesoft or Lotus Notes databases (US1_I1no1: 56).
Since  different  IT  systems  have  historically  been  implemented  in  different  countries,  and  the
implementation of such systems requires important investments, it  is not possible to change the
systems (US1_I1no1: 123). Yet, by defining such frameworks, a common understanding of what is
meant by high performance can be assured across the network. Common international programmes
also exist in the area of leadership training for top executives, which may be seen as a form of
common  socialization  mechanism  across  the  network  (US1_I1no1:  241).  The  implementation
process of transferred standard practices and tools is then quite structured and formalised. On the
country-level, HR does a pilot together with several line and HR representatives. Through this pilot,
the  tool  is  tested  concerning  content,  technical  and  methodological  issues,  and  on  whether  it
matches the needs. If a need for adaptations is detected, either these problems are directly resolved
locally, or it is sent back to the global organization with the demand for an adaptation to their needs.
Finally, such tools and practices are approved by the management board (US1_I1no1: 267). Best
practice schemes do exist, but they are not mandatory (US1_I1no1: 165).
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As we have seen, standard tools and processes that are to be rolled out globally throughout the
whole US2 company are often developed by a project team at U.S. HQ. During the design phase,
the  processes  and  tools  may  sometimes  be  influenced  through  consultations  and  inputs  from
different regions (US2_I1no1: 359, 367), but once a practice or process is rolled out, there is no
more negotiation tolerated: “There is no conflict, it's a process. A transfer has to be performed. (…)
There is no negotiation” (US2_I1no1: 357-359, own translation). Only exceptionally, practices and
processes  may  be  challenged,  for  instance  on  legal  grounds,  but  this  is  fairly  hard  to  do
(US2_I1no1:  363).  The only possibility  of  an  adaptation  of  such processes  on a  local  level  is
restricted to its application: “(...) afterwards it's at the point of application (…) Some countries will
apply practices literally,  and others will...  Well,  it's  not cheating,  they will  apply them up to a
certain limit,  and certain parts  won't  be applied,  and this  will  be documented.  This is  a bit  a
cultural issue” (US2_I1no1: 365).  The process of transfer and implementation is very structured
and clearly prescribed with information on the intranet, and deployment through a process owner on
global, regional and country level together with the line  (US2_I1no1: 130, 132, 345). Roll-out is
then supported through trainings, conference calls and e-mails with information for managers and
employees (US2_I1no1: 347). Application of and deviations from the transferred standard process
have to be documented and are closely monitored through frequent internal audits (US2_I1no1:
321) and evaluations are routinely done  (US2_I1no1: 371).  Furthermore, participation in related
trainings is tracked and examined (US2_I1no1: 355).  Structurally, the great emphasis on and high
degree of process standardization is also reflected in the deliberate use of shared service centres
(US2 group 2011: 26). According to our interviewee, also expatriates from the U.S. play a role in
the international transfer of practices and processes since the latter bring about their knowledge and
understanding (US2_I1no1: 153-156). Still another indirect transfer mechanism that is extensively
used at US2 is corporate culture which is transmitted inter alia via corporate values: “[corporate
values] They are there, they are communicated, they are reviewed, they are known, they have to be
lived. It's trust, innovation, performance” (US2_I1no1: 102).
Concerning the details of the transfer process itself, unfortunately our US3 HR interviewee had not
yet a complete experience in this field. Though, as far as he has lived it for instance in case of
common  training  for  senior  management,  some  basic  framework  containing  the  principles  is
announced and passed to subsidiaries who will then decide on how to roll it out, in which language
to  deliver  the  trainings,  and  whether  they  could  organize  it  together  with  another  site  etc.
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(US1_I1no1: 214, 216).  Sometimes,  for example when new IT is  arriving,  there are  also other
people from the division coming (US1_I1no1: 222). We would also argue that common corporate
culture  and  intense  socialization  is  used  as  an  indirect  transfer  mechanism.  Firstly,  there  is  a
common code of conduct in place at US3, and a green number where employees can contact HQ in
case of infringements (US1_I1no1: 138). Another element of corporate culture is also visible in the
entrance area of the Swiss production plant, where packages of the locally produced product are
exhibited,  together  with  a  range  of  quality  certificates  that  have  been  obtained.  Although  our
interviewee himself did not bring up the issue of socialization as transfer mechanism, he told a lot
about the utmost importance of good manufacturing practices and meticulous documentation in the
pharmaceutical  industry  “(...)  this  is  something  we  try  to  show our  employees  right  from the
beginning: this is a production plant and it is rigour and total quality that matter. One of these
elements is: I do exactly what is noted, nothing else, and I note exactly what I have done, and
nothing else neither (…) this is just to illustrate the importance of the processes” (US1_I1no1: 38).
When asked whether he thought that the concern for quality might be seen as part of corporate
culture at US3, our interviewee also agreed (US1_I1no1: 111-114). We would hence argue that there
seems to be quite some emphasis on standard process quality, which is also strictly controlled. This
may very well equally apply to HRM, where PeopleSoft as an integrated HRM IT system is in
place, as we have seen earlier (US1_I1no1: 97, 99). Concerning best practices, our interviewee told
us that such schemes are in place for work organization, where the Swiss plant had been identified
as  best  practice,  and benchmarking  is  done  (US1_I1no1:  210,  255).  One  interesting  case  of  a
transfer that our interviewee was experiencing at the time of our interview was the implementation
of a strict smoke-free policy. In this directive, the CEO had ordered that all US3 facilities should be
strictly smoke-free except for cases where this would not be possible for legal reasons. In this case,
the Swiss HR manager knew that employees would very much dislike this directive. However, after
having consulted a lawyer, the latter told him that they might not argue on legal grounds and so they
had to implement the directive with a one year delay (US1_I1no1: 234).
At US4, HR policies and processes are developed for the three levels, global, regional and national,
and standard processes play a central role. Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapter, at
US4 there is an important European HQ structure that acts as an interface between the global and
the local level, and hence plays an important part in the transfer of standard practices and processes:
“It's a process that has been fixed globally, and our role is to make it locally competitive and
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compatible. (…) These are instructions that are given on a global level, and our role is to make
them  compatible,  to  transfer  them  and  to  communicate  them  to  our  employees  and  heads  of
department”  (US4_I1no1:  225).  There  is  also  a  best  practice  scheme  in  place  at  US4,  where
European HQ in Switzerland had already been able to develop and feed in several best practices that
were reverse transferred throughout the global US4 network: “[best practice schemes?] (...) this is
a strength that we have here in [location in Switzerland]: we are quite skilled in that and have
already developed many best practices that HQ or other subsidiaries have copied” (US4_I1no1:
203). Our interviewee continued to explain that this has been possible thanks to their local resources
consisting in competent people, and to the fact that they were a non-union site where it is easier to
experiment.  However,  our  interviewee  expressed  some  concern  as  to  the  effects  of  strong
centralization: “(...) my personal battle is that all this centralization kills creation. On the contrary,
the decentralization that we've had before tends to facilitate this kind of innovation and creation.
I'm not sure whether our bosses understand this, I try to explain, but they won't always listen to me.
We have created many things here in HR, revolutionary things, and then we've been copied – and
somewhere this is good. But by centralizing more and more, there is a tendency to kill that, and this
is not a good thing” (US4_I1no1: 203). This case is interesting for the discussion of reverse transfer
since at European HQ actually all the required resources, capabilities and organizational conduits
are available  that  would allow for local  innovation and reverse transfer  of  practices  to  happen
(Edwards et al. 2010: 618–619; Ferner and Varul 2000a). However, this source of knowledge and
innovation  for  the  whole  network  seems  to  be  increasingly  underexploited.  According  to  our
interviewee, local innovation in HR is being more and more suppressed through centralization as
HQ wants to increase control over its operations. Therefore, this case reminds us the discussion of
chapter  3.3.2  on  the  difficult  balance  in  controlling  integrated  player  or  global  innovator  type
subsidiaries. While such subsidiaries may hold great potential for knowledge outflows, at the same
time they require high levels of autonomy and local embeddedness in order to leverage key contacts
and information sources, making control a difficult balancing act (Andersson et al. 2007; Geppert
and  Williams  2006;  Harzing  and  Noorderhaven  2006:  198–199;  Mudambi  and  Navarra  2004;
Taylor et al. 1996: 975). In such cases, Meyer et al. (2011: 245) caution against over-centralization
since  “unconditional  enforcement  of  ownership  rights  through  headquarters  centralization  can
destroy valuable resources” (Meyer et al. 2011: 245). Generally, European HQ plays a major role as
interpreter of local requirements and feasibility of standard practices across Europe, and they may
push back practices to HQ when national legal requirements make standardization impossible or
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when such standards are counterproductive.  “It is our job to interpret what is coming from them
and to tell them: 'In Belgium you can't do this, because (…)' At the U.S., they are not aware of this,
they don't know that in Belgium – we really have to be watchful and make sure that a discussion
takes  place  (...)”  (US4_I1no1:  107). Our  interviewee  could  also  give  an  example  of  a
counterproductive U.S. tool that had to be replaced. This tool was a predictive index for recruitment
that has been developed by a U.S. consultant and which proved to be incompatible with European
needs. In this case, European HQ has developed an own European process (US4_I1no1: 255). An
interesting element concerning the transfer process itself is the fact that there is always a project
team charged with transfer. These projects are ruled by the principles of Six Sigma and hence, very
structured and organized with a black belt as process owner, who is heavily trained. Additionally, a
lot of tests are done before the recommendation for rollout is given and approved by the hierarchy
(US4_I1no1: 229).  Also transfer success is controlled within the Six Sigma cycle by the project
owner  (US4_I1no1: 239),  and may as well be fixed as an individual objective for HR managers
(US4_I1no1: 233). The use of expatriates as an indirect transfer mechanism does not seem to play a
significant role in the transfer of practices (US4_I1no1: 243), although corporate values and culture
are clearly used as a management tool with corporate values being omnipresent and posted up on
office walls:  “This is the US4 culture. Behind you, you can find the US4 values. They are very
important and our philosophy is deeply rooted in them” (US4_I1no1: 40). A relatively high degree
of  standardization is  also  structurally reflected  at  US4 in the  fact  that  much of  the  day-to-day
business is concentrated in global centres (US4_I1no1: 100). Furthermore, US4 has a philosophy of
recruiting young graduates for internal career development (US4_I1no1: 130) which may be seen as
another practice strongly linked to corporate culture that typical for several US MNCs.
US5 has a European centre of expertise where standard practices for Europe are either developed or
arrive from the U.S. for rollout throughout the European operations (US5_I1,2no1: 9). Since much
HR competence is assembled at European HQ, the latter plays a central  part  when it  comes to
implementation of global programmes in different national legal systems, for instance restructuring
or  layoffs  in  times  of  crisis  (US5_I1,2no1:  86).  This  process  of  interpretation  of  local  legal
conditions also includes the country HR managers who play the role of country centre of expertise
since they know very well the details and specificities of their country and can therefore suggest
alternative courses of action in case of incompatibility (US5_I1,2no1: 170). Especially where trade
unions and works councils are involved throughout Europe,  U.S. HQ relies heavily on European
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HQ to handle this unknown environment “(...) they are a little bit afraid of trade unions and works
councils  (…)  because  we  managed  that  pretty  well  here  and  we  know  how  to  work  on  that
environment. They tend to keep a good wide berth from that. They don't want to create any trouble
there. So they are relying on us heavily to manage that process” (US5_I3no1: 177). Already at the
European HQ HR centre of expertise, experts of the different HR areas will have a look at practices
that arrive from US HQ and propose adaptations in case of need. In a second step, practices will be
discussed within the European HR network with the HR country managers and managers from the
businesses. After conclusion of these consultations, rollout is organized like a project country by
country, with project managers who dispose of certain resources and have to implement the practice
and deliver trainings if this is required. Finally, successful rollout is controlled (US5_I1,2no1: 300)
and may also  be  part  of  HR managers'  individual  objectives  (US5_I1,2no1:  302).  There  is  no
formalised  best  practice  scheme  in  place  at  US5,  where  US  HQ and  the  European  centre  of
expertise are the central  units involved with the development and transfer of global or regional
standard practices (US5_I1,2no1: 275-282). As we can see, HR policy making and practice design
is fairly centralised. Some parallel might therefore be seen between US5 and US4 concerning the
high degrees of centralization and possible negative effects on the ability of local subsidiaries to
innovate  and  feed  in  their  knowledge  into  the  corporate  network.  Furthermore,  also  corporate
culture,  expressed  in  corporate  vision,  mission  and  principles  is  heavily  used  as  socialization
mechanism  and  represents  an  integral  part  of  the  “One  US5”  strategy  (US5_I1,2no1:  143).
Corporate values are thoroughly implemented through special trainings for managers on core values
(US5_I1,2no1: 143), and they are well-known by all the employees: “You can go and ask people in
the corridor,  they will  systematically  tell  you security,  respect  for  people,  the environment  and
highest ethical standards in business” (US5_I1,2no1: 155, own translation). Such socialization on
corporate culture and values via trainings and intense communication is further sustained through a
practice of expatriation, where expatriates are sent to US HQ in order to get to know US culture and
to develop networks (US5_I1no2: 11).
At  US6,  HR processes and practices are transferred via a process of cascading either from the
director towards HR or directly through the HR functional line, depending on the relevance of the
practice that is transferred. In case of the US6 performance management system as a core process,
the latter has been directly introduced by the U.S. expatriate plant director who took control after
the  acquisition.  Implementation  of  practices  is  then  done  through  information  and  training  of
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employees  (US6_I1no1:  316,  322).  Certain  best  practices  are  communicated  to  the  respective
business unit through written processes or via informal and formal exchanges in international HR
meetings  (US6_I1no1:  93-96,  178,  299).  Control  of  transferred  HR  practices  is  done  during
appraisals via a one up signature process, and implementation of transferred practices may also be
defined as individual objective of HR managers (US6_I1no1: 318, 350-353). Corporate values are
used as a socialization mechanism. Each and every employee has to accept and to comply with
these values where no deviation is tolerated (US6_I1no1: 327). This element is also reflected in the
fact that, after acquisition of the Swiss subsidiary, US6 has sent a U.S. director with 25 years of
seniority at US6. US6 corporate culture very much refers to safety rules, which may be seen as a
common element with some other U.S. MNCs like US5: “He came to us because he's been with
US6 for 25 years. He knew the processes and the way of working, the US6 culture and the culture of
US6 animal nutrition in particular (…) he had to initiate this, and it wouldn't have worked any
other way. From one day to the next we had to change. From one day to the next, people had to
wear helmets on the plant (…) Afterwards, they had to wear protection glasses, special mandatory
shoes,  a lot  of  things” (US6_I1no1: 134, own translation).  Moreover,  corporate  culture is  also
passed through international management trainings  (US6_I1no1: 90).
Unfortunately, due to time constraints we could not go deeper into the transfer process itself during
out interview with US7 and therefore do not have any further information on the issue. In any case,
as we have seen in our presentation of micro organizational-level information, we know that there
are multiple international conduits in HR on regional European as well as business unit level taking
the form of meetings and regular conference calls  (US7_I1no1: 61-64).  Furthermore, leadership
trainings are implemented top-down and there is a common corporate code of conduct in place,
representing indirect mechanisms of socialization and associated measures (US7_I1no1: 50, 84).
As we have seen, many HR tools and practices are developed by specialists at US8 corporate HQ
back in the U.S. New tools are then spread throughout the HR community of the businesses during
the regular monthly calls (US8_I1no1: 85). There is also a multitude of written guidelines on such
diverse issues as the division of tasks between CEO and HR director,  the handling of difficult
conversations, or sexual harassment (US8_I1no1: 172). Some of these guidelines and philosophies
are continually evolving, such as the one on compensation (US8_I1no1: 174). In certain fields like
well-being  at  work,  HQ  just  defines  a  broad  framework  and  leaves  a  lot  of  room  to  local
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subsidiaries  concerning  the  concrete  practices  and  measures  to  be  implemented  locally
(US8_I1no1: 148). Furthermore, there are also some standardized workshops, for instance on topics
such as  recruitment  of  performance management,  where  the  HR specialists  train  the  managers
(US8_I1no1: 257).  Although there is  no formalised guide where best  practices would be noted
down, however there is regular exchange during the HR conferences. In this way, best practices are
spread throughout the company (US8_I1no1: 605-307). There is strong evidence for the sustained
use of indirect transfer mechanisms and people-based channels at US8. There is a corporate code of
conduct in place that has been called the “deontology” (US8_I1no1: 125, 180) by our interviewee.
It  is  thoroughly  implemented  and  monitored  by  means  of  trainings  and  annual  examinations.
Moreover, expatriates are used as a vector for U.S. practices and culture at US8: “[advantages of
expatriates] It is exactly to spread the practices. They are not just engaged for their know-how, but
also for their knowledge of the practices in use at our U.S. offices, where this person has been
(US8_I1no1: 157, own translation). Moreover, there are also corporate standard trainings for high-
ranking  senior  leaders in  place (US8_I1no1:  247),  and  important  efforts  are  made  to  socialise
people on corporate values by means of trainings, mentoring and inductions  (US8_I1no1: 194).
Especially  at  a  senior  management  level,  our  interviewee  insisted  on  the  great  importance  of
corporate values: “On a senior level, people become diffusers of corporate values. Thus, they have
to  be  indoctrinated”  (US8_I1no1:  262).  Structurally,  a  comparatively  high  level  of  process
standardization for the transactional part of HR is manifest in the operation of shared service centres
in the UK and India. Moreover, there is a kind of centre of expertise at London charged with more
conceptual HR work such as the design of trainings or the recruitment process (US8_I1no1: 49). As
we have already seen earlier, strict risk management includes many standard processes, making out
of the latter an important transfer mechanism at US8 (US8_I1no1: 122-125). Finally, PeopleSoft as
an integrated HR IT system serves as a powerful control instrument (US8_I1no1: 135).
At  US9, the transfer process is very structured and formalised. There is a system in place called
single point of contact or SPOC. In this system, in the first place, trainers train the SPOCs. The
SPOCs are then the process owners, corresponding to the P in the US9 decision-making system
PACE that we have described earlier. These cascade the new practice down the lines (US9_I1no1:
135). There are always HR guidelines in place as a standard reference. The latter are complemented
with written global policies, as for instance in the field of employee relations (US9_I1no1: 82-84).
Interesting is the US9 European HQ's approach towards identification of best practices: “We  want
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every HR employee to be part of one local network. This is in order to learn about best practices,
for instance on the issue of how to deal with European Works Councils” (US9_I1no1: 131, own
translation).  Corporate culture is an important and very strong element at US9, which determines
certain HRM practices in the field of recruitment and development (US9_I1no1: 69, 76). Thus, an
interesting indirect transfer mechanism that linked to corporate culture at  US9 is  a pronounced
philosophy of strictly internal careers. Employees are regularly hired as young university graduates
and undergo intensive training and socialization, including international mobility (US9_I1no1: 116).
Company values are an important element and are visibly put up in the lobby and on office walls
(own field observations).  There is a specialised team at HQ dealing with the corporate code of
conduct,  which  is  trained  and tested  annually  (US9_I1no1:  84).  Structurally,  the  great  deal  of
standardized processes at US9 is reflected in the operation of several shared service centres that are
located in the UK, Central and Northern America. Furthermore, this element is also manifest in the
fact that in Switzerland, the transactional part of HRM has been outsourced to a big U.S. business
service provider  (US9_I1no1: 85).
US10 has an interesting approach towards transfer that doesn't always start at corporate HQ, but
still seems to follow the logics of a more decentralised company. Not only are practices usually
intensively discussed and adapted already during the design phase. Moreover,  “(...) the initiation
very often happens from somewhere in the region. So things get fed up, they go through the ranks
(…) and everywhere  it  goes,  there  are more  questions  asked.  And so  basically  the  whole,  the
development  process  usually  goes  up  through the  organization.  So  by  the  time you are at  the
decision making point (…) you have already answered a lot of questions, you have already got a lot
of  buy-in  from people,  because  everyone  was  asking  their  questions  and you  answer  and you
change things  as  you go.  And by  the  time you get  sign off,  everyone actually  knows about  it
already” (US10_I2no1: 73). When a centrally devised practice arrives in Europe, it usually comes
through the functional line, for instance from global training to European training and then to local,
usually in HR. During the first phase of transfer from the U.S. to Europe, there is a process owner
who is  in  charge  of  the  transformation.  Further  down on market  unit  level,  there  will  be  first
announcements, then e-mail communication and web conferences  (US10_I2no1: 492-502).  Often,
such centrally devised practices are coming as some kind of broad global framework that has been
designed  to  be  adapted  locally.  For  instance,  such  an  approach  has  been  chosen  for  a  global
recruitment tool that is used to advertise jobs,  and to mange the recruitment process.  This tool
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allows every country to stick to its local cultural practices (US10_I1no1: 28). The same applies to
merit  increase,  bonuses,  the success factor system, the manager self  service system, and to the
flexible work arrangement. All these fields are governed by a global philosophy or framework that
leaves  considerable  room for  local  adaptations  (US10_I1no1:  38,  61;  US10_I2no1:  354-355).
Similarly, according to our interviewee, the available international HR guidelines are almost like
“(...)  an  overview of  possibilities,  and then  you pick  out  the  pieces  that  are  relevant  to  you”
(US1_I2no1: 157).  When the global  diversity and inclusion framework was to be rolled out  in
Europe,  US10 first  did a pilot,  and with the European feedback being  “It was just ridiculous”
(US1_I2no1: 201), the whole framework was revamped for Europe before rollout. In some core HR
areas  like  performance  management,  standard  processes  are  in  place,  that  are  also  monitored
(US10_I2no1: 21). European HQ is actively involved in the search for best practices in the region
that  usually  would  come  from  more  mature  countries  to  be  spread  throughout  Europe
(US10_I1no1: 116). Our second interviewee from European purchasing HQ estimated that, while
there being a strong tendency to standardize, this was done so far “(...) in a very co-operative way.
Not  so  much  top-down.  It's  looking  for  best  practice  and  making  it  standard  practice.  It's
developing a programme and then rolling it out bit by bit, adapting it to the places” (US10_I2no1:
208). In such a way, best practices do not automatically come from HQ, where some of them were
developed in a global centre of expertise, but they may very well be identified locally and reverse-
transferred throughout the company. Corporate values and a corporate code of conduct are seen as
important elements to make sure that management has “(...) more or less one touch and feel of the
critical (...) processes” (US10_I1no1: 90). Therefore, big efforts are made to transfer these elements
also  towards  newly  acquired  firms  in  Eastern  Europe  or  Russia  (US10_I1no1:  94-95)  as  an
important  “cohesion element” (US10_I1no1: 100).  Furthermore, every new employee has to do
some standard mandatory initiation trainings with the aim of having one same style throughout the
company (US10_I1no1: 120; US10_I2no1: 269-273, 280-286). Structurally, the fact that US10 has
only recently started to go into the direction of greater centralization and standardization is reflected
in the fact that European HQ is a fairly recent and small organizational unit. Furthermore, centres of
excellence  and shared  service  centres  are  currently being  created  for  the  areas  of  training  and
compensation (US10_I1no1: 122).
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Table 29: Transfer process: channels, mechanisms and measures in US MNCs
MNC Transfer channel and mechanisms measures
US1 Procedural  channels  &  direct  mechanisms:  in  some  core  areas,  common  frameworks  defining
concepts  and  quality  standards  are  commonly  created  and  transferred,  though  implementation
remains locally different according to the IT systems and other practices in place
People-based  channels  &  indirect  mechanisms: the  common  code  of  conduct  and  intensive
international  co-ordination structures with  regular  personal  meetings  may be viewed as indirect
socialization mechanisms through which certain ways of doing are spread, furthermore there are
common international leadership training programmes in place
Extensive  use  of  international  project  groups,
negotiations replace resource power of  HQ,  though
common standards are also controlled
US2 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: heavy use of standard processes that are designed by
project groups at HQ for the global, regional or national level and valid as mandatory best practices,
transfer process and implementation are very well structured
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: intensive use of socialization measures linked to
corporate culture, use of international transfer of managers, international management development
Very structured and formalised control and tracking of
implementation  progress,  frequent  internal  process
audits, trainings and examinations on new processes
and practices
US3 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: There are certain standard processes in place, although
U.S. HQ seems to accept local adaptations to a greater extent than this is the case in many other
U.S. MNCs – e.g. local leadership principles, and sometimes only large frameworks are transferred
that can be adapted locally – e.g. senior management training; best practice schemes are in place
at least for issues of work organization; in some cases use of central directives as in the case of the
smoke-free policy, such central directives are then difficult to oppose
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: there a strong signs for an intensive socialization to
corporate culture referring to highest standards in product quality and business ethics, including a
corporate code of conduct, when IT-related techniques or tools are transferred, expatriates or short-
term assignees may be involved
Great importance of processes, especially wherever
quality  might  be  affected,  benchmarking,  process
controls
US4 Procedural  channels  &  direct  mechanisms:  centrally  developed  processes  and  practices  are
designed for the global, regional and national level, European HQ plays a key role as interpreter
and link between the global and local level and adapts practices in order to ensure compliance with
local laws and functionality of practices; best practice schemes are in place 
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: International transfer of managers does not seem
to play an important role for practice transfer, however there is intensive socialization to corporate
culture and values
Very  well-structured  and  organized  Six  Sigma-
inspired transfer process design involving a black belt
process  owner  who  also  controls  transfer  success,
international  project  groups  developing  standard
practices,  resource  power  of  HQ  significantly
increased  through  recent  re-centralization,  formal
systems  of  management  control  and  sophisticated
HR  IT  in  place,  philosophy  of  recruiting  young
graduates for internal  corporate careers as  part  of
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corporate culture
US5 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: Standard practices are either directly designed at US
corporate HQ and passed down to European centre of expertise for necessary adaptations, or they
are centrally developed at European HQ's centre of expertise and implemented throughout Europe;
transfer process fairly structured and organized as projects, European HQ is recognized in the US
for its expertise in dealing with European unions and works councils
People-based  channels  &  indirect  mechanisms:  Corporate  culture  and  intense  socialization  on
corporate values used as part of the One US5 philosophy, trainings for managers on core values
and socialization to US ways of doing at corporate HQ (expatriates) intensively used
International  HR  network  to  discuss  harmonization
needs  and  to  feed  in  local  expertise  on  legal
requirements,  sophisticated HR IT in place, transfer
success  is  controlled  and  may  be  part  of  HR
managers' individual objectives
US6 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: some core processes like performance management are
cascaded down directly from US HQ via the plant  director,  other less central  HR practices are
handed down the functional line within HR and implemented by the HR manager, there is regular
exchange on best practices which are communicated within the business units often taking the form
of written processes
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: Socialization on corporate culture and values that
include many provisions on workplace safety are intensively used, also international trainings for
managers are done for socialization
Information  and  trainings  on  new  practices,
international exchange between HR managers, formal
control process with one up signatures and transfer
as part of HR managers' individual objectives
US7 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: N/A
People-based  channels  &  indirect  mechanisms:  corporate  code  of  conduct  and  standardized,
centrally designed leadership trainings are in place
PeopleSoft  is  in  place  as  a  powerful  control  tool,
international  HR meetings  and  conference  calls  on
regional  European  and  business  unit  level,  some
international management trainings
US8 Procedural  channels  &  direct  mechanisms:  centrally  developed  processes  and  tools,  use  of
guidelines, sometimes broad frameworks, informal best practice scheme in HR community
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: intensive socialization through trainings, initiation
and mentoring, expatriates as vectors of U.S. practices and culture, code of conduct very thoroughly
implemented with trainings and annual examinations
PeopleSoft  is  in  place  as  a  powerful  control  tool,
standard trainings for senior leaders, formal systems
of  management,  strict  Process control,  socialization
on corporate values and culture through trainings
US9 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: deliberate use of local external HR networks in order to
learn about best practices, highly formalised transfer process, use of global guidelines and written
HR  policies,  HR  process  standardization  for  transactional/administrative  part  (outsourced  and
shared services)
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: intense socialization of young university graduates,
Pronounced philosophy of internal careers as part of
corporate culture with intense socialization, trainings
and international mobility
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thorough implementation of code of conduct with training and annual examinations, very strong and
marked corporate culture that is based on corporate values
US10 Procedural channels & direct mechanisms: international HR guidelines are in place though often
they are more of a help to HR managers than mandatory practices, extensive use of broadly defined
global  frameworks  that  are  meant  to  be  locally  adapted,  sometimes  when  centrally  devised
practices or frameworks from HQ are rolled out, a pilot is done before definitive rollout in order to
undertake adaptations (e.g. global diversity and inclusion framework); some core processes such as
performance management are strictly standard; best practices are actively and routinely searched
for and spread by European HQ, such best practices often come from more mature countries and
are reverse-transferred
People-based channels & indirect mechanisms: corporate values and a corporate code of conduct
are  deliberately  used  as  a  means  for  socialization  in  order  to  foster  cohesion  throughout  the
company
Some  international  management  training,  explicit
process  control,  initiation  programmes  with
socialization on corporate culture,
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis.
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8.2.3 Transfer willingness and process in German and US MNCs compared
In this section, we will summarize central findings on MNCs' desire to transfer HRM practices, and
corresponding transfer processes. Again grouped by country-of-origin, these findings are compared
and  discussed  against  the  background  of  the  literature  and  micro-level  characteristics  of  the
organizations  involved.  Thus,  this  discussion  delivers  a  partial  answer  to  our  second  research
question  concerning  differences  between  German  and  US  MNCs  in  their  approaches  towards
transfer and ways of relating to the Swiss institutional setting. As we have have explained earlier, in
order to understand MNCs' willingness to transfer standard practices and the transfer process itself,
we have to analyse transfer against the background of important company-level variables that were
presented  in  the  precedent  chapter.  Taken together,  such a  step-by-step  analysis  of  micro-level
organizational characteristics, overall approaches towards transfer, and transfer processes may be
revealing of a company's way of relating to the Swiss institutional setting. In this respect, we would
argue that higher degrees of centralization and sustained use of formalised, standardized processes
that go along with higher willingness to transfer, are reflecting a distinctive approach in itself. A
pronounced  willingness  to  transfer  centrally
devised  corporate  standard  processes  and
practices often goes hand in hand with a priori
more  reduced  room for  manoeuvre  for  local
HR  managers  to  implement  original  local
practices, or to undertake major adaptations. 
As discussed in chapter 5 and summarized in
tables  16  and  18,  the  available  literature
suggests  that  HR  architecture  in  German
MNCs  has  traditionally  been  more
decentralised,  and that  willingness to  transfer
country-of-origin  HR  practices  was  less
pronounced  compared  to  their  U.S.
counterparts.  Furthermore,  as  we  have  seen,
many  German  MNCs  were  found  to  blend
Anglo-Saxon  elements  into  their  domestic
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8.2 Transfer of HRM practices: why and how?
HMR practices. Literature also suggested that there might be some less emphasis on the single use
of formal channels and some more use of expatriates in German MNCs. On the other hand, US
MNCs were typically found to be strongly centralised, and marked by high degrees of formalization
and standardization, and to display a pronounced willingness to transfer global policies that were
mostly  centrally  devised,  rolled  out  through  formal,  procedural  channels,  and  supported  by
sophisticated IT systems.
Before summarizing the results of our German-American comparison of company configuration
and approach towards transfer, we have to recall once again that our personal assessments of MNC
organizational structure and HR co-ordination mode may by no means be taken as definitive. As we
have already explained, it  is  very hard if  not impossible  to fully understand the complexity of
MNCs as global organizations based on the limited information of one or even several interviews
and some additional data analysis. Even though, we tried to do our best within these limitations to
draw a rough picture of each company in order to provide a suitable background for our discussion
of HRM practice transfer.
The evidence from our sample of German MNCs showed that there is no homogeneous picture of
a typical German country-of-origin model or pattern in terms of HR architecture, willingness and
approaches towards transfer. While one larger group of German MNCs consisting of D1, D2, D5,
D6 and D8 showed striking similarities with the typical U.S. approach as depicted above, a second,
smaller group including D3, D4 and D9 was more decentralised and much less marked by centrally
devised standard processes and policies.  The pattern observed in this second group is  therefore
rather in line with the one we identified in the extant literature. However, the bigger first group does
not seem to match this traditional German pattern of corporate configuration and approach towards
HRM practice transfer. This heterogeneity in our German sample may be explained by a set of
different factors.
Regarding first the  group of highly standardized German MNCs, concerning the cases of D1, D2
and D6, we would first point out the important size of these three organizations. As we have seen in
our theoretical discussion of corporate level variables, we may reasonably argue that increasing size
is a classic contingency factor that leads to higher degrees of formalization and standardization as a
means to assure sufficient control. Especially in case of D6, we could also identify the strict top-
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down implementation of a global strategy in order to serve global clients and the corresponding
imperative  for  coordination  as  another  reason  for  greater  standardization.  Reduced  room  for
manoeuvre  for  local  subsidiary actors  which  is  typical  for  highly centralised  and  standardized
MNCs was  thus  strongly felt  in  these MNCs.  At  D5,  higher  degrees  of  standardization  led  to
reduced local resources in HR that would simply not allow for the development and implementation
of deviating local practices. Such configurations might arguably coincide with reduced capacity or
openness  for  learning  from the  local  Swiss  environment  and  locally  developed  practices,  and
instead, exclusive reliance on practices that have been developed in a corporate centre of expertise.
Furthermore, as we have seen, high degrees of process standardization at D2 are the outcome of a
recent reorganization of HR that  was implemented together  with a  U.S. consultancy firm.  This
evidence directly supports earlier findings on the continuing influence of U.S. practices and firms as
role models in HRM (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). While such direct Anglo-Saxon influence is
manifest only at D2, however, a very similar pattern of centralization and standardization around
formalised processes is also very present at D1, D5, D6, and to some degree also at D8. Except for
D7, high degrees of centralization coincide with a strong willingness to transfer centrally devised
standard corporate practices and processes. Therefore, our evidence from the greater group of fairly
centralized and standardized German MNCs that show strong willingness to transfer HRM practices
cross-nationally strongly suggests that  Anglo-Saxonization (Ferner  and Quintanilla  1998) is  not
restricted to HRM practices, but also manifest in their overall HRM architecture.
On the other hand, the smaller group of German MNCs consisting of D3, D4 and D9 still largely
seems to  correspond to  the  traditional  picture  of  greater  decentralisation  and  lower  degrees  of
standardization in the field of HR and IR. However, we would argue that the reasons for these
lower  degrees  of  standardization in  HR and IR rather  lie  in  micro-level  organizational  than  in
macro-level institutional influences and effects that might give rise to a specific German country-of-
origin effect on transfer willingness. In the cases of D3 and D9, the lower degrees of formalization
and standardization may at  least  partly be attributable to  their  small  size and recent  history of
internationalization. Corresponding to their early stage of internationalization, neither of these two
MNCs  possesses  solid  international  conduits  in  HR.  Coordination  of  international  activities  is
exclusively assured by the members of the board and does not, or at least not centrally, affect HRM.
As we have seen in our theoretical discussion of transfer, under such circumstances, it is difficult to
spread corporate standard HR practices throughout the company. Yet, the example of D9 shows that
even if transfer of HRM practices is difficult without solid international conduits in HRM, it is still
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feasible. In this case, local initiatives and deliberate agency of the CEO of the Swiss subsidiary and
his HR manager led to reverse transfer of such central policies and practices as a corporate code of
conduct. In fact, the role of the highly profitable Swiss subsidiary of D9 is to some degree that of an
innovator in HR or “vanguard subsidiary” (Ferner and Varul 2000a). We would argue that the Swiss
subsidiary of D9 was able to achieve such a status not only through its high profitability, but also
thanks  to  the  permissive  nature  of  the  Swiss  institutional  environment  that  allows  for
experimentation. We might therefore compare the role of the Swiss subsidiary of D9 with that of
Anglo-Saxon subsidiaries  for  other  German  MNCs in  earlier  studies  (Ferner  and Varul  2000a;
Tempel 2001). Although Switzerland may not be considered a dominant economy, it is nevertheless
a  highly  developed  and  competitive  business  location  with  corresponding  HRM  practices.
Especially German MNCs that do not yet dispose of much international experience may therefore
learn from certain practices that have been developed for the dynamic and competitive Swiss labour
market as in  case of D9. The readiness to learn from its  Swiss subsidiary,  in turn,  points to  a
distinctive manner of relating to the Swiss host country which is considered as a valuable resource
in the sense of a field for experimentation and learning, rather than just any other market that would
have to be served following German norms. A similar willingness to learn from its Swiss subsidiary
was also present at D4, where we could also find some reverse transfer and flow diffusion. Yet, a
significant difference between D3 and D9 on the one hand, and D4 on the other lies in the existence
of well-developed international conduits in HRM at D4. The greater degree of decentralization at
D4, in turn, may be attributed to the international integration of its production, and to a growth
history that is marked by several important mergers and acquisitions. As we have seen, a history of
external  growth  is  an  important  factor  that  is  generally  associated  with  lower  degrees  of
standardization. The absence of a consistent common corporate culture across different D4 plants is
illustrative  of  this  argument.  The  same  logic  applies  to  the  case  of  D9  Switzerland  with  its
brownfield history. Yet, the presence of a production network, where every plant is a specialised
contributor to an international value chain, is maybe even more important in case of D4. This is
especially true for the power engineering division of D4 that we could access, since products are not
standardized,  but  highly  customized  to  individual  client  needs.  Under  such  circumstances,  the
possible efficiency gains of greater standardization are lower than in cases of taylorist work systems
with global standardized mass production.  Furthermore,  the heterogeneity we found in German
MNCs' approaches towards centralization or decentralization of decision-making in matters of HR,
as well as their propensity to transfer standard practices, may also be associated with the increasing
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disintegration of  the German  model  and corresponding “variation at  the source” (Meardi et  al.
2009: 505).
A further finding on practice transfer in German MNCs concerns the tendency in some of them to
deliberately use expatriates as vectors for elements of corporate culture and general ways of doing
at D1, D2 and D7. Yet, others such as D6 do not make much use of expatriates although they
transfer standard practices. After all, those German MNCs that are strongly determined to transfer
global standard practices also, or even primarily, make heavy use of formal transfer mechanisms
and procedural channels. Based on the evidence of our sample, we could however not identify a
general tendency towards greater use of expatriates than in US MNCs. However, an interesting
point  can  be  made  concerning  the  use  of  corporate  values  and culture as  an  indirect  transfer
mechanism in German MNCs. Our evidence suggests that this mechanism, which is known to be
heavily used in US MNCs, is present to some degree also in their German counterparts. Yet, there
seem to be some major qualitative differences between corporate values and their use in German
MNCs compared to their U.S. counterparts. As we have seen in cases of D1 and D2, there are also
German companies with a very marked corporate culture, where value-based leadership principles
are integrated in appraisal tools. Though, for instance in case of D1, it seems that corporate values
are rather based on the regional rootedness of the company and its history than having been defined
by corporate directors and formally cascaded down the organization like any other management tool
or practice. Somehow similar, at D5 our interviewee told that the company had strong German roots
and values. Other German MNCs such as D4 seemingly do not even have one common corporate
culture, although our interviewee pointed to a very strong influence of an engineering professional
culture. Again, in case of D3, there is a familiar culture present, though without any direct and
formalised reference to managerial or HR practices. At D7, corporate culture is very much linked to
the  utterly long history of  the  owner family and can  once  more  be  seen as  an example of  an
historically grown corporate culture. In our sample, D6 was the only case where apparently some
sustained effort  was made to implement  American-style  formalised corporate  values or guiding
principles as a management tool top-down with trainings and integration of these principles into
appraisal tools. However, as we have seen, the way our interviewee spoke about these principles
suggested that, even though considerable effort was made to implement these values or principles,
the degree of internalization does not seem to be utterly high.
364
8.2 Transfer of HRM practices: why and how?
On the other hand, the US MNCs of our sample seem to largely fit into the pattern that emerged
from the available literature. This is true for their greater overall tendency towards centralization,
the heavy use of formal channels for transfer, and their willingness to transfer country-of-origin HR
practices globally. However, as is the case with the German MNCs of our sample, there are some
marked differences concerning the willingness to transfer centrally devised corporate practices also
in our sample of US MNCs. 
As we have seen, US1 is an MNC that does not at all match the typical picture of the strongly
centralised US MNC since there is no strong corporate centre. Accordingly, willingness to transfer
is comparatively low and largely limited to common standards and frameworks that are negotiated
within the network. In this case, the analysis of micro-level organizational factors is once more
crucial to understand the reasons behind the utterly strong degree of decentralization in decision-
making.  First,  as  we have  seen,  US1 emerged from a series  of  mergers  between Anglo-Saxon
consultancy and assurance firms, and external growth through mergers and acquisitions is a factor
that is generally associated with lower degrees of standardization. Second, especially the assurance
business  is  heavily  subject  to  national  legal  regulations,  which  reduces  the  potential  for
harmonization  to  some  extent.  Third,  as  distinct  from some  competitors,  at  US1  a  deliberate
strategic decision has been made not to financially integrate regional activities in order to stay as
close to local clients as possible. However, at the same time, very sophisticated international co-
ordination mechanisms and common frameworks have been put in place that allow international
mobility where this is desired by global clients, and mutual learning within the network. Another
interesting case in this respect is US10. Although there is a strong corporate centre and the U.S. are
by far the single most important market, US10 is still fairly decentralised and only recently began to
harmonize its tools, policies and practices to some extent. Once again, our interviewees explained
this fact with the internationalization strategy of US10, which largely has been based on growth by
acquisitions and diversification of its product portfolio through further acquisitions of firms in other
businesses. Thus,  historically,  this  huge firm has been rather a conglomerate of several already
sizeable firms active in a range of different businesses and markets, and all of them already had
their own systems and practices in place before acquisition. Every centrally driven standardization
in terms of IT systems, processes and practices would hence cause important costs that would first
have to be outweighed by potential efficiency gains of standardization. Furthermore, US10 is active
in a business where local consumer tastes are important and may be best served locally, although
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some of the most important brands are globally sold. As we have seen, according to Edwards (2011:
493), the incentive to develop international HRM policies is rather weak in case of the pursuit of
financial  economies  through diversification into new products,  segmentation  of  operations,  and
product  differentiation  as  in  case  of  US10.  The  recent  creation  of  the  European  HQ  as  a
coordination structure and two-way information channel, and a cautious harmonization initiative
through broad frameworks and some common core processes, represent an interesting way to realise
some efficiency gains and assure cohesion in such a company.
Concerning the use of different transfer mechanisms and channels, the US MNCs of our sample
strongly confirm the picture drawn from literature concerning their sustained use of direct, formal
mechanisms  and  procedural  channels.  This  element  is  present  throughout  our  sample  and  is
reflected in the use of standard processes, and in the extremely formalised nature of practice transfer
through project owners in many firms and strict process controls. According to our expectations,
expatriates do not seem to play a central role for HRM practice transfer in most US MNCs, except
for US5 and US8 where expatriates seem to play an important role for the transfer of corporate
culture. In fact, concerning the US MNCs of our sample, it is particularly worth looking at other
indirect transfer mechanisms related to corporate culture. All  US MNCs throughout our sample
made sustained use of intense socialization mechanisms that are directly linked to an explicitly
defined and communicated corporate culture and values. Furthermore, corporate codes of conduct
may be seen as another central management tool in US MNCs that is associated with transfer. While
we discussed this tool as an indirect transfer mechanism since it is closely related to socialization
and  corporate  ways  of  doing,  codes  of  conduct  might  as  well  be  classified  among  the  direct
mechanisms  since  they  are  also  close  to  other  corporate  guidelines  and  rules.  In  any  case,
implementation  of  tools  associated  with  the  management  of  corporate  culture  was  remarkably
thorough across  all  the US MNCs of  our  sample,  which  strongly confirms  the  literature-based
expectation  of  a  sustained  use  of  corporate  culture  as  a  management  tool  in  these  MNCs.
Accordingly, implementation of tools and practices associated with the management of corporate
culture regularly comprised trainings and periodical examinations in case of codes of conduct. Such
thorough implementation that is a typical element across our group of US MNCs apparently also
leads to comparatively high degrees of internalization of corporate values among the employees.
Table 30 below provides a summary overview of this comparison between German and US MNCs
concerning their respective approaches towards transfer. It is organized into three parts presenting
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our findings on overall HR architecture, attitude towards transfer, and transfer mechanisms
Table 30: Transfer willingness, process and mechanisms in German and US MNCs of our sample
German MNCs US MNCs
HR
architecture
Heterogeneous:
one  bigger  group  of  strongly  or  rather
centralised MNCs (D1, D2, D5, D6, D7, D8),
at  D5  current  tendency  towards  greater
empowerment of local subsidiaries
and one smaller group of rather or strongly
decentralised MNCs (D3, D4, D9)
Overall  strongly  centralised  with  relatively
high degrees of standardization, although two
remarkable exceptions (US1 and US10)
Attitude
towards
transfer
Heterogeneous:
except for D7 where willingness to transfer is
moderate,  in  the  group  of  centralised
German MNCs, willingness is generally high;
in  the  more  decentralised  group  of  MNCs,
willingness to transfer is generally lower and
may include reverse transfer or flow diffusion
as in the cases of D4 and D9
Generally  strong  willingness  to  transfer
centrally  devised  practices,  some  rather
medium;
overall  tendency towards more centralization
except for US1;
in  US4  strong  centralization  significantly
reduced potential for reverse transfer, while in
the  still  rather  decentralised  US10  there  is
considerable reverse transfer
Transfer
mechanisms
Especially  in  the  group  of  centralised
German  MNCs,  direct  mechanisms  and
formal,  procedural  channels are used quite
similarly to their U.S. counterparts;
No  systematic  general  pattern  concerning
use  of  expatriates  as  indirect  transfer
mechanism could be observed, although this
is surely the case for some of the German
MNCs such as D1, D2 or D7;
corporate culture does not seem to be  used
as a management tool in the same way as
this is done in US MNCs, but appears to be
rather  linked  to  historically  grown  and
regionally or nationally rooted values; 
in  case of  D6 where efforts were made to
implement  corporate  values top-down as a
management  tool  as  this  is  done  in  US
MNCs, internalization seems to be lower
Sustained  use  of  direct  mechanisms  and
formal, procedural channels, transfer process
strongly formalised;
no evidence for use of expatriates as indirect
transfer mechanism
sustained  use  of  intensive  socialization  to
corporate culture and values that are used as
a management tool, codes of conduct (if seen
as  part  of  this  socialization)  are  also  very
thoroughly  implemented  with  trainings  and
regular examinations
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis.
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8.3 Standardized corporate HRM practices: what is transferred?
In the previous chapter, we have analysed and systematically compared our findings on transfer
willingness  and  the  transfer  process  in  German  and  US MNCs  following  the  structure  of  our
integrated  conceptual  framework of  HRM practice  transfer  in  MNCs presented  in  chapter  4.2.
Accordingly,  our  findings  have  also  been  discussed  in  the  light  of  individual  organizational
characteristics that have been identified in chapter 8.1. 
In a next step, we will now turn our attention to specific HRM practices. We have decided to start
with an analysis of standardized HRM practices since it is here, where practices and policies are
often centrally devised at
HQ,  and  where  we  are
most  likely  to  find
evidence  of  country-of-
origin  or  dominance
effects.  Furthermore,  this
analysis  allows  us  to
check whether,  in  reality,
the Swiss host country is
as  permissive  as  we
theorised,  or  whether
there  are  certain  host
country  effects  present
that  have  an  influence  on  HRM  and  might  demand  for  adaptations  of  standard  practices  or
implementation of local practices. 
Results  are  again structured according to  country-of-origin,  with the first  subsection presenting
standardized HRM areas, processes and practices in German-, and a second one dealing with US
MNCs. Furthermore, the results of our company sample on standardized practices will be discussed
against the pattern that emerged from the literature. At the end of each sub-chapter, a summary table
gives an overview of standardized practices for the respective country-of-origin group of MNCs. In
a third subsection, standardized practices in German and US MNCs are compared  and checked for
the presence of institutional, micro-political or organizational effects. Here, our empirical evidence
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is  discussed against  the  background of  our  integrated  conceptual  framework for  HRM practice
transfer, and in this way, checked for the presence of different key influences that may theoretically
explain our findings. Finally, results are again summarized in a table. 
As explained in the presentation of our research methodology, the present investigation is based on
semi-structured in-depth interviews. Due to this fact, we do not have complete information on each
and  every  practice  for  all  the  MNCs  since  semi-structured  interviews  are  not  as  structured  as
surveys, and time constraints often set limits to our data collection. This is why there are some
fields in our overview tables on standardized HR practices that could not be filled in. Nevertheless,
we believe that this kind of presentation of results still makes sense since it allows to get a rough
overview of standardized practices for our two country-of-origin groups at a glance.
8.3.1 Standard HRM practices in German MNCs
HR process standardization
As we have seen in the chapter 8.2.1 on willingness to transfer and the transfer process, there is a
group of German MNCs with a strong desire to standardize and transfer HRM practices cross-
nationally.  These  same  MNCs  were  also  generally  marked  by  comparatively  high  degrees  of
centralization and made heavy use of direct transfer mechanisms and procedural channels. This is
true  for  D1,  D2,  D5,  D6,  while  D7  is  strongly  centralised  but  somehow less  relies  on  direct
procedural practice transfer, and D8 seems to be somewhat less centralised. Having a closer look at
fields with high degrees of standardization, we could see that the five German MNCs D1, D2, D5,
D6 and D8 are effectively marked by high levels of HR process standardization.  Based on the
literature, this is very similar to what typically might be expected for their US counterparts. The
“D1 HR system” or the project “transforming HR” at D2 are illustrative of this general tendency.
These findings also demonstrate that apparently, many German MNCs are still very open for US
managerial practices as Michael Müller had stated already in 1999 (Müller 1999b: 139). Moreover,
our evidence is consistent with recent findings of Pudelko and Harzing (2007) who found strong US
dominance effects in the area of HRM, leading German MNCs to embrace the U.S. HRM model.
Performance management
Probably the  most  important  of  these  core  processes,  which  is  standardized  at  least  for  senior
managers (D4, D9) in all German MNCs except for D3, is  performance management. Typically
associated with this system are the processes of agreement on objectives, performance appraisal,
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determination of bonuses  and merit  increases.  As we have seen in  chapter  3.3.1,  this  confirms
earlier empirical findings (Myloni et al. 2007: 2066, 2069; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994: 232–233).
Moreover, a high degree of standardization in the area of performance management and associated
tools and processes corresponds to theoretical reasoning. As we have seen, HRM practices that are
marked by low degrees  of  differentiation and high degrees  of  integration  such as  performance
management may be expected to be delivered through corporate staff (Evans et al. 2002: 465–469;
Ulrich 1997). 
However, it is worth having a closer look at the design and operation of standardized performance
management  systems  in  German  MNCs.  First,  we  shall  recall  that  performance  management
systems are typically part of those HR practices that are covered by the section of the German
Works Constitution Act  (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972)  dealing with social affairs. This means
that German works councils are regularly endowed with far-reaching statutory co-determination
rights, and “management is forced to seek the agreement of the works council on any changes to
areas such as working time, work scheduling, bonuses and performance targets of employees, the
payment of wages and salaries,  workplace training,  data held on employees,  and monitoring of
workers” (Williams and Geppert 2006a: 57). Our findings suggest that this German labour market
institution  gives  rise  to  a  special  form  of  cross-national  corporate  isomorphism  (Ferner  and
Quintanilla  1998:  713–714)  that  is  induced  by German  country-of-origin  coercive  institutional
pressures.  Interesting in this  respect is  the fact that  coercive institutional pressures are actively
exercised or engaged by German general works councils as key actors, who are making use of their
statutory rights as a mighty institutional power resource (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011:
34).  As  we  have  seen  in  our  analysis  of  the  German  NBS,  German  general  works  councils'
institutional power resource is based on statutory rights, enabling the latter to significantly influence
contents of global HR practices during the design phase, or to block global rollout altogether. In our
sample,  we  found  several  concrete  examples  of  German  works  council  agency-induced  cross-
national corporate isomorphism. This isomorphism is manifest in both, HRM practice design, and
implementation. Concerning these two phases, it seems justified to speak of a strong influence of
the institution of works councils on German managers' socialised rationality (Almond 2011a: 260).
As our interview extracts show, this German socialised rationality strongly influences embedded
managerial norms (Almond 2011a: 265). Moreover, it  lends further support to the suggestion to
look at institutional choice as a matter of bounded rationality (Bluhm 2001: 156).
A first series of citations demonstrates how works council agency-induced cross-national corporate
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isomorphism affects global HRM practice design through German managers' socialised rationality
and institutional power of works councils:
“(...) for example implementation of a bonus system for team leaders (…) two or three years it was
globally blocked just because German works council did not give his consent. We would have been
ready a long time ago, but we couldn't (…) So, there you really feel it: if they want something to be
globally standardized that has to come from HQ, they have to pass it through the German works
council” (D1_I1no1: 201, own translation, Swiss manager)
“Yes, you always have to pass through the works council. They always establish a link to what
exists in Germany – but here we are in Switzerland” (D2_I1no1, I5no1: 3, own translation, French
manager)
“It's a real blessing, we have much less problems than our German parent company because we
don't have a works council” (D5_I1no1: 199, own translation, German manager)
“The works council is hanging over managerial thinking like a Sword of Damocles. Management
deprives itself of the possibility of blue sky thinking because they always think they would never be
able to pass it” (D5_I1no2: 30, own translation, German manager)
“(...) there are many things where you virtually see that they have already been created with the
thought in mind that German works council has to agree. (…) such appraisal instruments, there you
see that there is one thing for executives and another thing for the rest. It's clear that for the one
thing they weren't required to agree with works councils, but for the other they were” (D6_I1no1:
422-424, own translation, Swiss manager)
“This is impossible in Germany, to put a six-field grid over all employees and to say all those who
are down left have to go. This is impossible (…) But it is really typical German or American: there
is this bell-shaped curve that has to be respected. The bottom 10% have to be laid off. There is a
huge difference how such issues are approached” (D6_I1no1: 407-409, Swiss manager)
The last interview extract suggests that German works council at least at D6 strongly opposes any
kind  of  forced  ranking  and would  immediately block any such initiative.  In  fact,  none of  our
interview partners in German MNCs mentioned a system of forced ranking in their performance
appraisals.  Furthermore,  at  D6,  our  Swiss  interviewee  could  also  easily  distinguish  practices
designed for different classes of employees. This finding reflects the fact that the degree of works
council influence on HRM  practice design in Germany depends on the category of employees who
are affected. In this respect, Giardini et al. (2005: 71) explain that “ (…) in the case of employee
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appraisal,  co-determination  is  a  strong  restricting  factor,  but  only  with  regard  to  lower
organizational ranks”. Therefore, while works council influence in Germany is usually high for the
category of tariff employees,  it  is much lower for the higher-ranking category of exempts. Our
empirical  findings  thus  directly  illustrate  the  international  impact  of  a  distinctive  German  IR
institution  on  the  design  of  standard  global  HRM practices  in  German  MNCs where  different
practices are in place for tariff employees and exempts.  
A second set of interview extracts demonstrates how German socialised rationality and embedded
managerial norms influence on the way in which the processes related to performance management
are implemented, and potentially even on their functionality. As the following extracts show, some
local HR managers viewed this German way of implementation with a critical eye:
“(…) it’s something about German culture (…) there is a culture making it hard to evaluate an
employee with a 70% or 80%. We are not hard enough, not sufficiently objective. One searches for
consensus,  and  one  does  not  reward  sufficiently”  (D2_I1no1:  253,  own  translation,  French
interviewee)
“Once one of the bosses told me ‘there is no worse than a C’. That’s something I don’t understand.
There is  A,  B,  C, D, E.  C is  middle.  There is  no worse than C – so you don’t  need A and B
neither”(D4_I1,I2no1: 509, own translation, Swiss interviewee)
“(…) for example in this area of performance (…) you may only report talents. Low performers are
not looked at” (D6_I1no1: 405, own translation, Swiss interviewee)
“And if someone does not perform, this person is not fired. I don’t know what they do with these
people, but they don’t fire them” (D7_I1no1: 241, own translation, Swiss interviewee)
At this point, we would like to recall the recent contribution of Ferner  et al. (Ferner et al. 2012:
182) who have underlined the “(...)  critical  role of in-depth case studies” since these allow for
“deeper exploration of the process of transfer and of how transferred practices are implemented in
the routine life of the subsidiary”, leading them to the affirmation that case studies “(...) are more
appropriate for exploring in depth the way transferred practices operate in reality”. The example of
HR practices  related  to  standardized  performance  management  systems  and  the  way they  are
implemented and operate in reality may be seen as an illustration of exactly this kind of subtle
differences that may not be uncovered by means of a survey. If we had conducted a survey study, all
managers  working  in  a  German  MNC  would  probably  have  declared  to  have  a  standardized
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performance management system in place. The presence of standardized performance management
systems might then have simply been identified as just another innovation in HRM of Anglo-Saxon
origin that has been taken up by German MNCs. Though, in this way, we could not have gained
any understanding of how such foreign practices acquire their original German flavour when they
are taken up as objets trouvés (Ferner and Varul 2000a: 137) that are translated (Goutas and Lane
2009) into a German context, thereby undergoing a process of negotiation with stakeholders and
interpretation  by  managers.  It  is  also  interesting  to  compare  our  results  on  design  and
implementation of performance management systems in German MNCs with those of an earlier
investigation.  In  fact,  the  pattern  described above,  including the  critical  appreciations  of  Swiss
managers, are strikingly similar with earlier findings of Ferner  et al. (2001: 15), who report that
“(...) targets were (in the eyes of U.K. managers) undemanding and evaluation lax, and in some
cases the 'variable' percentage did not vary that much in practice”. Against this background, we
would argue that our findings seem to indicate a continued, strong influence of German country-of-
origin institutions on HRM in German MNCs, and not a weakening of the latter. Even if German
MNCs  apparently  continue  to  learn  from  and  implement  U.S.  HRM  practices,  processes  and
structures, yet there seems to be a continued translation and adaptation of such foreign practices so
that their content and implementation may considerably vary.
Pay policy
Pay policy is determined through a global framework or compensation guidelines in the majority of
the German MNCs of our sample (D1, D2, D5, D6, D7, D8). Payroll is another centralised process
in many German companies that  is  often performed by a  shared service centre  (D2 for  bigger
country subsidiaries, D5, D6 for German operations, D7 on a national Swiss level) or by an external
provider  (D8).  Concerning  payroll,  standardized  processes  that  are  marked  by  low  levels  of
integration and differentiation may very well be delivered through service brokers or some central
structure such as shared service centres (Evans et al. 2002: 465–469; Ulrich 1997).
Job descriptions and job families
Somehow associated with a global pay policy is the topic of global job descriptions or job families
that have been explicitly declared to be standardized at D2  (D2_I1no1: 195),  D4 (D4_I1,I2no1:
114), D5 (D5_I1no1: 102) and D8 (D8_I1no1: 390). Although this was not explicitly mentioned by
our D1 interviewees, the overall great degree of standardization and the presence of a global pay
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policy leads us to the assumption that job descriptions or job families are likely to be standardized
to some extent also at  D1. One of our interviewees told about clearly defined rules concerning
formal qualification requirements like university diplomas in order to be eligible for certain jobs,
and classifications for tariff and exempt employees in Germany (D1_I3no1: 236), which leads us to
believe that it is highly probable that there are standard job descriptions in place.
Mobility
Another area where global corporate frameworks, systems and processes are often standardized is
mobility. For example, at D1 there is a complex corporate system in place that has been adopted by
the  D1  Swiss  subsidiary.  The  latter  has  assumed  the  role  of  a  little  shared  service  centre  for
international  mobility  in  the  accessory business,  where  D1 Swiss  subsidiary has  a  head office
function (D1_I1no1: 356). Expatriations are generally very well structured, with clear statues and
regulations, and a bunch of intercultural training offers (D1_I2n1: 14; D1_I3no1: 174, 242). At D2,
mobility-related  standard  services  have  been  outsourced  to  a  global  mobility  service  provider
(D2_I1no2, I5no1: 20) and compensation is also globally standardized (D2_I3no1: 46). The whole
process is centrally administered by an HR shared service called HR direct (D2_I4no1: 41). Also at
D5,  mobility-related  processes  are  standardized  and  administered  by  a  shared  service  centre
(D5_I1no1: 173).  At D7 and D8, although to our knowledge there is no shared service centre for
mobility,  however  expatriate  management  practices  are  globally  standardized  (D7_I1no1:  458;
D8_I1no1: 136, 219). As we have seen in our presentation of D6 and the D6 HR co-ordination
mode, there is some evidence to believe that international mobility is not yet quite well developed
in terms of numbers of assignments per year and international career development practices. This is
somewhat astonishing for an MNC of the size of D6. 
Employee surveys
Standardized  employee  surveys  are  in  place  at  D1  (D1_I2no1:  143),  D2 (D2_I1no1:  134),  D5
(D5_I1no1: 211), D6 (D6_I1no1: 246), D7 (D7_I1no1: 46, 347-350) and D8 (D8_I1no1: 346-349).
As we have seen in our presentation of the US NBS and domestic HRM in US MNCs, employee
surveys are a typical instrument of direct communication that is intensively used in US HRM as
preferred alternative to representative channels in ER/IR. On the other hand, German MNCs are
generally not known for having strong ideological aversions  towards representative channels in
ER/IR.  On  the  contrary,  traditionally  the  German  NBS  favoured  collective  ER  and  IR  and
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representative bodies like works councils.  Nevertheless,  German MNCs were recently found to
blend in direct with indirect mechanisms of communication (Tüselmann et al. 2006: 75). The wide-
spread presence of surveys as direct mechanisms may be seen as still another illustration of the
effects of learning from Anglo-Saxon MNCs or dominance effects leading to Anglo-Saxonization
(Ferner and Quintanilla 1998).
Diversity management
Another HRM practice that is typically associated with US MNCs and historically linked to the US
NBS is diversity management. The fact that in several German MNCs of our sample (D1, D2, D5,
D6) a corporate diversity policy is in place might be viewed as still another manifestation of Anglo-
Saxonization. Although, in this case, it seems that there is much of a German or European flavour to
it, since diversity is very much associated with gender equality, the promotion of female employees
and the associated employer image: “Women & D1, to stronger promote women” (D1_I2no1: 157);
“(...) Employer branding (…) part of this is also the diversity aspect” (D5_I1no1: 191); “Diversity
is on the agenda this year (…) a heavily discussed subject: we have introduced a quota for number
of women” (D6_I1no1: 206), “[talking about the quota for number of women] (…) for sure this is,
so to speak, also to make one's mark, and this is certainly also important” (D6_I1no1: 399). As we
can see, in those German MNCs of our sample where a diversity policy is in place, the latter heavily
focuses on gender diversity and the promotion of women. Therefore, after all we might speculate.
On  the  one  hand,  it  might  be  that  such  a  diversity  policy  represents  an  example  of  Anglo-
Saxonization “in the German manner” (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: 724). On the other hand, we
might as well argue that such a diversity policy is more heavily inspired by current developments on
German and European labour markets with an ageing population and labour shortage, together with
increasing political and public pressure especially on MNCs with their great public visibility to
implement gender equality. 
Recruitment and employer branding
Some standard processes, tools and guidelines are also in place in the field of  recruitment and
employer branding  at  D1  (D1_I1no1: 124, 178)  and  D2  (D2_I4no1: 46),  and as far as this is
prescribed by ISO at D3 (D3_I1no1: 169, 175). Employer branding, an SAP recruiting tool and a
job fair  are  standardized  at  D4  (D4_I1,I2:  265,  346,  551),  a  global  policy and systems at  D5
(D5_I1n1o: 224)  and at D6 (D6_I1no1: 91, 445).  Assessment centres and employer branding are
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standardized at D7 (D7_I1no1: 444), and an international trainee programme is part of D8 and even
of D9 recruitment practices (D8_I1n1o: 221-233; D9_I1no1: 507). 
Socialization practices linked to corporate values, culture and corporate codes of conduct
Global  practices  in  this  area  have  already been  discussed  at  length  in  our  chapter  on  transfer
mechanisms in German MNCs. We will therefore not repeat these findings here. In this place, we
just underline once again that there is some evidence in our sample that points to differences in the
thoroughness of implementation when compared to US MNCs. Throughout our sample, there are
only  two  companies,  D6  and  D9  where  our  interviewees  told  about  trainings  or  examination
associated with corporate values or codes of conduct. At D6, we have seen that some evidence
indicates  comparatively  low degrees  of  internalization  of  globally  defined  and  trained  guiding
principles or values. To the knowledge of our interviewee, a survey was conducted in order to check
whether employees knew about guiding principles, but contents of the corporate code of conduct
have  never  been  tested  in  an  examination  (D6_I1no1:  246).  As  we  have  seen,  at  D9,  the
development of a code of conduct was a D9 Switzerland initiative and the D9 Switzerland HR
manager had also trained local employees on this code (D9_I1no1: 513-518). Our D7 interviewee
told us that the code of conduct was part of the employment contract at D7 Switzerland (D7_I1no1:
162-165). 
Interestingly, when looking at company web pages and official documentation, all German MNCs
including D3 have defined corporate values and codes of conduct. Though, compared to the US
MNCs of  our  sample,  the  way they were implemented  seems to  be  somewhat  piecemeal,  and
actually lived corporate culture appears to be more decoupled from formally defined values and
culture in some cases. This finding points to major qualitative differences between German and US
MNCs in the use of an Anglo-Saxon management tool.  These might be related to questions of
interpretation,  sensemaking  and  translation  (Clark  and  Geppert  2011;  Ferner et  al. 2012:  174;
Goutas and Lane 2009) of foreign tools and practices. Local actors as receivers of such foreign
practices are not embedded in the country-of-origin of the latter and hence, marked by a different
“socialised rationality” (Almond 2011a: 260). Such tools and practices may then once more be
considered as “objets trouvés” whose original purpose may very well be “transformed as they are
inserted into a pre-existing set of structures and values“ (Ferner and Varul 2000a: 137). Based on
our limited empirical  evidence,  we would suggest  that  this  is  exactly the case with the use of
American-style explicitly defined and top-down communicated corporate values in German MNCs,
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as the concept of corporate culture is rather associated with an organic whole in German firms
(Wächter et al. 2003: 82). It may therefore be difficult to fit in top-down defined corporate values to
the kind of concept about corporate culture that seems to prevail in German MNCs. Under such
conditions, implementation of such American management tools may demand considerable effort
and even though risks to end with low degrees of internalization and functionality. This might very
well  be the case for D6, while in some other German MNCs like D1 or D2, corporate culture
seemed to be more effectively spread through international mobility, and in this way better served
as an indirect transfer mechanism compared to the formal definition of, and training on, corporate
values.
Training, technical competence and career progression
A second field where we could  find a  certain standardization  is  the area of  careers,  personnel
development and the promotion process. In this respect, our evidence points to the presence of a
German  country-of-origin  effect around  a  “culture  of  training”  (Ferner et  al. 2001:  116)  as
described in the literature. However, this effect is not manifest in training per se, but rather in the
presence  of  a  centrally  defined  structure  and  standards  with  predefined  mandatory  technical
trainings that have to be absolved at a certain stage in order to be eligible for promotion. There is
hence a nexus between, on the one hand, technical competence, that has to be acquired through
structured trainings taking the form of curricula, and career progression on the other. And this kind
of nexus very much fits into the picture of German traditions around functional career paths and
legitimate authority that is based on technical knowledge (Barmeyer and Davoine 2008: 11; Bauer
and Bertin-Mourot 1996; Calori and Dufour 1995: 68; Evans et al. 2002: 376–377; Glunk et al.
1997: 99; Kristensen 2003; Lawrence 1980).  D1 is an exemplary case of a German MNC where
training curricula are extremely structured and the nexus with career progression is direct and clear:
“There are clearly defined criteria at D1 to achieve the next higher level (…) part of this is a three
years stay abroad” (D1_I2no1: 20); “When someone joins the promotion circle, this means that
this person is considered a high potential who might reach the next higher level within two to four
years. And on each level, there (...) are several well-defined seminars that have to be completed”
(D1_I1no1: 182); “There is this promotion circle (…) it’s like a marshalling yard – when someone
gets  promoted,  the  next  one  follows  from below” (D1_I2no1:  25-26).  Furthermore,  one of  our
interviewees told us that specialist careers were common at HQ (D1_I3no1: 68). But also at D2 this
element was very present. One of our interviewees stated that there was a strong focus on personnel
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development and that a specialised corporate structure,  the “D2 Business Service”,  offers many
trainings in a training centre. Furthermore, at D2 where expatriates were identified as a vector also
for corporate culture and practices, expatriation was clearly identified as part of a structured and
well-planned,  long-term  personnel  development  for  in-house  careers:  “[speaking  about
expatriation as part of personnel development] In Germany, you enter some kind of caste, you get
into  a  cycle,  there  is  almost  no  risk”(D2_I1no2:  12,  own  translation;  also  D2_I3no1:  42).
Structured technical trainings or curricula, sometimes even with certificates, are also important in
nearly all the other German MNCs. For example, at D4, a certificate in project management is an
important standardized internal training or curriculum (D4_I1,I2no1: 270),  and trainings for high
potentials on senior management level are generally standardized (D4_I1,I2no1: 269). At D5, many
trainings related to technical product knowledge are standardized  (D5_I1no1: 253). Furthermore
training, which can take the form of mentoring, coaching or classroom training (D5_I1no1: 251), is
linked to the annual performance review process (D5_I1no1: 260), and hence, to career progression.
At D6, there is a global competence model in place on which selection is based (D6_I1no1: 164)
and a clear corporate specialist career model is backed up with a structured qualification programme
called “Campus” which consists of several qualification modules (D6_I1no1: 164). At D7, there is a
global competence model in place with global competence qualification systems (D7_I1no1: 444),
Similar  to  D2,  also  at  D7,  expatriation  is  part  of  personnel  development  and  career  planning
(D7_I1no1: 142-143),  which is also linked to the performance management process  (D7_I1no1:
216).  Generally,  our  interviewee  told  that  great  efforts  are  made  in  the  field  of  personnel
development  (D7_I1no1:  259-260),  including very structured  training  programmes  like  a  mini-
MBA together with a British university  (D7_I1no1: 268-269). Commenting on the D7 corporate
training practice, our interviewee told that this was even more the case at German HQ:  “(...) my
colleagues at [corporate HQ in Germany], yes. They like the idea  (…) culturally, they are much
more attached to this idea of a curriculum” (D7_I1no1: 313). Also at D8, our interviewee stated
that there is a strong desire to train employees on all hierarchical levels (D8_I1no1: 246), and that
certain trainings,  especially the ones linked to product knowledge, are standardized  (D8_I1no1:
252). Finally, even at the rather decentralised D9, we could trace certain tendencies pointing into the
direction of global competence development, which is currently reflected in standardized trainings
related to technical product knowledge (D9_I1no1: 510). Yet, there is still another element linked to
the traditional German emphasis on internal labour markets and internal career development. Based
on our interviews, the German way of career planning and personnel development seems to be
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fairly structured, where talents and high potentials are identified by a high-ranking committee, and
career  opportunities  are  proposed to  them in a top-down manner.  We would call  this  approach
towards personnel development and promotion passive. This is because it does not seem to be the
general rule that well-performing employees actively seek and apply for their next job opportunity
on the internal labour market. By contrast, this seems to be more common in US MNCs, as we will
see further on.
“Where we are pushing people concerning their development and say: this would be a great job for
you, and afterwards you might do this or that” (D1_I1no1: 150)
“(...) I know some people here in the D1 Swiss subsidiary who are frustrated because they don't see
any future prospects. Partly this is due to themselves. And partly because HR doesn't show them
opportunities early enough, or – typically D1 I'd say – is a bit conservative in terms of personnel
planning” (D1_I2no1: 161)
“(…) during these meetings that last one day and where top managers are involved, we discuss our
portfolio, we discuss our chain lists, this is very important, the direct successor, in case of illness,
but also how we can replace these people within one, two, three years” (D2_I1no1: 112)
“There  are identified high potentials  who are defined  every two years,  according to  a certain
procedure. These candidates are then reported to the D4 group. (…) and of course we think about
their development (…) and if there is a possibility opening up, we offer it to them” (D4_I1n,I2no1_
377)
“(...)  and then there is this  practice of appointment to posts (…) finally, if  you have a flexible
manager,  you  can  be  nominated  as  a  talent.  If  you have  a  very  hard  manager,  you  won't  be
nominated. And finally, this will influence your career. Not 100%, because I guess when someone is
good, at a given moment it shows. But (…) I'm rather in favour of letting people apply for their
jobs. Because if you really want a job, what I mean is: the personal motivation is an important
part” (D7_I1no1: 405-406)
Distinctions between hierarchical levels
The distinction  between  senior  and  non-senior  management  level is  an  important  factor  in
determining whether practices are standardized or not in many of the German MNCs of our sample.
We  have  already  come  across  this  distinction  in  our  discussion  of  performance  management
practices  that  are  different  for  tariff  employees  and  exempts.  For  example,  at  D1,  bonus
programmes  for  heads  of  department  are  standardized  (D1_I1no1:  7),  and at  D2,  standardized
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performance  appraisal applies  only  to  executives,  whereas  this  is  local  for  other  employees
(D2_I1no1_302).  At  D4,  being  overall  characterized  by  a  fairly  low  level  of  standardization,
performance  appraisal  is  however  standardized  for  the  middle  and  upper  management  levels
(D4_I1no1_329-331),  which is then also linked to a standardized bonus system (D4_I1no1_384-
392).
A further area where the level of standardization is generally high for certain managerial levels is
high potential and talent management with the associated training and development programmes
and succession planning. We have already seen that there are heavily standardized and formalised
training curricula  in place for talents  or high potentials  at  D1 called promotion circle seminars
(D1_I1no1: 181-182).  But also selection and career development  plans for managers are rather
standardized on a business unit level at D1 (D1_I1no1: 194-195). Basically the same logic applies
to D2, where standard trainings are in place in the area of personal and soft skills (D2_I1no1: 256-
258), together with a standardized international management development programme (D1_I1no1:
268-270,  302)  and  succession  management  (D2_I1no1:  112).  At  D4,  succession  planning,
leadership instruments and training programmes for identified high potentials are standardized on a
group level  (D4_I1,I2no1:  114,  269-270,  377).  Furthermore,  centrally  defined requirements  for
access to  the highest  managerial  levels  are  in  place and prescribe two changes  between plants
including one stay abroad (D4_I1,I2no1: 375). At D5, a system for high potential development is
standardized  on  a  regional  level  (D5_I1no1:  211-212).  Local  management  development
programmes  have  generally  been  replaced  by  global  or  regional  management  excellence
development  programmes  and  systems  (D5_I1no1:  259-260)  that  are  developed  by  a  global
learning  and  talent  management  function  (D5_I1no1:  232-235).  The  talent  review process  for
identification of talents and high potentials is hence globally standardized, including all managerial
and employee levels  (D5_I1no1: 257). At D6, the performance and potential review process for
executives, leadership development and succession management on very senior managerial levels is
globally standardized  (D6_I1no1:  302,  333,  346).  And also  at  D7,  leadership  programmes  are
standardized from middle management upwards (D7_I1no1: 258),  and talent management as well
as  high  potential  identification  is  generally  standardized  with  a  complex  process  including  the
creation of leadership profiles and assessment centres (D7_I1no1: 280-282, 373).  Even in case of
the globally still fairly decentralised D9, the Swiss subsidiary HR has intensively worked on the
topic  of  leadership,  where  leadership  principles,  a  leadership  guide  and  associated  extensive
trainings  have  been  developed,  which  are  currently  passed  to  HQ  through  the  conduit  of  the
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international  management  board  meetings  (D9_I1no1:  416-428).  We  might  therefore  speculate
about some corporate harmonization initiative in this area to come in the near future.
Higher degrees of standardization for higher hierarchical levels may be attributed to two factors.
First, there is generally a higher need for internal consistency and control on higher hierarchical
levels,  and second,  on these levels,  works council  influence on HRM practice design is  lower.
Additionally,  managers  on a  certain  hierarchical  levels  are  additionally  exempt  from collective
bargaining agreements, which opens up additional room for manoeuvre concerning organizational
HRM practice design.
Table 31 below provides an overview of standardized HRM practices in the German MNCs of our
sample.
381
Table 31: Standardized HR practices in German MNCs of our sample
MNC Performance 
management 
process
High potential and 
talent identification 
management 
development
succession 
planning
Training 
curricula / 
standard 
trainings
Pay 
policy  
Payroll Job 
descrip-
tions / job 
families
Mobility Employee
surveys
Diversity Recruitment / 
employer branding
Socialization 
practices
Values 
defined / 
effective 
use of 
corporate 
culture
Code of 
conduct
D1 * * * * N/A N/A(*) * * * * */* *
D2 * * * * * * * * * * */* *
D3 - - - - - - - - - (*) ISO */- *1
D4 */s */s * N/A N/A * - - - * */- *
D5 * * * * * * * * * * */* *
D6 * * * * * - - * * * *t/- *
D7 * */s * * * - * * - * */* */c
D8 */s * * */s * */s * * *i * */- *
D9 */s - * - - - - - - * */- */t
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis; *=standardized, */s=standardized for (senior) management level/executives, 1 code introduced in
mid 2012, t=implemented with training, c=part of employment contract, i=mentioned on the company web pages, though not in the interview.
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8.3.2 Standard HRM practices in US MNCs
Standardization and formalization, backed up by sophisticated HR IT systems
As we have seen in our discussion of micro-level organizational characteristics and the transfer
process, the US MNCs of our sample largely correspond to the typical US pattern described in the
literature. Except for US1 and to some extent US10, all the US MNCs of our sample are rather
centralised in their decision-making and practice development in the area of HRM and IR, and more
or less strongly rely on globally standardized and formalised HR processes and tools. Except for
US1, where different IT systems are run in different countries, all of the US MNCs of our sample
had already in place or were currently introducing sophisticated, integrated HR IT systems and
standard processes. Yet, the example of US6 shows that not all US MNCs may be classified as
pioneers in this respect. As with the group of more standardized German MNCs, two categories of
standard  processes  may  be  distinguished: strategic  core  HR  processes with  high  degrees  of
integration on the one hand, and transactional or administrative HR processes with low degrees of
integration and differentiation on the other (Evans et al. 2002: 465–469; Ulrich 1997).
Performance management
Strategic HR core processes linked to the performance management system are generally strongly
standardized throughout our sample. Even in the special case of the strongly decentralised US1, a
common reference framework called “responsibility frame” (US1_I1no1: 56) has been established
for all employees, and a completely standardized performance management system is in place for
very senior  managers  (US1_I1no1:  195).  Furthermore,  a  compensation  system is  linked to  the
performance management system through key performance indicators (US1_I1no1: 160). At US2,
being one of the US MNCs of our sample where standard processes and tools are very present, the
performance management system is strongly standardized. Governed by the same rules throughout
the company, performance appraisal as a globally standardized process is linked to development
plans  (US2_I1no1: 134, 327). Basically the same applies to US3, where a standardized software
called  “performance and career” (US3_I1no1: 118-120, 178) is in place to run the standardized
performance management processes of joint target setting, performance appraisal and development
plans. Also at US4, there is a standardized performance management process in place with target
setting and a balanced scorecard, and highly formalised processes where every employee is in an
individual  cycle  (US4_I1no1:  74,  159,  218).  Equally  at  US5  (US5_I1,I2no1:  274,  297),  US6
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(US6_I1no1: 172, 208) and US7  (US7_I1no1: 137)  there are  strictly globally standardized and
formalised performance management  systems in place,  although at  US6,  IT process  integration
based on SAP is not accomplished yet. At US8, a standardized performance management system is
in  place  which  is  coupled  with  succession  planning  (US8_I1no1:  137).  Finally,  also  at  US9
(US9_I1no1: 110,  120) and US10  (US10_I1no1: 33-34,  37),  globally standardized performance
management systems are in place, with promotion being directly linked to performance at  US9
(US9_I1no1: 110). Unfortunately we do not have information on the presence of forced distribution
for most of the US MNCs of our sample, though this is definitely in place at US9  (US9_I1no1:
121). 
However,  we  went  deeper  into  the  matter  of  implementation  of  standardized  performance
management systems and calculative HRM practices during an interview that we could conduct
with a British expatriate of US5. This interviewee had been working for US5 in the UK, Spain,
Switzerland and the U.S. and told about his personal experiences concerning marked differences
between Europe and the U.S. in how these systems were operated in reality:
“As a leadership team we talked a lot about capability of people and the development of people and
how should we think about the next assignment for this person. If we had a problem or an issue on
that site it wasn't “How we're going to deal with the guy who failed?” It was “Let's talk about what
attributes does that individual need to develop?” if we were thinking that he could cope with that
kind of a circumstance differently in the future.  (…) Whereas in the United States, you had to be
careful not to screw up too bad or you're [clapping once with his hands]. (...) The level of intensity
went up on that day to day scrutiny. You might be reassigned, moved to another job. And I've seen
some colleagues dropped off the project because something happened and the leader decided: “Out
of here! Bring me another person to do this work.” (…) It's quite fast and almost quite ruthless on
times which is very strange for me and very uncomfortable. Because that wasn't my experience
coming from Europe” (US5_I3no1: 114-119).
We have to emphasize that this is a single account and should therefore a priori  be considered
cautiously and not overrated for larger generalizations. However, this account significantly gains in
importance since it fits astonishingly well in with the picture of contractual authority relations and a
pervasive market  mentality that  have  been repeatedly described in  the  literature  to  be  strongly
present in the U.S. (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29–30; Hollingsworth 1997a: 271, 1997b: 134, 141,
142; Redding 2005: 142). This mentality is considered at the basis of “strong marked based norms
behind the employment relationship” in the U.S. (Almond et al. 2005: 280)  and seems to be an
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integral part of an originally U.S. socialised rationality. Additionally, the fact that it was a British
expatriate who remarked these differences further supports this theses, since markets are the most
important economic co-ordination mechanism also in other liberal or compartmentalised Anglo-
Saxon business systems like the UK. Thus, there are at least some strong signs supporting the thesis
that  U.S.  embedded  managerial  norms  and  socialised  rationality  lead  to  a  more  ruthless
implementation of calculative HRM practices in the U.S. than this is the case in Europe, and this
even  in  one  and  the  same  strongly  centralized  US  MNC  that  is  marked  by  high  levels  of
standardization.
Yet, there is still further support for the theses about the presence of strong market-based norms in
US MNCs. Even if US MNCs that employ highly qualified employees in difficult labour markets
have been found to adopt internal  labour market approaches,  the functioning of internal labour
markets seems to be somewhat different when compared to German MNCs' internal labour markets.
Based  on  the  accounts  of  our  interviewees,  we  found  strong  evidence  of  a  market-logic  of
employability and do-it-yourself careers. In line with these principles, career planning seems to be
somewhat less or differently structured and more flexible than in German MNCs. First, as we have
seen, there are no mandatory training curricula that would have to be completed in order to be
eligible for promotion. And second, those who have performed well in their present jobs have to
actively seek for career opportunities on the internal job market and ask or apply for other jobs.
Employees have to take the initiative and actively promote themselves in order to progress. This
logic of a more active and self-responsible career planning of employees may be illustrated with the
following interview extracts:
“(...) we identify what we call top talents which means key talents we want to develop (…) but there
is no specific programme, it depends on the person. So that person is responsible, the employee is
responsible of his development at US2. It's his responsibility to look whether he wants to change, to
search for new positions, to orient his career as he wishes. And the manager will accompany him”
(US2_I1no1: 197, own translation)  
“(...)  for  my  succession,  we  call  on  [European  HQ]  who  will  first  publish  an  internal  job
advertisement at US6. There is a career marketplace where everyone who has access to US6 can
look and see” (US6_I1no1: 175, own translation)
“We clearly tell people that this is how they will progress in this company: enlarge your network,
discuss your work with others” (US8_I1no1: 96, own translation)
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“[speaking about  the internal  labour market]  And then it's  fairly  free,  American style  or even
Anglo-Saxon: people start on the basis that they might as well leave the company and take a new
job somewhere else. So they should be able to apply for another job here” (US8_I1no1: 231)
“I think that's the most American part of the company, really. Everybody is encouraged to show
what they can do” (US10_I2no1: 90)
“(...) there is one training which is for everybody, which is based- it's a leadership and individual
effectiveness model. And that's called career development journey. So every new hire is supposed to
attend that training which is about “How do I forward my career within this company?”, “What do
I have to look out for?”, “What do I need to develop?” etc. And that's a training that is very
standardized” (US10_I2no1: 270)
Training, development, career progression and succession planning
Connected with the performance management system is the equally standardized, more strategic
HR area of training, personnel development, promotion, career and succession planning. On the
other hand, the part of transactional or administrative HR is mostly standardized and processes are
often bundled in a shared service centre or delivered by external service brokers. For instance, at
US1, all training programmes for soft skill development of very senior mangers and key talents are
standardized and delivered by a common regional European training organization (US1_I1no1: 62-
63). At US2, the same logic as for other standard processes and practices applies also to trainings,
which are developed and standardized for a global, regional or national level  (US2_I1no1: 203).
And the management development plan is a globally standardized process (US2_I1no1: 237). As we
have  seen,  at  US3,  the  development  plan  is  firmly  integrated  into  the  standardized  corporate
performance  management  system  with  the  corresponding  standard  processes,  and  there  are
standardized management trainings for junior and senior managers in place (US3_I1no1: 120, 121,
164). At US4, where the focus is on internal careers, a centralised and standardized system of career
and succession management  (US4_I1no1: 132) is in place as a logical consequence. Also at US5,
the promotion process and certain training programmes are standardized either on a regional or
business level for certain professions, together with a standardized competence model. Regional
programmes are devised by a centre of expertise and there are certain partnership agreements in
place with renowned European and U.S. business schools (US5_I1,I1no1: 203-205, 206-208, 297).
Standardized  career  development  and  succession  planning  processes  are  also  in  place  at  US6,
together with common standard trainings (US6_I1no1: 147, 158, 303). Interesting in this respect is
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the case of US7, where European HQ has piloted a new system for the definition of talents that was
reverse transferred and which is being implemented also in the U.S.  (US7_I1no1: 131). US8 has
common standard trainings in place,  for instance in the area of client management,  and certain
standard  trainings  that  are  delivered  in  the  U.S.  and where  only a  limited  number  of  selected
employees is sent to participate  (US8_I1no1: 258-259).  Still other trainings are standardized on a
European level for senior managers, for instance leadership trainings  (US8_I1no1: 239-242, 260-
262).  Furthermore,  a  standard  tool  and  process  is  in  place  to  track,  review and  identify  high
potentials (US8_I1no1: 163). At US9, a whole standard corporate training curriculum in the area of
employee relations was first developed by EMEA HQ, taking up elements from various European
countries,  and which has then been taken up as a global standard curriculum by corporate HQ
(US9_I1no1: 107).  Furthermore,  high potential  identification is standardized and well-structured
(US9_I1no1: 118). Finally, also US10 has a fairly structured way of developing people, including a
standardized  people  planning  process  (US10_I1no1:  125-130). Furthermore,  standardized
leadership trainings are being developed together with a local business school  (US10_I1no1: 80,
88). Interesting in this respect is especially the fact that, somehow similar to what we have seen in
many German firms, there are structured mandatory curricula in place:  “(...)  we have a finance
university online tool which is global. Across the globe, financial people and non-financial people
can go and follow a course. This is reported globally. There are certain requirements for certain
levels, how many courses you'll need to have. (...)  it is expected that if you are a manager level in
finance,  you'll  need  to  follow  at  least  two  courses  in  a  year,  using  Finance  University“
(US10_I1no1:  80-82).  The  same  kind  of  curriculum  is  currently  under  construction  for  HR
(US10_I1no1: 84) to be delivered in a centre of excellence structure for learning, development and
compensation practices, which is currently being created (US10_I1no1: 122). 
Transactional and administrative HR processes: payrolling and mobility
Concerning  the  second  area  of  transactional  and  administrative  HR  processes,  the  degree  of
standardization among the US MNCs of our sample is equally high. This is not surprising since
efficiency gains and cost reductions as one of the most important reasons for standardization can be
realised in this area thanks to scale effects.
At US2, our interviewee explicitly mentioned standardized pay bands, which also points to the
presence  of  standard  job descriptions  (US2_I1no1:  267).  Furthermore,  there  is  much reason to
believe that  US2 also has  shared service centres  in  place for  administrative HR processes like
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payrolling and mobility-related standard processes. This belief is grounded on the fact that the very
big MNC US2 is among the corporations of our sample that generally appear to be most marked by
the sustained use of standard processes and tools, that the use of shared service centres is explicitly
mentioned in the annual report (US2 group 2011: 26), and that the creation of exactly such service
centres and service brokerage for other companies and public administrations is part of the US2
consulting business. At US3, there is a standard pay policy in place, where bonuses are clearly
defined (US3_I1no1: 130). Therefore, there might as well be standard job descriptions in place to fit
the  pre-defined pay bands.  At  US4,  there  is  a  corporate  pay or  compensation  policy in  place,
although to our knowledge there is no common shared service centre for payrolling which is done at
EMEA HQ  for  Switzerland  (US4_I1no1:  108,  163,  214).  Although  we  know  from  publicly
available US4 documents that there are shared services in place (US4 group 2011: 51), we don't
have any information on the existence of HR shared services in Europe. At US5, payroll is run in a
shared service centre for eleven Western European countries (US5_I3no1: 24) and the company is
currently harmonizing job descriptions and competence profiles on a global level, which will be
backed up by a corresponding IT-tool  (US5_I1,I2no1: 132). At US6, there are guidelines for pay
policy in place (US6_I1no1: 147), but according to our interviewee, jobs are defined and payrolling
is done locally  (US6_I1no1: 11, 12).  However, some services around expatriate management are
delivered by a centralised structure (US6_I1no1: 11). At US7, there is a standardized compensation
framework in place defining pay bands,  a benefit  policy  (US7_I1no1: 128),  and a stock option
programme  (US7_I1no1: 109).  Furthermore there is a standardized process for bonus calculation
(US7_I1no1: 120). Payroll is done in a shared service centre (US7_I1no1: 89) and job families are
globally standardized and linked with the pay band structure  (US7_I1no1: 110). US8 has an HR
shared  service  for  the  transactional  part  of  HR where  pay,  administration  of  benefits  and  the
administrative  part  of  expatriate  management  are  done  (US8_I1no1:  49).  There  is  a  globally
standardized compensation policy in place with standard processes  (US8_I1no1: 106, 133, 327).
Although not mentioned by our interviewee, we are inclined to speculate that there may also be
some kind of standardized job families or job descriptions in place as compensation and benefit is
standardized, and standard processes in this area are performed in shared service centres. At US9,
payroll and the administrative part of relocations, sickness and pension plans have been outsourced
to an external service provider  (US9_I1no1: 20-26).  There is  also a  standardized compensation
policy  in  place  (US9_I1no1:  123-125).  Finally,  at  US10  there  is  a  common,  standardized
compensation  philosophy or  framework in  place  (US10_I1no1:  33,  38,  40),  as  there  is  for  job
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evaluations and job families (US10_I1no1: 41, 74, 122).
Employee surveys, direct communication and non-union policy
Standardized  surveys  are  an  instrument  of  direct,  individual  employee  communication,  that  is
generally associated with U.S. HRM. This form of communication is often viewed as opposed to
representative  and  collective  channels  of  communication  such  as  works  councils  or  works
committees. Employee surveys are definitely present in eight out of ten US MNCs of our sample. In
the remaining two companies US3 and US5, our interviewees did not mention such a tool. On the
other hand, these same MNCs did not report any contact with unions at least as far as Switzerland is
concerned, and even a marked preference for non-union ER (US5_I3no1: 177, 179). Nor did they
mention  any kind of  employee  representatives,  but  rather  other  direct  communication channels
(US3_I1no1:  135,  193;  US5_I1,I2no1:  91).  Employee  surveys  as  an  instrument  of  direct
communication with employees are especially interesting to consider together with the issue of
indirect representative channels, and the role of unions in IR. In fact, according to our expectations,
none of the US MNCs of our sample reported to have any contacts with unions in Switzerland. At
US4, our interviewee told that there were unionized  production sites (US4_I1no1: 167). Though, a
look into the US4 SEC 10-k Filings (US4 group 2013: 8) reveals that the greatest part of U.S.
employees are at-will employees who are not subject to any kind of contract of written agreement at
all. Only some 25% of US4's U.S.-based employees being hourly production workers are covered
by collective agreements with various unions. Concerning US4 union policy outside the U.S., the
same document stipulates that “Outside the United States, the company enters into employment
contracts  and  agreements  in  those  countries  in  which  such  relationships  are  mandatory  or
customary.  The  provisions  of  these  agreements  correspond  in  each  case  with  the  required  or
customary terms in the subject jurisdiction“ (US4 group 2013: 8). In some cases, US MNCs did
make  use  of  some  non-unionised  internal  personnel  commission  as  an  additional  indirect
communication channel  (US2_I1no1:  263).  In one case,  this  commission was even involved in
negotiations of annual salary increases  (US6_I1no1: 228-234). However, there is some reason to
believe that such commissions might first and foremost be used to keep unions out. For instance, in
case of US6, our interviewee was very clear on this matter: “This is the advantage of maintaining
this personnel commission, to give them credibility in order to avoid unionisation” (US6_I1no1:
233, own translation). As we have seen, such a tactics fits in quite well with findings on US MNCs
in Germany and their ways of dealing with works councils. The latter were strictly separated from
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unions and integrated as an internal employee representative body in order to gain legitimacy (see
table 19). At US9, our interviewee equally emphasized the US9 policy of legal compliance with
local provisions in terms of IR and unions' rights. Though, he made clear that US9 has the will to
“(...) reinforce the individual employee relations pillar in order to weaken the collective labour
relations pillar” (US9_I1no1: 10, own translation). In this case, we may therefore say that there is
evidence of active agency of a local actor in order to keep the plant union-free and please the parent
company.
There are hence strong signs for a clear preference for non-union individual ER/IR among the US
MNCs of  our  sample,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  previous  studies  that  we  have
reported in some detail earlier in this work. The following two citations were worded by a British
expatriate who had been working in various European countries and at US HQ. They may serve as
an illustration of the overall U.S. attitude towards unions, and equally point to existing differences
between the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK: “(...) they are a little bit afraid of
trade unions and works councils. Because you know, the level of trade union representation in the
United States is a lot lower overall. There are some extreme cases, but in US5 we have many, many,
many non union sites” (US5_I3no1: 177); “Well, I think the American mentality would say: non
union is better. The American mentality. My experience says that the threat of the union is worse
than the union itself. Because I have worked very effectively in union environments and achieved
huge change at times in unionised environments  without any real – yes,  with challenge,  but it
doesn't always prevent you to do what's right for the business” (US5_I3no1: 177).
These  characteristics  that  are  present  across  our  sample  of  US  MNCs  are  therefore  largely
consistent  with  earlier  findings  on  a  wide-spread  philosophy  of  individualistic  high-road  ER
patterns in non-union US MNCs (Tüselmann et al. 2008: 1624).
Diversity policy
As we have seen, strong and formalised diversity policies have for long been identified as another
typically U.S. American HR practice which is linked to the idiosyncratic historical development of
the  U.S.  NBS  and  backed  up  by  particular  institutional  enforcement  mechanisms  (Egan  and
Bendick. 2003; Ferner et al. 2005a; Kurowski 1999, 2002). In fact, all the US MNCs of our sample
were found to have some corporate diversity policy in place, although several of them had some
European  adaptations  (US1,  US2,  US6,  US10)  or  told  that  the  diversity  policy  was  not  as
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intensively lived as in the U.S., which points to differences in internalization and implementation:
“Here,  race  is  not  an issue whereas  in  the  U.S.  they  have  quotas  for  black  people,  for  Latin
Americans (...)” (US6_I1no1: 276); “There is a diversity programme in place which is certainly
more intensively lived in America than in Switzerland (…) cultural diversity, so regardless of skin
colour,  religion,  sexual  orientation.  They  insist  a  lot  on  the  fact  that  everyone  has  the  same
chances”  (US2_I1no1:  294-296).  In  the  case  of  US10,  we  have  already  seen  earlier  that
implementation of the global diversity policy has been adapted at European HQ. In the cases of
US5, US7 and US8 our interviewees also mentioned explicit policies in terms of sexual harassment
(US5_ I1,I2no1: 163, 283)(US7_I1no1: 100)(US8_I1no1: 172). 
Recruitment
Recruitment is a moderately standardized area where a great part of our US MNCs except for US6
had implemented some common standards  (US1: I1no1: 50), common employer branding  (US1:
I1no1: 137, 167)(US10:_I1no1: 30) guidelines, frameworks, standard tools (US10_I1no1: 28, 30)
or  even  a  whole  standard  process  (US2_I1no1:  181-183)(US5_I3no1:  23)(US8_I1no1:  132)
(US9_I1no1: 96).
Socialization practices linked to corporate values, culture and corporate codes of conduct
In our analysis of transfer mechanisms, we have already discussed the intensive use of corporate
culture and corporate codes of conduct as indirect tools for practice transfer in US MNCs. It is
therefore not surprising to see that all US MNCs of our sample had a strictly standardized corporate
code  of  conduct  in  place.  These  codes  are  usually  very  explicit,  clearly  communicated  and
infringements are severely punished, for instance at  US1 with summary dismissal  (US1_I1no1:
142). In several US MNCs, the code of conduct is part of the employment contract and/or has to be
signed  by  each  employee  (US1_I1no1:  142)(US2_I1no1:  126)(US8_I1no1:  186).  Additionally,
there are regular mandatory trainings and tests that each employee has to pass on the contents of the
code (US2_I1no1: 152)(US4_I1no1: 121)(US5_I1,I2no1: 148)(US6_I1no1: 147)(US7_I1no1: 104-
106)(US8_I1no1: 180)(US9_I1no1: 84)(US10_I1no1: 98). At US3, there is also a green number
where employees can call US HQ in case of infringements of the code of conduct  (US3_I1no1:
138). As we can see, in all US MNCs of our sample, there is a multitude of measures in place that
are  aimed  at  thorough  implementation  of  corporate  codes  of  conduct,  corporate  values  and
corporate culture. As we have seen earlier, such associated implementation measures like regular
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trainings and examinations were rather the exception than the rule in the German MNCs of our
sample. The evidence found in our sample of US MNCs therefore lends further support to earlier
findings pointing to the more intense use of corporate culture as a management tool and sustained
efforts of “cultural engineering” (Alvesson 2002: 47–48)  in US MNCs (Ferner et al. 2004a: 117).
The following interview extracts may serve to illustrate this thesis in a variety of situations and
ways: 
“[values] They are there, they are communicated, they are reviewed, they are known, they have to
be lived” (US2_I1no1: 102, own translation); 
“US3 very much emphasizes ethics and correct behaviour. They also created a phone number you
can contact if you realise something that is not OK” (US3_I1no1: 138, own translation); 
“The big bosses decide on the big strategies and on the corporate vision, then they are cascaded
down (…) there  is  always  the  same sophisticated  model  of  construction  based on the  values”
(US4_I1no1: 79, own translation); 
“(...) we also have trainings in order to make sure that managers know about the core values and
how to apply them” (US5_I1,I2no1: 153, own translation); “As a company we refer to our core
values which is safety and health of employees, highest ethical standards, care for the environment,
and respect for people” (US5_I3no1: 150); “These are four core values that are then each of them
deployed in global programmes” (US5_I1,I2no1: 155, own translation); 
“The principles of corporate culture, integrity, all that is not negotiable. Whoever would not adhere
to  these  values  (…)  would  not  stay  in  this  company.  This  is  clear,  this  is  not  negotiable”
(US6_I1no1: 309, own translation); 
“(...) growth is difficult to manage since suddenly there are all these new people whom we engage
and who find themselves in a company whose culture they do not know. So you have to recreate this
kind of glue between people (…) to feel part of a whole, to understand the company values and to
be  able  to  incarnate  them.  So  there  is  lot  of  training  effort  involved” (US8_I1no1:  194,  own
translation); 
“Corporate culture plays an important part. It is very strong. This is wanted and sustained through
our recruitment practice: normally we only hire young university graduates (…) A priori we hire
people  for  in-house  careers  with  a  strong  socialization”  (US9_I1no1:  76,  own  translation);
“[talking about European HQ and control] (…) we put measures, KPI's (...) I'm talking in HR in
specific. US10 says: let's have a look at 3 to 4 measurements per quarter. We do report quarterly on
what we do to achieve these measurements (...)  I'll give you an example. (...) Do we communicate
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our values in every activity that we do? ”(US10_I1no1: 70).
Security, safety and health
Still another element that was often mentioned by our interviewees together with, or as an element
of, corporate or US American culture is the issue of security, safety and health. In case of US2, our
interviewee emphasized lots of security-related processes: “(...) many of our processes are related
to  security.  I  think  Americans  are  fairly  well-known  for  security”  (US2_I1no1:  306,  own
translation).  At  US3,  there  is  a  global  health  directive  in  place  called  smoke-free  campus
(US3_I1no1:  234),  a  directive  that  our  interviewee  expected  to  provoke  some  discontentment
among Swiss  employees.  Interestingly,  also our  US4 interviewee told  about  a  strong corporate
security and health policy and equally expressed some criticism: “For example, to park your car
here we didn't have any process. Now we have one that specifies who is allowed to or not, how to
do and so on. This isn't just US4, this is American, because when you go to the U.S., there is a
process  for  everything.  (...)  At  US4,  everything  is  organized  and structured.  This  has  a  lot  of
positive sides, although sometimes it goes too far. When you climb up the stars up to the 4 th floor, on
each floor there is a sign warning you to hold the handrail in order not to stumble (…) Often it is
things related to security and health. In the U.S. this goes as far as to extend into private life: they
will tell you what you have to eat in order to live healthy” (US4_I1no1: 190-195, own translation).
At US5, safety is even part of the company's core values, and once again, employees are told to
hold the handrail on the stairs (US5_I3no1: 250, 252). At EMEA HQ of US5, the visitor will even
see a big traffic light fixed in the entry hall that indicates the current safety status (US5 field notes).
Also our US6 interviewee considered security and safety-related policies in HR to be something
typically American:  “We have a lot of directives, mainly referring to security and safety. This is
very strict. There are internal controls that are commissioned by [corporate HQ]” (US6_I1no1:
145, own translation). At US8, there is even a whole risk management in HR in place: “There is a
risk group in HR that makes sure that all procedures are absolutely water tight in terms of risks”
(US8_I1no1:  118).  In  this  case,  one of  the  potential  risks  that  are  controlled  in  HR is  correct
implementation and non-violation of the corporate code of conduct (US8: I1no1: 124).  At US10,
safety and health is a function of its own that is taken out of HR and considered to be “absolutely
important” (US10_I1no1: 142) by our European HQ interviewee. Also our second interviewee at
European  purchasing  HQ agreed  on  the  great  importance  of  safety  and  health-related  policies
(US10_I2no1: 167). In fact, in the European purchasing office, the interviewer had to sign a form
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that he had read and understood the safety and health instructions of the site which was an office on
one  single  floor  without  any stairs  or  heavy machinery  (US10 European purchasing  HQ field
notes). At European HQ of US10, there were signs fixed in the rest room telling people to drink
enough during the day, together with a sample of control colours in order to cross-check the colour
of your urine (US10 European HQ field notes). Similar to our US4 interviewee, our interviewee of
US10 purchasing HQ expressed some discomfort with this kind of health policies:  “That's very,
very important within US10 and it's very difficult to get the Swiss to follow there. Because it's just
not  Swiss.  You  don't  do  it  in  Switzerland”  (US10_I2no1:  167).  Our  second  interviewee  also
established a link between this kind of safety and health policies and American culture: “(...) that's
definitely the American culture of being sewed for everything. If you don't warn people they can sew
you. So you warn them about everything. That is there. (...) And there is a process in place: if
something happens we do this, this and this” (US10_I2no1: 177, 179).
As we can see, several of our interviewees not only suggest that the issue of security, safety and
health  is  a  genuinely  American  practice,  but  also  that  they  faced  some  problems  concerning
acceptance of such practices in Switzerland. Based on our material it is not possible to establish in
how far low levels of acceptance also lead to low levels of internalization and functionality of such
practices  in  Switzerland  with  ceremonial  adoption  or  similar  outcomes,  although  this  seems
probable or at the very least, possible.
Interesting in this respect is the fact that only at D6 our interviewee mentioned the introduction of a
corporate  security  policy  that  has  been  introduced  fairly  similarly  to  the  corporate  guiding
principles or values through an online-training with some questions that have to be answered as a
test. This practice and kind of implementation once more appears to be strongly inspired by Anglo-
Saxon practices.
CSR as a business case
CSR is the last area where we could identify some pronounced U.S. influence on specific practices.
Though, the degree of standardization of formalised HR practices in this area is somewhat lower
than in the ones previously discussed. In fact, the influence in this area seems to be more subtle and
does not quite as much take the form of standardized and formalised HR practices. In this case, a
U.S.  country-of-origin  effect  rather  manifests  itself  in  a  particular  U.S.  understanding  of  and
approach towards the topic of CSR. However, we decided to report these findings in this chapter on
standardized practices since it is also here where we have discussed the country-of-origin influence
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on other, significantly more standardized HR practices and their implementation in Switzerland. 
The discussion of practices related to CSR should allow us to get some elements of an answer to our
question about how US MNCs relate to the Swiss institutional setting and try to gain legitimacy. As
Kostova  et  al.  (2008:  1001)  suggested,  MNC  legitimacy  may  be  viewed  rather  as  a  social
construction than a function of isomorphism, making engagement in symbolic image building a
critical  issue that  is  directly related  to  agency.  Having a  look at  how MNCs try to  engage in
symbolic image building when coming to Switzerland is hence also revealing about the socialised
rationality of high-ranking U.S. managers who are devising corresponding policies. As we have
seen in the literature, this kind of analysis allows us to gain a better understanding of the issue of
competing rationalities (Edwards et al. 2007b: 202) and actors' institutional choice as a matter of
bounded rationality (Bluhm 2001:  156).  Moreover,  empirical  examples may give illustration to
what concrete happens when two sets of institutional rationalities collide (Ferner et al. 2012: 166).
As regards CSR, in our interview material we found some evidence indicating that in US MNCs, a
vision of CSR as a business case is predominant. Such a vision finds its concrete expression in the
specific ways in which US MNCs act and communicate on their actions in order to gain legitimacy,
and to strengthen corporate culture and team spirit of their employees. The collision of two sets of
institutional rationalities takes place in Switzerland, where Swiss people do not seem to be at ease
with a U.S. approach towards CSR with its emphasis on publicly visible volunteer action that is
imposed on them:
“(...) in the United States, I was very conscious of a lot of volunteer work. And I've had people in
my immediate work group who were part of environmental initiatives with the local communities,
cleaning up parks or that kind of stuff, working with disadvantaged parts of the community (...)”
(US5_I3no1: 222)
“(...) I'm sure people here, who work in this building here are working with local charities and
schools and all that kind of stuff, but they don't write it on the wall. They just get on with it and do
it. It's part of their own personal social obligation (…) In Switzerland here, people are personally
committed  to  something.  Perhaps  more  superficial  in  the  United  States.  It's  to  be  seen  to  be,
perhaps” (US5_I3no1: 227, 232)
“Contributing to society as one of our values is also a particularity. We have to do volunteer work,
and in Switzerland, the mentality is  that everyone does some volunteer work but doesn't speak
about it. It's discreet. As for US6, the principle applies that if you do some volunteer work, this
helps to weld together the team and increases engagement. In Switzerland, this doesn't work, and
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we're also evaluated on this. We are supposed to form a committee with teams, and one team would
go and paint the walls of a school, another would serve dishes to some handicapped people – we
try to mobilise, but it doesn't work” (US6_I1no1: 310, own translation)
“There is a willingness to be a reference employer and to create a US9 town where US9 people are
everywhere around. For instance, once 600 employees went to clean up around the Lake Geneva,
or  there  are  projects  with  handicapped  people.  This  contributes  to  the  positive  image  of  the
company in the canton” (US9_I1no1: 33, own translation)
“I mean there is a completely different audience US corporate companies are working towards. But
also what I find convincing in this, why I don't think it's just propaganda in that sense is that: it's
based on business. (…) [So it's a business case in the US?] Absolutely. But that's what makes it real
for me. Because it's much more pragmatic (…) I think there is often that feeling that you need to
hide it. You need to hide that there is a business reason. And I think with the US companies it is the
opposite.  You  have  to  prove  that  it  is  a  business  case”  (US10_I2no1:  431,  434,  437,  own
translation)
In summary, this evidence suggests that in some cases, local Swiss people strongly oppose US CSR
practices,  leading to  undesirable  outcomes like failed transfer  or  ceremonial  adoption.  In  other
instances though, there do not seem to be major problems with a typically US approach towards
CSR as a business case and corresponding practices.
Table 32 below provides an overview of standardized HRM practices in  the US MNCs of our
sample.
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Table 32: Standardized HR practices in US MNCs of our sample
MNC Performance 
management
process
High poten-
tial and talent
identification,
management
development,
succession 
planning
Training
curricula
/ stand-
ard 
trainings
Pay 
policy
/ 
comp
&ben
Payroll Job 
descrip-
tions / 
job 
families
Mobility Employee
surveys
Non 
union 
policy
Diversity Security, 
safety 
and 
health
CSR Recruit-
ment 
process, 
stand-
ards/ 
employer
branding
Socialization 
practices
Values 
defined / 
effective 
use of 
corporate
culture
Code of
conduct
US1 */s, cf */s */s * N/A N/A */cf * * */E - * */cf */* */c
US2 *+p * * * (*) (*) (*) * * */E * N/A * */* */c/t
US3 *+p * * * N/A (*) N/A (*) * * * N/A - */* */c
US4 * * N/A * - N/A N/A * */lc * * N/A -/cf */* */t
US5 * * * * * * * (*) * * * * * */* */t/p
US6 * * * * - - * * * */E * * - */* */t
US7 * * N/A * * * * * * * N/A N/A N/A */* */t
US8 *+p * *, */s * * (*) * * (*) */1 * N/A * */* */c/t
US9 *+p * * * * N/A * * */lc * N/A * * */* */t
US10 * */cur * * N/A * N/A * * */E * * */cf */* */t
Source:  own  compilation  based  on  interview transcript  analysis;  *=standardized,  (*)=supposed  to  be  standardized,  s=standardized  for  (senior)  management
level/executives,  cf=common  framework,+p=explicitly  coupled  with  career/promotion/succession  management,  cur=mandatory  structured  curricula,  lc=legal
compliance, respect of local customs, t=training, c=part of employment contract and/or signed, p=process, 1=mentioned as part of CSR, included in code of conduct
and part of corporate values, E=European adaptations e.g. emphasis on gender diversity.
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8.3.3 Standard HRM practices in German and US MNCs compared
In the previous two sections, we have presented and account of standardized HRM practices and
processes in our two country-of-origin groups of German and US MNCs. Furthermore, we have
discussed  findings  against  the  background of  macro-  and micro-level  key influences  on  cross-
national HRM practice transfer in MNCs (see table 15). We highlighted evidence of country-of-
origin effects, but also of dominance effects that led to Anglo-Saxonization. For certain practices,
we also discussed issues of interpretation and translation of Anglo-Saxon practices through German
and  Swiss  stakeholders  and  managers,  that  led  to  important  differences  in  design  and
implementation  of  formally  similar  practices.  This  was  the  case  for  design  and  operation  of
performance management systems, where important differences could be found between German
and US MNCs, and even within European and US sites of the strongly centralized and standardised
MNC US5. Similarly, a closer look at German versions of diversity policies revealed that contents
as well as institutional background and reasons for their implementation differed widely between
German  and  US  MNCs.  Still  another  example  that  revealed  differences  between  the  US  and
Switzerland was typical US policies and practices in the field of CSR, that strongly reflected the
notion of CSR as a business case. We will now compare the results of our analysis of standardized
HRM practices in German and US MNCs against the background of key insights and propositions
that we have formulated in our research framework in chapter 7.3. 
Concerning German MNCs, we expected to find some manifestation of long-term developmental
HR with heavy emphasis on training, mostly internal careers with career progression being heavily
based on increasing technical competence. Furthermore, we expected a co-operative, consensual
style in IR. The issue of IR has not yet been discussed in more detail since it appeared to be more
localised in German MNCs. This finding is interesting since it applies also to the group of highly
centralised and standardized German MNCs of our sample. While this group of MNCs showed high
levels of centralization and standardization of HRM processes and practices, the area of IR still
seems to be an exception, where practices are still more locally determined. However, at this point,
we may already say that generally, our German case study MNCs seem to confirm the picture of a
co-operative style in IR just in the sense of the expected country-of-origin effect. Furthermore, the
wide-spread  use  of  standardized  employee  surveys  as  a  complementary  instrument  of  direct
communication  within  generally  pluralist  traditions  lends  further  support  to  earlier  findings  of
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Tüselmann et al. (Tüselmann et al. 2003; Tüselmann et al. 2006).
The results of our analysis of standardized HRM practices strongly confirm our expectation to find
signs of developmental HR (Dickmann 2003; Ferner et al. 2001: 116). As we have seen, among the
German MNCs of our sample, we were able to identify the existence of a clear German country-of-
origin effect in this area. Our collected evidence hence confirms the expectations formulated in the
research framework. However, based on previous research, it was difficult to predict how exactly
such  country-of-origin  influence  would  be  manifest  in  concrete  HRM  practices  in  the  Swiss
subsidiaries of German MNCs. In this  respect,  our analysis  revealed that this  country-of-origin
effect showed through in the following way:  in most of the German MNCs,  fairly  structured and
formalised technical trainings were in place. Furthermore, there was a direct nexus between the
acquisition of technical competence, and career progression. D1 is maybe the most illustrative case
for  the presence  of  utterly structured training  curricula  that  managers  at  certain levels  have  to
complete  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  promotion.  As  we  have  seen,  this  logic   corresponds  to
traditional German functional career paths and a concept of legitimate authority of superiors that is
based on superior technical knowledge. Our empirical evidence suggests that, in German MNCs,
technical competence continues to be the most important, or at least one very important, criterion
for  promotion.  This  is  particularly interesting since meanwhile,  most  German MNCs also have
introduced performance management systems and might as well use performance against targets as
criterion for the identification of high potentials. As far as we understood from our interviewees,
performance in fact is a criterion for promotion in a sense that low performers would not be invited
to assume greater responsibility. However, performance alone did not seem to have the status of a
single most important criterion. Connected to this logic of structured curricula and acquisition of
technical competence for career progression is  what we termed passive careers.  Passive careers
refer to a top-down approach towards personnel development and career planning on internal labour
markets that we could identify in several German MNCs. Our evidence suggests that,  in many
German MNCs, it is committees of high-ranking line- and HR managers who identify potential
candidates who might climb up the corporate career ladder and reach the higher ranks. It is these
committees who will then plan the development of these talents in a top-down manner, determining
what kind of trainings they would have to complete, and whether international experience would
have to be acquired. After completion of their curriculum, talents are appointed to a new post. This
approach considerably contrasts with an apparently more active way of personnel development and
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career planning that is present in many US MNCs. Our findings suggest that German career patterns
that are marked by long internal careers and the acquisition of technical knowledge, are apparently
largely transferable to Switzerland. Even if local labour markets are highly dynamic and turnover is
higher  than in  German plants,  we did not find any evidence of German MNCs changing their
respective approaches  towards  personnel  development  and career  planning in Switzerland.  This
finding might be explained by similar career patterns in Switzerland with comparatively long job
tenures and an emphasis  on technical  competence.  However,  also the functioning of  the Swiss
labour  market  may  partly  explain  why  German  career  planning  seems  to  work  well  also  in
Switzerland.  As  we  have  seen,  neither  are  hire  and  fire  strategies  cognitively  or  normatively
supported practices in Switzerland, nor do they make sense on a highly competitive labour market
with low unemployment rates. In our interviews, we found strong evidence of the disciplining effect
of the Swiss labour market on employers. In this respect, the Swiss labour market is different from
the British one, where different career patterns undermined German long-term investment in dual
VET and in-house career approaches. 
Our evidence also lends further support to the findings of previous research on strong dominance
effects in HRM, with the USA as a role model for German MNCs (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). In
our sample of German MNCs, these dominance effects showed through in a variety of ways. A first
interesting finding concerns centralization and HR process standardization. As we have seen in our
discussion of corporate configuration and transfer, these characteristics, that have traditionally been
viewed as typical elements of the HR architecture of US MNCs, were also present  among the
German MNCs in  our  sample.  In  line  with  a  tendency towards  centralization  and HR process
standardization, certain HR core processes around performance management were standardized at
least  for  executives  in  all  German  MNCs  except  for  D3.  Although  the  introduction  of  such
performance management  systems might  at  first  sight  be  viewed as  still  another  expression of
Anglo-Saxonization and U.S. dominance effects, things seem to be somewhat more complicated in
reality. In fact, there is strong evidence from at least six out of the nine German MNCs of our
sample that points to huge differences between U.S. performance management systems and what
has been implemented and is operated in German MNCs. Based on the reports of our interviewees,
we could identify German works councils' as the central actor in this field. In fact, works councils
are endowed with great institutional power resources to oppose the introduction of performance
management systems and force management into negotiations and consensus already at the stage of
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design. This institutional coercion to enter into negotiations and seek for works council's agreement
seems to be internalised by German managers to such an extent that it influences directly on their
cognition and choice of practices, thus making them “carriers of institutions” (Kostova and Roth
2002: 218) of their country-of-origin. To our knowledge, none of the German MNCs' performance
systems comprised any kind of forced distribution.  Furthermore,  embedded German managerial
norms seem to influence heavily on the way in which such performance management systems are
operated in reality. Several managers emphasized the fact that the use of these systems was fairly
humane and not as rude as this might be the case in U.S. MNCs. A subtle Swiss host-country effect
might  be  viewed in  the  fact  that  this  German  way of  implementing  performance management
practices was seen with a critical eye by several of our interviewees in Swiss subsidiaries. This
finding is interesting because, as we have seen, Swiss management style has equally been described
as fairly consensual. Yet, Swiss consensual style does not seem to translate into a similar approach
towards performance management as in several German MNCs.
Based on our literature review, we did not initially expect to find strong and formalised diversity
policies in German MNCs. However, our empirical findings show that four out of nine German
MNCs of our sample have formulated such policies, what might be viewed as another manifestation
of Anglo-Saxon influence. In fact, there is no doubt about the U.S. origins of diversity policies in
HRM. Yet, a closer look at German diversity policies revealed some differences. The latter very
much emphasized the aspect of gender equality which is increasingly important for the employer
image in Germany,  and hence,  used for employer  branding. Although this  employment market-
related reason may equally apply to US MNCs, the big difference is the absence in Germany of a
comparable social  history with problems around racial  discrimination,  and the strictly enforced
legal framework that has been established following the U.S. civil rights movement. In this case, we
would therefore argue that, as distinct from other HR practices, U.S. diversity management policies
are a result of coercive isomorphism. In the US NBS, elaborated diversity policies are required by
law, and respective equal opportunity legislation is strictly enforced through specialised institutions.
On the other hand, the room for manoeuvre in HRM for German firms is usually rather restricted
through a constraining legal environment. However, concerning diversity, they were free to develop
some policy without being legally required to do so, just in order to gain social legitimacy and to
improve their employer image on the labour market. Our findings on German versions of diversity
policies  with  their  focus  on  gender  equality  can  also  be  compared  to  earlier  findings  on  U.S.
practices in the UK and Ireland, where US MNCs adapted their original diversity policies in fairly
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similar ways to European settings.
A last area where we could find signs of Anglo-Saxon influence is socialization practices  that are
linked  to  corporate  culture,  values  and  codes  of  conduct.  Having  a  look  at  official  company
documents and web pages, we can see that all German MNCs have defined explicit corporate values
and codes of conduct. However, our interviews revealed that once again, there were some important
differences between the use of these same HR practices between US and German MNCs. The first
important difference that we could clearly identify concerns implementation of corporate codes of
conduct. Only one out of nine German MNCs had delivered some kind of training, and none of our
interviewees told anything about regular examinations that would have to be passed on the contents
of the code of conduct. This finding is particularly interesting in view of the general thoroughness
and structure of technical trainings in these same German MNCs. Apparently, the German notion of
training is not so much associated with the idea of socialization and passing of a formally defined
common corporate culture to new employees, but rather with the acquisition of technical skills.
Furthermore, especially the case of D6 seems to imply that it might prove to be fairly difficult to try
and train German managers and employees on explicitly top-down defined corporate values in order
to socialise them to a common corporate culture. This might be due to differences in the perception
of  the  concept  of  corporate  culture  between  Germany  and  the  U.S.  However,  our  collected
information  did  not  allow to  go deeper  into  the  matter  of  underlying  reasons and concepts  of
corporate culture.
Regarding  US MNCs, we expected the latter to transfer sophisticated performance management
systems with calculative HRM practices, strong diversity policies,  and a marked preference for
individualistic  non-union  approaches  towards  ER/IR  including  strong  direct  mechanisms  of
communication  such  as  employee  surveys.  Furthermore,  we  expected  intensive  socialization
practices  around  strong  corporate  cultures  that  are  used  as  management  tools  and  passed  to
employees via explicitly formulated corporate values and associated trainings. But also codes of
conduct may be added to these practices since the latter also formalize and prescribe certain ways of
doing and underlying values. Finally, once more related to corporate culture and socialization, we
have suggested that US MNCs might adopt internal labour market approaches as they were found to
do  in  difficult  labour  markets.  Though,  as  distinct  from German  MNCs,  based  on  the  extant
literature we had no reason to expect functional career paths or any kind of nexus between career
progression and the acquisition of technical knowledge as in German MNCs. The results of our
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analysis of standardized HRM practices in US MNCs largely confirmed these expectations. 
As  we  have  seen,  all  of  the  US  MNCs  of  our  sample  heavily  rely  on  standardization  and
formalization of practices which facilitates transfer. Furthermore, with the remarkable exception of
US1, all  of the US MNCs of our sample had already in place,  or where currently introducing,
sophisticated integrated HR IT systems that allow for strong central control over standard processes
and related key figures. As expected, all US MNCs of our sample had standardized performance
management systems in place. This is even the case with the heavily decentralised US1, where all
employees are covered by a common responsibility frame, and where a completely standardized
system is in place for senior executives. Individual performance against targets is generally closely
monitored and linked to compensation. Furthermore, we may underline that in nearly half of the US
MNCs of our sample, interviewees explicitly pointed to clear and direct link between individual
performance and career progression. This is largely in line with suggestions based on the literature
about  a  pervasive market  mentality and contractual  forms of  authority that  are  manifest  in  the
relations between employers and employees. On the other hand, in none of the US MNCs of our
sample,  there  were  any  comparably  standardized,  structured  and  formalised  technical  training
curricula in place that would be linked to career progression, as this was the case in many German
MNCs. While in  terms of career prospects,  in  US MNCs the emphasis seems to be clearly on
individual  performance  against  targets,  we could  not  find  any further  requirement  in  terms  of
standardized training programmes that would have to be completed.
However,  in  nearly  all  US MNCs that  we could  access,  there  were  some mandatory standard
trainings in place. Yet, the latter were not meant to convey technical knowledge, but rather served as
a socialization measure to ensure effective use of corporate culture as a management control tool.
Trainings on corporate values, corporate culture and internal career opportunities, and especially on
the code of conduct, were wide-spread among US MNCs. Especially implementation of codes of
conduct is utterly thorough and comprises trainings as well as regular examinations on its content in
the great majority of our cases. Additionally, in nearly half of the US MNCs we studied, the code
was even part of the employment contract. Interesting in this respect is the fact that we did not find
evidence  of  any  kind  of  Swiss  host  country  effect  that  would  represent  an  obstacle  to  the
introduction of corporate codes of conduct as strongly value-infused practices (Selznick 1957: 17).
None of our interviewees mentioned any kind of difficulties with the implementation of corporate
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codes of conduct in Switzerland, neither in terms of employee acceptance, nor in terms of legal
requirements. While the absence of legal problems may be attributed to the permissive nature of the
Swiss host country, that is marked by a low degree of regulatory density, however, there might have
been some degree of employee resistance being attributable to different cultural-cognitive patterns
and concepts of ethics (Barmeyer and Davoine 2011; Palazzo 2002; Witt and Redding 2009). On
the  other  hand,  in  none of  the  German  MNCs of  our  investigation  we found any comparable
emphasis on, and thoroughness in, implementation of these instruments. Based on the accounts of
our interviewees, we would hence suggest that, according to the extant literature, the deliberate use
of an explicitly defined corporate  culture is  in  fact  a  distinctive feature that is  common to US
MNCs. In all of the US MNCs of our sample, corporate culture is systematically passed to new
employees  through  elaborate  socialization  measures,  making  use  of  intensive  training  and
examinations.  The presence of  a  type of corporate  culture that  is  constructed around top-down
defined corporate values and corporate ways of doing as management  tools hence seems to be
significantly  more  common  and  more  effectively  implemented  in  terms  of  internalization  and
functionality in US MNCs than in the German MNCs of our sample. 
One further difference between German and US MNCs concerns the functioning of the internal
labour market. As we have seen, in German MNCs, personnel development and career planning
seems to be done rather in a top-down manner, whereas in US MNCs, the role of the internal labour
market and active self-promotion of employees play a more important role. In many US MNCs, it is
apparently more up to  the employee  himself  to  take initiative and actively search for  new job
offerings and development opportunities. Following this philosophy, the employee has to take care
of his employability and to apply for new positions as if it was a new job in another company, with
career planning and training being much more left to himself. The functioning of this internal labour
market with its strong emphasis on the term market and corresponding career opportunities was also
clearly explained to new employees, sometimes in mandatory initiation trainings, reminding us the
logic of a fair contract in the sense of d'Iribarne (1989).
In  our  analysis  of  US  MNCs,  we  could  also  find  clear  evidence  confirming  our  theoretical
suggestions about US country-of-origin effects in terms of strong and formal diversity policies or
frameworks  that  were  in  place  in  all  our  US case  study MNCs.  These  policies  seemed  to  be
somewhat more comprehensive than the versions found in German MNCs. For instance, some of
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them  also included explicit policies on sexual harassment. In four cases, U.S. policies were adapted
to a European setting, either in contents or at least in the manner they were implemented. As we
have seen, these findings on certain European adaptations in their diversity policies are consistent
with results of earlier studies on US MNC subsidiaries in the UK and Ireland.
The results of our analysis also confirm our theoretical literature-based suggestions about another
US country-of-origin effect in the area of ER/IR taking the form of highly standardized non-union
policies and direct communication with employees. As we have seen,  all  the US MNCs of our
sample  showed  a  marked  preference  for  direct  communication  with  their  employees,  This  is
manifest in the fact that our interviewees in eight out of ten US MNCs explicitly mentioned the use
of a standardized employee survey. Furthermore, non of our US MNC interviewees reported on any
kind of relations with unions in Switzerland.  On the contrary,  several  HR managers told about
efforts to actively keep unions out, or at least at bay, wherever this is possible. In order to do so,
direct  communication  channels  were  deliberately  strengthened,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  US6,  an
employee commission was used with the explicit intention to avoid that employees might feel any
need for a  union.  As expected on grounds of  our  in-depth analysis  of the Swiss  NBS with its
permissive IR, there were no Swiss host country constraints that would have hindered US MNCs in
implementing such policies. While there is a strong tradition of social partnership in Switzerland,
we did  not  collect  any information  that  would  point  to  lower  degrees  of  social  acceptance  or
legitimacy of non-union US MNCs.
Finally, there is a last area where we could identify signs for a clear US country-of-origin effect
that, to our knowledge, has not yet been described as such in the extant literature. This influence is
manifest in the presence of strong policies in HRM relating to issues of security, safety and health.
Interesting in this respect is also the way several of our interviewees spoke about these policies
when expressing their discomfort. Our collected evidence suggests that this kind of HR policies
seems to be incompatible, at least to some extent, with Swiss conceptions. Not only were these
policies  felt  to  interfere  in  the  private  lives  of  employees,  but  also  to  be  exaggerated  or  even
ridiculous. 
Somehow similar is the case of U.S. CSR policies and actions, where apparently two different
institutional rationalities collide. In this case, we may once more come back to the issue of value-
infused practices (Selznick 1957: 17) and apparent differences in cultural-cognitive patterns (Witt
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and Redding 2009) between Swiss and US employees. While such differences seemingly did not
cause major problems for the transfer and implementation of corporate codes of conduct, the picture
seems to be somehow different in case of policies dealing with issues of security, safety and health,
and the U.S. notion of CSR. For these practices, we found low degrees of acceptance and probably
low degrees of internalization and resistance in several Swiss subsidiaries. Outcomes may therefore
include ceremonial adoption or failed transfer, as in the case of intended transfer of publicly visible
U.S.-style CSR actions at US6. However, this was not the case in all the US MNCs of our sample.
At US9 and US10, our  interviewees did not tell  about  any kind of problem with similar  CSR
actions.
Table 33 below sums up our findings on standardized HRM practices in German and US MNCs,
together with the identified corresponding key influences and effects that may explain why the
respective practices are standardized.
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Table 33: Standardized HR practices and key influences and effects on transfer in German and US MNCs
HRM practices German MNCs US MNCs
Formalization 
and  process 
standardization
Apparently  more  and  more  use  of  formalization  and  standardization  of
processes in German MNCs
Confirming  to  the  extant  literature,  strong  formalization  and
standardization of processes
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
U.S. dominance effect / Anglo-Saxonization country-of-origin effect
Performance 
management
System design and implementation in a negotiated manner,
nexus with bonus, pay, and to some extent, career prospects
Rigorous implementation top-down in a unilateral manner,
strong and direct nexus with pay, bonus and career prospects
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
U.S. dominance effect led to introduction of performance management systems
in German MNCs (Anglo-Saxonization), 
however,  this  innovation  in  HR  of  U.S.  origin  underwent  significant
modifications during a process of interpretation and translation into the German
NBS where U.S. dominance effects interfered with a German country-of-origin
effect and agency:  
works council agency, that is based on strong institutional power resources, led
to corporate isomorphism on system design (e.g. no forced distribution); 
furthermore,  implementation  is  less rigorous and  more humane than in  US
MNCs.  This  may be  explained  by  German managerial  norms and German
socialised  rationality  of  key  actors,  that  are  strongly  marked  by  the
omnipresence  of  pressures  for  negotiation,  and  the  need  to  achieve  a
consensus;  maybe  also  linked  to  German  concepts  of  CSR  referring  to
employment security
Swiss host country effect:
cognitive  mismatch:  German  consensual  or  soft  ways  of  implementing
performance management systems was felt to be counterproductive or unjust
by certain local HR managers; 
apparently differing concepts about the sense and mode of functioning of such
systems
Organizational effect:
Performance management systems as central part of HR systems/HIWSs that
country-of-origin effect 
rigour of  implementation influenced by managerial  norms that
are based on a U.S. socialised rationality pointing to the strong
presence of a pervasive market mentality
Organizational effect:
Performance management  systems as  central  part  of  HIWSs
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imply the need for internal consistency to work properly that imply the need for internal consistency to work properly
Training and 
development: 
technical 
training versus 
socialization
Strong use of  structured mandatory curricula-like trainings for acquisition of
technical competence;
direct nexus with career progression
Strong use of structured mandatory trainings for socialization to
corporate values, culture and codes of conduct; 
no direct nexus with career progression
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
country-of-origin effect country-of-origin effect
Promotion and 
career
Passive  careers:  being  identified  as  high  potential  and  appointed  to  new
positions in a top-down manner; 
functional  specialist  careers  on  structured  and  organized  internal  labour
markets
individual performance against targets as a  conditio sine qua non for career
progression, although not as the single most important criterion
Active  careers:  being  identified  as  high  potential,  though
responsibility  for  career  development  handed  over  to
employees, who have to apply for new jobs and positions on a
flexible  internal  labour  market,  which  is  governed  by  similar
principles as the external labour market
individual performance against targets appears to be the single
most important criterion for individual career prospects
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
country-of-origin effect: 
traditional focus of German MNCs on long internal functional career paths and
an understanding of legitimate authority being based on technical competence
led  to  nexus  between  technical  training  and  competence  acquisition,  and
career progression;  in line with earlier  findings around a German culture of
training
country-of-origin effect: 
U.S.  MNCs  were  found  to  embrace  internal  labour  market
approaches for highly qualified staff or in difficult labour markets,
the  pervasive  market  logic  is   reflected  in  the  functioning  of
these internal markets
Corporate 
culture, values 
and codes of 
conduct
Formally  defined corporate values and codes of  conduct  in  all  the German
MNCs,
implementation apparently less thorough than in US MNCs, generally no or
less trainings and no examinations on formally defined corporate values and
codes of conduct
Strong  emphasis  on  engineering  corporate  culture  as  a
deliberately used management tool,
extremely  thorough  implementation  with  initiation  trainings  on
corporate values, culture, ways of doing and codes of conduct;
codes  of  conduct  in  several  US  MNCs  integrated  into
employment  contract  and  contents  are  regularly  tested  and
results monitored with IT-tools
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
U.S. dominance effect: 
inspiration to formulate explicit corporate values and codes of conduct; 
once  more,  this  U.S.  practice  underwent  significant  modifications  during  a
Country-of-origin effect: 
the use of corporate culture as a tool for management control is
described in the extant literature as typical element of US MNCs
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process  of  interpretation  and  translation  into  the  German NBS:  apparently,
there is still another concept of corporate culture present throughout German
MNCs making the adoption of  U.S. style practices of  engineering corporate
culture a priori more difficult in a German context;
additionally,  apparently  overall  less  thoroughness  and  emphasis  on
implementation through socialization measures seems to lead to lower levels of
internalization and functionality of formally defined corporate values and culture
as a management tool in German MNCs
Diversity Diversity policies are in place in some of the German MNCs, although more
strongly focused on gender equality (except for D1)
Strong diversity policies in place corresponding to evidence of
previous  studies,  sometimes  adapted  to  European  context
(implementation and/or focus on gender equality)
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
U.S. dominance effect: 
inspiration to formulate a diversity policy
again, this U.S. practice underwent significant modifications during a process
of  interpretation  and  translation  into  the  German  NBS:  in  Germany,  until
present, there are no legal-institutional constraints in place that would require
German MNCs to adopt any kind of formal diversity policy;
yet, MNCs and top management as actors in the German NBS are well aware
of increasing public and political pressure to conform to social norms around
gender equality:
deliberate use of a German/European form of a diversity policy that strongly
focuses on gender equality and career opportunities for women as a means to
gain legitimacy and an advantage on the labour market
Country-of-origin effect: 
clearly linked to idiosyncratic social history of the U.S. and the
development of its NBS; 
diversity is one of the few areas where the U.S. NBS imposes
important legal-institutional as well as socio-political constraints
for HRM that US MNCs absolutely have to comply with for legal
reasons and in order not to loose legitimacy;
influence of US NBS institutional constraints on U.S. managerial
socialised rationality somehow similar to German works council
mindset: U.S. managerial norms are heavily influenced by U.S.
diversity legislation and discourse, which is transferred through
diversity  policies  into  a  European  context;  here,  the  U.S.
challenges to HR management in terms of racial discrimination
and a history of immigration are non existent or at least, by far
not as strong as in the U.S.
ER/IR
employee 
surveys
Corresponding to earlier findings of Tüselmann et al. (2003; 2006), the majority
of German MNCs of our sample used standardized employee surveys as a
direct  communication channel,  though there were no signs of  an anti-union
stance in these same MNCs
no  evidence  of  any  kind  of  standardized  formal  policies  or  clearly  defined
models or practices in the area of ER/IR which still appears to be decentralised
General  preference  for  direct  communication  and  non-union
policy confirming previous studies
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Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Subtle country-of-origin effect: 
German managerial  norms and  socialised  rationality  influenced by German
NBS that  imposes a multitude of  legal  constraints forcing management into
continuous negotiations with stakeholders, including works councils and union
representatives; high degree of sensitivity for local constraints in the field of IR
dominance effect/Anglo-Saxonization:
introduction of employee surveys as an innovation of Anglo-Saxon origin that is
integrated into pre-existing German patterns of IR/ER
Country-of-origin effect: 
linked to adversarial industrial relations and the development of
welfare  capitalist  models  of  ER  that  are  heavily  based  on
individual direct communication with employees, and that try to
exclude or minimize collective, representative mechanisms and
especially influence of outside actors such as unions
Security, safety
and health
Security  policy  only  mentioned  by  D6  interviewee,  together  with  a
corresponding online-training
Strong policies in place in the majority of US MNCs
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Anglo-Saxonization (similar to use of D6 guiding principles as a codified form of
corporate values and culture)
Country-of-origin effect: 
our interviewees have clearly identified such policies as a typical
U.S. element linked to U.S. legal culture; maybe also attributable
to  a  U.S.  interpretation  of  corporate  social  responsibility  that
comprises the obligation to take care of the safety of employees
Swiss host country effect: 
cognitive  mismatch  –  low acceptance  of  and  discomfort  with
policies  that  are  felt  to  interfere  into  peoples'  private  lives,
potentially  lower  levels  of  internalization  that  might  lead  to
ceremonial  adoption  and  low levels  of  functionality  in  certain
cases (e.g.  requirement to hold the handrail, specified process
for parking, checking of urine colour)
Organizational effect:
linked to US5 company history as a gunpowder producer, safety
aspects gained considerable importance
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CSR - Strong  signs  for  a  typical  U.S.  understanding  of  CSR  as  a
business case
Key influences and effects:
Country-of-origin effect: 
more subtle and somehow less manifest in concrete, formalised
and standardized HR practices than in other HR areas; however,
in  those  cases  where  our  interviewees  reported  on  such
practices, the content was fairly similar;
Swiss host country effect: 
cognitive-normative  mismatch  and  collision  of  institutional
rationalities:  in  Switzerland,  people  seem  to  have  another
understanding  of  CSR and were  not  at  ease  with  U.S.  style
public volunteer actions; low levels of internalization, ceremonial
adoption  or  failed  transfer  in  some  cases,  seemingly  overall
lower levels of functionality in Switzerland
Agency:
widely visible corporate CSR actions as a way of gaining social
legitimacy
Higher degrees
of standardiza-
tion for higher 
hierarchical 
levels 
Present in several HRM practices and German MNCs While  there  were  some  standardized  practices  in  place
exclusively for very senior managers,  e.g. leadership trainings,
the distinction between hierarchical levels generally seems to be
less marked than in German MNCs
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
organizational effect:
higher need for internal consistency and control on higher hierarchical levels
country-of-origin effect:
such a distinction reflects a lower degree of works council influence on HRM
practice  design  for  managerial  employees,  and  the  fact  that  the  latter  are
additionally  exempt  from  collective  bargaining  agreements;  German  MNCs
hence benefit from greater room for manoeuvre when designing separate HRM
practices for managerial employees
organizational effect:
higher  need  for  internal  consistency  and  control  on  higher
hierarchical levels
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis and literature review.
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8.4 Local Swiss practices: what is local – and why?
In the previous chapter, we have established which particular HRM practices, policies and processes
are  standardized  in  German and US MNCs.  The findings  on standardized  practices  have  been
compared between the two country-of-origin groups and discussed against the background of theory
and literature. We could identify the presence of distinct micro- as well as macro-level effects as
described in our integrated conceptual framework of HRM practice transfer in chapter 4.2, and thus
theoretically explain our empirical findings.
In the following, we will report our results on HRM practices that are determined locally or locally
adapted. Our particular attention in this chapter is hence
placed  on  the  identification  of  Swiss  host-country
effects that are due to the Swiss NBS as described in
chapter  6.  Results  are  again  structured  according  to
country-of-origin  with  the  first  subsection  presenting
localised  HRM  areas,  processes  and  practices  in
German-, and a second one dealing with US MNCs. In a
third section, we will again compare and summarize key
findings on local practices in a table. As in the previous
chapter on standardized HRM practices, we do not have
complete information on each and every practice for all
the  MNCs,  which  is  due  to  our  research  methodology  based  on  the  use  of  semi-structured
interviews. This is why there are again some fields in our overview tables on standardized HRM
practices that could not be filled in. 
Similar to our proceeding in the previous sections on standardized HR practices, the results of our
company sample concerning local HR practices will be discussed against the pattern that emerged
from the literature, and checked for the presence of institutional, micro-political or organizational
effects and influences. While the previous chapter focused particularly on the presence of country-
of-origin and dominance effects, we will now concentrate on local Swiss host-country effects.
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effects
8.4 Local Swiss practices: what is local – and why?
8.4.1 Local Swiss HRM practices in German MNCs
Legal-administrative HR issues
As we have seen in our analysis of the Swiss NBS, there are generally few institutional constraints
that might give rise to local coercive isomorphic pressures. This is especially true for institutions
governing the labour market and employment relations. Swiss labour law is liberal, and collective
IR, although highly co-ordinated, remain very flexible with comparatively weak negotiation power
of unions. 
On the  other  hand,  in  the  highly decentralised  federal  Swiss  state,  in  fields  where  clear  legal
regulations and requirements are in place, a great deal of the latter are defined on a cantonal level.
The highly decentralised nature of Swiss state organization and legislation also influences on HRM,
where certain practices have to be dealt with locally. In our analysis, we could identify one area that
we have termed legal-administrative HR issues. Here, firms have to comply with clear federal Swiss
or cantonal legal requirements. According to our findings, this area is the only one where local
Swiss HR managers can fend off corporate standardization initiatives on legal grounds, and hence
based on a strong institutional power resource:
“We have a common pension fund where,  honestly speaking, we clearly try to keep D1 at bay
because we say: there is a clear mandatory legal requirement, where D1 is not allowed to interfere
too much. This has been quite a struggle for some time, but now the issue is settled” (D1_I1no1:
284, own translation). 
This is basically the case in areas that are linked to the Swiss welfare system, and hence, comprise
legal regulations on social insurance, health insurance and pension funds. But also taxes and legal
provisions governing employment contracts, equal pay, recruitments and layoffs have to be dealt
with locally.
“(...) the practice concerning layoffs (…) all what I call life cycle management, contracts, all that is
local” (D7_I1no1: 457, own translation)
“[How do you convince HQ that there are cantonal requirements?] I say: 'Believe me. I know the
U.S., the UK and Germany – and I am managing 26 countries here and not only one like you!' And
I describe this as horror. 'Oh my God: cantonal tax laws!'” (D5_I1no2: 19, own translation)
“[Do you have a corporate diversity policy or a policy on gender equality?] Equal pay is a big
issue here. Since we are supplying the Confederation, or more precisely the army, with products, we
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are audited inter alia concerning equal pay. In 2008 we underwent an equal pay analysis (…) and
the results were not quite satisfactory. So, following this audit,  I made certain adjustments (…)
During the last four months, we evaluated 110 functions with a non-discriminatory system. And
following  my  strategic  planning,  next  year  I  will  start  to  revise  the  whole  compensation  and
performance management system.” (D9_I1no1: 661, own translation)
In our interview with a representative of the Swiss employers' association, we could find another
element that seems highly important to understand the functioning of the Swiss labour market. As
we have seen before,  Swiss labour law is  very liberal,  and from a strictly legal point  of view,
individual as well as mass layoffs can be done quite easily. While this feature of the Swiss NBS
allows for quick reactions and the creation of jobs, the downside consists in a lack of institutional
protection for local employment. As we have seen, laying off employees in Germany is onerous and
takes a lot of time because of institutional constraints that require management to negotiate and
agree upon a social plan with works councils (Harcourt et al. 2007: 964; Morin and Vicens 2001:
51). By contrast, in Switzerland, there are no comparable formal constraints. This reminds us the
case of a German MNC and her British subsidiary described by Anne Tempel (2001: 264), where
the German MNC chose to take advantage of the permissiveness of the British environment to lay
off employees there. This decision had been taken in order to avoid conflict with home country
employee  representatives  by  protecting  its  German  workforce,  and  not  on  grounds  of  better
performance. With liberal labour law in Switzerland, similar situations would be conceivable. Thus,
it might be that the permissive nature of Swiss labour law and the low level of legal  employment
protection rendered D7's decision to close down its divisional HQ in Switzerland easier. However,
as we have seen, considering general outcomes in terms of comparatively high levels of perceived
employment security and long job tenures, there seem to be fairly effective mechanisms in place
that prevent Swiss employers from laying off staff locally just because this can easily be done. One
of these mechanisms is directly linked to the political influence of unions in the Swiss parliament,
and to dense associational  networks together  with the disciplining role  of associations  on their
member firms, as the following interview extract illustrates:
“[question on liberal labour law and the possible downside of hire- and fire policies that might be
pursued in Switzerland](...) through the industry associations we can fairly easily show them and
say: 'You can close down that plant, you closed it in Switzerland because it was easier than in
Germany. And of course, each time when a firm is closed down like that in Switzerland, there is this
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feeling  that  this  was  done  just  because  it  was  easier.  And  then  we  clearly  have  one  or  two
parliamentary motions. This is something you have to be aware of'. And this is also the difficulty:
how to demonstrate to the firms that it is through their own behaviour that they decide on the
political climate” (Swiss employers' association: 112, own translation)
This extract demonstrates how the behaviour of local employers in Switzerland is not as much
controlled by formal legal requirements, but rather by means of close links between actors of the IR
and the political arena, and the disciplining role of associations on their members. We will come
across this specifically Swiss dynamic again in our discussion of practices in the field of IR and ER.
Moreover, some more interview extracts illustrate the working of specific Swiss mechanisms of
social control in small cantonal societies, where people know each-other personally and meet quite
regularly in everyday life. This form of social control, that has been described as the law of multiple
encounters  in  life  (Freitag  2004:  113;  Weibler  and Wunderer  2007:  283),  is  effectively felt  in
practice. Furthermore, employers feel the pressure from a very dynamic local labour market, where
employees do effectively have the exit option (Meardi 2007: 511–512; Meardi et al. 2009: 508) if
they  are  not  happy  with  their  employer,  and  may  additionally  make  use  of  word  of  mouth
propaganda.
“Layoffs without reason, that's something difficult to understand in Switzerland” (D2_I1no2,I5no1:
8, own translation)
“(...) good citizen, having a liberal labour law does not legitimize you to behave like a pig. Because
you always meet twice. (…) the image you have achieved on the labour market isn't just something
unimportant” (D6_I1no1: 285, own translation)
Even though there is no legal obligation to justify layoffs, our evidence indicates that normally, the
principle of freedom of dismissal without indication of any kind of just cause neither seems to be
regularly applied in practice by employers,  nor to be well-accepted by employees.  Moreover,  a
similar dynamic also seems to be in place with recruitments, which are closely tracked by the local
professional community:
“Swiss people are very much attached to their  local  community.  Every hire is  closely  traced”
(D5_I1no2: 24)
There is still another area where the Swiss host country imposes certain constraints that may raise
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problems for HR professionals. These constraints were strongly felt by HR professionals who are
dealing with frequent short-term international mobility and concern the matter of visas and work
permits. This is especially the case when third country nationals from non-EU member states, who
are not covered by the bilateral agreement with the EU on the free movement of persons, have to
obtain a work permit. In this case, the functioning of the Swiss administration very much shows the
importance of local networks  within the Swiss people-networking society (Avery et al. 1999: 22)
for everyday business. This finding can be illustrated with the case of D5. As we have seen, D5 is
one of the highly standardized German MNCs, where many standard processes are in place, that are
normally performed by shared service centres. Although mobility is one of these shared services at
D5, our interviewee explained why Switzerland is a special case:
“Well, in Switzerland we have a special situation, because mobility is a shared service (...) We are
working together with a global provider who is doing visa, relocations etc. In Switzerland we have
the particular situation that we still have local providers. This is due to the fact that the global
provider is not able to qualitatively satisfy our local needs. He doesn’t know the cantonal world –
he knows the cantonal structure, and maybe he even knows the legislation, but he doesn't have the
network that you need if you want to transfer people short-term. Because we all know that after
eight days it gets serious, and that person must have a visa. And when people are coming and
going, eight days pass quickly (…) I'd say that dealing with authorities is very network-oriented.
(...) And negotiable” (D5_I1no1: 175, own translation)
In this case, an original Swiss host-country effect shows through, as this evidence very much fits in
with our suggestions on the presence and working of informal institutions in Switzerland. While
there is no formal regulation in place requiring foreign MNCs to charge a local service provider
with administrative issues linked to international mobility, reality shows that apparently there are
informal sanctions in place if foreign firms do not adhere to local habits, customs and practice.
Local  providers  who have personal  networks  within,  and who are  familiar  with,  the  rules  and
functioning of local authorities seem to be able to deliver faster and better services than global
players. Such a mechanism might as well be interpreted as an efficient way to protect the local
market and interests of local service providers without raising any kind of formal entry barrier to
global service providers.
However, there is still another original characteristic of the Swiss NBS that has an effect on HRM
practices in this case concerning the great flexibility of Swiss authorities and the legal framework at
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large. The latter leaves much room for negotiations between business actors and local authorities to
find tailor-made solutions. This has been recognized by HR managers, but also by an expatriate
German  customs  specialist,  and  seems  to  apply  even  to  those  few  areas,  where  clear  legal
requirements are in place, such as pension plans – and even customs authorities:
“A Swiss particularity: there are quite some legislative grey areas. This gives you some room for
manoeuvre, and hence, for negotiation between companies and local authorities or pension funds”
(D2_I1no2,I5no1: 14, own translation)
“In Germany you could also discuss with customs authorities, but they are much more oriented
towards the law and say: 'This is the law, we can only do it this way' (…) Of course, there are laws
here as well, but there are not quite as much things regulated as in Germany. Many things aren't
regulated and this allows for creative freedom, which is also exploited. On the one hand, this is
good, because when I have to deal with the District Directorate of Customs at Basel (…) and I need
some simplification, I just make a call (…) so, much more is possible there. The problem is, that
when I have implemented this at Basel, this does not mean that it works at Geneva. This is because
there are four big District Directorates of Customs (...)” (D1_I3no1: 37-40, own translation)
As this last interview extract shows, there are advantages as well as disadvantages flowing from the
flexibility which is inherent in the Swiss legal system. In our analysis of local Swiss practices and
influences, we will also come across further specificities linked to the great importance of the sub-
national, cantonal level for regulations.
Overall, following our interviewees, the great flexibility of the Swiss legal framework in areas that
might affect HRM generally seems to largely outweigh or prevail over those few areas that are
strongly regulated. This becomes evident in the following extract, where our D6 interviewee clearly
stated that he normally did not have to adapt practices for legal reasons. This fact, in turn, actually
deprives him of an important institutional power resource on which his colleagues in other countries
can draw:
“Normally we do not have to adapt anything for legal reasons. Basically, we are very tolerant.
When there is a new target-setting system, we do it that way, and if it's changed the following year,
we do it differently. So, from a legal point of view, normally there isn't much, and concerning core
processes, there are basically no good excuses except for an argumentation grounded on labour
law. Thus, our means to defend ourselves are fairly restricted in this area” (D6_I1no1: 467, own
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translation)
In turn, this same manager told about his French colleagues fending off the transfer of corporate
standard practices by referring exactly to  such local  legal  requirements that are  non-existent  in
Switzerland.  Furthermore,  management  at  German  HQ  seems  to  be  very  receptive  to  such
arguments since they are used to this kind of constraints at home, which in turn points to the impact
of the German socialised rationality:
“The other thing is (…) that they instruct us to comply with co-determination. Of course, normally
this is not an issue here, but the German corporation is very understanding that things take time.
And French people always get away scot-free as they always find objections to everything. And
Germans are understanding – whereas in America they are not at all appreciative when the French
just say: 'We don't accept the code of conduct'” (D6_I1no1: 410, own translation)
As  we  can  see,  apparently,  in  HRM  there  is  a  near  absence  of  Swiss  institutional  coercive
isomorphic pressures that might be used as institutional power resource by local actors to fend off
corporate interference on legal grounds. This means that Swiss HR managers have to find different
ways to convince corporate HQ to adhere to local Swiss customs and practice, which is not legally
required.  Even though adherence  to  Swiss  customs and practice  is  not  necessarily formally or
legally required, non-adherence might nevertheless give rise to problems, as we have seen in the
case of mobility.
IR/ER
According to the findings of previous investigations, German MNCs were expected to be rather
decentralised in the field of IR and ER, and to adapt to local customs in this area. Opposed to their
U.S. counterparts, German MNCs were notably not expected to show any systematic preference for
non-union policies or for direct, non-representative channels. At the same time, the extant literature
suggests that German MNCs have adopted Anglo-Saxon innovations in the area of ER, especially
the use of standardized employee surveys as a means of direct communication, and to blend in such
elements with their traditional use of indirect representative channels (Tüselmann et al. 2006). As
we have seen in our section on standardized HR practices in German MNCs, the use of standardized
employee surveys is effectively quite wide-spread also in our sample, with two out of three German
MNCs using such a tool. 
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Furthermore, in our analysis of the German NBS, we have seen that there are huge differences in
the field of IR within Germany, especially according to region and firm size, where larger firms and
MNCs from Western Germany were found to have higher rates of collective bargaining coverage
and works council representation (Bluhm 2001: 166–167; Schnabel 2006: 170; van Klaveren and
Tijdens 2011: 68). Due to the fact that all the HQ of German MNCs of our sample are located in
Western Germany,  size  would  be the only contingency factor  that  might  have an  effect  in  our
sample.  However,  in  our  small  sample  we  could  not  find  any differences  in  their  approaches
towards IR and ER between our smallest two MNCs D3 and D9 and the biggest ones, D1, D2 and
D6. It might also be that such differences that are linked to firm size rather exist between different
classes of organizations such as SMEs on the one hand, and MNCs on the other, and much less
between MNCs of different sizes.
Apart  from the use of  standardized employee  surveys,  the evidence from our  sample  on other
practices  related  to  IR  and  ER  is  mixed.  We  therefore  suggest  that  this  evidence  should  be
interpreted also against the background of our information on micro-level variables concerning the
activities  performed  by,  and  market  orientation  of,  Swiss  subsidiaries.  In  doing  so,  we  follow
arguments that  have been worded by Tempel  et  al.  (2005: 197) concerning possible  interaction
effects. In the cases of D1 and D2, we had the opportunity to compare production plants with blue-
collar  workers  or  subsidiaries  that  served  the  local  market,  and sites  that  had  an  international
orientation, and where primarily white-collar workers were employed. In the first category of blue-
collar  production  sites  or  subsidiaries  with  a  local  market  orientation,  D1  and  D2  entertained
relations with local unions and signed one or several collective agreements with unions as social
partners, thus following a traditional Swiss pattern in IR. On the other hand, in their international
operations with white-collar employees, our interviewees did not report any relations with unions or
to have signed any kind of collective agreement. We would therefore argue that this second finding
on international sites should not, or at least not exclusively, be seen as expression of a country-of-
origin or host-country effect. In fact, corresponding IR practices rather seem to be linked to the
activities  performed  in  the  local  Swiss  subsidiaries.  White-collar  employees  are  usually  not
unionised, which is true for Switzerland as well as for Germany, where they are often part of the
category of exempt employees. The same logic would apply to the cases of D5 and D8, as well as to
the international divisional HQ of D7. All these are sites where managerial, research or consulting
activities are performed, and it would be rather unusual for these categories of  employees to be
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unionised and covered by collective agreements. As for the cases of D3, D4 and D9, the opposite
logic  would  apply.  All  three  subsidiaries  have  major  production  activities,  where  blue-collar
workers are usually covered by collective agreements, which is common practice in both countries,
Switzerland and Germany. While the D9 HR manager did not sign a collective agreement, this was
not due to any ideological reasons but merely due to her desire to maintain flexibility.
Where  collective  agreements  have  been  signed  (D1,  D2,  D3,  D4),  the  latter  were  negotiated
between an employers' association and unions. German MNCs followed the local Swiss practice to
exclude wages and salary increases from collective agreements and to negotiate these issues on a
firm  or  plant  level.  In  these  companies,  wages  would  then  be  discussed  with  a  personnel
commission as social partner except in the case of D2 where no personnel commission was in place:
“In the collective agreement of the mechanical engineering industry,  there is no minimal wage
fixed. On the other hand, we have a personnel commission. (…) So the board will communicate
with the personnel commission to define the guidelines (...)” (D3_I1no1: 294, own translation)
“Salary increases, individual and general ones, are discussed with the personnel commission. But
basically the personnel commission has only the right to be heard, no co-determination right. Of
course  we  try  to  find  a  way  so  that  they  have  it,  too,  but  this  is  different  from  Germany”
(D4_I1,I2no1: 418)
“We have a personnel commission that is well-established. You cannot call this wage negotiations.
They have the right to make a proposal, but no co-determination right in such areas” (D6_I1no1:
387, own translation)
“Of course we have a personnel commission. Of course have a normal social partnership with our
personnel commission. I have a monthly meeting with the president of the personnel commission.
Wage negotiations are also discussed with the personnel commission that makes inputs which have
to  be  discussed  together.  This  is  just  in  line  with  what  is  common  practice  in  Switzerland”
(D9_I1no1: 604, own translation)
In the case of D1, another interesting detail concerns the existing connection between personnel
commission  and unions.  This  detail  is  interesting  since  such a  connection  also  exists  in  many
German firms between works council  members and unions,  often taking the form of unionised
works council members (Giardini et al. 2005: 68). 
“(...)  of  course,  treating  certain  issues  like  regulations  for  annual  working  hours,  where  our
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personnel commission is not exactly sure what to do, it is possible that they call in the union. This
pretty much depends on the persons in that commission. (…) Today, we have a very democratic
[president of the personnel commission] who is incapable of asserting himself. And if he calls in the
union half-way, and they restart from the beginning, I say it's better to call them in right from the
outset” (D1_I1no1: 214, own translation)
On the other hand, as we have seen, US MNCs in Germany were eager to cut off such connections
between internal representative organs and external players like unions. It is hard to say whether
this is more due to the personal attitude of our Swiss interviewee or whether this is a common
practice also in Switzerland. In any case, based on our literature review, we have grounds to believe
that such a practice would probably not be accepted in US MNCs.
In the cases of D2 Switzerland and D5, where no personnel commission is in place, and also at D7,
it is interesting to see that the HR managers were very conscious about the fact that it corresponds
to  local  custom  to  have  one.  In  fact,  according  to  the  Swiss  Mitwirkungsgesetz or  Workers'
participation law (Bundesgesetz über die Information und Mitsprache der Arbeitnehmerinnen und
Arbeitnehmer in den Betrieben (Mitwirkungsgesetz) 1993), such a commission would have to be set
up on the demand of employees. In these cases, apparently employees just did not demand for the
formation  of  a  personnel  commission.  Though,  there  are  no  signs  indicating  a  willingness  to
actively avoid such a representative committee, or to refrain from the idea of social partnership and
inclusion of employees or their representatives into decision-making. In case of D2 Switzerland, the
Swiss HR manager even had to justify to corporate HQ why there is no commission in place:
“And so I don't have any elected personnel commission at [Zurich area] because it has not been
formed. So I'm quite happy with that. Or the other way round, what I always answer when Germany
asks  me:  'We treat  our  people  in  such a way so that  they  don't  have  grounds for  complaint”
(D2_I4no1: 231, own translation)
“We don't  have a personnel  commission neither,  which is  provided for by Swiss law.  We have
already discussed this issue, but it has never been relevant, which is quite probably due to the fact
that  we are already very  open and integrate  our  employees  into  our  planning and keep them
informed” (D5_I1no1: 292, own translation)
“[question if there was a deliberate policy or ideology behind the fact that there aren't any relations
with unions or collective agreements in Switzerland] I can't tell you because I don't remember any
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conversation where this issue would have been discussed.  (…) No, we have a European Works
Council because they must have this representation in Europe. We also have a Swiss delegate in this
representation.  I'm  not  conscious  of  any  particular  aversion”  (D7_I1no1:  329-330,  own
translation)
We also found some influence of a German socialised rationality and of a German negotiated style
(Wever  1995)  that  is  reflected  in  a  German  mindset  and  approach  towards  IR  and  ER  in
Switzerland. This influence was manifest in the fact that German HQ required Swiss HR managers
to make sure that they comply with whatever kind of co-determination regulations. Even if there are
no such requirements in place in Switzerland, German managers seem to be utterly sensitive to the
possible presence of local legal requirements for negotiation with stakeholder representatives:
“When  they  want  to  introduce  worldwide  competence  management,  they  first  ask  in  every
country:‘What do we have to do with the works council in your country in order to be able to roll
that  out?’ And well,  being Swiss,  this  question just  raises  a smile  on my face when I  answer:
‘nothing’. There you really feel the German mindset” (D1_I1no1: 200, own translation)
“(...)  we  always  have  to  confirm  compliance  with  any  relevant  co-determination  regulations“
(D6_I1no1: 418, own translation)
A further influence of a German mindset or socialised rationality may be viewed in the idea of
social partnership and the involvement of employee representatives and unions as stakeholders in
difficult  decisions.  This approach,  in turn,  might  also be interpreted as a  strategy to gain local
legitimacy, which is quite similarly done in Germany. For example, at D1, local management had to
restructure the production plant in recent years and to significantly reduce the local workforce. In
this restructuring, unions were included as social partners from the outset in order to negotiate and
find an acceptable solution together:
“(…) what role do unions play: in recent years we had to significantly reduce our workforce. Here,
unions play a role in a sense that you have to find a proper solution with them. Otherwise you get
problems elsewhere” (D1_I1no1: 210, own translation)
In our interview with a high-ranking Swiss union representative, we discussed the issue of what
kind of problems employers might actually face if they did not negotiate with unions. As we have
seen in our analysis of the Swiss NBS, unions are fairly weak in their negotiations with employers.
422
8.4 Local Swiss practices: what is local – and why?
So the question arises what drives employers under these circumstances to include unions and to opt
for social partnership solutions, when there is no formal institutional pressure put on them? 
“Basically  I  believe that  it  makes sense to  carry out  reorganizations with a social partnership
approach in order to guarantee a minimal reconciliation of interests. (…) The second thing is of
course, that the potential for conflicts is reduced if unions are integrated. And naturally, the third
element is that –  to use diplomatic phrasing – once in a while firms also have some needs. And
these needs are rather satisfied if there is a good co-operation. And if there isn't, these needs are
less satisfied”  (UNIA: 139-141)
“Time and again, certain questions arise that certain firms have to face. And there it is important to
know that unions are represented in nearly all the important economic commissions, that we are
represented in the Swiss Export Risk Insurance, and that we discharge our mandates effectively”
(UNIA: 181)
This statement of a unionist directly confirms our theoretical expectations concerning an important
element of the Swiss NBS that is linked to the Swiss political system. As we have seen, unions in
Switzerland are weak in their relations with employers, but strongly integrated into the political
system, where they have the status of a veto-player. As our union interviewee suggests, this political
influence also extends to union representation in a range of commissions as part of Swiss private
interest government, where certain resources are allocated. In such commissions, unions may hence
influence to a certain degree whether a certain firm can access certain resources or not based on
political criteria.
Since Swiss unions are able to launch a referendum and block legal initiatives for a long time or
potentially even completely stop them, employers run a high risk if they do not seek consensus with
unions.  This  constellation  leads  to  an  interference  between  the  political  arena  and  industrial
relations  bargaining.  In  fact,  our  interviewee  also  gave  one  important  example  where  unions
bargained in the political arena in order to achieve social security for employees in certain economic
sectors. The latter would have faced the risk of low-wage competition and social dumping from
European Union countries as a negative side effect of the agreement  on the free movement of
persons:
“If we as a union opposed the free movement of persons, the economy would never find a majority
in the population. I mean, the unions have agreed on the free movement of persons. In return, we
expect suitable accompanying measures, collective agreements etc. This is a deal” (UNIA: 143)
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“(...) of course this is typical, (…) I will aggressively put pressure on them and say: 'If you want a
yes for the free movement of persons, then I want minimum wages in the collective agreements”
(UNIA: 231)
The macro-effects of this political bargaining between unions and business associations have also
been confirmed by our interviewee from the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. This
interviewee clearly identified the bilateral agreements with the EU on the free movement of persons
as the single most important factor that influenced recent developments in Swiss IR. This agreement
had strong effects on Swiss labour market organization, since it led to a revival of the instrument of
collective agreements, where coverage increased. Furthermore, social partners agreed to introduce
minimal wages in several of these collective agreements which are legally binding also for workers
from EU states. Since there is no legal minimal wage in Switzerland, and wage bargaining has been
excluded from collective agreements in important industries like mechanical engineering and in the
chemical industry, the introduction of minimal wages in collective agreements is a novelty in Swiss
IR. In fact, once these collective agreements are declared generally binding on request of both,
employers' association and union, these are legally binding for all firms active in a given sector and
region and, together with a deposit requirement, effectively prevent wage dumping. On the other
hand, this solution remains flexible, since minimal wages are negotiated between the social partners
for single industries and industry branches on a regional level.
“(...) during the last 10 years, employers showed increasing interest for the negotiation of collective
agreements (…) together with the accompanying measures, with the free movement of persons, their
interest  increased  (…)  above  all,  this  is  in  order  to  involve  the  foreign  competition.  When  a
collective agreement has been declared generally binding and foreign firms come to Switzerland,
the latter also have to respect the minimal wages fixed in the collective agreement” (SECO: 193)
Dual VET
As we have seen in our analysis of the German and Swiss NBSs, the dual Vet systems in these two
countries  are  strikingly similar.  On these  grounds,  we formulated  our  expectation  that  German
MNCs  would  probably  engage  in  dual  Vet  also  in  Switzerland,  where  all  the  necessary
infrastructures  are  available.  This  institutional  support  allows  for  a  direct  transfer  of  German
production models and work organization. Apart from the question of whether German firms train
apprentices,  we also wanted to know why they would do so. As we have seen,  apprentices are
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trained by Swiss firms not  only for rational-economic,  but  also for  social  reasons as  a part  of
corporate social responsibility. In our sample of German MNCs, eight out of nine German firms
trained  apprentices.  In  case  of  D8,  where  currently  no  apprentice  training  was  done,  the  HR
manager stated that they were however willing to do so in the future, and that they also had two
persons with the necessary qualifications to train apprentices. Therefore, this first finding confirms
our expectations about engagement of German MNCs with dual VET in Switzerland.
Concerning our second question about the underlying reasons for training apprentices locally, we
found several explanations. Some of our interviewees simply pointed to direct German influence:
“There is a great internal willingness. We discussed the issue at the management meeting: why
don't we have any more apprentices here? This doesn't come from me, the issue came up internally”
(D2_I1no1: 282, own translation)
“We have engaged one apprentice, then a second. This comes from Germany” (D2_I1no2,I5no1: 4)
“In Germany they also train quite a lot of apprentices” (D3_I1no1: 226)
Others very much emphasized the fact the apprentice training wasn't an economic necessity for
them, but clearly a matter of assuming their corporate social responsibility:
“Yes, we do have apprentices. We also hold this in high regard. You have to formulate it the hard
way: we do not need them to survive. We do not train in order to satisfy our own demand, but this is
much more about social responsibility” (D5_I1no1: 239, own translation)
“In Germany, we have always had a very sustained apprentice training, which is due to the fact
that  Germany is  a  development  location  (…) And there we train  to  satisfy  our  own demand”
(D5_I1no1: 244, own translation)
“Apprentice training, there was this forum Start (…) to present professions to young pupils from
secondary school. We were very much engaged there. So, yes, there are a lot of things. I think that
we have contributed our share” (D3_I1no1: 328, own translation)
“On the one hand, there is production, where staff was reduced. (…) On the other hand, we built
new apprenticeships. And of course, this also sells well” (D9_I1no1: 530, own translation)
The idea of training apprentices as part of corporate social responsibility in Switzerland was also
confirmed by our interviewee from the Swiss employers' association:
“There are firms that have a special logo, for example a carpenter, they have a sticker which is put
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on their entrance door,  so that  everyone can see that  they offer apprentice training.  This also
somehow belongs to (…) corporate social responsibility, where we say: of course, this is part of it.
And this  is  something that  you can show. A decent  Swiss firm also trains  apprentices” (Swiss
employers' association: 94, own translation)
Our union interviewee pointed out the political aspects of non-engagement in dual VET:
“Politically they avoid pressure. (…) Of course, when I have a discussion with a firm and they don't
have apprentices, I can attack them on this issue in a political dispute. Then I can say: 'Look, you
do not have any apprentices!” (UNIA: 113, own translation)
Lastly, apprentices can also be trained for a mixture of both, rational-economic and social reasons
as the case of D9 demonstrates:
“On the one hand, this is surely also a reaction to – well I'd say that D9 wants to assume a regional
social ethic responsibility, because there are less and less jobs or apprenticeships. And on the other
hand, of course, also thanks to the positive experiences that we made. Because I hire a great part of
them afterwards” (D9_I1no1: 524-525, own translation)
Training
Apart from dual VET, there were some more local trainings in all the German MNCs of our sample.
For instance, in the workshop-related field for blue-collar workers at D1 (D1_I1no1: 272) and D3
(D3_I1no1: 246) or local language trainings at D2 (D2_I1no1: 300) and D5 (D5_I1no1: 252). At
D4, trainings that are delivered in Switzerland are also organized locally (D4_I1,I2no1: 339). At
D6,  the  offering  in  the  area  of  further  training  is  developed  locally  (D6_I1no1:  464).  Further
training is also a local issue at D9 (D9_I1no1: 544). At D7, everything in terms of training is local
up  to  the  level  of  middle  management  (D7_I1no1:  258),  and  at  D8,  trainings  in  the  field  of
informatics are local (D8_I1no1: 253). 
All in all, we might say that trainings are either highly standardized, which is especially the case for
higher ranking managerial employees, or very local, as is the case with dual VET and other shop
floor technical trainings. This finding is therefore largely in line with suggestions from the literature
(Ferner et al. 2011: 500; Myloni et al. 2007: 2066, 2069; Nakhle 2011).
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Recruitment
As we have seen, in the area of recruitment, there are certain standard processes or tools in place in
all the German MNCs of our sample, which are often related to the idea of a uniform corporate
employer branding, or common recruitment tools. On the other hand, there are some aspects around
recruitment  that  are  local,  making  it  a  functional  area  in  HR  where  there  is  often  a  mix  of
standardized corporate and local practices. Accordingly, all of the German MNCs of our sample,
while  having some corporate  standards in place,  told that  a big part  of the practices related to
recruitment were still local:
“HQ in Germany wanted to introduce an assessment centre in Switzerland, following a logic of
processes. Fortunately, until now we still have great freedom as far as recruitment is concerned:
this is a local-geographic issue, and also in terms of the employment market” (D2_I1no2,I5no1: 11,
own translation)
“Concerning recruitment, we have our own procedure here” (D3_I1no1: 348, own translation)
“Parts of  recruitment  are centralised,  the use of  the recruitment  tool  and issues like employer
branding or -marketing. But then there is a fast cut-off. The recruitment itself is still done at the
single sites” (D4_I1,I2no1: 265-266)
“After all, recruitment is something personal” (D2_I4no1: 301, own translation)
“We  have  a  job  fair,  apart  from  that,  we  do  things  in  Switzerland  how  this  is  done  here”
(D4_I1,I2no1: 347, own translation)
“Basically, the tools and processes are defined by the plant” (D4_I1,I2no1: 553, own translation)
“(...) recruitment is local. For instance, in Germany, the recruiter makes a phone call and then the
manager meets a view preselected candidates. This would be impossible in Switzerland! Personal
contact is a must” (D5_I1no1: 10-11, own translation)
“(...) for example, we have our trainee-programme (…) and also the issue of university marketing,
how we do this in Switzerland” (D6_I1no1: 456, own translation)
“I co-operate with local employment agencies (…) I have some framework agreements with certain
partners. Apart from that, no, the major part of recruitment we're doing ourselves” (D9_I1no1:
479, own translation)
As we can see, the local Swiss logic of local networking and personal contact also seems to give
rise to a certain host-country effect on recruitment practices.
Compensation and benefits, wage increases
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A further  area,  where  practices  are  partly  standardized  and  partly  local,  is  compensation  and
benefits. As we have seen, there is some corporate pay policy in place in the large majority of firms.
On the other hand, pay increases are negotiated locally at D1 (D1_I1no1: 283) and D3 (D3_I1no1:
311-312). At D2 international, the pay system with a special bonus for non-managerial employees is
local (D2_I1no1: 300)(D2_I1no2,I5no1: 24). Also at D4, wages are negotiated according to local
practices (D4_I1,I2no1: 547). At D5, the benefits-policy is strictly local (D5_I1no1: 200, 278). In
case of D5, this local adaptation of the compensation and benefits policy is due to the desire to be
market competitive in the relevant labour market segment:
“(...) we want to be market competitive on the relevant labour market. And the relevant market for
certain functions may be a very local one, sometimes it may be even restricted to one region within
Switzerland.  But  the  higher  the  hierarchical  level,  the  more  this  market  gets  international”
(D5_I1no1: 280, own translation)
This is a nice illustration of the underlying logic of global pay policy and system design. As we
have seen, these policies and systems usually provide for the possibility of local adaptations in
terms of compensation and benefits, while equally guaranteeing the application of some common
global  rules.  While  labour  markets  for  managerial  employees  and  experts  on  high-ranking
hierarchical  levels  are  often  international,  policies  and  processes  related  to  the  performance
management system are accordingly strongly standardized. On the other hand, this is less the case
for lower hierarchical levels and for employees who have to be found on more regional or local
labour markets.
At D7, the wage scale is aligned with the internal D7 policy, but local surveys are done in order to
know whether one is market competitive (D7_I1no1: 325). Though, at D7, our interviewee clearly
identified a conservative policy of D7. This policy reflects the position of German HQ as the most
important  employer  in  the  region,  and a  philosophy of  lifelong employment.  Yet,  in  the  Lake
Geneva region, there are several dozens of MNCs in a very small geographic region, and the local
labour market is very flexible and highly competitive:
“Culturally, my German colleagues find it hard to conceive that one could leave their company,
and many people  in  Germany have  their  whole  family  working at  the  D7 group (…) At  [HQ
location in Germany] D7 is the most important employer, together with [other big company]. There
are two big employers and people basically work for these two companies” (D7_I1no1: 234, own
428
8.4 Local Swiss practices: what is local – and why?
translation)
“You have 70 MNCs between Geneva and Lausanne, OK? So if you have median salaries, even if
you have a bit more with the bonus (…) How do you find the market wage? This is difficult. (…) We
have our wage scales.  We try to  be a bit  more conservative.  Sometimes the law of the market
applies. Did I loose people because we didn't pay enough? Yes, though after all not many. Because
we sell them the fact that we have a talent management programme, that we want to develop our
people, that we want to grow them, generally laying off isn't part of our culture” (D7_I1no1: 252,
own translation)
“Yes, the practice to have wages at the mid-point is a concern” (D7_I1no1: 472, own translation)
These statements can be linked back to our analysis of the German and Swiss NBSs, and of the
institutions governing the labour market. As we have seen, the Swiss labour market is astonishingly
flexible and marked by very low levels of unemployment. Furthermore, in major economic centres
or regions with a high geographic concentration of big employers,  the dynamic of the external
labour market is much higher than in Germany and puts important pressure on employers. This
pressure is not only felt in terms of its effect on wage levels, but also in higher turnover rates and in
the way employees are treated:
“[lifelong  employment?]  Basically  yes.  However,  this  is  more  common  in  Germany  than  in
Switzerland. Generally we have a turnover rate of 6% here in the mechanical industry. In Germany
they tell me: target 1,5% - this makes me laugh, I just ask: 'Are you really serious on that?' And he
answers: 'Yes'.  So I  say: 'Well,  forget it  for Switzerland'.  Here,  I'm more than lucky with 5%”
(D1_I1no1: 385, own translation)
“[current topics in HR] Clearly, for the past two years turnover has been an issue, and I'd like to
reduce it. (…) demand on the market was very strong”  (D1_I1no1: 135, own translation)
“[talking about procedures for recruitment] (…) in the past, these things were sent by post and it
took three weeks to get the approvals for hirings signed – and within such a period of time, the
candidate is already taken in Switzerland. If the position is approved, they want a second talk, they
say: 'OK, I'll come', and then we confirm” (D4_I1,I2no1: 563, own translation)
“We  have  a  dynamic  labour  market  that  really  works,  somewhat  different  from  Germany”
(D6_I1no1: 273, own translation)
“If they are unhappy with us and again ten people or so are leaving, then I have a problem. So I
have to be much more careful. And this is something that you also feel: in Switzerland, you cannot
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deal with your employees in an equally rough manner as in Germany, because if you do, they are
gone” (D6_I1no1: 271, own translation)
“The  image  that  you  acquire  on  the  labour  market,  this  is  not  just  something  unimportant”
(D6_I1no1: 285, own translation)
These interview extracts clearly illustrate the strong disciplining effect of a flexible, dynamic and
highly competitive labour market on Swiss employers. The latter  have to find ways to position
themselves  as  an  employer  of  choice,  to  have  lean  and  fast  recruitment  processes,  and  to  be
innovative in terms of retention. Retention and talent development have also been named by several
of our interviewees as current issues in HRM. Thus, policies and practices in the area of employer
branding and work-life-balance, including flexible working time schemes and offerings in the fields
of well-being at work and health might as well be considered in this context. 
Membership in local Swiss associations
All HR managers of German subsidiaries who participated in our investigation were members of at
least one local Swiss association. This finding confirms our expectations, since Switzerland as well
as  Germany  are  collaborative  business  systems  that  are  marked  by  an  associational  mode  of
coordination. Membership and activities of HR managers in local associations are manifold and
range from membership in employers'  associations and cantonal or regional associations of HR
professionals over regional joint training schemes for the collective organization of dual VET (D2
Switzerland,  D4)  to  specialised  industry-  or  trade-specific  associations.  Based  on  theoretical
grounds,  we  expected  to  find  multiple  local  networks  in  Switzerland,  together  with  social
networking, that were supposed to generate great amounts of social capital in the Swiss society.
Membership in, and the activities of such local networks can now serve to illustrate outcomes of
social capital as a systemic resource of Swiss society (Esser 2000: 237). Generally, our interviewees
underlined the important role of networking within these associations, that are seen as an important
channel for information exchange. Moreover, as several of our interviewees explained, there are
often some kinds of committees or working groups formed within these associations. Members of
such  committees  are  then  working  on  a  specific  issue  or  common  challenge  and  try  to  find
solutions.  Furthermore,  some of  these local  associations  set  up internal  benchmark studies  and
exchange on salaries, which may be seen as part of an informal way of labour market organization.
Our findings hence strongly suggest that in Switzerland, there is still  a high degree of informal
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coordination of managerial wage policy in place, which is assured through employers' associations,
just as described in earlier investigations (Flanagan 1999: 1152; Soskice 1990: 41). 
Another interesting finding is the involvement of German firms and HR managers in regional Swiss
joint training schemes for initial dual VET. Such regional joint training schemes may be viewed as
another concrete institutionalised outcome of Swiss collaborative practices between firms of the
same industry, that we have theoretically discussed in our analysis of the Swiss NBS. Such joint
training schemes may also be considered as an innovation that is important for the competitiveness
of smaller-sized as well as larger firms, and for the cost-competitiveness of the Swiss system of dual
VET, as our interviewee of the Basel joint training scheme Aprentas explained:
“Of course,  the thinking behind was also to  cut  costs.  Apart from that,  this  solution was also
recommended by [global consulting firm] who accompanied the whole process. Because our initial
training is fairly costly,  the volume is  an important factor, economies of scale,  the greater our
volume the cheaper it gets for the single firm. (…) At that time, this was very innovative. We were
the second joint training scheme in Switzerland” (Aprentas: 11, own translation)
“(...) we built up again continuous training facilities because at that time, smaller firms didn't have
any continuous training offerings (…) referring to costs, things became much cheaper (…) With us,
one apprentice costs 40% of what [local Swiss MNC of the pharmaceutical industry that does not
participate in the joint training scheme] spends for an apprentice” (Aprentas: 20, own translation)
The fact that  two German MNCs of our sample with production facilities in  Switzerland were
directly involved in such regional joint training schemes is not surprising. We would even suggest
that this approach might be interpreted as a distinctively German way of relating to the Swiss host
country context. Initial dual VET is a highly treasured training practice in Germany, and as we have
seen, German MNCs already tried to reproduce or to establish functional equivalents of dual VET
in several other host countries, although they often had to put up with major difficulties. Therefore,
it seems obvious for German firms to take advantage of existing institutional and cultural supports
or props (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 92) in Switzerland, that facilitate the local reproduction of
successful work systems and work organization involving dual VET. Moreover, such regional joint
training schemes may be considered as an example of the “competitive provision of supports for
MNCs and the local firms dependent on them” (Almond 2011b: 533) that we have discussed in
chapter  2.5.  In  fact,  joint  training  schemes  provide  exactly the  kind  of  “collective competition
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goods”  (Heidenreich  2012:  550)  that  have  been  described  in  the  literature,  such  as  qualified
employees, advanced technological competences, and reliable infrastructures (Meyer et al. 2011).
Furthermore, the fact that these joint training schemes are clearly sustained and managed on a sub-
national level provides also a concrete illustration to theoretical arguments around the important
role of the sub-national level in discussing contextual effects on IHRM (Almond 2011a, 2011b;
Lane and Wood 2009). Their  active participation in the creation and maintenance of such joint
regional training schemes strongly indicates that German MNCs make great use of this specific kind
of institutional support, that may be considered as one out of a certain range of  supports that are
present in Switzerland (Lane and Wood 2009: 542). Further, this engagement also points to their
great capacity to engage with, and to exploit, high trust relations with local firms and governance
actors (Almond 2011b: 542). 
Activities  of  local  Swiss  associations  are  diverse  and  include  exchange  on  HR related  issues,
questions  and  experiences,  the  negotiation  of  collective  agreements,  questions  related  to  the
organization of dual VET and the setting up of benchmarking studies and salary surveys. Generally,
exchange  is  intense  and  company-spanning  networks  are  based  on  personal  knowledge  of
colleagues in other firms:
“For instance, I am member of the board of the Swiss employers' association of the mechanical
industry” (D1_I1no1: 202, own translation)
“Thanks to our two collective agreements that we have signed via the employers' association, my
contacts are very sustained. So, there I know the campus of [Swiss MNC of the pharmaceutical
industry],  [further  Swiss  MNC of  the  pharmaceutical  industry],  [Swiss  MNC of  the  chemical
industry] etc. And this is very useful, because it allows for a certain exchange (…) The association
of importers of pharmaceutical specialties in Switzerland. Coming back to HR, of course, there we
also implement so-called benchmarkings, salary surveys, to know where you are. And there we meet
and  define  parameters.  And  so  you  are  in  touch  with  people  from [Anglo-Saxon MNC of  the
pharmaceutical  industry]  or  [further  Anglo-Saxon  MNC  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry]  or
whatsoever” (D2_I4no1: 155, own translation)
“We  are  participating  in  several  associations  (…)  We  are  member  of  [association  of  HR
professionals working in MNCs of the Lake Geneva region] (…) So, you can find all the major
MNCs there” (D2_I1no1: 283, own translation)
“We meet  within  the  Swiss  mechanical  engineering  association.  There  is  a  conference  of  HR
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directors where I am member. This is very valuable. [talking to her colleague] Yes, and you are in
the [regional joint training scheme], so this concerns initial vocational training” (D4_I1,I2no1:
468, own translation)
“Referring to HR, I am member of the committee of [association of HR professionals working in
MNCs of the Lake Geneva region]. (…) in order to be member of the committee, you have to have
led a working group. So, I have led a working group that dealt with the regulation of costs, and then
with a fiscal ruling that we tried to obtain (…)” (D7_I1no1: 336, own translation)
“(...) I am a member of the [regional association of HR managers of the Zurich area], this is simply
an information network that I maintain. There, I am member of two committees, the committee on
social insurances and the one on labour law. (…) What is maybe more interesting: of course I am
also  member  of  the  [local  industrial  association  of  the  canton].  There  I  am  part  of  the  HR
committee.  My superior  (…) is  the president  of  the HR committee (…) So,  this  is  much about
maintaining the regional networks between HR people. Exchange, help: a quick mail: 'How do you
handle this? How much do you pay as a starting salary?' Just a kind of networking. (…) We have
also put in place a common job platform” (D9_I1no1: 627-632, own translation)
Lastly, at D5, we could find an interesting example of ad hoc formation of an informal cooperative
network. In the greater Zurich region, several MNCs like D5 and others of Anglo-Saxon origin had
a common problem. They were all negatively affected by cantonal quotas for residential and work
permits  for  third  country  nationals  from  non-EU  member  states.  Since  these  quotas  severely
restricted their ability to import external know how, this group of MNCs of the IT sector formed a
project-related cooperative lobbying group (D5_I2no1: 32), yet without forming any kind of a more
institutionalised associational form of cooperation for the time being.
Table 34 below provides a summary overview of local HR practices in the German MNCs of our
sample.
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Table 34: Local HR practices in German MNCs of our sample
MNC Legal-administrative 
HR issues
IR/ER Dual 
VET
Training 
(shop-floor, 
technical)
Recruitment Compensation & 
benefits, wage 
increases
Membership in 
local associationsPersonnel 
commission
Relations with 
unions
Collective 
agreement
D1 * */u */p-/i
*/p
-/i */p * * */wi *
D2 * --
*/p/l
-/i
*/p/l
-/i
*p/jts
*/i * * * */p/jts
D3 (*) * */a * * * * */wi *
D4 (*) * */a * */jts * * */wi */jts
D5 * - - - * * * * *
D6 * * - - * * * */wi *
D7 * N/A - - * * * * *
D8 * N/A (*) - - -/w * * * *
D9 * * * - * * * */wi *
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis; *=local, (*)=supposed to be local although not explicitly mentioned as such by interviewees, u=link
between internal personnel commission and union, n=local for non-executives/non-managerial employees, p=production site, l=site with local market orientation,
i=site with international market orientation, a=via employers' association, jts=engagement in joint training scheme, w=willing to do so, wi=wage increases/wage
negotiations.
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8.4.2 Local Swiss HRM practices in US MNCs
Legal-administrative HR issues
Similar to what we have seen in the German subsidiaries of our sample, also US MNCs are subject
to Swiss legislation and corresponding coercive isomorphic pressures that are felt in quite the same
areas.  Of  course,  employment  contracts  are  subject  to  Swiss  law  (US3_I1no1:  203),  and
accordingly, all the administration linked to engagements and layoffs have to be done following
local  Swiss  rules  (US6_  I1no1:  11).  The  same  is  true  for  social  and  accident  insurances  and
everything that is linked to taxation (US1_I1no1: 179, US6_I1no1: 12), maternity leave and pension
funds (US7_I1no1: 159, US8_I1no1: 312, US10_I2no1: 155). Although not everyone among our
interviewees explicitly mentioned these issues, we would strongly argue that all the US subsidiaries
of  our  sample  are  equally  concerned,  since  in  this  area,  Swiss  legislation  prescribes  certain
mandatory practices.
Some interviewees pointed out one major downside of Swiss decentralised federalism that is felt by
firms that have plants in several cantons: 
“Federalism is slowing us down, and from an administrative point of view it's just horror. If you
consider that there is not a singly tax at source that would be identical from one canton to the other
(…) These are costs, since we're obliged to deal with all that complexity. We calculate taxes at
source with five different methods, and we have to pay five times the software to do so. This is
miserable. Harmonization concerning family allowances hasn't harmonized more than a minimum
and each canton still does whatever they want” (US6_I1no1: 282, 284, own translation)
“(...) you have to find the right measure of federalism (…) we have to be careful not to get too slow,
to  take  the  appropriate  measures,  especially  referring  to  initial  and  further  education”
(US1_I1no1: 308, own translation)
“In any case, U.S. federalism is also different – outsourcing at [location of a Swiss production site]
was too complicated” (US5_I1no2: 17-18, own translation)
A further legal issue that is seen with a critical eye, is the status of Switzerland as a non-EU member
state. Fairly similar to what we have seen at D5, our US1 interviewee pointed out problems with
international mobility of project workers:
“(...)  the  whole  issue  of  Switzerland  not  being  an  EU  member  state  with  all  the  regulatory
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provisions referring to work permits etc. which isn't always easy. Project workers who come to
Switzerland for short periods of time. Here they need a permission. And in many other countries,
this is not the case. For instance, if we have (…) an American here in Switzerland with a work- and
residence  permit,  and he  goes  to  Germany without  any  permissions,  he  may be  kicked out  of
Switzerland. There are effectively constellations that are far from easy” (US1_I1no1: 284, own
translation)
IR/ER
As we have seen in the chapter on standardized HRM practices, the US MNCs of our sample were
marked by a unilateral managerial style, a clear preference for individual employee relations and the
willingness to keep unions out or at least union influence at bay. Unfortunately, the data that we
were able to collect on the matter of how the US MNCs of our sample are dealing with issues
related to ER and IR in their Swiss production plants is fairly patchy. This is due to the fact that
many of our interviewees worked in EMEA HQ structures and their MNCs either did not have any
production plants and blue-collar workers in Switzerland (US1, US2, US4, US8, US10), or our
interviewees were not involved in IR (US7). For these reasons, most of our interviewees could not
tell us about whether collective agreements or personnel commissions were in place in Switzerland,
and how these were dealt with. What we know for sure is, that none of our interviewees told us
about  any kind  of  relations  with  unions  in  Switzerland.  However,  this  does  not  automatically
preclude the possibility to sign a collective agreement that has been negotiated by the employers'
association for their blue-collar workers. Furthermore, it might as well be that some of their blue-
collar workers are subject to collective agreements that have been declared generally binding. 
An interesting finding is, that in those two cases where our interviewees told about the existence of
a  personnel  commission  in  their  Swiss  plants  (US2,  US6),  these  commissions  were  strictly
separated from unions. This fits in quite well with previous findings on how US MNCs dealt with
German works councils,  that were integrated as an internal representative body,  though strictly
separated  from  unions  and  not  involved  in  wage  negotiations  on  plant  level.  Furthermore,  it
contrasts with D1's approach to actively invite union members to assist their internal negotiations
with the personnel commission.
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Dual VET
An interesting finding concerns several US MNCs' engagement in apprentice training. As we have
seen, apprentice training can be done for different reasons, one of them being social responsibility.
Though, such a vision of CSR must be arguably foreign to senior US managers, who may not even
be  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  this  Swiss  training  practice,  and  even  less  so  with  its  social
dimension.  However,  six  out  of  ten  US MNCs of  our  sample  reported  to  train  apprentices  in
Switzerland for different reasons (US2, US3, US5, US6, US7, US9). We may very well illustrate
the collision of a Swiss and US-American institutional rationality with the example of dual VET at
US3,  where  the  skills  acquired  during  dual  apprentice  training  are  needed  to  run  the  highly
complicated production processes:
“(...) this is our mid-long term vision and our obligation as a citizen. As an important firm in this
region we have to train the future generations. So this is one thing, but this isn't without any self
interest neither. As far as possible, we try to engage our apprentices afterwards. (…) This also
allows us to train people to our specific needs” (US3_I2no1: 179-180, own translation)
“[was apprentice training difficult to justify?] Well, yes. Yes, in a sense that our friends on the other
side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean count  heads:  headcount.  And an apprentice  is  a  head,  not  even  a
productive one (…) So yes, it's not self-evident for them to understand. You must explain them, and
then, every year you have to explain it again and again [How do you explain it?] Well, its numbers,
showing them that these people aren't productive but they don't cost much, neither (…) [what are
the best accepted arguments?]  (…) what the Americans call  best citizen, this  is something that
works” (US3_I2no1: 188-192, own translation)
This  interview extract  may be  discussed against  our  findings  on  a  standardized  U.S.  approach
towards gaining social legitimacy through specific publicly visible CSR actions, where a notion of
CSR as a business case is underlying. The engagement in apprentice training is once more clearly
identifiable  as  a  local  Swiss  practice  that  is  part  of  a  local  institutional  rationality,  and  a
corresponding notion of what CSR in a local context means. Of course, in the U.S., where there is
no such training system in place, local legitimacy must be obtained in different ways. On the other
side, in Switzerland, dual VET is of great social and economic importance and therefore closely
linked to the notion of CSR. The local practice of training apprentices might as well be seen against
the  background  of  our  discussion  of  normative,  cognitive  or  informal  institutions,  and  the
importance of custom and practice. Although once more, there is no formal legal obligation to train
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apprentices, the explanations given by our Swiss US3 interviewee suggest the presence of some
kind of sanction for big local employers who do not train apprentices. Interesting in this respect is
also the tactics used by our Swiss manager in order to obtain approval of his U.S. superiors. By
selling the issue of apprentice training as an action that fits in quite well with the U.S. concept of
CSR as  a  business  case,  and that  would  allow US3 to  be  publicly viewed as  best  citizen,  he
demonstrated his mastership of adequate interpretation and translation of local needs towards the
institutional or socialised rationality of his U.S. colleagues. Therefore, through his local agency, he
allowed for the satisfaction of local needs, and compliance with corporate strategies and practices.
A second interesting case is US9, where few apprentices are employed in the EMEA HQ structure,
since it  is  actually difficult  to find adequate jobs for this  kind of employee in such structures.
Nevertheless,  US9  does  train  apprentices  as  part  of  mutual  obligations  that  arise  from
embeddedness in local networks with the cantonal administration:
“[Do you train apprentices?]  Yes, we do have some, but not a lot of them. The work at a HQ
structure is very difficult and not very well suited for apprentices. There are also problems with
English. Generally, we have little success with the apprentices. [So why do you train apprentices
then?] This is part of our collaboration with local authorities” (US9_I1no1: 99-103)
In this case, the decision to train apprentices clearly is not based on rational-economic reasoning,
but it is exclusively done for social reasons. Yet, the truly interesting point about this is not even the
fact that US9 trains apprentices for social or CSR reasons, but that such behaviour points to deep
embeddedness in local networks. This unexpected finding will be discussed in some more detail in
the section on membership in local associations.
Training
In the area of training, the picture is rather similar to what we have seen in many German MNCs. In
most of the MNCs of our sample, our interviewees told about some local practices in the field of
training. Local practices in this area took a wide range of different forms. For instance, at US1 the
technical training and diploma required to do the job of a certified or chartered accountant are Swiss
(US1_I1no1: 52). In fact, this is one of the few fields where Swiss legislation defines mandatory
standards that have to be complied with in HRM. Generally, our interviewee distinguished between
technical skills and soft skills,  with the former being mostly Swiss (US1_I1no1: 169). But also
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practices related to coaching and mentoring are completely local (US1_I1no1: 163). Also at US3,
certificates  for  certain  professions  are  local  (US3_I1no1:  162),  and  they  have  furthermore
developed local leadership principles for their plant and trainings in French (US3_I1no1:  64, 203).
At US4, our interviewee told about a close partnership with a local business school that delivers
management  trainings  (US4_I1no1:  149).  At  US5,  local  HR has  developed  a  form of  further
training for managerial employees, taking the form of briefings on certain issues such as how to
handle stress at work (US5_I1,I2no1: 294). Our US6 interviewee explained that one of the reasons
for  being  member  of  local  Swiss  professional  associations  and  networks  is  the  offerings  of
continuous  training  (US6_I1no1:  248).  At  US8,  especially  trainings  for  employees  on  lower
managerial ranks are locally organized with local providers and delivered in the local language
(US8_I1no1: 248). At US10, our interviewees told about trainings on values, the code of conduct,
and diversity, that are locally adapted or developed (US10_I1no1: 94, US10_I2no1: 192-194).
Recruitment
Similar to our findings on German MNCs, there are also some local practices in place in the area of
recruitment in US MNCs. For example, at US1, HR marketing activities at universities, the local
Swiss assessment centre and the tool for integration for new hires are local practices (US1_I1no1:
14, 157). At US2, there are local internship programmes (US2_I1no1: 187), and work certificates
and references play an important part in the recruitment process (US2_I1no1: 327, 335) which,
according to our interviewee, is not a common practice in the U.S. At US3, the HR manager is
generally rather free in terms of local recruitment practices (US3_I1no1: 155), and at US4, they
developed a recruitment process locally, because the questionnaire and predictive index used in the
U.S.  did  not  yield  the  desired  results  in  Switzerland  (US4_I1no1:  255).  US5  Switzerland
established a local trainee programme as a means to attract young talents and to establish a relation
with US5 early on, which is seen as an advantage on the local labour market (US5_I1,I2no1: 192).
At US6, there is no system prescribed, and the HR manager uses local Swiss vacancies pages and
employment forums for recruitments (US6_I1no1: 176). Furthermore, a practice that would seem a
typically  Swiss  approach  is  the  use  of  local  associational  networks  to  collect  information  on
potential candidates (US6_I1no1: 251-254). At US8, recruitment is basically local for non-senior
employees (US8_I1no1: 217) and HR marketing at universities is also locally done (US8_I1no1:
234). At US10, the channels used to find employees are local (US10_I1no1: 28) and involve the use
of local recruiters (US10_I2no1: 247).
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At US9, there is a voluntary gentlemen's agreements in place between the local cantonal authorities
and the MNC to hire local Swiss people on certain positions, and not to exceed a certain self-fixed
quota of foreign employees on the local site 
“We have a gentlemen's agreement in place with the local authorities to fill certain positions with
local employees. For instance, we try to recruit the assistant of the board in Switzerland. (…) if we
have to search internationally, we are both well aware, us and the canton, that there is the free
movement of persons in Europe. But anyway, we have fixed ourselves a quota that we do not wish
to surpass” (US9_I1no1: 104-105, own translation)
It is now hard to clearly determine whether such a kind of informal agreement can be explained by a
Swiss host country effect in a sense of collaborative practices and multiple overlapping formal and
informal networks. In fact, such ways of relating to the local environment might as well be inspired
by philosophies of welfare capitalist U.S. employers, who established very close relations to their
immediate local community (Ferner 2000a: 19). In any case, the Swiss environment seems to be
very receptive to such a kind of relation with locally embedded big employers. 
Compensation and benefits, wage increases
Wage increases were found to be determined on a local level at US1 (US1_I1no1: 208-211) and
US6 (US6_I1no1: 12). Certain practices in this area are also local at US3 (US3_I1no1: 131). At
US4,  local management is free do adapt practices within a given framework. For example they may
adapt local compensation through local benchmarking, according to a global policy that stipulates to
pay better than average salaries (US4_I1no1: 134, 214). Such local benchmarking according to a
global reference frame is also done at US5 (US5_I1,I2no1: 235), US7 (US7_I1no1: 120) and US10
(US10_I1no1: 38). At US7, the variable part of pay is also locally determined (US7_I1no1: 120). At
US8, compensation including basic salary, benefits and pension contributions, is locally adapted
according to the local tax system (US8_I1no1: 311, 314).
The strong focus of US MNCs on being locally market competitive in terms of their compensation
practices is in line with earlier findings and contrasts with the conservative compensation policy
that is in place at D7.
Maybe due to a more unilateral style, it does not seem to be common practice in US MNCs to
discuss wage increases with personnel commissions, as this is done in the Swiss subsidiaries of
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several German MNCs of our sample. Even if our evidence on the presence of such commissions in
US MNCs is patchy, the following extracts may serve as an illustration of this argument: 
“There are no wage negotiations  in this  sense here.  (…) The process goes like this:  I  make a
proposition to the board concerning the sum of salaries or just the percentage increase, this is
approved,  implemented  in  each  division  and  controlled  (...)”  (US1_I1no1:  208-211,  own
translation)
“This is simple: I put a certain amount into the budget that I am fixing together with my boss, I
discuss it. There I am a bit the one who defends the plant, I prefer having something generous to
offer (…) the employee has nothing to say,  I'd dare to put it  like that” (US3_I1no1: 187, own
translation)
“Here, this is not really a negotiation. There is finance and HR involved in this. [Are there any
employee  representatives?]  No,  it's  the  board,  it  remains  at  the  level  of  the  board”
(US7_I1no1_149-151, own translation)
Membership in local associations
In our discussion of dual VET, we came along some unexpected behaviour of Swiss US MNCs'
subsidiaries. As we have seen, several US subsidiaries trained apprentices in Switzerland, some of
them exclusively for reasons of local social legitimacy. Yet, even more interesting for us was the
explanation that our US9 interviewee gave for why they trained apprentices, even if it didn't make
economic  sense.  His  speaking of  a  gentlemen's  agreement  with the  cantonal  authorities  clearly
points to the existence of mutual obligations. However, this kind of obligation does not result from
formal contractual commitments as this could have been expected from U.S. MNCs, but from deep
embeddedness in local Swiss informal collaborative networks. As we have seen, the same logic
applies to US9's recruitment practices, where certain positions are deliberately filled with Swiss
employees.
Such findings are fairly unexpected for several reasons. First,  such deep embeddedness in local
networks  does  not  seem to fit  in  quite  well  with the typically  short-term,  contractual  authority
relationships  that  have been repeatedly underlined as  a  typical  U.S.  element  (Hall  and Soskice
2001a: 29–30; Hollingsworth 1997a: 271; Redding 2005: 142). Second, as Kristensen and Morgan
(2007: 203) explain, usually “settings with strong institutional systems (...) are hard for MNCs from
other contexts to enter. They are often described as ‘‘insider’’ systems, which means that internal
networks are strong and difficult for outsiders to penetrate”. Thus, why shouldn't this apply to US
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MNCs  in  Switzerland?  Third,  as  we  have  seen,  US  MNCs  not  only  were  reluctant  to  join
associations,  but  even  actively  furthered  tendencies  towards  disarticulation  of  associational
networks in Germany (Singe and Croucher 2005: 123). Just as Switzerland, Germany is also a host
country with  dense  associational  networks  that  demands  for  collaboration  (Saka-Helmhout  and
Geppert 2011: 573–574). So, why do some US MNCs behave so differently in Switzerland?
In our research framework, the third proposition on expected differences between German and US
MNCs dealt with this question. We pointed out that, based on theoretical reasoning and empirical
evidence, there was no reason to expect deep embeddedness and sustained engagement in local
networks. At this point, we will try to explain this unexpected behaviour. 
As  we  have  seen,  Switzerland  is  politically  more  decentralised  than  Germany,  and  cantonal
authorities are comparatively strong in terms of their political decision power over regulations and
financial resources. Corresponding to this principle of Swiss state organization, also associational
structures  are  different  from  those  in  Germany.  In  Switzerland,  the  most  important  part  of
associational  life  takes  place  on  the  sub-national  cantonal  or  linguistic-regional  level,  whereas,
contrary to Germany, the role of umbrella organizations is comparatively weak (Armingeon 2001;
Linder  2003).  The  same is  true  for  arenas  of  political  access  to  societal  actors,  that  are  more
geographically variable  in  more decentralised states  (Scott  1994:  213,  215).  Furthermore,  other
factors such as time of local presence and experience, the size of local operations, and the presence
of locally networked managers in higher-ranking positions might have an additional influence on
the degree of local embeddedness. It may therefore well be the case that in Switzerland, a large US
employer  as  US9  has  much  greater  weight  on  a  local  level,  and  easier,  privileged  access  to
important cantonal authorities than this is the case in Germany. This, in turn, makes local cantonal
networks highly attractive, and particularly more attractive than networks on the higher level of an
umbrella organization in Germany. Concerning US9, these arguments perfectly apply, since it is the
third largest employer of the canton. Additionally, US9 has already been present in the Lake Geneva
region for decades, together with several other US MNCs that arrived during the 1950s and 1960s.
This  particular  constellation  makes  networking  in  a  Swiss  manner  highly  attractive,  since  the
cumulative  economic  weight  of  several  large  employers  is  enormous,  and  access  to  the  most
important level of political decision-making, the cantonal one, is direct. Yet, there is still another
important  difference  compared  to  the  situation  in  Germany.  Due  to  their  sheer  number  and
geographical concentration, especially along the Lake Geneva, US MNCs had effectively the choice
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to join pre-existant local Swiss networks, or to form their own original one. US MNCs did not
necessarily  have  to  try  and  penetrate  pre-existing  local  Swiss  insider  networks,  which  might
actually have proven to be difficult. Taken together, this unique constellation of local conditions is
therefore extremely favourable for the development of collective and cooperative forms of MNC
agency.  Under  such  circumstances,  MNCs can  effectively act  as  rule-makers,  and  successfully
engage in institutional work (see table 14) on a local level. This is once more facilitated through the
fact that Swiss local authorities seem to be utterly business-friendly,  flexible and fairly open to
listen and react to the concerns of local business:
“(...) we do not interfere with local politics (…) Of course we do have contacts to the local fiscal
administration etc.,  we explain our concerns, but this is where it stops” (US4_I1no1: 251, own
translation)
“The availability of local authorities is part of the country's competitiveness” (US5_I1no2: 32, own
translation)
“We have a Swiss culture of negotiating with local authorities in order to obtain a certain number
of  rulings,  for instance concerning school fees for expatriates or stock options,  so there are a
certain number of advantages that have been negotiated (D7_I1no1: 164, own translation)
“We have really good and valuable relations with [local canton]: for their diversity programme we
spent time, we lend the competences of our employees. As a counterpart, the mayor listens closely
and takes an interest. There are personal meetings and a very regular and uncomplicated exchange.
Together  with the cantonal  administration,  we set  up accelerated processes for obtaining work
permits. We've been working on the issue together, and we try to be a good citizen” (US9_I1no1:
35-37, own translation)
“Switzerland promotes business to establish itself” (US10_I1no1: 163)
However, the institutional rationality underlying such a local collaborative networking approach
seems utterly Swiss more than anything else, and above all, little American. For this reason, we
would argue for the presence of a subtle, yet strongly manifest Swiss host-country effect. Swiss
institutional rationality and the socialised rationality of local actors lead to the adoption of highly
collaborative,  trust-based  behaviours  within  formal  as  well  as  informal  external  local  networks
between firms and local authorities. This proposition is supported by the account of a Lake-Geneva-
based British expatriate manager who had already been working at U.S. HQ:
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“(...) maybe as an American company, we are conscious of that as well and we're very careful about
what bodies we're members of and participate in,  particularly if  there is  a risk that there is  a
competitor in the room.  I'm just looking to see on my – protecting information – US5 Code of
Conduct.  Every  year  we  take  training  about,  and  there  is  always  modules  about  being  in  an
environment where a competitor is present, how you deal with that and how you cope with that. So I
think as a company, US5 would be very careful about what associations it would be member of. (…)
I do know that I sometimes hear reference to 'I've learned from someone at [another local US
MNC] that you know, the good approach for this is as follows, so they have done a shared services'.
Sometimes I do be asked to come and meet other folks. So perhaps there are some links into some of
these little associations, but I personally don't have any real engagement within it”  (US5_I3no1:
137-139)
This is very much is in line with propositions linked to the market mentality, arm's length low trust
relations between economic actors and the intensiveness of competition and strictness of anti-trust
legislation that are present in the U.S. These features apparently do have an influence on concrete
behavioural  norms that  are  codified  in  the  company code  of  conduct.  Even though our  Swiss
interviewees of US5 have been trained on, and are subject to, the rules defined in the very same
code of conduct, they do not seem to perceive their involvement in local trust-based networks as
problematic,  even  if  some other  members  are  definitively working  for  competitors.  We would
therefore argue that this interview extract lends support to ideas around actor's socialised rationality
to greatly differ between Switzerland and the U.S., and that the idea to make use of local trust-based
personal networks as a valuable resource corresponds rather to a Swiss than to an original U.S.
rationality.  Therefore,  this particular way of relating to the Swiss institutional environment,  and
using locally available resources suggests that there is a subtle, yet strong influence of the Swiss
host country. In the latter, the concept of collaboration is a central part of its distinctive rationale.
Still with the same British US5 expatriate manager, we also had the chance to discuss qualitative
differences between European and U.S. associations, and the role of personnel networks:
“(...) in the United States, there were various organizations that HR people were members of. But it
was very – I don't know if this is the right word – but it was more of a commercial thing. There were
forums, going to conferences (...). I did one in Las Vegas which was all about suppliers entertaining
customers. Yes, there were conference topics and things and there was more – it wasn't really about
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building  networks  in  it  and  relationships.  In  Europe  however,  I  have  attended  a  number  of
conferences where that has almost been my primary objective, to find some other folks from other
companies  who  were  either  experiencing  the  same  issues  as  we  were,  or  who  were  perhaps
regarded as a benchmark for something we were struggling with. So I would use those kinds of
things” (US5_I3no1: 131-132)
Apart from confirming the existence of qualitative differences between associational networks and
the role of personal contacts and relationships in the U.S. and Europe, this extract also reminds us to
be careful with generalizations about Anglo-Saxon practices. The account of our British interviewee
suggests that overall, personal relationships might play a greater role in business and the working of
associations also in the U.K. than this is the case in the U.S. 
However, as we have seen above, in Switzerland the above-cited British US5 expatriate did not
actively participate in local networks. Here, we might establish a further link to suggestions worded
by Morgan and Kristensen (2006) about career orientations of managers and local embeddedness.
The case of our British US5 expatriate may serve to illustrate the case of a global corporate career
orientation. With more than 35 years of tenure, this expatriate has already been working for the
same company in several different countries and settings, and there is no single location where he
would  be  deeply embedded into  local  external  networks.  Since  his  career  orientation  is  firmly
company-centred, and not location-specific, his loyalty will be with the performance requirements
of the company. This is also illustrated in his reasoning on the thought experiment of a possible
dilemma involved in the restructuring and layoff of personal friends or family members:
“That's a dilemma, alright. And I guess if I have a comment, I would say that to allow that to
prevent you making the right business decision for the long term would be a mistake. That would be
a pity to do that. And I have seen that kind of behaviour in the past from certain supervisors or
managers that would say: “Hhh, you want me to do this? But that means we have to let this person
go...”  Even temporary  workers.  But  I  have to  let  the  temporaries  go and yeah.  And then you
discover  that  one  of  them  is  the  fiancé  of  a  cousin...  Because  in  Ireland,  these  are  small
communities as  well.  And sometimes people would say:  “Hey,  we've been hearing you will  be
downsizing?” or “Hey, you announced some lay-offs last week?” and certainly from people you
didn't think would know that. And they say: “Oh yeah, my uncle, he works there, he was telling
me.” So that's, yeah, I think the business decision, you have a long-term view, that's best for the
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business and the community” (US5_I3no1: 285)
Even if  communities  are  small  in  Ireland as  well,  and people know each-other  personally,  the
British expatriate manager clearly would opt for what is economically rational for his company. On
the other hand, taking the example of locally embedded Swiss HR managers of US3 and US4, we
can see a fairly distinct reasoning:
“[thought  experiment:  how  would  you  react  if  HQ  would  say  that  you  had  to  lay  off  100
employees?] Honestly, if I didn't have the choice (...) I would have to lay them off, yes. Now, of
course this has an impact. One hundred jobs in a region like [French-speaking canton], this would
have a huge impact. But I don't think that our division would listen if we were telling them 'Look,
are you aware of the impact, a little town (…) 35 000 inhabitants, 100 layoffs are important. They
wouldn't say: OK, just do 50. (…) They wouldn't have that approach. [Could you anyway convince
divisional HQ to proceed on this issue more softly?] Maybe. [And would you try and do so?] In any
case, I would try. [Why?] Well, I am someone local. So I understand well the problems, I know
about the impacts. And if there was anything that I could do to minimize these impacts I would
certainly do everything I can [So this is because you're someone local?] I guess that, if you have an
expatriate coming from California, he surely would have much less problems to execute such a
thing” (US3_I2no1: 126-138, own translation)
“[speaking of differences between U.S. and Europe] There it isn't like here in Europe. 'I'm Swiss, I
defend Switzerland'. This is something Americans don't understand. It's our role to defend it and to
make it known. We are the first ambassadors of ourselves. You also have to establish networks in
the U.S., to go regularly to the U.S., to send people to the U.S.  who will  somehow defend the
European voice. This is very important because it starts with ourselves” (US4_I1no1: 185, own
translation)
“We always engage the best, regardless of whether he's Italian or Swiss. Though, somewhere we
would like to have a certain representation of Swiss people, too. We need Swiss people for the site
of [Lake Geneva region] to live in the long run. These are Swiss people, persons who are devoted to
this site here and who will make it live for a long time. An American thinks short-term. He comes in
for four years and then he goes back. (…) But those who really support this site are Swiss people –
not in a sense of having the red passport, but people who feel at home here, who are rooted here
and know that they will be here for the long term (…) Until present, we were lucky since we have
had Swiss people in the US4 hierarchy, so they didn't touch the site. All this is internal politics, it's
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very personal. (…) We have to keep this site internally competitive. This is something I really care
about” (US4_I1no1: 275-278, own translation)
This reasoning points to the presence of a clearly local career orientations and local embeddedness
of Swiss managers. Otherwise, there would be no need to engage local Swiss people in order to
make sure the long-term survival of the site, or to care about local impacts of mass layoffs. And in
fact, the above-cited Swiss US4 manager is also deeply embedded in external cooperative local
networks, that he intensively uses as a resource for the benefit of his company. Furthermore, this
behaviour is absolutely in line with suggestions made by Morgan and Kristensen (2006: 1480–
1481)  on  highly  entrepreneurial  subversive  strategists  that  would  be  likely  to  appear  in
institutionally dense and highly networked local environments. These would make novel use of
local social institutions and spur experimentation with local contexts in ways that may deepen local
comparative  advantages.  These  theoretical  elements  also  received  some  empirical  support  in
Switzerland:
“Networking? This is utterly important, internally as well as externally. In my profession (…) I pass
one hour a day doing this. This is extremely important. You can gain a lot of time with that, but it
has to be well done (…) and US4 profits from it” (US4_I1no1: 67, own translation)
“Local top managers can better benefit from local networks” (US5_I1no2: 9, own translation) 
In  fact,  very much in  line  with  these  suggestions  about  subversive  strategists,  our  findings  on
activities, and the quality and degree of collaboration among local subsidiaries of US MNCs are
non-ambiguous.  They  show  an  amazing  range  of  activities  of  tight  local  networks  that  were
particularly dense within the regional Lake Geneva association of HR managers:
“(...) one of our colleagues from here moved to merger and acquisition in [Lake Geneva area], and
he said, when he started, he got a list of contacts in other companies. And he thought, you know, he
would now have to start networking, finding people. It's all there: 'These are the people we work
with in other companies'. Completely open” (US10_I2no1: 526)
“[question concerning the role of networks] Oh, well, this is to identify certain trends, also for
benchmarking (…) Very frequently, there are people from a firm which isn't a direct competitor who
come to us, or we go to them. It's really networking (…) One concrete example would be; what is
the position of the firms belonging to [association] concerning a new regulation that is going to be
passed. We work together with [Swiss association of  the pharmaceutical industry]  so that  they
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defend our position towards European authorities etc. So we get some lobbying done” (US3_I1no1:
196, own translation)
“[association  of  HR  professionals  working  in  MNCs  of  the  Lake  Geneva  region]  does
benchmarkings on everything.  For instance,  we have done a salary survey where many of  our
member firms have participated” (US4_I1no2: 13, own translation)
“There are certain kinds of work done in the [association of HR professionals working in MNCs of
the Lake Geneva region], for instance a group health insurance for 15 000 employees of MNCs
here at [Lake Geneva region] and their family members. We are participating in this collective
contract, and we are sponsoring it by paying a participation for our employees in order to be
members of this (…). The new salary certificate which has entered into force in January 2008, we
have developed a regulation of costs which was specific to MNCs, and which has been negotiated
with local authorities (…). Finally, we are reaching results that have been fixed internally, but in a
collective way, because we can achieve results that we couldn't have achieved if we were only US5.
We can do it because we are several organizations” (US5_I1,I2no1: 244, own translation)
“[Are  there  any  negotiations  with  local  authorities  done  together  with  other  local  MNCs?]
Generally we always take the most favourable benchmark for us, and generally this is [other local
US  MNC].  I'm  not  involved  in  these  discussions,  but  it's  known  that  typically  for  all  that  is
schooling fees or standard costs, we took [other local US MNC] as a reference since they had
negotiated very interesting rates” (US7_I1no1: 166, own translation)
“The  [association of HR professionals working in MNCs of the Lake Geneva region] is a great
networking and information exchange forum. It represents a big player in the Swiss environment,
particularly around the 'Arc Lémanique'  in  terms of negotiating with authorities or playing its
weight on certain decisions (…) The other European headquarters in Switzerland play an important
role.  The  environment  that  allows  these  exchanges,  particularly  the  [association  of  HR
professionals  working  in  MNCs  of  the  Lake  Geneva  region]  helps  a  lot  to  know  what  other
multinationals are doing, to have this benchmarking experience as well and to work together. In
terms of HR practices, each company has its own practices, which are more or less globalised. We
can definitely play a role in feeding up some information on best practices in other companies and
bring this knowledge on the table. Inevitably, that would influence how the progress will go. [Could
that kind of exchange networks be considered as a typical Swiss element?] Very much so, especially
in [location in Lake Geneva region]” (US10_I1no1: 181-184)
As we can see, this kind of collaborative practices arguably require decisively more than just arm's
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length  contractual  relationships  between market  competitors  as  they would  be  typical  for  U.S.
companies according to the extant literature. 
Table 35 below provides a summary overview of local Swiss practices in the US MNCs of our
sample.
Table 35: Local Swiss HR practices in US MNCs of our sample
MNC Legal-
administrative 
HR issues
IR/ER Dual 
VET
Training 
(shop-floor, 
technical)
Recruitment Compensation &
benefits, wage 
increases
Membership in
local 
associationsPersonnelcommission
US1 * N/A - * * */wi *
US2 (*) */nu * N/A * N/A *
US3 * - * * * * *
US4 (*) N/A N/A * * */lb *
US5 (*) N/A * * * */wi/lb *
US6 * */nu * * * */wi/n *
US7 * - * N/A N/A */lb *
US8 (*) N/A - * * * *
US9 (*) N/A * N/A * N/A *
US10 * N/A - * * */lb *
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis; *=local, (*)=supposed to be local although
not  explicitly  mentioned  as  such  by  interviewees,  (-)=supposed  not  to  be  in  place,  nu=non-unionized
representative body, wi=wage increases, lb=local benchmarking, n=negotiated with personnel commission.
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8.4.3 Local Swiss practices in German and US MNCs compared
In  our  discussion  of  local  HRM practices,  we could  identify a  number  of  specific  Swiss  host
country influences, and analyse the ways in which German and U.S. MNCs relate to the Swiss
institutional setting. 
A first central finding which confirms our theoretical expectation concerning the high degree of
permissiveness of the Swiss NBS, is the near absence of formal institutional constraints affecting
HRM and IR practices. However, local coercive isomorphic pressures are present in areas that are
related  to  institutions  of  the  Swiss  welfare  state  and  tax  regime.  This  typically  concerns  the
obligation to contribute to Swiss pension plans, social and health insurances, the respect of legal
provisions on maternity leave, as well as fiscal and contract law. In these clearly delimited areas,
strong local coercive pressures are present, that are invariably felt by German as well as US MNCs.
In our analysis, we have termed those HRM matters that are affected by this kind of Swiss coercive
isomorphic pressures legal-administrative HR issues.
Furthermore, our empirical investigation revealed that constraints for international HRM, especially
in the area of  mobility, arise from the  Swiss status as non-EU member state and corresponding
difficulties with residence and work permits for international project workers. Interesting in this
respect was also the fact that the strategies adopted by German and US MNCs to deal with these
difficulties  are  somehow  similar,  pointing  to  the  importance  of  local  Swiss  networks  for  the
functioning of local administrations. The Swiss country HR manager of D5 has fought to keep
Switzerland out of corporate shared services in the field of mobility. This was in order to be able to
continue  to  work  with  local  service  providers  who  can  draw  on  their  networks  with  local
administrations, since only this solution allowed for the satisfaction of their needs in terms of short-
term work permits for international project workers. Furthermore, D5 formed a network with other
local  MNCs  to  do  some  topic-specific  lobbying  at  a  cantonal  level  in  order  to  block  further
restrictions on quotas for foreign workers. The HR director at EMEA HQ of US9 even went one
step  further  in  capitalizing  on  the  great  economic  weight  of  US9  as  one  of  the  largest  local
employers,  and  established  direct  personal  links  and  long-term co-operative  relations  with  the
communal and cantonal authorities. This network enabled US9 not only to word their concerns
directly in personal meetings with local officials, but also to set up new processes together with the
local administration to obtain work permits faster. 
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These examples are illustrative of a central  characteristic of the Swiss NBS: the flexibility and
business-friendliness  of  local  administrations,  and  the  possibilities  to  find  local  tailor-made
solutions thanks to the overall  low regulatory density.  Yet,  in order to capitalise on this locally
available resource, foreign MNCs have to follow behavioural patterns of local actors who capitalise
on personal local networks. It is interesting to see that both, German and US MNCs, seem to have
very well understood how to profit from the possibilities available in Switzerland. The possibility to
obtain this sort of tailor-made solutions might also be considered as a particular kind of locally
provided competitive support (Almond 2011b: 533) to MNCs. 
A  last  area  where  foreign  MNCs  felt  the  presence  of  local  constraints  is  linked  to  Swiss
decentralised federalism and the fact that important legislations and rulings such as fiscal law and
family allowances are subject to cantonal authorities. Wherever firms have subsidiaries in different
cantons, several versions of corresponding software have to be bought to calculate taxes at source
and allowances. Otherwise, as in case of D5, such issues are outsourced to an external specialised
service provider due to the high complexity of the task.
Also our empirical findings in the area of IR/ER are in line with our propositions concerning the
permissiveness of the Swiss IR system, and the near absence of coercive pressures on practices of
foreign MNCs. 
As we have seen, especially US MNCs did not find any obstacles that would have hindered them to
implement a typical unilateral style in IR/ER, and to keep unions out of their operations. Interesting
in this respect is the case of US6, where the HR manager deliberately used a personnel commission
as an internal, non unionised social partner according to typical Swiss practices as a preventive
measure. Having such a representation gave employees the feeling of being heard, and of their
concerns being taken seriously by local management, so that they did not feel the need for a union.
As we have seen, preventive measures against unionisation or conflicts in IR have been adopted by
US MNCs especially in institutional settings like Spain or Germany where IR is more constraining.
While  in  Spain,  US MNCs sought  to avoid industrial  conflict  through the use of strong direct
communication channels and higher wage levels, (Quintanilla et al. 2004: 143–145; Quintanilla et
al. 2008: 690), in Germany the primary aim seemingly was to prevent works council constitution or
parity representation on supervisory boards. The latter was achieved not only through adoption of
direct communication mechanisms, but also through restructuring of activities (Royle 1998: 1040;
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Tempel et al. 2006a: 1559–1560). Our finding of this particular preventive measure in Switzerland
somehow resembles  a  tactic  used  by some US MNCs in  Germany.  Here,  management  strictly
separated works councils from unions, and cooperated closely with non-unionised works councils
(Wächter et  al. 2003: 105, 2004: 98),  and thus, gained additional legitimacy (Kluge and Vitols
2001: 3). Similar to Germany, also in Switzerland, the notion of social partnership in IR and ER is
deeply rooted. Therefore, in the Swiss institutional setting, the establishment of a social partnership
with a weak representative body that is easy to handle for management may be viewed as a fairly
comfortable means to achieve or maintain the desired outcome of non-union status. However, also
without the use of such preventive measures, none of the US MNCs of our sample reported any
relations with unions, nor did any interviewee tell about any kind of difficulties in achieving or
maintaining non-union status.
On the other hand, as far as German MNCs are concerned, the picture is different. As we have seen,
the greater  part  of German MNCs of  our  sample is  overall  quite  as standardized as  their  U.S.
counterparts as far as HRM core processes and practices are concerned. Yet, the area of IR and ER
seems to be an exception. Here, we could observe rather decentralised policies even in the most
centralised and standardized among the German MNCs of our sample. Furthermore, we could also
identify  some  Swiss  host-country  effects  in  this  area.  The  presence  or  not  of  personnel
commissions,  the  signing  of  collective  agreements,  and  union  involvement  could  be  partly
explained by organizational-level factors. These are linked to company strategy and structure, and
to  the  specific  role  that  the  Swiss  subsidiary  has  in  the  company network.  Where  blue-collar
workers are employed in production plants, German MNCs adapted to typical Swiss IR/ER patterns
including personnel commissions, collective agreements, and relations with unions. Where German
MNCs were following such a social partnership approach, the role of personnel commissions, their
relations with unions,  and the signing of collective agreements  matched typical  Swiss patterns.
Hence,  wages  were  excluded  from  collective  agreements  and  negotiated  with  personnel
commissions as social partners at plant level. On the other hand, in subsidiaries where white-collar
employees and corresponding activities are predominating, more individual approaches are in place.
This pattern also largely corresponds to what can be found in Germany, where a central distinction
is  made  in  IR/ER  between  tariff  employees  at  lower  hierarchical  levels  who  are  covered  by
collective agreements, and those in managerial or specialist positions who are exempt (Giardini  et
al. 2005: 71; Müller 1999b: 134). 
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Particularly interesting were our findings on how German MNCs try to gain legitimacy in the Swiss
environment. While it is hard to establish whether this is due to a German country-of-origin or a
Swiss host-country effect, the approach is clearly to include local stakeholders. Works commissions
and unions are seen as social partners to negotiate working time schedules, wages and social plans
in  case  of  mass  layoffs.  In  fact,  the  idea  of  social  partnership  is  common  to  Germany  and
Switzerland, and as we have seen,  also in  earlier  investigations,  German MNCs were found to
establish  cooperative  relations  with  local  social  partners,  what  might  be  interpreted  as  a
manifestation  of  the  ethos  of  the  works  community  (Ferner et  al. 2001:  109).  Therefore,  we
expected German MNCs to follow some kind of social partnership or cooperative approach in IR.
The argument of social partnership and union inclusion as a means of gaining social legitimacy is
mainly grounded in the account of our D1 HR director and following discussions with a unionist.
The presence of unionists in the local press and their political influence could clearly be identified
as a strong means to put pressure on firms, or to grant legitimacy through their inclusion as social
partners in difficult situations such as mass layoffs. At this point, we may however recall the fact
that also Anlgo-Saxon MNCs in Germany were found to include works councils as social partners
in case of restructuring, thereby increasing their legitimacy (Kluge and Vitols 2001: 3).
Concerning dual VET, our findings on German MNCs' use of locally available infrastructures and
participation in  apprentice training largely confirmed our  expectations.  For German MNCs,  we
were  able  to  identify  direct  country-of-origin  influence  pushing  Swiss  subsidiaries  to  train
apprentices. Furthermore, we found cases where rational-economic reasons predominated, that are
directly linked to the skill needs of production plants in Switzerland. And yet in different situations,
management  made conscious  use  of  apprentice  training  to  increase  social  legitimacy.  The link
between apprentice training and legitimacy is once more an issue that might be explained with both,
German country-of-origin as well as Swiss host country influence, since institutional rationality in
this area is fairly similar. Interesting in this respect is that the active engagement of two German
MNCs in Swiss regional joint training schemes could be identified as an example of how German
MNCs  take  advantage  of  locally  provided  competitive  supports  for  MNCs.  While  such  an
engagement of US MNCs cannot be excluded, we did however not find any evidence of similar
practices in our sample of US MNCs. In fact, there is some more evidence suggesting that probably
US MNCs normally would not show engagement in such schemes. In this respect, our interviewee
of Aprentas specified that all the U.S. firms in the Basel area that participate in the training scheme
453
Chapter 8 Results of the empirical study
were in fact originally Swiss firms that were already engaged in the joint training scheme before
they had been acquired: “(...) all those firms that are now American once had Swiss roots. (…) no
American firm that establishes new operations here comes to us. All of them have Swiss roots, or
German ones” (Aprentas: 144, 146).
Nevertheless, our findings on US MNCs' approaches towards dealing with Swiss dual VET system
are fairly interesting. In our sample, several US MNCs were engaged in apprentice training not for
rational-economic, but for social reasons only. In these cases, local Swiss managers adopted the role
of skilled interpreters who explained the need to train apprentices locally to their U.S. superiors,
who were not familiar with this Swiss training practice. This interpretation was necessary since, as
opposed to German managers, engagement in dual VET does not come naturally to US managers
who are unfamiliar with this practice and corresponding social implications. The particular skill of
Swiss managers like the US3 plant manager may be seen in their achievement of selling the issue of
apprentice training to their U.S. superiors as a business case for CSR, which is fully acceptable to
U.S. mangers. In case of US9, apprentice training was even part of mutual obligations from an
informal agreement with local authorities. This finding was unexpected since it reflects the deep
embeddedness of certain US MNCs in local Swiss networks. In these local networks that follow a
fairly Swiss rather than U.S. institutional rationality, the type of relationship between members far
exceeds the type of formal-contractual arm's length relationships that we expected US MNCs to
have with their environment also in Switzerland. 
In  fact,  we  found  some  of  our  most  unexpected  evidence  when  investigating  the  matter  of
membership in associations and embeddedness in local Swiss networks. While for German MNCs
who are used to an associational mode of coordination and a domestic institutional setting that
demands for collaboration  (Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011: 573–574), this is arguably not the
case with their U.S. counterparts. Accordingly, while we expected the former to be embedded in
local networks, our findings on the latter came as a surprise. Especially the utterly dense networking
among US MNCs along the Lake Geneva with their multitude of highly collaborative practices was
unexpected. In fact, in Germany as another collaborative business system, US MNCs were found to
further tendencies towards disarticulation of the associational mode of coordination,  whereas in
Switzerland, their employees are not only part of local networks, but they even established their
original own ones. We might consider this finding as an illustration of the argument that “MNCs
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become  a  source  of  diversity  inside  institutional  contexts.  They  engage  in  new  ways  with
institutions, local firms and local actors, in some cases reshaping them, in others reinforcing them
and in others undermining them” (Morgan 2007: 139). While in the collaborative, but constraining
German  business  system,  US  MNCs rather  tried  to  reshape  or  undermine  institutions,  in  the
collaborative and permissive Swiss business system, they even reinforced associational networks
and associational coordination as a central part of the local institutional setting. Concerning US
MNCs, this way of relating to the collaborative Swiss host country setting might even be interpreted
as a particular manifestation of deliberate differentiation by choice. It may well be that, thanks to
hard facts and figures on savings that could be realized thanks to collective insurance contracts,
local actors achieved to convince decision-makers in their companies that in this way, they could
best profit from locally available resources.
A last significant difference between German and US MNCs could be identified concerning wage
increases.  As  we  have  seen,  several  German  MNCs  followed  local  Swiss  patterns  of  social
partnership in IR, including wage negotiations with employee representatives on plant level as far
as blue-collar workers are concerned. In our sample of US MNCs, personnel commissions were in
place only at US2 and US6. However, annual wage increases were rather decided upon unilaterally
by the finance and HR function, and communicated to employees. Here, US6 was the only case
where  employee  representatives  were  somehow  included  in  negotiations.  These  different
approaches might actually reflect the differences described in the literature between a negotiated
style in German-, and a unilateral style in US MNCs (Wever 1995). But also Swiss host county
effects  are  present  in  our  findings,  pointing  to  the  intensive  use  of  local  networks  in  order  to
exchange information on local wage levels. This evidence confirms the findings of earlier research
on the use of informal modes of coordination of wage policies on the side of employers (Flanagan
1999: 1152; Soskice 1990: 41). The most striking and surprising element in this respect is, that even
US MNCs in the Lake Geneva region had intensive exchange and benchmark studies on these
highly sensitive issues within their own original local network of US MNCs. 
Therefore, we might say that our greatest surprise in Switzerland is the way in which US MNCs
relate to this collaborative environment. The formation of an original local networks of US MNCs
follows a Swiss institutional rationality of trust-based personal networks and information exchange
which could not at all be expected as based on the extant literature and earlier findings.
Table 36 below summarizes key findings of our comparison of local HRM practices and identified
key influences and effects in German and US MNCs.
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Table 36: Local HR practices and key influences and effects on transfer in German and US MNCs
HRM practices German MNCs US MNCs
Legal-
administrative 
HR issues
Legal compliance with federal Swiss or cantonal legislation on contracts,
taxes, social insurance, health insurance, maternity leave, equal pay and
pension plans;
flexibility  of  Swiss  legal  environment:  room  for  negotiations  between
business and local authorities to find tailor-made solutions
Legal  compliance  with  federal  Swiss  or  cantonal  legislation  on
contracts, taxes, social insurance, health insurance, maternity leave
and pension plans
flexibility of Swiss legal environment: room for negotiations between
business and local authorities to find tailor-made solutions
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Swiss host country effect:
coercive isomorphic pressures: 
in case of cantonal tax laws, pension funds, social and health insurance
schemes 
non-EU membership:
downside of non-EU member status felt because of restrictions for short-
term international mobility and work permits for project workers
Low regulatory density:
advantage  of  flexibility  of  individual  solutions  in  the  overall  weakly
regulated Swiss environment;
disadvantage  of  perpetual  need  for  individual  negotiation  and  network
formation
people-networking society/agency:
functioning of local authorities with the strong role of personal networks
might be interpreted as a mechanism to protect local interests, markets
and businesses;
local cooperative practices in associations or ad-hoc interest groups (e.g.
D5  and  collective  lobbying  towards  cantonal  authorities  concerning
common problems around residence and work permits)
Swiss host country effect:
coercive isomorphic pressures:
in  case  of  cantonal  tax  laws,  pension  funds,  social  and  health
insurance schemes
non-EU membership:
downside of  non-EU member status felt  because of restrictions for
short-term international mobility and work permits for project workers
Swiss decentralised federalism:
downside in terms of slowness, high costs and low efficiency of Swiss
decentralised federalism and cantonal prerogatives in the fields of tax
and educational system design have been emphasized
people-networking society:
close  personal  contact  to,  and  collaboration  with,  local  authorities
used to achieve improvements in local administrative processes (e.g.
work permits), 
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agency:
fending  off  HQ  plans  for  standardization/mobility  shared  services  on
grounds  of  administrative  difficulties  in  Switzerland  and  use  of  local
providers with  personal  networks  to  local  authorities in  order  to  obtain
local mobility services that satisfy short-term needs
coercive  isomorphic  pressures  in  legal-administrative  area  as  single
institutional power resource for local actors that may be used to fend off
HQ interference (e.g. pension plans)
IR/ER Where Swiss subsidiaries are production plants with blue-collar workers
and/or  serve  the  local  market,  personnel  commissions  and  collective
agreements are in place in most cases;
in  subsidiaries  where  white-collar  employees  prevail,  there  are  no
collective agreements, personnel commissions and unions involved;
unions and personnel  commissions are included as social  partners for
example to agree on annual working time schedules, but also in case of
reorganizations and mass layoffs
In  only two cases,  our  interviewees reported to  have a personnel
commission in place (US2, US6), which was strictly non-unionised
except  for  US6,  no  further  interviewee  told  about  any  kind  of
involvement of employee representatives in wage bargaining on plant
level;
at  US6,  the personnel  commission was deliberately installed as a
means to keep the plant union-free
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Swiss host country effect:
social partnership orientation and political veto-player status of unions –
link between the IR- and the political arena
agency:
negotiating social legitimacy with personnel commissions and unions in
case of working time schedules, wage negotiations, and mass layoffs – an
approach towards gaining legitimacy that seems similar to what is done in
Germany,  and may be interpreted as a  manifestation of  a stakeholder
philosophy
organizational effect:
due to company strategy and structure, the role of the Swiss subsidiary in
the MNC network, corresponding kind of activities performed and types of
employees  engaged  are  important  to  determine  which  model  and
practices are adopted in IR/ER
Country-of-origin effect:
unilateral  style  in  IR/ER,  anti-union  ideology,  determined  to  keep
unions out in Switzerland
agency / country-of-origin effect / Swiss host country effect:
 using a weak personnel commission as a means to keep unions out
(US6),
particular way of maintaining non-union status: using a comfortable
form  of  social  partnership  as  a  preventive  measure;  might  be
interpreted as reflecting Swiss socialised rationality since the idea of
social partnership is deeply rooted in Swiss IR/ER
                                                    457
Dual VET Nearly  all  German MNCs train  apprentices  in  Switzerland  for  rational-
economic as well as for social reasons
Some  US  MNCs  train  apprentices  in  Switzerland  for  rational-
economic  as  well  as  for  social  reasons,  or  as  part  of  mutual
obligations within local networks with authorities (US9)
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Country-of-origin effect:
apprentice training is  an important  German training practice and firmly
integrated in German work organization and production models
Host-country effect:
in Switzerland, a dual VET system is in place that is very similar to the
German  one,  together  with  the  corresponding  infrastructures  and
institutional supports,
German MNCs make use of regional joint training schemes as example of
a locally provided competitive support or resource
Agency:
training  apprentices  as  a  strategy  to  gain  social  legitimacy  since  in
Switzerland, this is strongly viewed as part of corporate CSR – a strategy
that comes quite natural to German managers since they are familiar with
dual VET and corresponding social implications
Host country effect / agency:
in  Switzerland,  training  apprentices  is  considered  as  be  part  of
corporate CSR, 
although there is no legal obligation to engage in apprentice training,
this may be seen as a good illustration of informal normative rules
and the role of custom and practice in Switzerland: 
Swiss managers as insiders took the role of interpreters of the Swiss
environment and convinced their superiors in the U.S. of the need to
engage  in  dual  VET  as  a  matter  of  good  corporate  citizenship,
yielding positive effects on legitimacy and employer image for their
company (US3)
Training apprentices was even part  of  an informal  agreement  and
mutual  obligations  between the cantonal  authorities  and  the  MNC
US9, which points to deep embeddedness at least of some US MNCs
in local Swiss networks. 
This finding was unexpected and points to a unique constellation that
led to local network formation and agency of a whole group of US
MNCs,  thereby  following  typical  patterns  of  Swiss  institutional
rationality
Shop floor 
technical 
training
Some training is localised according to literature and theory Some trainings is localised according to literature and theory
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects: 
Due to lower degree of integration and higher degree of differentiation of
local trainings
Due to lower degree of integration and higher degree of differentiation
of local trainings
Recruitment Faster  processes  in  Switzerland  than  in  Germany,  need  for  personal
contact with candidates, local university marketing and cooperation with
employment agencies, social control: recruitments are closely monitored
by the local community
Use of local vacancies pages and employment agencies;
use of employment certificates, references and personnel networks to
gather information on potential candidates;
gentlemen's  agreement on filling certain  positions with  local  Swiss
employees as part of local informal networks;
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local internship programmes and local HR marketing at universities,
locally designed process at US4 since US predictive index did not
work well in Europe
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects: 
Host country effect:
disciplining  effect  of  the  highly  dynamic  and  competitive  Swiss  labour
market;
great importance of employer image to attract promising candidates
- effects are not only visible in recruitment, but also in efforts for retention
Host country effect: 
reference-checking and importance of employment certificates, role
of personnel networks to gather information on candidates and to fill
positions,
internship  programmes as  a  means to  get  in  touch  early  on with
potential  young  talents  (US5)  which  is  important  on  the  highly
competitive Swiss labour market
 
Compensation 
and benefits, 
wage increases
Conservative pay policy at D7,
Local adaptations of global systems and processes
wage  increases  often  negotiated  or  discussed  with  local  personnel
commission
Strong local benchmarking,
local adaptations of global systems and processes
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects: 
Conservative pay policy at D7 as country-of-origin effect linked to local
German labour market at HQ and practice of life-long employment
If policy is global or local is linked to whether the labour market segment is
local, regional or rather international;
Host country effect:
involvement of local personnel commissions in wage negotiations on plant
level corresponds to typical Swiss patterns
use  of  deep  embeddedness  in  local  trust-based  networks  to  obtain
information on local pay policies and wage levels
strong disciplining effect of highly dynamic and competitive Swiss labour
market
Country-of-origin effect:
Generally strong focus on market competitive compensation that is
ensured through strong benchmarking – in line with earlier findings
on US MNCs in other host countries
no involvement of personnel commissions in local wage negotiations
possibly due to U.S. unilateral style
Host country effect:
use of deep embeddedness in local trust-based networks to obtain
information on local pay policies and wage levels
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- effects are not only visible in comp&ben, but also in efforts for retention
Membership in 
local Swiss 
associations 
and networks
Sustained  membership  in  local  associations,  multiple  collaborative
practices;
engagement in regional joint training schemes
Sustained  membership  in  local  associations  and  deep
embeddedness  in  local  networks  especially  in  the  Lake  Geneva
region,  multiple  forms  of  collaboration  between  firms  and  local
authorities
Key influences and effects: Key influences and effects:
Country-of-origin effect:
German MNCs are able to engage in high trust relations and to capitalise
on membership in local networks and social capital that are present in
Switzerland – one specific way of doing so is their active participation in
joint training schemes
Host country effect:
joint  training  schemes  as  an  example  for  the  competitive  provision  of
supports or collective competition goods on a sub-national level
agency:
ad-hoc network formation to do lobbying on a cantonal level concerning
residence and work permits for short-term international mobility (US5)
Host-country-effect:
local network formation of US MNCs follows patterns of a typically
Swiss institutional rationality
the use of, or access to, this resource requires deep embeddedness
in local personnel networks, which is often assured by local Swiss
employees
agency:
gaining legitimacy as a good corporate citizen through contributing to
cantonal political aims (e.g. diversity, sustainability) in publicly visible
ways – all this in close cooperation with local authorities based on
informal personal networks and mutual obligations
subversive strategists use local networks as valuable resource for the
benefit of their company, but also to achieve information asymmetries
that can be used to strengthen their own position in negotiations with
local authorities or corporate HQ
Source: own compilation based on interview transcript analysis and literature review
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PART V: CONCLUSION
Chapter 9 Discussion and conclusion
The present investigation has taken an institutionalist approach to address the issue of the cross-
national transfer of HRM practices in MNCs. The latter has been considered as the outcome of a
complex  interplay  of  various  influences  and  effects  on  the  institutional  macro-  and  on  the
organizational  micro-level  (Almond et  al. 2005;  Barmeyer  and  Davoine  2011;  Edwards et  al.
2007b; Edwards and Ferner 2002). According to suggestions of Tempel and Walgenbach (2007), the
national  business  systems  approach  and  new  institutionalism have  been  combined  in  order  to
increase the explanatory power of our theoretical foundations. Furthermore, company-level factors
(Rees and Edwards 2006a; Taylor et al. 1996) and recent contributions on the issue of power and
agency (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2011; Ferner et al. 2012) have been integrated into our
conceptual framework for research into cross-national HRM practice transfer. 
Following calls for an expansion of research on further host countries (Tempel et al. 2005: 196), our
analysis focused on an in-depth analysis of the Swiss national business system in order to uncover
and  understand  Swiss  host  country  effects,  and  their  influence  on  international  HRM practice
transfer. In order to find out about these effects, we compared Swiss affiliates of German and US
American MNCs that are embedded in two different ideal types of business system, where original
and distinct HRM practices have developed. In the following sections, we will take up and discuss
key findings of this investigation. 
9.1 Key findings on the Swiss business system and host country effects
Our first research question concerned the Swiss host country business system, and the effects of its
institutional setting on HRM practice transfer in foreign MNC subsidiaries. Our in-depth theoretical
analysis  of the Swiss business system revealed that it  may clearly be placed into the group of
collaborative business systems, with heavy emphasis on an associative mode of social  order or
“private interest government” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 128). At the same time though, there are
very few institutional  constraints  on HRM and IR that  would  result  from coercive  isomorphic
pressures. Especially the Swiss system of IR and the labour market are very liberal and formally
provide firms with great room for manoeuvre in these fields to make their own strategic choices.
Our analysis revealed that the Swiss national business system is marked by a particular mixture of
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institutional features that make it flexible and permissive (Tempel 2001: 52) in terms of IR, while at
the same time holding a large variety of institutional supports or props (Edwards and Rees 2006d:
92) for firms. While leaving firms with great room for manoeuvre in terms of their HR and IR
practices,  we found that the underlying institutional rationality (Ferner et  al. 2012: 167) of the
Swiss business system clearly is one of a host country setting that demands for collaboration (Saka-
Helmhout  and Geppert  2011:  573–574).  Surely,  the  most  evident  institutional  props  present  in
Switzerland are the infrastructures for an encompassing system of initial dual VET that is similar to
the German one. As we have seen, one further interesting kind of support on a sub-national level are
collaborative joint training schemes like Aprentas in the greater Basel area. Such structures, where
firms  cooperate  on  a  local  or  regional  level  even  with  their  direct  competitors,  allow for  the
realization of scale effects, and hence, firms may achieve dramatic cost reductions for apprentice
training.  Moreover,  the  example  of  Aprentas  has  shown,  that  collective  competition  goods
(Heidenreich 2012: 550) are provided locally. Further training for smaller-sized local firms who do
not  dispose of their  own training programmes and facilities  is  one concrete example of such a
collective competition good.
The results of our empirical investigation largely confirmed the flexible and formally permissive
character of the Swiss business system and its expected effects on the transfer of HRM practices.
Our interviewees confirmed that HR managers enjoy large room for manoeuvre when implementing
standardized processes and practices in their  subsidiaries.  As distinct  from Germany or France,
Swiss  HR  managers  do  rarely  come  along  legal  constraints  or  obligations  to  negotiate  the
introduction of new practices and processes like performance appraisal systems or corporate codes
of conduct with local stakeholders. Thus, also in practice, firms are fairly free concerning their
strategic choices in terms of HRM practices as well as the management of their employment- and
industrial relations in Switzerland. 
The only field where we could find coercive isomorphic pressures that have an effect on HRM is in
the area that we called legal-administative HR issues. Swiss contract law has to be respected just as
legal obligations to contribute to health and social insurance schemes as well  as pension plans.
Furthermore,  firms have to  comply with local  tax  regimes.  In  this  latter  case,  the  principle  of
decentralised  federal  state  organization  (Braun  2003)  is  manifest  in  the  reality  of tax  regime
competition between cantons and communities within Switzerland, hence illustrating once more the
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important role of the sub-national level of business systems. On the one hand, this form of internal
regime competition (Streeck 1991: 336) gives MNCs more power in negotiations with their canton.
However, on the other hand, the high complexity of 26 different tax regimes across Switzerland also
raises problems when firms have plants in several cantons. This complexity inevitably leads to
higher costs for tax software and specialised consultancy services. 
Further legal-administrative constraints in the field of IHRM are linked to the status of Switzerland
as  a  non-EU member state.  This  status has effects  that  are  locally perceived as  constraints  for
international mobility,  especially when third country nationals are involved. Quotas and various
obligations  and  restrictions  for  international  project  workers  have  been  highlighted  by  several
interviewees,  and  are  seen  with  a  critical  eye.  Restrictions  for  HRM  that  arise  from non-EU
membership concern the obligation to obtain residence and work permits, and complications with
mobility  of  non-EU project  workers  between Switzerland  and other  countries  of  the  European
Union. In case of D5, such local constraints on mobility have led to the outcome that Switzerland
could  not  be  included in  the  international  shared  service  structure.  Furthermore,  following  the
referendum of February 2014, where the Swiss population voted for the introduction of quotas for
EU-citizens who wish to live and work in Switzerland, all the bilateral agreements with the EU are
at stake. It remains to be seen how foreign as well as domestic MNCs in Switzerland will react to
this  great measure of uncertainty,  where currently EU market access and the free movement of
people are at risk.
However, we have also seen that highly business-friendly local administrations are very receptive to
local business needs and often succeed in finding tailor-made solutions to such problems, which is
regularly  achieved  in  direct  collaboration  with  the  businesses  concerned.  The  generally  low
regulatory density in Switzerland opens up fairly large room for manoeuvre and negotiation with
authorities, and for case-by-case decisions and solutions. Here, local personal networks are key to
our  understanding  of  the  functioning  of  local  administrations  in  the  Swiss  people-networking
society (Avery et al. 1999: 22), and local managers are highly aware of this fact. 
This approach of negotiating individual solutions, while respecting the basic principles defined by a
flexible legal framework, may be seen against the background of our theoretical discussion. As we
have seen, there is a recent shift away from government with centralised imperative coordination
towards governance with its emphasis on societal guidance strategies (Jessop 1993). Similar to the
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case of Germany (Almond 2011b: 533), the evidence collected in our investigation suggests that
also  the  Swiss  state  arrangement  predates  recent  economic  shifts  towards  governance  and  the
growth in  importance of sub-national  levels (Boggs and Rantisi  2003).  In the Swiss case then,
geographical  closeness  is  not  only  highly  supportive  of  “geographically  specific  inter-firm
relations” (Lane and Wood 2009: 543), but also of geographically specific relations between firms
and  local  authorities.  In  this  context,  the  utterly  high  degree  of  sub-national  business  system
autonomy in Switzerland  de facto seems to positively affect sub-national host embeddedness of
MNCs (Almond 2011b: 542).
On the other hand, changing to the micro-level and agency, as we have seen, the near absence of
institutional coercion deprives local HR managers of institutional power resources that they might
use to block the transfer of undesired practices or other forms of HQ interference. In such cases,
Swiss managers  need to adopt  different strategies  and draw on  other types of locally available
power resources. And this is where local embeddedness and networking once again come into play.
In  fact,  except  for  the  expatriates,  all  our  interviewees  were  members  of  local  professional
associations  and deeply embedded in  local  trust-based,  personal  networks.  Within  these  highly
collaborative  networks,  HR professionals  regularly  exchange  information  on a  large  variety of
issues including, inter alia, local wage levels and experiences with certain IT systems, benefits paid
by, and HR practices of, competitors. In this way, they create information asymmetries that can be
used in their negotiations with local administrations as well as HQ, just in the sense of “micro-
politics of information-shaping” (Morgan and Kristensen 2006: 1478). Such an edge in information
may very well be interpreted as a particular form of locally available resource, where access is
conditional on local embeddedness, and hence, on membership in clubs (Meyer et al. 2011: 287).
Theoretically,  the  recent  contribution  of  Dörrenbächer  and  Gammelgaard  (Dörrenbächer  and
Gammelgaard 2011) helps us to better understand and interpret different kinds of power resources
and their use in practice. The kind of information obtained through membership in local Swiss clubs
may be considered as  micro-political  bargaining power. In our empirical investigation,  we have
seen several  examples  of  how such information  is  skilfully  used  for  instance  to  obtain  higher
benefits for ones' own employees in negotiations with HQ, based on the argument that this is what
local competitors do. Especially in case of European HQ, information obtained from other MNCs
on their experiences with certain practices or delivery channels may be used to argue for, or against,
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further standardization initiatives in negotiations with HQ. 
As we have seen, in several cases of Swiss subsidiaries, micro-political bargaining power is further
combined with resource-dependent power. The latter is particularly found where local subsidiaries
control  further  resources  like  market  access  and  market  knowledge,  or  again,  membership  in
innovative networks. Therefore, this kind of power is especially relevant where local subsidiaries
are cultivating the local Swiss market, as for example in case of D5 or D9.since market access is
often obtained through personal networks of local employees.
Finally, as far as institutional power is concerned, even if there are utterly few coercive isomorphic
pressures  that  may  be  used  to  shield  the  subsidiary  against  HQ  interference,  our  empirical
investigation has shown that this is only one part of the picture. Our evidence suggests that local
managers still effectively perform the important task of insider exegesis of subtle and tacit cognitive
and normative elements of the Swiss institutional context (Ferner et al. 2012: 174). Dacin et al.
(1999: 324) have argued that institutional contexts influence on strategic choices by shaping “what
is possible and advantageous”. Our empirical investigation has shown that in Switzerland, subtle
and tacit cognitive and normative elements play a central role to understand “the real pattern of life”
(Streeck and Thelen 2005: 14) under seemingly permissive rules. The law of multiple encounters in
life (Weibler and Wunderer 2007: 283) and other forms of social control (Broussolle 2009: 292) are
important elements for an understanding of HRM practices under Swiss institutions. Just like the
labour  peace  agreement  (Aubert  2005:  150–151),  also  many  other  Swiss  HRM  practices  or
outcomes such as stable employment relations, cooperative and trust-based relations between social
partners, between firms or between firms and local authorities, are rather socio-cultural than legal
phenomenons.  Nevertheless,  as  we  have  seen,  the  presence  of  strong  social  (Davoine  2005;
Durkheim 1997; Streeck 1997a: 202) instead of legal constraints does not imply, that in reality,
managers would be free to do whatever they want. This kind of  normative control, which is also
reflected in embedded managerial norms and beliefs about what constitutes desirable outcomes of
practices  (Almond  2011a:  258-259,  265),  is  highly effective  in  Switzerland,  and  points  to  the
particular  importance  of  normative  isomorphic  pressures.  These  are  strongly  felt  by  HR
professionals,  especially together  with pressures from a very dynamic local  labour  market  that
provides employees with the exit option (Meardi 2007: 511–512; Meardi et al. 2009: 508), if they
are not happy with their employer. 
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Furthermore, we also found strong support in our interviews for suggestions about stronger local
embeddedness and career orientations of managers in collaborative environments (Kristensen and
Morgan 2007, 2006). In this respect, we would suggest that such long-term local embeddedness is a
strong mechanism that allows normative control to work effectively in practice. As we have seen in
our interview with the Swiss US3 plant manager, his socialised rationality and  local embeddedness
led him to sell the locally important issue of apprentice training to divisional HQ back in the U.S.
again and again. In our thought experiment, this same manager also told that he would do whatever
he could to avoid local layoffs, while he was sure that arguments about local impacts would not be
heard back at U.S. HQ, and that U.S. expatriates wouldn't hesitate neither to execute decisions of
this kind. In fact, a typical expatriate leaves the region after a certain while to pursue his corporate
career on another site, whereas a locally embedded manager wishes to stay there. Thus, he regularly
meets the people he laid off, their family members and friends. In such circumstances, it is not
difficult to imagine the extent of social pressure that can be put on local Swiss managers not only by
their employees, but also by unionists and the local press. Equally, the US4 HR director at European
HQs was utterly anxious to assure the long-term internal competitiveness of the Swiss site, since he
considered this  to  be important  for the long-term economic well-being of his  canton where he
wished to stay. 
We have discussed mechanisms of social control as linked to the existence of informal institutions,
since the latter usually refer to unwritten socially shared rules that are created, communicated, and
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). The concrete
examples found in our interview material provide rich illustration of the working of such informal
institutions and associated unofficial sanctioning mechanisms in Swiss society.
Concerning the formally permissive Swiss context, we may therefore conclude in allusion to Dacin
et al. (1999: 324), that  not everything what is possible is also advantageous. The subtle and tacit
cognitive and normative aspects of Swiss institutions are interpreted by local Swiss actors in ways
that lead to outcomes that might otherwise rather be expected in highly regulated environments.
Therefore, our findings lend further strong support to arguments about the impossibility of reading
off transfer outcomes from institutional distance (Tempel et al. 2005: 188) or from the institutional
setting alone (Redding 2005: 124). In this respect, the case of Switzerland shows that this argument
is  relevant  not  only for  formally constraining institutional  settings  like the German one,  where
actors where still able to find considerable room for manoeuvre or to avoid contents, but also the
466
9.1 Key findings on the Swiss business system and host country effects
other  way around.  In  Switzerland,  local  HRM practices  cannot  simply be  read  off  a  formally
permissive  institutional  framework,  since  the  latter  is  enacted  through  actors  whose  socialised
rationality (Almond 2011a: 260) or rationale (Redding 2005: 126, 136) and institutional choice
(Bluhm 2001: 156) are heavily influenced by cognitive and normative interpretations of what is
desirable.  Therefore,  in  Switzerland,  local  institutional  pressures  that  lead to  the adoption  of  a
pluralist  HRM approach  (Müller 1999b: 140)  are not coercive,  yet  utterly present in cognitive-
normative elements like the concept of social partnership, a balanced stakeholder philosophy, and
the merit of collaborative, trust-based relations. 
9.2 Key findings concerning German MNCs
Our second research question was about how, and in what ways, German and U.S. country-of-origin
effects would influence these MNCs' ways of relating to the Swiss host country institutional setting
(Morgan 2007: 139) which is at the same time flexible, and demands for collaboration.
Concerning German MNCs, originating from an institutionally dense environment, the argument
has been worded, that the latter would meet “differences of a different order” (Meardi et al. 2009:
491) depending on where they intended to transfer country-of-origin practices. To our knowledge,
this is the first comparative institutionalist investigation where the host country to German MNC
affiliates is another collaborative business system that holds strikingly similar institutional supports
as for example in the field of dual VET (Edwards and Rees 2006d: 92; Streeck 1997b: 243-244,
252; Tempel 2001: 64, 66). In our comparative in-depth analysis of the German and Swiss NBSs,
we  have  seen  that  there  are  important  similarities  in  certain  areas.  These  are  reflecting  an
institutional  rationality  that  is  marked  by  cooperation,  associative  coordination  and  social
partnership. Furthermore, our literature review of earlier comparative institutionalist investigations
of German MNCs in other host countries allowed for the formulation of more concrete expectations
about  typical  German  country-of-origin  effects,  and  the  approach  towards  transfer  of  German
MNCs. In the following, we will conclude on key findings in two steps. A first subsection will sum
up our collected evidence on German MNCs' HR architecture and approaches towards transfer, and
a second one will report our findings on specific ways of relating to the Swiss institutional context.
9.2.1 German MNCs' HR architecture and approaches towards transfer
As based on the extant literature, we expected German MNCs to be more decentralised concerning
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HRM and IR (Ferner and Varul 2000a: 132, 2000b: 89; Guest and Hoque 1996: 64, 69) and to adopt
rather subtle  and selective approaches towards transfer,  including differentiation by choice,  and
hence, non-transfer of practices that are related to co-determination (Bluhm 2001; Dickmann 2003:
279; Dörrenbächer 2004; Tempel 2001: 56; Tüselmann et al. 2006: 69).  
Our evidence shows important differences in our sample between two groups of German MNCs. 
A first  group consisting  of  six  MNCs did  not  correspond to  the  traditional  German pattern  as
described  in  the  extant  literature  concerning  their  overall  HRM  architecture  and  degree  of
standardization. In fact, for this group of organizations, our evidence indicates that many German
MNCs have further developed towards greater degrees of centralization and standardization around
HR core processes, as this was expected to be notably the case for US MNCs. In this first group of
German MNCs, we could not find evidence of higher degrees of local adaptation or freedom in
terms of HRM compared to their U.S. counterparts. This is especially true for HRM practices with
high degrees of integration, and consequently, great need for internal HR consistency (Evans et al.
2002: 55). The overall high level of standardization of HRM practices and processes in the areas of
performance management,  personnel development,  and training for more senior-level managers,
may be seen against this background.
Concerning these  standardized  practices,  our  empirical  investigation revealed  evidence  of  both,
continuing Anglo-Saxon influence in the field of HRM, as well as sustained German country-of-
origin influence.  As we have seen,  nearly all  German MNCs of our sample have implemented
performance  management  systems  as  an  Anglo-Saxon  innovation  in  HRM.  Yet,  global  system
design as well as implementation and operation of these systems by German managers continued to
be  heavily  influenced  by  German  institutional  rationality.  Notably  works  councils  and  co-
determination as one of the most  important  institutions of the German labour  market  could be
identified as central influences. This finding hence confirms earlier evidence of Ferner et al. (2001:
115), and also explains why in many areas such as performance appraisal, different practices are in
place for the two categories of tariff employees and exempts, since in the latter case, works council
influence is much weaker. 
Also in the field of diversity management, about half of the German MNCs of our sample had
defined some diversity policy as another HRM practice that has its origins in the U.S. However, in
most cases, the content of these practices heavily focuses on gender equality. Moreover, taking into
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consideration the current political and social pressure in this area in Germany, it does not seem
completely mistaken to assume that gender equality policies of German firms under the label of
diversity are rather a means of gaining social legitimacy, and to improve the employer image, than
anything else. The institutional dynamic underlying the definition of diversity practices in Germany,
where there is no explicit legal framework in place in this field, is completely different from the one
in the U.S., where this area is highly regulated and legally enforced. As we will see below, also in
the area of corporate culture, our evidence suggests that despite the formal adoption of Anglo-Saxon
style corporate values, apparently the underlying different German notion of  Unternehmenskultur
seems to persist (Eberwein and Tholen 1993; Ferner et al. 2001: 114; Wächter et al. 2003: 82).
Especially the case of D2 revealed direct U.S. influence on the restructuring of its  HR system
architecture, since this project was carried out together with a U.S. consultancy firm. This finding
directly confirms the important role of consultancy firms and other “institutional entrepreneurs”
(Tempel  and Walgenbach 2007:  11)  who legitimize organizational  forms and practices,  thereby
contributing to their global diffusion through normative and mimetic isomorphism. As we have seen
earlier, some research has already been undertaken in this field (Kipping 1996, 1997; Kipping et al.
2004; Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). Thus, our evidence
lends further strong support to the argument worded by Tempel and Walgenbach (2007: 11), that it
is  highly important to extend the borders of organizational fields through engagement in cross-
national research when investigating into MNCs.
Moreover, our findings on continued learning from U.S. models also lend further support to earlier
results showing that U.S. models are the strongest source of inspiration for German MNCs in the
field of HRM (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). 
However, based on the evidence of our sample, IR is an area that apparently still continues to be
more decentralised, even in this group of highly centralised and standardized German MNCs. At
least in our sample, neither could we find any evidence of a clearly defined anti-union stance as this
was the case in  many US MNCs, nor of clearly-defined policies  aiming at  a direct  transfer  of
country-of-origin practices. Yet, German institutional rationality and norms of social partnership
show through in the overall approaches of German MNCs towards IR and ER. Here, local patterns
were followed and collective agreements signed for blue-collar workers, and representative bodies
were integrated as social partners on plant level in several cases. This localization of practices in the
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field of IR also applies to the two large and highly standardized MNCs D1 and D2. This finding
may also be seen against the background of differences within the German NBS. As we have seen,
greater firms were found to follow the traditional German model in IR more closely, showing higher
rates of collective bargaining coverage and unionisation (Schnabel 2006: 170; van Klaveren and
Tijdens 2011: 68), and more cooperative attitudes of management (Bluhm 2001: 166–167) than
smaller ones. On the other hand, the case of D6 does not seem to fit into this picture, since our D6
Switzerland interviewee did not report any relations with unions or collective agreements to be in
place. In this case, we might speculate whether this practice is due to the fact that D6 is active in the
service sector, or whether it is the outcome of a purposeful strategic choice to make use of the
permissiveness of the Swiss IR system. 
Yet, in other HRM areas, the degree of standardization and willingness to transfer was similarly
high as in US MNCs, and the group of standardized German MNCs equally made heavy use of
procedural channels to transfer standard processes and practices towards Switzerland.
The other group of German MNCs showed still greater degrees of local freedom in the area of
HRM.  Though,  it  is  arguable  whether  this  lower  degree  of  standardization  is  attributable  to
persisting  country-of-origin  influence,  or  rather  due  to  corporate-level  factors,  and  hence,
organizational effects. As we have seen in our discussion, D3 and D9 are rather small MNCs with a
more recent history of internationalization. Furthermore, the Swiss subsidiary of D9 is a brownfield
plant and only partially owned by the D9 group. In these MNCs, international conduits in HR do
not  yet  exist,  or are still  underdeveloped,  and hence,  transfer is  a priori  restricted due to their
current HR architecture. In case of D4, we have seen that a long company history of mergers and
acquisitions has led to de facto fairly different organizational cultures in every plant, which deprives
the MNC of an important indirect transfer mechanism. Even more important for our understanding
of this case is the configuration of the international value chain of the power engineering division
that  we  could  access,  and  the  nature  of  their  products.  In  this  D4  division,  every  plant  is  a
specialised contributor of complementary skills to the production of highly customized products.
Under  such  conditions,  the  potential  for  efficiency gains  through  the  introduction  of  standard
processes and practices is hence fairly reduced. 
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Our empirical evidence revealed still another important difference between German and US MNCs
concerning the use of indirect transfer mechanisms. The fact that all the German MNCs of our
sample, including the least standardized ones like D3, had formally defined a code of conduct and
corporate  values,  may  be  interpreted  as  another  manifestation  of  U.S.  influence  or  Anglo-
Saxonization.  As we have seen,  the intensive use of corporate culture as a management tool is
widespread among US MNCs (Ferner et  al. 2004a:  117),  and may be  viewed as  an  important
indirect transfer mechanism. On the other hand, in German MNCs, the notion of corporate culture is
traditionally more  associated  with  an organic  whole  that  has  grown over  decades,  than  with  a
management tool (Eberwein and Tholen 1993; Ferner et al. 2001: 114; Wächter et al. 2003: 82). We
found some evidence suggesting that the formal adoption of tools aimed at cultural engineering
(Alvesson 2002: 47–48) such as formally defined corporate values and codes of conduct in German
MNCs does not always seem to work as an effective indirect transfer mechanism in practice. Our
findings suggest lower degrees of internalization and functionality of formal cultural engineering
initiatives when compared to US MNCs, as for example in case of D6. Apart from the differences in
cognitive concepts associated with the notion of corporate culture, especially in case of transfer of
corporate codes of conduct, we also highlighted the less thorough implementation of these tools in
German MNCs when compared to their U.S. counterparts. However, as we have seen, several of the
German MNCs are nevertheless marked by a strong corporate culture. Yet, the latter seems to be
rather transferred through German expatriates than through formal values and codes of conduct.
Based on our limited empirical evidence, it is not possible to claim that there is clear evidence of a
generally more sustained use of expatriates for the transfer of concrete HRM practices in German
MNCs. Though, our results however suggest that expatriates might play a more important part as a
people-based channel to transfer tacit knowledge and corporate culture in German MNCs.
9.2.2 German MNCs' ways of relating to the Swiss institutional context and HRM 
practices
The second aspect of how German MNCs relate to the Swiss host country institutional context now
concerns particular HRM practices. In this respect, we expected German MNCs to be marked by a
mindset reflecting a cooperative, consensual style in IR (Dickmann 2003; Ferner et al. 2001: 109),
including some more use of collective, representative channels, that might be combined with direct
communication channels to dualistic approaches (Tüselmann et al. 2006: 75). Furthermore, based
on the literature on German career patterns and empirical findings of previous investigations on
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transfer, we estimated to find some manifestation of long-term developmental HR with an emphasis
on training and acquisition of technical competence (Ferner et al. 2001: 116) and a focus on internal
functional careers (Barmeyer and Davoine 2008: 11; Calori and Dufour 1995: 68; Evans et al. 2002:
376–377; Glunk et al. 1997: 99; Kristensen 2003). In view of the strikingly similar Swiss system of
dual VET, where all necessary institutional supports are readily available to German MNCs, we
expected  the  latter  to  engage  with  much  ease  in  apprentice  training  in  Switzerland.  Though,
considering the fact that apprentice training may be done not only for rational-economic, but also
for social reasons, we were also eager to find out about German MNCs' reasons for, or against,
engagement in dual VET. Finally, based on arguments worded by Kostova  et al. (2008: 999), we
tried  to  find  out  whether  and  how German  and  US  MNCs  would  engage  in  symbolic  image
building, and which sources of legitimacy they would use locally. 
Our first set of propositions concerned a cooperative style in IR, and the possibility of individual
high  involvement  work  systems  being  merged  with  traditional  collective  and  representative
channels. On the one hand, our evidence suggests that overall managerial styles seem to be rather
negotiated than unilateral (Wever 1995) with HQ being fairly open to collective representation and
negotiations with unions. Furthermore, in none of our German case study MNCs we found signs for
sustained industrial conflict. On the other hand, we found some important differences in German
MNCs'  use  of  representative  channels  and  collective  agreements.  As  we  have  seen  in  our
discussion, there are several reasons for attributing such differences rather to micro-level factors
than to macro-institutional country-of-origin or host county effects. Especially the two cases of D1
and D2 were revealing in this  respect,  since these MNCs have different  kinds of operations  in
Switzerland. In this way, we could check for different kinds of practices in IR and ER, according to
the kind of operations and workforce they employed in Switzerland. In production plants with blue-
collar workers, collective agreements where in place, whereas in international sites with managerial
functions and white-collar employees, this was not the case. Some German MNCs as D5 did not
have any kind of personnel commission, nor did they report any relations with unions or strike
collective  agreements.  Yet,  once  again,  having  a  look  at  the  kind  of  activities  performed  and
employees working on these sites, it would be rather a surprise to find such practices in a subsidiary
that mainly performs distribution, service and consulting activities. At the same time, in two thirds
of our sample of German MNCs, standardized employee surveys were in place. This evidence from
Switzerland thus lends some further support to earlier arguments about dualistic models in IR/ER
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among German MNCs based on findings in the UK (Tüselmann et al. 2006). Another interesting
aspect is the fact that in those five German subsidiaries where a personnel commission was in place,
the  latter  was  included  as  a  social  partner  for  example  in  wage  negotiations,  thus  following
traditional Swiss patterns of social partnership. 
As far as long-term developmental HR with an emphasis on the acquisition of technical competence
and  internal  functional  careers  are  concerned,  our  empirical  evidence  strongly  supports
propositions about a relevant country-of-origin effect in this domain. In fact, we could find evidence
of internal career patterns that were often coupled with strongly structured technical trainings. Thus,
our  data  suggest  that  career  progression  in  German  MNCs  does  not  exclusively  depend  on
individual performance,  but is also conditional on the acquisition of technical competence.  The
latter, in turn, is acquired through long-term personnel development involving structured training
curricula and expatriation. Furthermore, internal labour markets of German MNCs appeared to be
more organized in a top-down manner than in US MNCs, which may be attributable to the more
structured approaches towards career development practices. Therefore, the market logic seems to
be by far less present on German internal labour markets, and the practice of nominating candidates
to new positions appears to be more widespread, what we have termed “passive” careers.
Referring to engagement in dual VET, our empirical results show that eight out of nine German
MNCs of our sample train apprentices, thus lending strong support to our theoretical proposition.
Furthermore,  two of  the  German MNCs were actively participating  in  a  regional  joint  training
scheme, and hence, capitalising on local embeddedness and locally available resources. Concerning
apprentice training, it is furthermore interesting to see that this is also done in affiliates with an
international  orientation,  or  with  operations  where  other  qualifications  than  apprenticeships  are
required. In this respect, we could find evidence of direct country-of-origin influence as in case of
D2 international, but also of purely social reasons underlying the engagement in apprentice training
as  in  case  of  D5.  Still  others  like  D9 had both,  rational-economic  and social  reasons  to  train
apprentices. We found strong support for the suggestion that social reasons to train apprentices in
Switzerland are  directly  related  to  local  concepts  of  corporate  social  responsibility,  and hence,
linked to the issue of symbolic image building.
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Therefore, one way in which German MNCs engage in symbolic image building in Switzerland is
their engagement in dual VET. A further source of legitimacy used by German MNCs may be seen
in following Swiss patterns of social partnership with the inclusion of personnel commissions as we
have seen above. Yet, the most interesting case of symbolic image building of a German MNC is
probably D1, where local management deliberately opted for union inclusion and negotiation of a
generous social plan as an accompanying measure for a mass layoff that they had to implement. As
we have seen, such an approach may be influenced by both, Swiss as well as German institutional
rationality.  Though,  our  interviewee emphasized  the  fact  that  D1 as  a  German firm was  more
generous than Swiss firms normally would be.  He explained this  attitude by the fact  that  such
layoffs are much more expensive in Germany, and that this was the frame of reference for German
HQ. 
9.3 Key findings concerning US MNCs
Having resumed our  most  important  findings  on  German county-of-origin  effects  and ways  of
relating to the Swiss host country institutional setting, we will now turn to our results on US MNCs.
As  we have  seen,  US MNCs are  embedded  in  a  compartmentalised  business  system which  is
loosely  regulated  and  does  not  provide  a  large  variety  of  institutional  supports  to  domestic
organizations.  Concerning  the  underlying  institutional  rationality  of  the  compartmentalised  US
NBS,  we  could  identify  a  pervasive  market  mentality  (Hollingsworth  1997b)  and  operational
flexibility (Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011: 573–574) as key elements. US MNCs may be viewed
as isolated hierarchies (Whitley 2000a: 76,  85, 2000b: 859, 2008) that have grown in a highly
competitive U.S. business environment,  that is marked by arm's length contractual relationships
(Redding 2005: 142). Therefore, it was interesting to see how these organizations would relate to
the Swiss NBS that demands for collaboration (Saka-Helmhout and Geppert 2011: 573–574). Our
literature review of earlier investigations on US MNCs in different host countries allowed for the
formulation  of  concrete  propositions  concerning  their  approaches  towards  transfer,  and  typical
HRM  practices  that  had  already  been  observed  in  other  host  settings.  In  the  following  two
subsections,  we  will  sum  up  our  most  important  evidence  and  findings  on  US  MNCs'  HR
architecture and approaches towards transfer, and specific ways of relating to the Swiss institutional
context in terms of particular HRM practices.
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9.3.1 US MNCs' HR architecture and approaches towards transfer
Based  on  our  literature  review,  we  expected  US  MNCs  to  be  marked  by  high  degrees  of
centralization, formalization and standardization (Almond 2011a: 261; Edwards et al. 2010: 615;
Ferner et  al. 2004b),  and to  rely heavily on procedural  channels  for  transfer.  Furthermore,  we
expected US MNCs to show a pronounced willingness to transfer country-of-origin HRM practices.
This strong willingness was explained by the dominant systemic position of the U.S. (Ferner et al.
2004b: 367; Tüselmann et al. 2008: 1625), and by a tradition of parochial, inward-looking HRM
(Dowling  1999:  37;  Ferner et  al. 2004b:  378).  Moreover,  the  fact  that  many US MNCs  have
developed HR bundles  in  the  liberal  environment  of  their  country-of-origin  NBS (Schuler  and
Jackson 2005: 20) strongly demands for the transfer of standard corporate practices in order to
maintain internal  consistency (Evans et  al. 2002:  48).  In  line with these considerations,  earlier
research  also  suggested  that  foreign  subsidiaries  of  US  MNCs  usually  had  lower  degrees  of
autonomy and discretion in HR policy formulation than those of other nationalities (Ferner et al.
2011: 495).
Our empirical evidence largely confirmed the typical U.S. pattern described in the extant literature
concerning  overall  HR  architecture  and  approaches  towards  transfer,  although  with  the  two
remarkable  exceptions  of  US1  and  US10.  Confirming  our  expectations,  in  our  analysis  of
organizational characteristics, we found evidence of high levels of centralization, and comparatively
low degrees of local freedom left to subsidiaries in the field of HRM and IR. In case of US4, the
level of centralization was even felt to be as high as to significantly reduce the potential for local or
regional innovation and reverse transfer of practices. Our analysis of the transfer process confirmed
that  formalization and standardization were regularly and heavily used as direct mechanisms and
procedural  transfer  channels.  In  this  way,  especially  standard  processes were  heavily  used  to
transfer mostly country-of origin practices. In several US MNCs of our sample, also the transfer
process itself was strongly formalised and formally tracked. Concerning people-based and indirect
transfer  mechanisms,  we found very few evidence  of  expatriates  playing a  role  in  transferring
specific HRM practices. However, consonant with findings of earlier investigations, we collected
strong evidence of cultural engineering (Alvesson 2002: 47–48; Ferner et al. 2001: 114) and hence,
of sustained use of formal corporate culture and codes of conduct as indirect transfer mechanisms.
Our evidence suggests that corporate culture is regularly passed to employees through the use of
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formal instruments such as explicitly defined corporate values and codes of conduct,  which are
systematically trained and periodically examined. Within the scope and limitations of our multiple
case study, our collected evidence seems to suggest that expatriates play a much less important role
for socialization than the use of formal and structured trainings, policies and instruments, which
constitutes a major difference compared to German MNCs. The case of  US6, where an expatriate
director took control after acquisition to pass the corporate culture to the new plant, may be seen as
an  exception  in  this  respect.  Overall,  probably  linked  to  the  thoroughness  of  implementation,
explicit corporate values and principles defined in corporate codes of conduct appear to be more
internalised than this seemed to be the case in the German MNCs of our sample.
The cases of US1 and US10 are different from the other US MNCs of our sample concerning their
significantly lower degrees of centralization and standardization in terms of overall HR architecture
and practices. Consequently, in these two MNCs, we found that higher levels of local freedom in
HRM and IR were left to country subsidiaries than in the other cases. 
As we have seen, these two cases once more reveal the great importance of an  understanding of
organizational-level influences. Both, US1 and US10 are marked by a long history of mergers and
acquisitions of sizeable companies in foreign countries, which is generally not supportive of higher
levels of standardization. Moreover, in case of US1, local legal requirements and the necessity to be
close  to  local  clients  was  at  the  origin  of  a  deliberate  strategic  choice  not  to  further  integrate
international operations. 
At the same time, as we have seen, this choice does by no means exclude sustained international
exchange, and a basic harmonization of practices through the use of common policies, guidelines
and  frameworks  in  important  areas  such  as  performance  management  and  high  potential
development. International conduits in HRM on a European level were highly developed in both
these  MNCs.  While  in  the  federal  US1  organization,  a  sophisticated  network  structure  was
established  for  exchange  on  best  practices  and  harmonization  needs,  at  US10  the  recently
established European HQ structure plays a key role in this process. As these two cases show, when
highly integrated HRM practices are  concerned,  the need for internal consistency (Evans et  al.
2002: 48) apparently overrides the need for local adaptation (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994: 230)
even in these otherwise more decentralised US MNCs.
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9.3.2 US MNCs' ways of relating to the Swiss institutional context and HRM 
practices
As we have seen, in terms of their HR architecture, the US MNCs of our sample quite fit into the
pattern of highly formalised, standardized and centralised organizations that mostly show a strong
willingness to transfer country-of-origin HRM practices. The second aspect of their ways of relating
to  the  Swiss  host  country setting  now concerns  particular  HRM practices.  In  this  respect,  we
expected US MNCs to transfer notably sophisticated performance management systems (Ferner et
al. 2004b:  372)  with  calculative  HRM  practices  (Gooderham et  al. 1999:  507–510),  diversity
frameworks (Egan and Bendick. 2003; Ferner et al. 2005a; Wentling and Palma Rivas 2000), non-
union approaches together  with direct communication in IR and ER (Ferner et  al. 2004b:  365;
Wächter et al. 2003: 87), and strong corporate cultures (Ferner et al. 2001: 114). Yet, evidence from
Ireland suggested that US MNCs might as well use collective agreements in IR as a benchmark to
define their own conditions and position themselves above the mean level (Collings et al. 2008:
249). The latter practice has also been observed in Spain as part of preventive measures in order to
avoid  industrial  conflict  (Quintanilla et  al. 2004:  143–145;  Quintanilla et  al. 2008:  690).  Such
practices may be seen against the background of US unilateral managerial style (Wever 1995), and
hence,  the  desire  to  maintain  managerial  prerogative.  In  view of  locally  provided  institutional
supports, we asked if and how US MNCs would make use of the comprehensive Swiss system of
dual  VET,  and whether  they would  engage in  apprentice  training.  As in  case  of  their  German
counterparts, we also aimed to find out what sources of legitimacy they would use locally in order
to engage in symbolic image building (Kostova et al. 2008: 999). Another central question was how
US MNCs would deal with the  Swiss associational mode of coordination and local cooperative
practices, and hence, how they would respond to the Swiss host country demand for collaboration
(Saka-Helmhout  and Geppert  2011:  573–574).  This  question  was  particularly interesting,  since
evidence  from Germany as  another  collaborative  host  country showed that  US MNCs tried  to
actively exacerbate tendencies of the German system towards disarticulation (Singe and Croucher
2005: 123).
Our empirical evidence confirmed the presence of sophisticated performance management systems
with  a  strong  focus  on  individual  performance  against  targets.  One  interesting  element  that
distinguishes US MNCs from their German counterparts in this respect is the strong nexus between
performance  management  and  career  planning.  In  several  of  our  US  case  study  companies,
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individual  performance against  targets  could  be  clearly identified  as  the  single  most  important
criterion for career progression on internal labour markets. The latter appeared to be significantly
less  structured  and  organized  in  a  top-down manner  when  compared  to  German  MNCs.  This
emphasis on individual performance, together with a strong market logic underlying the functioning
of internal labour markets in US MNCs are at the basis of what we termed  active careers. Our
collected  evidence  suggests  that  on  such  internal  labour  markets,  the  practice  of  nominating
managers for new positions in a top-down manner is less common than in German MNCs. Thus,
employees in US MNCs have to take the initiative and candidate for new positions, and sell their
past performances on the internal labour market in order to advance, just as they would do on the
external labour market. A further interesting element concerned differences in the implementation
of performance management systems. While our evidence on German MNCs suggested that such
systems are implemented in a fairly soft manner, rather the contrary seems to be the case in US
MNCs. However, our interview with a British US5 expatriate revealed that even within a highly
centralised and standardized US MNC, local implementation of one and the same standard core
process like performance appraisal may differ significantly. In Switzerland, as in other European
countries  that  the  US5  expatriate  interviewee  came  to  know,  implementation  of  individual
performance appraisals and managerial style appears to be less harsh, and the control of figures is
significantly less frequent and important than this is the case in the same company at US HQ. These
differences  in implementation may be seen against  the background of differences  in  respective
embedded managerial ideological norms (Almond 2011a: 265). In this way, a system rationality
evolving heavily around a market logic in the U.S. shows through on the individual level of single
managers and their ways of implementing practices. 
As far as  diversity frameworks are concerned, our findings are in line with suggestions from the
literature, since all  the US MNCs of our sample had some formal frameworks and practices in
place, with four out of ten having their diversity frameworks adapted to the the European context.
In the area of IR and ER, once again the US MNCs of our sample confirmed our literature-based
expectations, since none of them reported to entertain any kind of relation with unions, and all of
them had standardized employee surveys and other practices in place to strengthen direct,  non-
representative  communication  with  their  employees.  However,  against  the  background  of  our
findings on the German MNCs D1 and D2, we have to be careful with our interpretation of this
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evidence. In fact, it might very well be that there are some collective agreements in place for the
blue-collar production workers of US5 or US7. Yet, we could not gain access to these plants, and
our interviewees were not informed about these issues, so that we lack empirical evidence to more
clearly  establish  whether  there  is  a  general  strong  and  clear  country-of-origin  effect  showing
through, or if practices in IR might as well vary according to activities performed and classes of
employees in Switzerland. In any case, our evidence of US6, where a form of social partnership
with  a  weak  personnel  commission  was  voluntarily  established  by  local  management  as  a
preventive measure in  order to keep the plant union free, seems to indicate that also in Switzerland,
a strong anti-union stance including blue-collar workers and production operations might be the
norm among US MNCs.
Regarding dual VET, six out of ten US MNCs of our sample trained apprentices. While US3, US6
and US7 have production plants in Switzerland, and apprentices are trained at least  inter alia for
rational-economic reasons, our findings clearly showed that this is by no means the case for US5
and US9. Furthermore, the US3 plant manager regularly had to sell the issue of apprentice training
to divisional HQ, since back in the U.S., managers were not familiar with this training practice and
asked questions about the higher headcount. This case was illustrative for the presence of social
reasons behind apprentice training in Switzerland, which is seen as part of CSR. Though, translating
this local interpretation into something acceptable for U.S. managers, the US3 plant manager sold
the issue as an appropriate measure of symbolic image building in order to be locally seen as best
citizen. The case of US9 European HQ was even more revealing. In fact, in this European HQ
structure,  the  nature  of  tasks  performed,  and  the  need  for  English  language  skills  made
apprenticeships  a  widely  useless  form of  qualification  to  this  site.  Nevertheless,  the  local  HR
director  struck  an  informal  gentlemen's  agreement  with  the  cantonal  authorities,  where  mutual
obligations included the training of some apprentices per year. This finding hence shows a high
degree of local embeddedness of certain US MNCs in local informal and trust-based networks as
they are typical for Switzerland. Within these networks, legitimacy is negotiated directly with local
authorities and stakeholders. This evidence therefore gives direct empirical support to arguments
worded  by Kostova  et  al. (2008)  about  MNCs  gaining  legitimacy in  insufficiently  structured,
fragmented  organizational  fields  not  necessarily  through  local  isomorphism,  but  rather  through
negotiation.
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In fact, probably our most striking and unexpected finding on US MNCs in Switzerland concerns
their ways of dealing with the Swiss associational mode of coordination and host country demand
for collaboration. In this respect, our findings surprisingly stand in sharp contrast to suggestions of
Kristensen and Morgan (Kristensen and Morgan 2007: 201) who argued for US MNCs that “[e]ven
where such MNCs locate in an area because of its institutional competitiveness, the tendency is still
to look for quick returns and not to engage in long-term commitment and development of existing
institutional  advantages”.  Instead  of  trying  to  keep  out  of  local  networks  and  maintaining
organizational independence from outside actors as we would have expected US MNCs as isolated
hierarchies to act, many of them are deeply embedded in local trust-based networks. Moreover, a
group of locally long-established US MNCs even built up their own collaborative network, where
many local Swiss employees are actively engaged, and where we found evidence of a wealth of
collaborative practices. The latter included notably common benchmark studies on local wages and
exchange  on  benefits  between  competitors,  which  is  surprising  evidence  for  US MNCs.  Such
collaboration within trust-based local networks is a key element of Swiss institutional rationality or
rationale, and may hence be considered a host country effect. In fact, the practice of informal wage
coordination on employer side is a well-known Swiss practice in the field of IR (Flanagan 1999:
1152; Kenworthy 2003: 41; Soskice 1990: 41). While some form of wage coordination through
employers'  associations  was  expected  to  be  common practice  for  German  MNCs  known from
Germany,  for  US  MNCs,  this  use  of  local  networks  was  surprising.  In  fact,  as  expected,  HR
managers working in US MNCs told about wage benchmarking, but they also made additional use
of information from more informal  local  networks.  Apparently,  this  host country effect  is  even
strong  enough  to  prevail  over  opposed  influences.  Such  influences  might  have  arguably  been
expected to be present in US MNCs, since Almond (2011b: 542) reminds that “MNCs whose home
base is in a country with low-trust conventions may disrupt local conventions in host countries”. For
US MNCs that are embedded in a NBS where competitive intensity is extremely high, and contracts
as well as relations between market participants are usually arm's length (Ferner 2000a: 8; Ferner
and Müller-Camen 2004: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29–30; Redding 2005: 142), we would have
expected  information  on  wages  and  benefits  to  be  protected  from,  rather  than  shared  with,
competitor firms. Thus, although the US MNCs of our sample kept systematically out of collective
agreements and did not entertain any relations with unions, they are by no means isolated, and do
cooperate with various external actors in Switzerland.  We might consider this  behaviour of US
MNCs with their collaborative practices in Switzerland as another form of differentiation by choice.
480
9.3 Key findings concerning US MNCs
While this term has so far been used to describe the approach of German MNCs in less regulated
environments  like  the  UK  or  Eastern  Europe,  where  they  freed  themselves  from institutional
constraints, US MNCs in turn learnt how to benefit from collaborative practices in the Swiss host
country. This fits in quite well with arguments worded by Morgan (2007: 139) about MNCs that
might  “(...)  engage in  new ways  with  institutions,  local  firms  and  local  actors,  in  some cases
reshaping them, in others reinforcing them and in others undermining them”. What we found in
Switzerland actually seems to point to a reinforcement of local institutions, and to foreign MNCs
adapting to a host country institutional rationality with its demand for collaboration.  As we have
seen, intense information sharing in many different areas of HR and IR allowed locally established
MNCs to gain an edge in information for the benefit of their company and of their local subsidiary
in internal and external negotiations where it served as locally available power resource to locally
embedded actors.
A further country-of-origin effect referring to practices that have been transferred form the U.S.
towards Switzerland that we found in seven out of ten cases in our sample concerns standardized
practices and processes in the fields of safety, security and health. To our knowledge, such practices
have  not  yet  been  clearly  described  as  a  U.S.  county-of-origin  effect  in  the  extant  literature.
However, our evidence suggests that it may be worth to try and further corroborate these findings
from our sample in the future.
One last area where half of the US MNCs of our sample had some standard practices in place is the
field of CSR. Here, our evidence suggests that, in U.S. companies, there is a vision of CSR as a
business  case  underlying  corporate  approaches  and  practices  in  this  area,  which  is  not  always
readily accepted  in  Switzerland.  In  fact,  in  some cases  like  US6,  our  interviews  revealed  low
degrees of acceptance,  internalization and functionality of certain U.S. practices in this area.  In
certain cases, Swiss employees refused to do good things as a business case for their employer, but
rather showed personal engagement outside of their professional lives.
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9.4 Key findings on HRM practice transfer and different influences, theoretical 
and practical implications
As we  have  seen  in  our  summary of  key  findings  on  German  and  US MNCs,  our  integrated
conceptual  framework for  research  into  cross-national  transfer  of  HRM practices  proved to be
highly useful for several reasons. First, the distinction of macro-level institutional and micro-level
organizational effects was essential for our structured analysis and discussion of a large variety of
effects  on different  levels,  that  are  influencing on cross-national  HRM practice transfer.  In our
investigation, several examples illustrated the utmost importance to gain an understanding of key
organizational  characteristics  in  order  to  correctly  analyse  and  understand  MNCs'  approaches
towards cross-national HRM practice transfer. If such information is not sufficiently analysed, it is
highly probable that empirical findings are attributed to macro-level effects, which often appears to
be too simplistic. For example, when taking into account the organizational characteristics of our
group of German MNCs that are decentralised in terms of their HRM practices, it is probable at
least, that this decentralization is more due to organizational than to institutional country-of-origin
effects.
HRM practice  transfer  is  regularly susceptible  to multiple  influences  of  different  order,  as  for
example in case of German performance management systems. While the idea to implement such
systems is surely attributable to a U.S. dominance effect in the field of HRM, the way in which
these systems are designed, implemented and operated on a daily bases in German MNCs is subject
to German country-of-origin influences and the socialised rationality (Almond 2011a: 260) of single
managers. The concept of socialised rationality was also highly useful for our analysis of Swiss host
country influences and the interpretation of subtle, tacit cognitive and normative elements of the
local context by local Swiss managers.
Second,  the  distinction between procedural  and people-based channels  together  with direct  and
indirect  mechanisms for HRM practice transfer  allowed us to go deeper  into the matter of the
transfer process itself, and the important role of HR architecture. In this way, we could show that
the greater part of the German MNCs of our sample showed striking similarities with their U.S.
counterparts concerning HR architecture and the use of direct mechanisms and procedural channels.
To our knowledge, until present, such features have not been associated so clearly with German but
rather with US MNCs in the extant literature. This finding, in turn, allows for the conclusion that
U.S. dominance effects are influencing not only on single HR practices, but also on global HR
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architecture, and on how practices are transferred in German MNCs. Furthermore, the distinction
between different channels and mechanisms allowed for a more nuanced discussion and analysis of
differences between German and US MNCs concerning their perceptions, and the role of corporate
culture for standardization and practice transfer.
Third,  we  distinguished  between  different  dimensions  and  outcomes  of  transfer. We  hence
consciously researched for evidence of reverse or flow diffusion in our sample, and for different
degrees  of  internalization  and  functionality  of  certain  practices.  The  issue  of  internalization
appeared to be particularly important concerning indirect transfer mechanisms that are linked to
corporate culture. As we have seen, important differences could be uncovered between German and
US MNCs in their use of explicit corporate values and the implementation of corporate codes of
conduct,  which  also  had  effects  on  their  functionality.  The  closer  examination  of  the  issue  of
functionality,  in turn, yielded interesting findings on German performance management systems
that  were  felt  to  be  too  slack  by  several  Swiss  interviewees,  and  on  the  use  of  formal  tools
associated with corporate culture in German MNCs. The same is true for the insights that we could
gain into the transfer and implementation of standardized CSR practices in US MNCs that are based
on an understanding of CSR as a business case. In this latter case, we could find some evidence of
ceremonial adoption as an undesirable outcome in Switzerland.
Recent theoretical contributions on power and agency in MNCs (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard
2011;  Ferner et  al. 2012;  Morgan  and  Kristensen  2006)  were  also  particularly  helpful.  These
contributions led us to consciously determine the role of the Swiss subsidiary within the corporate
network, and the degree of individual managers' local embeddedness. These, in turn, enabled us to
understand in a next step the coaction of influences on different levels, and how these are shaping
practical  outcomes.  For example,  on a  macro-institutional  level,  we can search for institutional
power resources  for  individual  actors,  while  resource-dependent  power can only be determined
through an understanding of the role of the subsidiary within the corporate network. The issue of
micro-political bargaining and subversive strategizing on the level of the subsidiary or of single
managers may be captured best through an understanding of a manager's socialised rationality. The
latter, in turn, is heavily influenced by cognitive-normative aspects of his institutional environment
with its distinctive institutional rationality (Ferner et al. 2012: 167) or rationale (Redding 2005:
126, 136). As we have seen in Switzerland, the latter aspects are key to understand how certain
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practices are implemented, or how managers make responsible use of fairly high degrees of formal
institutional freedom in HRM. 
Furthermore, recent contributions in new institutionalism that point to the importance of symbolic
image building  and negotiation as a mechanism to obtain legitimacy for MNCs (Kostova et al.
2008) revealed to be highly useful for our interpretation of empirical findings. 
As far as  practical  implications are  concerned,  we may refer  to  Parry et  al.  (2008:  2037) who
maintained that research into national business system differences in host and home environments
and the extent of feasible learning as well as the degrees of HR freedom could become an important
source for key institutional and organizational decision-makers. This is because new insights might
help determining the likelihood of success of failure as well as the desirability of standardizing and
transferring HRM practices. Our analysis of the Swiss NBS and its host country effects on HRM
and IR practices gives a nice illustration to such claims. As we have seen, the Swiss NBS holds
astonishingly few formal constraints on organizational practices in these fields. However, having a
closer look at concrete practices and outcomes in Switzerland, and having linked these outcomes to
features of its NBS, we could clearly show that it is actually in the best interest of foreign firms not
to  make  the  mistake  to  think  that  everything  goes  in  this  formally  permissive  environment.
Furthermore, as far as Swiss decision-makers are concerned, our analysis revealed salient strengths
of the Swiss NBS, that lie in its utter flexibility and the wealth of institutional supports provided to
firms, and the existence of multiple collaborative networks between a large variety of actors. It
seems worth to do whatever they can in order to maintain and further strengthen these features of
the Swiss NBS. On the other hand, there are also important risks linked to the extremely fragmented
nature of the Swiss NBS with its decentralised federal state organization and high complexity of
cantonal  laws  and  rulings  that  generate  non-negligible  costs  for  firms  that  operate  in  several
cantons. Furthermore, as we have seen, there may be potential risks for Switzerland as an attractive
business location that are linked to its status as a non-EU member state and relevant restrictions on
the free movement of persons. This is especially true in case of short-term mobility of third-country
nationals who are working on international projects. Additionally, the referendum of February 2014
and  the  introduction  of  quotas  for  EU  citizens  might  considerably  aggravate  already  existing
problems in this field and even bring about new ones. Local decision-makers might therefore be
well-advised  to  find  adequate  solutions  for  these  problems,  and  thus  further  strengthen  the
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institutional competitiveness of Switzerland as a host- but also as a home country to an important
populations of MNCs.
9.5 Limitations of the present investigation and future perspectives
Whilst this investigation has been useful in revealing the complex interaction and construction of
practices in the event of cross-national transfer and standardization within MNCs as outcome of a
variety of effects on macro- as well as micro-level, it also has its limitations. 
First,  we  have  to  underline  the  fact  that,  due  to  the  qualitative  multiple  case  study approach
underlying this research, findings are  not statistically generalizable. However, as explained in our
chapter on the research methodology, we sought to undertake any possible measure to ensure the
greatest possible rigour and validity of our findings in order to ensure analytical generalizability.
However, we still have to acknowledge that some degree of subjectiveness, and hence bias in data
collection and analysis cannot be completely avoided in qualitative research. This is particularly
true for a PhD thesis, due to the comparatively strong individual character of such research.
On  the  other  hand,  especially  our  insights  into  the  Swiss  host  country  NBS,  its  institutional
rationality and  host country effects should be applicable as a model to other populations of MNCs.
As the present investigation has shown, in those areas where coercive isomorphic pressures are
present, these should be felt in fairly similar ways by other organizations, together with constraints
linked to the dynamic of the Swiss labour market. As far as normative and cognitive elements and
informal institutions are concerned, it would be interesting to conduct further in-depth case studies
into MNCs from still other countries-of-origin. In this way, one could find out how local Swiss
demand  for  collaboration  and  social  constraints  shape  concrete  HRM  practices  within  further
constellations of key influences. In this respect, especially French MNCs suggest themselves as an
interesting field of research, since until present, few studies have investigated the issue of HRM
practice transfer within these MNCs. Furthermore,  some of our interviewees have reported that
French HR managers dispose of important institutional power resources that are linked to the legal
constraints that the French NBS imposes on firms. It might be interesting to find out how French
MNCs behave when they are freed from the legal constraints  of their  country-of-origin,  and to
compare the findings with those already available on German MNCs, whose county-of-origin NBS
equally imposes important constraints on HRM. On the other hand, further research could focus on
how Swiss MNCs relate to different host country settings, for example to another collaborative
NBS like the German one, compared to a compartmentalised NBS like the British or US-American
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ones.
Further limitations to our investigation arise from practical difficulties linked to access to the field.
Even if we were able to profit from a pre-existing network of personal contacts to multiple HR
professionals in MNCs, we could however not obtain any kind of interview we would have liked to.
For example, in case of D2 we could obtain interviews from two different sites with two completely
different kinds of operations. In this way, we could collect precious information on differences in
HRM and IR practices  that  were  effectively linked  to  the  kind  of  activities  performed  and to
different  classes  of  employees  on  different  sites  within  the  same  company  and  host  country.
Furthermore, having had both, German expatriates with knowledge of corporate HQ, and further
countries as well as local Swiss interviewees was an ideal constellation to increase validity of our
information,  since the typical single respondent bias could be checked for. In case of US5, the
possibility to conduct an interview with a British expatriate having several decades of tenure and
knowledge of several different countries was also a big opportunity to test theoretical assumptions
and gain further  insights.  Yet,  much of our evidence remains  based on the account of a  single
respondent  per  company,  and  further  interviewees  might  have  confirmed  or  challenged  the
information and personal assessments worded by our interviewee. Often we additionally had to
cope  with  time constraints.  In  this  way,  in  many cases,  our  information  on HRM practices  is
somehow incomplete.  However,  we hope to have controlled at  least  partly for these limitations
through  our  systematic  presentation  and  discussion  of  results  with  participants  and  further
researchers.
We also have to recall the important  amount of information that has to be treated  in qualitative
interview-based research. Conducting, transcribing and analysing interviews is a long and arduous
task. While the amount of interviews is restricted by limited access to the field, the capacity to
appropriately analyse increasing amounts of complex data is another important limitation linked to
the  cognitive  capacity  of  the  researcher.  We  felt  that  the  use  of  an  appropriate  software  like
MAXQDA 10 was extremely useful to help the researcher in structuring the data, and especially in
retrieving information for later interpretation and write-up of results. 
Another important limitation that we have underlined in our discussion is linked to the need to
develop a  sound  understanding of  important  corporate-level  variables in  order  to  research  into
cross-national practice transfer. As we have seen, organizational-level influences may in some cases
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9.5 Limitations of the present investigation and future perspectives
override  institutional  country-of-origin  or  host  country  effects,  and  deliver  more  convincing
explanations for certain findings than any other kind of factor. However, a researcher's capacity to
correctly interpret the already patchy information obtained on corporate characteristics is limited.
We  would  therefore  strongly  argue  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  really
understand such highly complex organizations as MNCs in a typical case study research setting.
This is especially true for multiple case studies, where several organizations have to be analysed
and understood. Nevertheless, our results imply that it  is worth the effort to try and do what is
possible within these limitations in order to understand important corporate characteristics.
In view of  these limitations,  it  might  be a  promising strategy to  conduct  further  in-depth  case
studies involving a greater number of respondents and sites per organization in order to limit single
respondent bias, and to be able to more clearly disentangle macro-level institutional, micro-level
organizational, and agency-related influences. In order to keep the amount of information at a level
that  is  still  manageable,  it  might  make sense to  restrict  the number of  organizations in  such a
research setting.
Coming finally back to the issue of statistical generalizability of results, future research might also
include  quantitative  survey  studies to  test  the  conclusions  and  the  model  developed  in  this
investigation against a larger number of organizations. 
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Appendices
A1 Interview templates
As described in the chapter on our research methodology, the present work is a qualitative study
based on semi-structured interviews. The structure of our interviews was hence roughly pre-defined
by our interview templates.  Since our  investigation involved interviews with different  kinds  of
respondents,  inter  alia  HR  professionals,  expatriate  managers,  and  external  experts,  different
interview guides were used, according to the type of interviewee. Furthermore, in order to obtain an
optimum of information from our interview partners, wherever possible, interviews were conducted
in the mother tongue of the interviewee, thus involving the three languages French, German and
English. 
A1.1 Interview template HR managers French version
QUESTIONS POSÉES SYSTÉMATIQUEMENT QUESTIONS DE RELANCES / OPTIONNELLES
DONNÉES PERSONNELLES
- Âge, parcours, position, poste, années d’ancienneté, expérience à l’étranger
- Responsabilités, rôles, objectifs
L’ENTREPRISE ET LA FILIALE
l’entreprise multinationale  
(industrie/services)
- secteur(s) d’activité
- priorités stratégiques/stratégie  
internationale
- taille de l’entreprise multinationale
- date de fondation
cette filiale
- activités et marché desservi (local-   
global)
- objectifs stratégiques
- taille
- date de fondation de la filiale
- greenfield/brownfield ?
- si brownfield : histoire de la 
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               filiale, structure du capital    
               (participation %)
la prise des décisions :
- qui prend les décisions ?
investissements, assortiment de produits, 
pratiques managériales, budget
- comment sont prises les décisions ?
- marges de manœuvre stratégiques
- à partir de quel montant (CHF) faut-il 
avoir l’accord de la maison-mère pour 
une décision ?
compétences spécifiques de la filiale
Est-ce que cette filiale développe ou détient des
compétences spécifiques qui intéressent la 
maison mère ?
La communication
- sens
- canaux
- fréquence
- niveaux hiérarchiques internationaux
- degré de concertation
- justice procédurale organizationnelle lors de la 
prise de décisions stratégiques
- confiance ou méfiance mutuelle ?
- Top-down, flux dans toutes les directions
- Conférences ?
- Réseaux personnels ?
Le contrôle
Vous devez
- reporter à quelle entité ?
- comment ?
- Existe-t-il un système d’information 
commun ?
- Quelles informations sont repérées  et 
qu’est-ce qu’on en fait ?
- Y a-t-il d’autres mécanismes de 
contrôle ?
- unité, division, HQ
- personnel/expatriés, impersonnel/contrôle du 
résultat financier, culture 
d’entreprise/socialisation, comparaison entre 
filiales/compétition interne
Coordination
- mécanismes de coordination ?
- lignes directrices au niveau 
international de la politique RH ?
- volonté de transférer ? (de manière 
formalisée et structurée ?)
- pour quelles raisons ?
- code de conduite ou philosophie 
partagée au niveau international, guide 
de bonnes pratiques/bon comportement
professionnel ?
- système d’information, expatriées, réseaux 
personnels, réunions et conférences régulières
- existence d’un shared service centre RH / 
centre de service RH partagé ?
LES PRATIQUES RH
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Changements et développements généraux 
dans les pratiques GRH :
- thèmes RH les plus importants 
actuellement ?
- ces dernières années ?
- ces prochaines années ?
-
Pensez-vous que les problématiques RH se 
posent de la même façon au niveau de la 
filiale et pour l’ensemble de l’entreprise ?
Aperçu des pratiques RH dans la filiale (dans 
les domaines les plus intéressants) ?
Instruments RH à l’origine de bonnes et 
mauvaises expériences ?
- Pourquoi ?
Nous allons maintenant essayer de faire 
rapidement un portrait de vos pratiques RH 
(env. 30 minutes). 
- Ce qui nous intéresse particulièrement est 
de savoir quelles pratiques RH sont 
standardisées ou adaptées localement et 
dans quelle mesure.
- Puis, deuxièmement, nous nous 
intéressons au caractère anglo-saxon, 
allemand, français, suisse des pratiques.
Les domaines RH :
 Le recrutement
 La formation et le développement des 
compétences
 La sélection et le développement des 
carrières des managers
 existe-t-il un système IT- RH intégré ? 
(p.ex. pour des profils de compétences, 
planification de la succession etc.)
 L’évaluation de la performance et 
rémunération
 Les relations industrielles, dialogue 
social/communication/participation dans
des associations
Pouvez-vous identifier des pratiques dans 
votre filiale qui vous sembleraient typiquement 
américaines/allemandes/ françaises?
- Pourquoi ?
Domaines RH « possibles » (en cas 
d’incompréhensions/demandes de précision)
 Le recrutement
o Jeunes diplômés ; senior managers - 
rôle de la maison mère
o Programme trainee ?
o Importance du marché de travail 
interne/externe
o Apprentis ?
 La formation et le développement des 
compétences
o Apprentis/système dual ?
o Où et comment ont été élaborés les 
programmes de formation ?
o Qui est responsable des programmes 
et des budgets ? Taille du budget de 
formation ?
 La sélection et le développement des carrières
des managers
o Existe-il un programme de 
développement de managers 
internationaux ?
o Programmes de mobilité ? (HQ  
filiales, entre filiales, filiales  HQ)
o Identification de hauts potentiels – 
formalisé, structuré ? 
o Emploi à vie 
envisagé/désirable/possible ?
 L’évaluation de la performance et 
rémunération
o Critères, instruments :
 rémunération liée à la 
performance, au résultat 
financier, à la séniorité ?
 intégration avec les objectifs 
stratégiques ? (quels 
objectifs : croissance, parts de
marché, rentabilité/profit ?)
 stock option schemes ? 
(problèmes avec syst. fiscal 
cantonal?=> US7/Vaud)
o Importance/rôle des syndicats lors de 
la fixation de la rémunération ? 
Conventions collectives de travail ?
o Niveau des négociations salariales : 
individuel, site, entreprise, branche ?
 Les relations industrielles, dialogue 
social/communication/participation dans des 
associations
o Relations aux syndicats / politique 
(anti-)syndicale ? Crises dans les 
relations? 
o Participation dans des 
associations/réseaux suisses 
d’entreprises ?
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o Participation des employés/ sondages 
d’opinion ?
o Gestion de la diversité/diversity 
management
LE TRANSFERT DES PRATIQUES RH
Existence de best practices à prendre en 
compte ?
Quelles pratiques viennent de la maison 
mère ?
Quelles pratiques ont été développées 
localement ?
Lesquelles des instruments et pratiques RH 
transférés ont été adaptés/changés ?
(Qu’est-ce que vous avez dû adapter ?)
- Dans quelle mesure ?
- Pourquoi ?
- Transfert total, petites adaptations, solution 
hybride, maintien des pratiques locales
LE PROCESSUS DU TRANSFERT / RÉSULTATS
- qui s’en occupe ?
- comment se déroule le transfert ?
- qui contrôle le transfert et les 
résultats ?
- comment est-ce qu’on contrôle le 
transfert ?
- qu’est-ce qu’il se passe en cas de 
conflit sur le transfert ?
- rôle des expatriés et de la mobilité 
internationale ?
- canaux par lesquels on échange des 
points de vue avec le reste de 
l’entreprise ?
- A-t-on défini la réussite du transfert de pratiques 
RH comme but/facteur important pour la 
rémunération liée à la performance ?
- conférences, réseaux, expatriations, tandem-
management,…
problèmes/résistances lors du transfert des 
pratiques RH ?
- quel type de problème ?
- comment expliquez-vous ce 
problème ?
- existence de conflits avec maison-
mère au sujet de la définition des 
pratiques ?
- Selon vous, quel est le rôle/l’importance
de la légitimité interne ou bien de la 
réputation du département RH pour 
un transfert réussi ?
Existe-il des innovations pour lesquelles la 
maison mère et la filiale ont collaboré ?
- cf. interculturel, langue, institutions, règlements
Ou collaboration des filiales entre-elles ?
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Avez-vous remarqué des spécificités, des 
particularités typiquement suisses dans les 
pratiques RH ?
 attention aux données démographiques de 
l’interviewé : socialisé dans le contexte suisse ? 
D’origine étrangère ? Expérience d’expatriation ?.....
A1.2 Interview template HR managers German version
SYSTEMATISCH GESTELLTE FRAGEN RÜCKFRAGEN, ERLÄUTERUNGEN, DETAILS
PERSÖNLICHE DATEN
- Alter, Laufbahn, Position, Stelle, 
Dienstalter/Betriebszugehörigkeit, 
Auslandserfahrung
- Verantwortung(en), Rolle(n), Ziele
DAS UNTERNEHMEN UND DIE TOCHTERGESELLSCHAFT
Das multinationale Unternehmen  
(Industrie/Dienstleistung)
- Tätigkeitsfeld(er)/Sektor
- strategische Prioritäten/
internationale Strategie
- Grösse des multinat. Unternehmens
- Gründungsdatum
Diese Tochtergesellschaft
- Tätigkeiten und bediente Märkte 
(lokal-global)
- strategische Ziele
- Grösse (Umsatz/Mitarbeiter)
- Datum Gründung/Kauf der 
Tochtergesellschaft
- greenfield/brownfield ?
- falls brownfield: Vorge-
schichte der 
Tochtergesellschaft, Kapitalstruktur 
(Beteiligung in %)
Entscheidungsfindung :
- Wer fällt die Entscheidungen? bezügl. :
Investitionen, Produktpalette, 
Managementpraktiken, Budget
- Wie werden diese Entscheidungen 
gefällt ?
- Über welchen strategischen 
Spielraum verfügt die 
- internationale Hierarchieebenen
- Ausmass an Konzertation
- organizationale Prozessgerechtigkeit beim 
Treffen strategischer Entscheidungen
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Tochtergesellschaft? (Über welche 
Beträge – Grössenordnung in CHF – 
kann die Tochtergesellschaft frei 
entscheiden, ab welchem Betrag muss 
das Einverständnis der 
Muttergesellschaft/Division o.ä. 
eingeholt werden?)
Spezifische Kompetenzen der 
Tochtergesellschaft:
Besitzt oder entwickelt diese 
Tochtergesellschaft spezifische 
Kompetenzen, die das Stammhaus 
interessieren?
Kommunikation
- In Welche Richtung(en)?
- Welche Kanäle?
- Mit welcher Häufigkeit?
 gegenseitiges Vertrauen oder Misstrauen?
- Top-down, Kommunikationsflüsse in alle 
Richtungen?
- Konferenzen ?
- Persönliche Netzwerke ?
Kontrolle
- Gegenüber welcher Einheit müssen 
Sie Bericht erstatten?
- Wie erfolgt die Kontrolle?
- Existiert ein gemeinsames 
Informationssystem?
- Welche Informationen werden 
gesammelt und was geschieht damit?
- Gibt es noch weitere 
Kontrollmechanismen?
- Geschäftseinheit, Division, Hauptsitz
- persönlich direkt/Expatriierte, 
- unpersönlich/ indirekt Resultate - finanziell, 
individuelle und kollektive Zielvorgaben; variable 
Vergütung, Karrieren -- direkt Definition von 
Arbeitsprozessen, Funktionen, Selektions- und 
Evaluationskriterien
- Unternehmenskultur/Sozialisierung (Weiterbildung,
internationale Mobilität, informelle Kommunikation)
- Vergleich zwischen verschiedenen 
Tochtergesellschaften/interner Wettbewerb
Koordination
- Welche Koordinationsmechanis-
men kommen in Ihrem Unternehmen 
zur Anwendung?
- Gibt es internationale Leitlinien für 
die HR-Politik?
- Will das Unternehmen Praktiken 
transferieren? (formaler und 
strukturierter Ansatz?)
- Aus welchen Gründen?
- Existiert ein Verhaltenskodex oder 
eine Philosophie, die auf 
internationaler Ebene geteilt wird; ein 
Leitfaden „guter Geschäftspraktiken“/ 
„guten professionellen Verhaltens“?
- (integriertes) Informationssystem, Expatriierte, 
persönliche Netzwerke, regelmässige 
Sitzungen und Konferenzen
- Existenz eines HR shared serivce centre: 
wenn ja für welche Region(en), welche HR- 
Bereiche?
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DIE HR-PRAKTIKEN
Veränderungen und allgemeine 
Entwicklungen bezüglich der HR-Praktiken :
- Welche sind Ihrer Meinung nach derzeit
die wichtigsten HR-Themen?
- In den vergangenen Jahren?
- In den kommenden Jahren?
Denken Sie, dass sich die HR-Problematiken 
auf Ebene der Tochtergesellschaft in 
derselben Weise stellen, wie für das gesamte 
Unternehmen?
Mit welchen HR-Instrumenten haben Sie gute 
bzw. schlechte Erfahrungen gemacht?
- Worauf führen Sie dies zurück?
Wir werden nun versuchen, ein grobes 
Portrait Ihrer HR-Praktiken zu erstellen (ca. 
30 min.).
- Wir interessieren uns hierbei einerseits 
insbesondere für die Frage, welche HR-
Praktiken standardisiert oder lokal 
angepasst sind und in welchem Mass dies 
jeweils der Fall ist.
- Andererseits interessieren wir uns für den 
angelsächsischen, deutschen oder 
schweizerischen Charakter der Praktiken.
Überblick über die HR-Praktiken in der 
Tochtergesellschaft (in den interessantesten 
Bereichen)
Die HR-Bereiche :
- Rekrutierung
- Schulung und Kompetenzentwicklung
- Selektion, Karriereentwicklung/-
planung der Manager
 existiert ein integriertes HR-IT-System? 
(für Kompetenzprofile, Nachfolgeplanung 
etc.)
- Leistungsbeurteilung und Entgelt
- Industrielle Beziehungen, sozialer 
Dialog/ Kommunikaton/ Teilnahme, 
aktive Mitgliedschaft in Verbänden
Können Sie in Ihrer Tochtergesellschaft 
Praktiken identifizieren, die Ihnen typisch 
amerikanisch/ deutsch erscheinen?
- Wieso ?
„mögliche“ HR-Bereiche (bei Rückfragen, zur 
Präzisierung)
Rekrutierung
Junge Absolventen ; Senior Managers – Rolle 
des Stammhauses?
Traineeprogramm?
Rolle des internen und externen 
Arbeitsmarktes?
Auszubildende/Lehrlinge?
Schulung und Kompetenzentwicklung
Lehrlinge/duales System?
Wo und wie wurden die Schulungsprogramme 
ausgearbeitet?
Wer ist für die Programme sowie für die 
Budgets verantwortlich? Höhe des 
Schulungsbudgets?
Selektion und Karriereentwicklung bzw. -planung 
der Manager
Existiert ein internationales 
Entwicklungsprogramm für Manager?
Mobilitätsprogramme? (HQ  
Tochtergesellschaften, zwischen 
Tochtergesellschaften, 
Tochtergesellschaften  HQ)
Identifikation von High Potentials – formalisiert, 
strukturiert? 
Anstellung auf Lebenszeit: 
angestrebt/wünschenswert/ möglich?
Leistungsbeurteilung und Entgelt
Kriterien, Instrumente:
Entgelt abhängig von Leistung, finanziellem
Ergebnis, (Dienst)Alter?
Integration mit den strategischen Zielen? 
(welche Ziele: Wachstum, Marktanteile, 
Rentabilität/Profit?)
Stock option schemes? (Probleme? Z.B. 
mit kantonaler Steuergesetzgebung? 
=>US7/Vaud)
Bedeutung/Rolle der Gewerkschaften bei der 
Entgeltfindung? Kollektivverträge?
Auf welcher Ebene finden Lohnverhandlungen 
statt: individuell, Betriebsstätte, 
Unternehmen, Branche?
Die Industriellen Beziehungen, sozialer Dialog/ 
Kommunikation/ Mitgliedschaft, aktive 
Teilnahme in Verbänden?
Beziehungen zu Gewerkschaften / (Anti-) 
Gewerkschafts-Politik ? Krise(n) in den 
Beziehungen? 
Aktive Mitgliedschaft/ Teilnahme in Verbänden/ 
schweizerischen 
Unternehmensnetzwerken?
Partizipation der Angestellten/ 
Meinungsumfragen?
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Diversity Management?
TRANSFER VON HR-PRAKTIKEN
Existieren in Ihrem Unternehmen best 
practice-Modelle, die Sie berücksichtigen 
müssen?
Welche Praktiken kommen vom Stammhaus?
Welche Praktiken wurden lokal entwickelt?
Welche der transferierten HR-Praktiken 
wurden angepasst/abgeändert?
- Was mussten Sie anpassen?
- Wie weit gingen diese Änderungen?
- Weshalb mussten sie vorgenommen werden?
- Eins-zu-eins Transfer, kleinere Anpassungen, 
Hybridlösungen, Behauptung/Beibehaltung 
lokaler Praktiken
TRANSFERPROZESS / RESULTATE
- Wer kümmert sich um den Transfer?
- Wie spielt sich der Transfer ab?
- Wer kontrolliert den Transfer und die 
Resultate?
- Wie wird der Transfer kontrolliert?
- Was geschieht im Konfliktfall 
bezüglich des Transfers?
- Welche Rolle spielen Expatriierte und 
internationale Mobilität?
- Über welche Kanäle findet ein 
Meinungsaustausch mit dem restlichen 
Unternehmen statt?
- Incentives: erfolgreicher Transfer von HR-
Praktiken als Ziele für leistungsbezogene 
Entgeltkomponente definiert?
- Konferenzen, Netzwerke, Expatriierungen, 
Tandem-Management,…
Probleme/Widerstände beim Transfer von HR-
Praktiken?
- Welche Art von Problemen gab es?
- Wie erklären Sie diese(s) Problem(e)?
- Gibt es Konflikte mit dem 
Stammhaus bezüglich der Definition 
der Praktiken?
- Welche Rolle spielt Ihrer Ansicht nach 
die interne Legitimität bzw. das 
Ansehen des HR-Departments für 
einen erfolgreichen Transfer?
Gibt es Innovationen, bei deren Entstehung 
Stammhaus und Tochtergesellschaften  
zusammengearbeitet haben?
- Z.B. interkulturell, sprachlich, Institutionen, 
Regulierungen ...
Oder Zusammenarbeit der Tochtergesellschaften 
untereinander?
Sind Ihnen typisch schweizerische
Besonderheiten bezüglich der HR-Praktiken 
aufgefallen?
 demographische Daten des Interviewpartners: im 
schweizerischen Kontext sozialisiert? Ausländischen 
Ursprungs? Erfahrung als Expatriierter?.....
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A1.3 Interview template HR managers English version
SYSTEMATICALLY ASKED QUESTIONS OPTIONAL QUESTIONS, DETAILS
PERSONAL DATA
- Age, career, position, post, years of seniority, experience abroad
- Responsibilities, roles, objectives
THE MNC AND THE SUBSIDIARY
The multinational company
- Strategic priorities
- Internationalization strategy (mergers, 
acquisitions, “organic growth” via foreign direct 
investment…)
This subsidiary
- activities and markets served (local-global)
- strategic objectives (and role within the 
MNC?)
- size
- foundation date 
   - greenfield-brownfield (if yes: history?)
- Is your management mainly composed by 
expatriates or local managers?  Expatriates in 
key positions?
Decision-making:
- Who takes the decisions?
investments, range of products, managerial 
practices, budgets
- How are decisions taken? 
- Strategic latitude/ operational margin?
- Fixed amounts (CHF, $) as a rule when
decisions need to be approved?
Core competences of the subsidiary
Does this subsidiary develop or hold core 
competences that are particularly interesting for
the HQ ?
Centres of excellence? Divisionalization? 
Communication
- direction
- channels
- frequency
- international hierarchical levels
- degree of consultation - consensus
- organizational procedural justice for the 
decision-taking
- Mutual trust or distrust?
- Top-down, bottom-up or both directions
- Face-to-face meetings/Conferences ? Phone 
calls, Videoconferences?
- Personal networks ?
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- language used? Ethnocentricity?
Control
- To what entity do you report? Reporting
lines? 
- How do you report?
- Is there any common information 
system?
- Which kind of information is collected 
and to what purpose?
- Do you have other control 
mechanisms?
- unit, division, HQ – matrix (product/geography 
– solid and dotted line?)
- personal/expatriates, impersonal/control of 
financial result, corporate culture/socialization,
- comparison among subsidiaries/internal 
competition
Coordination
- coordination mechanisms?
- existence of international HR 
guidelines?
- Written manual of personnel policy & 
procedures?
- willingness to transfer? (in a formal 
and well-structured manner?)
- what are the main reasons?
- codes of conduct or international 
shared philosophy, guide of best 
practices/personal behaviour?
-
- information system, expatriates, personal 
networks, meetings and regular conferences, 
informal councils to bring managers together in 
order to exchange information? 
- existence of a shared HR service centre?
- Relations between HQ HR and country 
subsidiaries’ HR function?
HR PRACTICES
Changes and general developments 
concerning HR practices:
- what are your current HR priorities?
- during the last few years?
- for the next years?
Do you think that HR problems and issues 
are identical on subsidiary and corporate 
level? 
Overview of HR practices in subsidiary 
(concerning the most interesting domains)?
Do you remember particularly positive or 
negative experiences with specific HR 
practices? Why? Examples?
We are now trying to gain an overview of your 
HR practices (30 minutes). 
- We are particularly interested to know which 
of your HR practices are standardized or 
locally adapted, and to what extent?  
- Secondly, we are interested in the Anglo-
HR domains :
Recruitment
- Young graduates? Partnership with selected 
universities?; senior managers (internal 
development or external recruitment?– role of 
the parent company?
- Trainee programme?
- Importance of internal/external labour market
Training and competence development
- Apprentices/participation in dual VET? 
Why?
- Where and how have the training programs 
been elaborated? 
- Who is responsible for the training programs 
and the budget? Amount of the budget 
dedicated to the training programs
- Global/regional and local training 
programmes?
- Link between structured training 
programmes and career advancement?
Selection and development/career management 
(managers):
- Is there any programme dedicated to the 
development of international managers?
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Saxon, German or Swiss character of these  
practices
HR domains:
 recruitment
 training and competence development
 selection and development of 
managers/ career planning
 Working time? Annualised hours? 
Flexible hours? (“numerical flexibility” 
vs. working time flexibility)
 is there an integrated HR IT-system in 
place? (e.g. for competence profiles, 
succession planning etc.)
 Performance appraisal and 
reward/remuneration/compensation
 Industrial relations, social 
dialogue/communication/member of an 
association 
Can you identify the HR practices that are 
typically American, German or Swiss?
- Why?
- In what ways does American influence 
manifest itself?
- Mobility programs? (HQ->subsidiary, between
subsidiaries, subsidiaries->HQ)
- High potential identification – formalised, 
structured? 
- Career planning/internal careers also for 
“normal” employees (non-high potentials)?
- Lifetime employment 
considered/desirable/possible? 
Performance appraisal and rewards/ compensation
criteria, instruments:
- Performance-based remuneration? (% of total?)
- Variable part based on: individual objectives, 
financial result, seniority?
- strategic integration of individual objectives? 
(which objectives: growth, market share, 
profitability/profit?)
stock option schemes ? 
(problèmes avec syst. fiscal cantonal?
=> US7/Vaud)
- importance/role of trade unions in the 
remuneration negociation? collective 
agreements?
- Level of wage negociations: individual, plant, 
company, sector?
- HQ influence on participation policy in 
subsidiaries?
Industrial relations social 
dialogue/communication/member of an association
- Relationships with unions / anti-unions policy? 
- Crises during relationships? 
- Member of an association/Swiss company 
networks?
- Employee participation/ survey?
- Diversity management (strong policy?)
TRANSFER OF HRM PRACTICES
Existence of best practices to take into 
account?
Which practices are stemming from corporate 
headquarters (parent company) ?
Which practices have been developed 
locally ?
Which of the transferred HR practices have 
been adapted /changed?
- What did you have to adapt?
- To what extent?
- Why?
- Total transfer, small adaptations, hybrid 
solution, maintain local practices
THE TRANSFER PROCESS / RESULTS
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- Who is in charge of the transfer?
- How is the transfer done?
- Who controls the transfer and the 
results?
- How do you control the transfer?
- What happens in case of conflict 
about a practice transfer?
- Role of expatriates and international 
mobility?
- Channels used to exchange opinions 
and experiences internally?
- Involvement of national subsidiaries
or regional HQ in practice 
development and definition?
- Has successful practice transfer been fixed as an 
individual objective and is linked to variable, 
performance-related pay? 
- Conferences, networks, use of expatriates, 
tandem-management,…
Problems / resistance during the transfer of 
HR practices?
- What kind of problem?
- How do you explain this proble ?
- Existence of conflicts with corporate 
headquarters about the definition of 
practices?
- How do you feel about the importance 
of internal legitimacy or the 
reputation of the HR department for 
the success of a practice transfer? 
Are there innovations for which corporate 
headquarters and the subsidiary cooperated? 
- cf. intercultural, 
- language, 
- institutions, regulations, 
Or cooperation between subsidiaries?
Did you observe any Swiss particularities 
concerning HR and managerial practices in 
particular or the country and people in general?
 Due consideration of the interviewee’s personal 
details: socialised in the Swiss context? Foreign origin? 
Expatriation experience?.....
A1.4 Interview template Swiss plant manager (US3)
DONNÉES PERSONNELLES
- Âge, parcours, position, poste, années d’ancienneté, expérience à l’étranger, expériences dans d’autres 
entreprises avant
- Responsabilités, rôles, objectifs
+ Est-ce que le poste du plant director a été occupé par un expatrié américain avant ?
+ Est-ce que d’autres postes clés ( cf. controlling, financial director) sont actuellement ou ont été occupés 
par des expatriés américains ?
L’ENTREPRISE ET LA FILIALE
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- Comment décririez-vous le rôle de votre filiale/ce site au sein de l’entreprise multinationale?
- Est-ce que cette filiale détient ou développe des compétences spécifiques qui intéressent la maison 
mère?
- Comment décririez-vous les relations de cette filiale avec le siège principal?
- Qui prend quelles décisions – niveaux hiérarchiques internationales ?
- filiale Nechâtel
- niveau Europe : HR=Vienne – aussi divisional HQ Europe ?
- division Biosciences L.A. ?
- corporate HQ Deerfield/Illinois ?
LES PRATIQUES MANAGÉRIALES
Est-ce qu’il y a des éléments concernant le monde du travail ou le style et les pratiques de management 
lesquels vous avez particulièrement remarqué quand vous avez commencé à travailler chez Baxter?
- Avez-vous remarqué des façons de travailler qui vous semblaient étranges (en comparaison avec ce que
vous connaissiez des entreprises Suisses) ?
- la façon de prendre des décisions, le comportement des supérieurs hiérarchiques et des collaborateurs?
Dans quels domaines les pratiques managériales en Suisse se distinguent-elles de celles au siège 
principal ou dans d’autres pays qui vous connaissez?
- Comment est-ce que vous expliquez ces différences?
Pouvez-vous identifier des ressemblances et des différences concernant le style de management et le 
monde du travail  suisse et américain?
Pouvez-vous identifier des forces et des faiblesses de l’environnement économique suisse ?
Y a-t-il des obstacles?
Quelles seraient les opportunités spécifiques?
+ Pourquoi Baxter a décidé de venir installer ce site en Suisse ?
Quelle est la réputation de la fonction RH globalement ?
- dans le groupe? – dans cette filiale ?
- Auriez-vous des exemples de bons ou de mauvaises expériences avec des instruments et des
pratiques RH ou avec la fonction/le département RH ? Pourquoi ?
Quels seraient pour vous les éléments clé d’un style de management typiquement américain?
+ Pouvez-vous identifiez ces éléments chez Baxter?
US:
- Stratégie court terme très axée sur l’atteinte d’objectifs financiers
- Rémunération fortement individualisé avec part variable importante lieé à la performance 
(intégration stratégique de systèmes de management de la performance)
- Faible distance hiérarchique et contact direct et facile avec le supérieur hiérarchique
- Idéologie anti-syndicaliste, High Involvement Work Systems  (HIS) avec des enquêtes 
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d’opinion régulières, on cherche le contact direct avec les employés sans intermédiaire collectif
- Politique bien définie et développée de la gestion de la diversité
- Codes de Conduite, respect de Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), compliance
- Mécanismes de « whistleblowing », no. de téléphone au siège principal pour dénoncer des 
infractions du Code de Conduite etc.
- Sécurité au lieu de et santé comme politiques RH
- Seniors Managers des USA avec carrière « globale », des changements de poste fréquents,
rôle plus important du marché de travail extérieur, managers sont des généralistes plutôt que 
des spécialistes => Managers américains peu impliqués dans des réseaux externes locaux 
(associations)
- Des processus et pratiques fortement formalisés et standardisés
- Formalisierte, standardisierte Prozesse und HR-Praktiken
- Forte volonté de transférer des pratiques venant des US
D:
- Stratégie plus long-terme, moins axée sur des résultats financiers au court terme mais plutôt sur
les parts de marché, les produits et le développement au long terme, dépendance du marché 
financier moins marquée
- Style plus formel, imortance des titres (Prof. Dr.) vouvoiement répandu
- Inclusion des stakeholders les plus importants, particulièrement des Conseils d’entreprises et 
des synicats: mindset des managers fortement influencé par la présence du Conseil d’Entreprise 
puissant
- Les relations industrielles collectives et représentatives (moins individualisées qu’aux US et 
plus importance des contrats collectifs)
- Très focalisé sur la formation de base et continue respectivement le développement (interne) 
du personnel : pratique influencée par l’expérience avec les système dual de formation 
professionnel en D
- Rôle important du marché d’emploi interne pour les cadres, carrières in-house, carrières de 
managers spécialistes plutôt que de généralistes
- Forte implication dans des réseaux externes locaux (associations)
- Approche au transfert de pratiques allemandes plus sélectif, introduction de pratiques 
empruntées des MNCs anglo-saxons
- Style de communication direct
Quels seraient pour vous les éléments clé d’un style de management typiquement suisse?
+ Pouvez-vous identifier ces éléments chez Baxter?
CH   :
- Style managérial et prise de décision consensuelle
- Faible distance hiérarchique
- caractère personnalisé des relations au lieu de travail et dans le monde du business plus 
généralement : culture de l’apéro => discussions face-à-face 
- forte dynamique des marchés de travail régionales : il faut faire très attention à ces employés 
pour ne pas les perdre
- On se croise et recroise souvent en Suisse – il ne faut surtout pas empoisonner les relations 
avec les autres personnes
- style de communication diplomatique
Pouvez-vous identifier des pratiques qui sont appliquées de la même façon au siège principal ?
Avez-vous déjà fait l’expérience d’un transfert de pratiques?
Si oui : 
Y avait-il des problèmes ou des résistances lors du transfert de pratiques?
- De quel type des résistance ou de problèmes’agissat-il?
- Comment est-ce que vous expliquez ces résistances(problèmes ?
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- Avantages et inconvénients lors d’une standardisation de pratiques- exemples?
- Y a-t-il des conflits avec la maison mère concernant la définition de pratiques? 
- Dans ce cas, quels seraient vos possibilités de négocier avec la maison mère ?
Existe-il des innovations qui sont nées d’une coopération entre la maison-mère et des filiales ? Ou 
coopération de filiales entre-elles ?
Formation d’apprentis dans le système dual :
- Pourquoi ?
 Besoin concret en personnel formé pour la production ?
 D’autres raisons (image social, assumer responsabilité pour les jeunes…) ?
- Comment est-ce que l’apprentissage et tout ce qui y est lié est régulé : par une association ?
- Difficultés de justifier ces investissements en formation aux US (système dual inconnu)?
Convention collective de travail qui couvre les travailleurs dans la production ?
Réseaux et contacts externes :
- Participation dans des associations/réseaux suisses d’entreprises ?
- Rôle des ces réseaux et contacts externes ? Apports ?
- Caractère personnel des contacts ?
- Perception de ces réseaux et contacts aux USA ? (« suspect » ?)
A1.5 Interview template expatriates German version (D1, D2)
PERSÖNLICHE DATEN
- Alter, Laufbahn, Position, Stelle, Dienstalter/Betriebszugehörigkeit, Auslandserfahrung
- Wie würden sie Ihre Funktion hier im Schweizer Standort beschreiben?
- Verantwortung(en), Rolle(n), Ziele?
MNC UND DIE TOCHTERGESELLSCHAFT
- Wie würden Sie Rolle dieser Tochtergesellschaft innerhalb des Unternehmens beschreiben?
- Besitzt oder entwickelt diese Tochtergesellschaft spezifische Kompetenzen, die das Stammhaus 
interessieren?
- Wie würden Sie die Beziehung dieser Tochtergesellschaft zum Hauptsitz beschreiben?
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DIE MANAGEMENTPRAKTIKEN
Was ist Ihnen (im Berufsleben) besonders aufgefallen, als Sie in die Schweiz gekommen sind? 
Gibt es bestimmte Aspekte der Zusammenarbeit, die Ihnen fremd waren?
Entscheidungs- und Kooperationsverhalten; Verhalten von Vorgesetzten und Mitarbeitern?
In welchen Bereichen unterscheiden sich die Managementpraktiken in der Schweiz von denjenigen am
Hauptsitz bzw. in anderen Ländern, die Sie kennen gelernt haben?
- Wie erklären Sie sich diese Unterschiede?
Wo sehen Sie Ähnlichkeiten in Managementstil und Arbeitsleben zwischen Deutschland / USA und der
Schweiz?
Können Sie Stärken und Schwächen des schweizerischen Business-Umfeldes identifizieren?
Wo sind Hürden?
Wo liegen die besonderen Möglichkeiten?
Wie ist das Ansehen der HR-Funktion in Ihrer Unternehmung? 
- Am Hauptsitz? In der Tochtergesellschaft?
- gute und schlechte Erfahrungen mit HR-Instrumenten und der HR-Abteilung ?
- Beispiele und Begründungen?
Welches sind für Sie typische Kernelemente deutschen / US-amerikanischen Managementstils?
Beispielliste US:
- Kurzfristige, auf Finanzzielerreichung angelegte Strategie
- stark individualisierte und leistungsbasierte Entlohnung (performance management systems, 
strategisch integriert)
- flache Hierarchien, direkter Kontakt
- keine Gewerkschaften, aber High Involvement Work Systems (HIS) in welfare capitalism firms
- =>direkte, standardisierte Mitarbeiterbefragungen
- starke Diversity Management-Policy
- Codes of Conduct/Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) compliance
- Whistleblowing-Mechanismen (Telefonnummern im HQ)
- Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz und Gesundheit als HR-Politik
- Senior Manager aus USA  - „globale“ Managerkarriere, häufige Wechsel und grössre Rolle des 
externen Manager-Arbeitsmarktes, Generalisten-Karrieren
- US-Manager: schwächere lokale Einbindung in Verbände etc.
- Formalisierte, standardisierte Prozesse und HR-Praktiken
- Starke Transferneigung
Beispielliste D:
- stärker auf Marktanteile und längerfristige Entwicklung angelegte Strategie, weniger Abhängigkeit
vom Finanzmarkt
- formellerer Umgang, Hierarchien spürbarer (als in US oder CH-Unternehmen), Gebrauch von 
Titeln und „Sie“
- Einbindung der Stakeholder, insbesondere der Gewerkschaften und – in D – der Betriebsräte:
- => „Betriebsratsmindset“ und
-  Institutionell-repräsentative Employee Relations: kollektive Arbeitsbeziehungen
- starker Fokus auf Aus- und Weiterbildung bzw. Personalentwicklung: Prägung durch Erfahrung 
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des deutschen dualen Ausbildungssystems
- wichtige Rolle des internen Arbeitsmarktes für Top-Kader, lange In-House-Karrieren, 
Spezialisten-Karrieren
- D-Manager: starke lokale Einbindung in Verbandsnetzwerke
- selektiver Transfer und Anleihen aus dem angelsächsischen Bereich
Können Sie in der Tochtergesellschaft Praktiken oder Managementinstrumente identifizieren, die am 
Hauptsitz genauso Anwendung finden?
Können Sie in Ihrer Tochtergesellschaft Praktiken identifizieren, die Ihnen typisch amerikanisch/ 
deutsch erscheinen?
- Inwiefern ?
Probleme/Widerstände beim Transfer von HR-Praktiken aus dem Hauptsitz?
- Welche Art von Problemen gab es?
 Gewinne und Verluste bei Standardisierungen - Beispiele?
- Wie erklären Sie diese(s) Problem(e)?
- Gibt es Konflikte mit dem Stammhaus bezüglich der Definition der Praktiken?
- Welche Möglichkeiten haben Sie,  mit dem Stammhaus zu verhandeln? 
- Wie können Sie argumentieren und sich Gehör verschaffen?
- Welche Rolle spielt Ihrer Ansicht nach die interne Legitimität bzw. das Ansehen des HR-
Departments für einen erfolgreichen Transfer?
Gibt es Innovationen, bei deren Entstehung Stammhaus und Tochtergesellschaften  
zusammengearbeitet haben?
Oder Zusammenarbeit der Tochtergesellschaften untereinander?
A1.6 Interview template expatriate English version (US5)
PERSONAL DATA 
- Age, nationality, career, position, years of seniority, experience abroad
- How would you describe your function at the Swiss subsidiary/European Headquarters?
THE MNC AND THE SUBSIDIARY 
- How would you describe the role of this unit within the MNC?
- Does this unit detain any particular kind of competencies Corporate HQ is interested in? 
- How would you describe the relationship between this unit and Corporate HQ?
How do you feel about the image of the HR function within your company? 
- Are there any differences between corporate HQ, other subsidiaries and this unit?
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HR/MANAGERIAL PRACTICES 
When arriving in Switzerland, what were your 
first sensations about the country?
And about your subsidiary/site? (As distinct from 
other sites)
What did surprise you most?  What appeared 
the most unusual/exotic to you?
In what ways does Swiss managerial practice 
differ from those at Corporate HQ and from 
those in other countries you got to know?
- How do you explain these 
differences?
Did you notice similarities and differences 
regarding managerial style and working life 
between Corporate HQ/USA, other countries 
you know, and Switzerland?
“For instance, some people told me…”:
Examples: 
- Communication (formal/informal, implicit, 
criticism…), 
- management of work time (work hours, intensity, 
pauses, breaks, punctuality, meetings…),
- acquaintances with people in a professional and 
private context, management style….
Could you give some examples?
=> Decision-making, way of communicating, 
behaviour of supervisors and supervisees, apéro 
culture?
Do you have examples of good or bad 
experiences you made with certain HR 
practices?
Do you think that there are certain standard 
practices which are easier to transfer globally 
than others?
Problems/resistance  in the event of HR practice
transfer from Corporate HQ?
- Are there sometimes conflicts with 
Corporate HQ concerning the definition 
and/or implementation of practices?
- Differences between countries and 
subsidiary resistance (boy scout 
subsidiaries in Spain, opposite in UK 
Ferner/Varul 2001)
- Which ones are problematic?
- Why?
- How and in how far can you negotiate 
with Corporate HQ? 
- How can you make yourself heard?
- Power resources and arguments you 
can invoke?
Which characteristics would you consider to be 
an essential part of 
- American managerial style and practice?
- Swiss managerial style and practice?
Can you identify (managerial/HR) practices in the
Swiss unit
- that are similar or identical compared to those 
at Corporate HQ?
- that differ from those at Corporate HQ? (in style 
and/or substance)
Do you think there is a difference between a U.S. and
a Swiss or European understanding of the concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility?
Swiss Apéro-culture: US-corporations and 
alcohol at work?!
How do you explain the emphasis on safety at 
work and health in US-companies?
How about co-operative behaviour and exchange 
of information among U.S. managers and/or 
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- CSR
- Apéro-culture
- Safety at work
- Co-operation and exchange of 
information/ role of associations
- Career logic
- Overlapping social spheres
companies?
- literature states that this is not the case due 
to anti-trust legislation and strong emphasis 
on competition, mistrust among economic 
actors, arm’s length relationships and hard-
nosed bargaining over prices
How about the role of associations and other local
networks in the U.S.?
- literature states that U.S. associations are far
from being as strong and integrated as they 
are in Switzerland due to great geographic 
distance and greater differences in interests
- is such a thing as the GEM conceivable in 
the U.S.?
Overlapping social spheres in Switzerland – 
militia system: is this fact known? Does it seem odd 
to foreigners? Social control in the U.S.?
Career logic in U.S. companies – generalist and 
short-term with full participation in the “numbers 
game” (financial data, targets), not much loyalty to 
local communities?
Individual “career planning” – people propose and 
promote themselves in order to get ahead; within the 
company or outside
Could you identify some strengths and 
weaknesses of the Swiss business 
environment?
Are there specific constraints and/or opportunities?
A1.7 Interview template UNIA
DUALE BERUFSAUSBILDUNG UND BERUFLICHE WEITERBILDUNG:
Generell nachlassende Ausbildungsbereitschaft in
CH?
Unterschiede 
– zwischen Branchen (Chemie/Pharma vs. 
Maschinenbau vs. Dienstleistung)
– Regionen und (=> Interview D2 ZH:  IR in
Basel „härter“ als in Zürich)
– KMU vs. MNCs => KMUs profitieren i.d.R.
mehr von dualer Ausbildung)?
– Reaktionen von Gesellschaft und Politik? Gibt es
politischen Druck?
Giardini et al. (2005):
in  D nachlassender  Wille der  Unternehmen,  an
dualer Ausbildung teilzunehmen
=> es gibt allerdings nicht unerheblichen Druck 
seitens der Politik, « Ausbildungsquoten » zu erfüllen
Interview UNIA/Davoine  (488):  duale  Ausbildung
wurde teilweise entwertet/abgewertet und es werden
zu  wenig  Mittel  bzw.  Zeit  bereitgestellt  (610-614)
(keine Zeit, sich um ihre Azubis zu kümmern)
=> Wie sieht das in der Schweiz aus?
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Rolle  von  Gewerkschaften  und
Arbeitgeberverbänden bei  der  dualen
Berufsausbildung sowie  berufsbegleitender
Weiterbildung  –  wie  genau  funktioniert  die
Zusammenarbeit  in den viel  zitierten „tripartiten
Arrangements“  Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Staat
(Ausbildungszentren...)
– Verbundausbildung wie  AZW  Winterthur
(Maschinenbauindustrie),  Aprentas  Basel
(Chemie/Pharma)
– seit wann gibt es diese Zentren?
– Wie kam  es  zu  dieser  Entwicklung?
Warum gibt es diese Zentren?
– Governance dieser Zentren?
– Flexibilitätsgewinn und Kostenersparnis 
durch Externalisierung?
– Unpassendes Aus- und 
Weiterbildungsangebot?
– Sind Gewerkschaften hier in irgend einer 
Form mit beteiligt?
– Position der Gewerkschaften zu dieser 
Form der „koordinierten/kooperativen 
Externalisierung“?
MNCS UND DUALE AUSBILDUNG:
Unterschiede  D-MNCs  und  US-MNCs bezüglich
Teilnahme  und  Intensität  der  dualen
Berufsausbildung 
„Markenzeichen Ausbildungsbetrieb“ (=>D5)
für  (US-)MNCs  (=>US3...)  im  Sinne  der  „Good
Corporate Citizenship“ 
(Giardini et al. 2005: 76: D-Firmen haben signifikant
höhere Ausbildungsquote als US-MNCs)
(ähnlich  der  Existenz  eines  Betriebsrats  in  D  =>
Giardini et al. 2005: 76)
=>gesellschaftliche  Legitimität/Image  der  Firma
dadurch in CH beeinflusst? (Frage der Visibility von
HR-Praktiken => Giardini et al. 2005: 77)
MNCS UND IR BZW. GEWERKSCHAFTEN:
Unterschiede D-MNCs  vs.  US-MNCs  bezüglich
allgemeiner  Beziehungen  zu und  mit
Gewerkschaften?
Gewerkschaften  als  Sozialpartner  und
gesellschaftliche Legitimität von Firmen
Was können Gewerkschaften hier in der Schweiz
tun, um Unternehmen unter Druck zu setzen?
These:  D-MNC-Manager  haben
„Betriebsratsmindset“:  von  D  aus  müssen
Gewerkschaften  und  andere  Stakeholder  ohnehin
berücksichtigt werden
=> Macht sich das in den IR mit D-MNCs aus Sicht
der Gewerkschaftsvertreter bemerkbar, gerade im
Vergleich  zu  US-MNCs?  (=>„negotiated  approach“
(Wever 1995))
man kann  Gewerkschaften, (in D über die bzw. mit
den  Betriebsräten)  als  Sozialpartner mit  ins  Boot
holen,  um  gesellschaftliche  Legitimität zu
erlangen
– Bsp. CH:  Restrukturierung mit Entlassungen
in  D1,  gemeinsam  mit  Gewerkschaften
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– Rolle  der  lokalen,  sprachregionalen  und
nationalen Presse?
– Rolle der Sozialdemokraten im Parlament?
– Direkte Demokratie, Vetospielerstatus und
öffentliche Meinung/ Aufmerksamkeit 
These: D vs. US-Ansatz der „Corporate Social 
Responsibility“ bzw. „Good Corporate 
Citizenship“ und entsprechender Strategien, 
gesellschaftliche Legitimität zu erlangen
– Kann man das so aus Gewerkschaftssicht
bestätigen?
– Sind  US-MNCs  dennoch  in  GAVs?  Oder
können sie dies vermeiden?
– Wie  funktioniert  die  duale  Ausbildung  in
US-MNCs,  die  berichten,  sie  hätten  keine
Kontakte zu Gewerkschaften?
ordentlich  geregelt, „um  nicht  hinterher  an
anderer Stelle Probleme zu bekommen“
– Welche Art von „Problem“ könnte der D1-
Manager gemeint haben?
– (Giardini et al. 2005: 77) => Legitimität => Wie 
legitim und Anerkannt sind Gewerkschaften in
der Schweiz als gesellschaftlich-politischer 
Akteur?
D-MNCs durch Sozialpartnerschaft:
Einbindung der Gewerkschaften, duale Ausbildung, 
Arbeitsplatzsicherheit, bedeutende Sozialleistungen 
(D8-Jahresbericht: wir haben trotz Krise keine 
unserer gut ausgebildeten Mitarbeiter entlassen – 
teilweiser Lohnverzicht
– „negotiated approach“ (Wever 1995), 
kooperative Beziehungen mit 
Sozialpartnern (typisch für Social System of
Flexible Production - Hollingsworth 1997; 
sowie für koordiniertem/koopertivem 
Business System Whitley 2000; Tüselmann 
2006 => dualer D-MNC-Ansatz: kollektive 
IR und employee relations nebeneinander)
US-MNCs durch öffentlichkeitswirksame 
Aktionen: wie Müllsammeln am Lac Léman, grosse 
Spendenaktionen, freiwilliges Engagement der 
Mitarbeiter in sozialen Projekten (US8-Jahresbericht:
wir haben X Millionen $ für soziale Zwecke 
gespendet, unsere Mitarbeiter haben X Stunden 
Freiwilligenarbeit geleistet; US9-Mitarbeiter haben in 
Entwicklungsprojekten mitgearbeitet) – aber: weit 
verbreitete anti-Union-Ideologie, d.h. Kontakte mit 
Gewerkschaften auf ein absolutes Minimum 
beschränkt und Stärkung der direkten Employee 
Relations
– „unilateral/unitarist approach“ (Wever 
1995), Entscheidungen werden einseitig 
durch Management getroffen, das sich in 
Entscheidungsfreiheit nicht duch kollektive 
Interessenvertretungen einschränken lassen 
möchte
– s.a.  Interview  UNIA/Davoine  193-195:
Partizipation  schwierig  mit
angelsächsischen MNCs
GAVS IN DER SCHWEIZ:
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Rechtlicher Status von GAVs in der Schweiz? 
(=> sofern für allgemeinverbindlich erklärt oder nicht
–  ändert  sich  nur  Gültigkeitsbereich  oder  auch
rechtlicher Status und Verbindlichkeit?)
– Schwierigkeiten,  GAVs  für
allgemeinverbindlich erklären zu lassen?
– Welche Branchen betrifft das (ausser Bau?)
– Deckungsgrad und Regelungsbereiche 
(Sicherheit? Sozialleistugnen? Arbeitszeiten? 
Fortbildungen?...) der GAVs und für 
allgemeinverbindlich erklärte GAVs heute – 
1980er-1990er-Jahre?
– Sind  mehr  D-MNCs  als  US-MNCs von  GAVs
gedeckt?
– Sind mehr KMUs als MNCs in GAVs?
–  (im  Vergleich  zur  Tarifautonomie  in
Deutschland,  wo  das,  was  in  Tarifverträgen
geregelt wurde, quasi gesetzlichen Rang hat und
eingeklagt  werden  kann)  –  Interview
UNIA/Davoine  „Ce  n'est  pas  un  document
juridique“ -  sauf par  le  mécanisme d'extension
qui  permet  de  donner  force  de  loi  à  contrats
collectifs
– Basler  Chemie: bis  Mitte  der  1990er-Jahre
waren als Besonderheit (?) auch Löhne in GAVs
enthalten? (=>Streckeisen 2007)
– Was wurde  früher in  GAVs  geregelt,  was
heutzutage? Gibt es Unterschiede?
– Deckungsgrad der  GAVs nach  Branchen und
Regionen (z.B.  Chemie  Basel  vs.  Chemie
Zürich;  Maschinenbau  vs.  Chemie/Pharma  vs.
Finanzdienstleistungen)? 
– Unterschiede 1980er, 1990er und 2010/11?
SCHWEIZERISCHES UMFELD ALLGEMEIN:
Sinn  für  soziale  Verantwortung  und  Wert  der
Sozialpartnerschaft seitens  der
Unternehmer/Unternehmen
Wie ist das aus Sicht der Gewerkschaften?
– Gibt es Unterschiede:
– zwischen MNCs und KMUs bzw. 
– zwischen US-MNCs und D-MNCs 
– zwischen  versch.  Nationalitäten  der
Direktoren 
Desintegration des CH-Systems der IR?
– Interviewee  US4:  „In  der  Schweiz  gab  es
traditionell  bei  den  Unternehmern  einen
Sinn  für  soziale  Verantwortung  und
Sozialpartnerschaft.  Das  verliert  sich
leider  zunehmend.  Ein  gutes  Beispiel  für
einen  solchen  Unternehmertypus  ist  noch
Hayek von Swatch“)
unterschiedliche Konzeption der CSR US-MNCs vs.
D-MNCs,  Angst  vor  kritischer
Medienberichterstattung...
(Sozialisierung der Direktoren in CH sowie lokale
Verankerung  und  Karrierelogik  =>  US3-Plant
manager, Morgan/Kristensen 2006)?
Interview  UNIA/Davoine:  Schwächung  der
Arbeitgeberverbände und der Gewerkschaften im
Bereich KMU 
=>  zunehmende  „Fragmentierung“  bzw.
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Ressourcenausstattung der Arbeitgeberverbände 
und Gewerkschaften?
Neue Gestaltungsstrategien der 
sozialpartnerschaftlichen Akteure in GAV-
Verhandlungen seit 1990er Jahren?
Verlagerung nicht sozialpartnerschaftlich-
konsensuell geregelter Arbeits-Konflikte von der 
Branchen- auf die politische Ebene?
Zunehmende Verlagerung der 
Lohnverhandlungen auf Betriebsebene?
Gewerkschaftlicher organizationsgrad nach 
Branchen und 
Entwicklung 1980er, 1990er-Jahre und heute?
– Wo sind Gewerkschaften in CH stark, wo nicht,
und warum?
„Desintegration“ des  integrierten/koordinierten
Systems der IR (ähnlich der Situation in D:  Giardini
et  al.  2005:  dort  –  relativ  wenig  genutzte  –
Öffnungklauseln  in  Tarifverträgen  bzw.
Firmentarifverträge)?
Ressourcenausstattung der  kollektiven
Verhandlungspartner  (1980er,  1990er-aktuell)?
(Meyrat  2000,  in  Armingeon/Geissbühler  2000-
mehr Ressourcen=>mehr Konsensbereitschaft?)
seit  1990er-Jahren  vermehrt  Einsatz  von
Gestaltungsstrategien der Akteure, insbes. In GAV-
Verhandlungen  mit  Themenvielfalt,  die
Kompensationsgeschäfte,  Paketlösungen  und
Kreuzkonzessionen ermöglichen (Meyrat 2000, in
Armingeon/Geissbühler 2000: 211, 214)?
Spannungen  und  politische  Interventionen;
Abschwächung der Sozialpartnerschaft  (lt. Interview
UNIA/Davoine  etwas  weniger  problematisch  in
Suisse romande als auf nationaler Ebene?!; (Meyrat
2000,  in  Armingeon/Geissbühler  2000:  216  =>
Veränderungen der Verhandlungsstrukturen auf  der
Mesoebene der  Branchen hatte  mittelfristige
Rückkopplungseffekte  auf  die  Makroebene  der
Politik =>  bislang  konsensuell
sozialpartnerschaftlich  ausgehandelte  Themen
führen  zu  polarisierenden  und  langwierigen
Auseinandersetzungen auf der politischen Bühne)
zunehmende Verlagerung der Lohnverhandlungen
auf  Betriebsebene  (Meyrat  2000,  in
Armingeon/Geissbühler 2000: 216)?
CH-IR IM VERGLEICH ZU D, BETRIEBLICHE EBENE:
Kann  man  in  CH  von  Zweiteilung  der
Arbeitnehmerschaft  in  GAV-  und  nicht  GAV-
gedeckte sprechen?
– (Analog  zu  D:  Giardini  et  al.  2005:  71:
tarifliche  und  ausser-tariflich  Angestellte
(„exempts“)  –  bei  letzteren  greifen  die
tariflichen Regelungen nicht)
– z.B. In D: Entgelt und leistungsabhängiger
Anteil sehr unterschiedlich geregelt; ebenso
Leistungsbeurteilung unterschiedlich,  bei
tariflichen  Angestellten  haben  Betriebsrat
und Gewerkschaften mitzureden
Gibt es in CH  Einfluss des Mitwirkungsgesetzes
und/oder  freiwillig  konstituierter
Arbeitnehmervertretungen?
– in D werden  Betriebsräte oft als  wichtiger
Kommunikationskanal beschrieben
(Giardini et al. 2005: 72)
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Rolle Europäischer Betriebsräte in CH?
Andere  wichtige  Kommunikationskanäle? -  z.B.
Arbeitsgruppen bei Vernehmlassung?
– D4:  in  CH sind  Arbeitnehmervertreter  nicht
wie in D freigestellt, d.h. Sie haben de facto
gar  keine  Zeit,  sich  um  viele  Dinge  zu
kümmern – wie sehen Sie das?
Sonstige Themen, die nicht angesprochen wurden?
Anregungen?
A1.8 Interview template Aprentas
SYSTEMATISCH GESTELLTE FRAGEN RÜCKFRAGEN, ERLÄUTERUNGEN, DETAILS
GESCHICHTE/ROLLE/ZIELE VON APRENTAS
 Wann/Wie ist Aprentas entstanden?
 Was war/waren der/die Grund/Gründe, 
dass Firmen ihre Ausbildungen in 
Aprentas zusammenlegen?
 Wie ist die Expansion zu erklären?
 Finanzierung von Aprentas
 Angebot an Ausbildungsgänge und 
Azubi-Zahlen?
 zunächst im Raum Basel - dann auch 
Schaffhausen und seit 2011 Bern 
 Kofinanzierung durch die öffentliche Hand
Über Trägerschaft der Berufsschulen?
 Firmen
 Verteilung der 680 Azubis auf die 13 Berufe 
(welche?); wenn möglich 
 auch Zahlen zu Anzahl der Azubis der 
grössten Firmen
ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT PARTNERN 
 Welche Rolle spielen staatliche 
organizationen für Aprentas?
 Welche Rolle spielen Verbände?
 Welche Rolle spielen Gewerkschaften?
 Welche Rolle spielen die 
 Kantone Bern/Basel/Schaffhausen
 Bund
 Chemische Industrie
 Regionale Arbeitgeberverbände
 Welche Rolle spielen die Träger- bzw. 
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Partnerfirmen?
 Welche Rolle spielen andere 
Ausbildungszentren?
Gründerfirmen (Novartis, 
Syngenta und BASF) im Vergleich zu den 
anderen Mitgliedern?
 AZW
 Spezialisierung auf 
Branche/Regionen/Firmen?
ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT MNCS
 Gibt es Unterschiede in der 
Zusammenarbeit bzgl. der Nationalität?
 Was für eine Rolle spielen 
Amerikanische Firmen?
 Was für eine Rolle spielen 
Chemie/Pharma gegenüber anderen 
Branchen?
 Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen grossen 
und kleineren Firmen?
 Woher stammen die Firmen, mit denen sie 
zusammen arbeiten? 
 Prozentuale Anteile?
 Gibt es Unterschiede?
 Z.B. Cilag, J+J, Drug’on Pharma, Huntsman, 
SI Group
 US-Firmen Brownfield und bereits integriert?
 Warum ist Schindler von der 
Maschinenindustrie aus Luzern involviert?
AUSBILDUNG IN DER SCHWEIZ
 Generell nachlassende 
Ausbildungsbereitschaft in CH?
 Rolle von Ausbildungszentren? 
 Gibt es politischen 
Druck/Unterstützung?
 Trittbrettfahrer
 Unterschiede Branchen/Regionen/KMU, 
MNC’s?
 Bedarfsentwicklung
 Seit wann gibt es diese Zentren?
 Wie kam es zu dieser Entwicklung?
 Warum gibt es diese Zentren?
A1.9 Interview template Swiss Employers' Association
SYSTEMATISCH GESTELLTE FRAGEN RÜCKFRAGEN, ERLÄUTERUNGEN, DETAILS
ROLLE DES ARBEITGEBERVERBANDES 
- Rolle des Arbeitgeberverbandes im - Zunehmende Bedeutung des Staates?
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Verhältnis zu Gewerkschaften/Firmen?
- Zusammenarbeit mit Gewerkschaften
- Zusammenarbeit mit Firmen
- Spezielle Zusammenarbeit mit MNC’s?
- Warum?
- Unterschiede zwischen 
Amerikanischen/Deutschen Firmen?
SCHWEIZER ARBEITSMARKT
- Gibt es allgemeine Tendenzen und 
Entwicklungen im Arbeitsmarkt bzw. im 
Arbeitgeberverband?
- Personenfreizügigkeit, Austritte
- Unterschiede zwischen KMU’s, MNC’s?
ARBEITSRECHT IN DER SCHWEIZ
- Was sind die wesentlichen Merkmale 
des Schweizer Arbeitsrechtes? 
(institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen)
- Wie ist die Rolle des GAV’s im 
Verhältnis zum Arbeitsrecht?
- Stärken/Schwächen? (Arbeitsrecht, Verbände,
Wirtschaft, Politik, Steuern etc.)
- Können MNC’s das umgehen?
- Obligationenrecht 
(Einzelarbeitsvertrag/Gesamtarbeits-
vertrag/Normalarbeitsvertrag)
- Arbeitsgesetz (allgemeiner 
Gesundheitsschutz, Arbeits- und Ruhezeit, 
Jugendliche, schwangere Frauen und stillende
Mütter)
- Unfallversicherungsgesetz (Arbeitssicherheit)
GAVS IN DER SCHWEIZ
- Warum GAV’s aus Sicht des 
Arbeitgeberverbandes?
- Verbreitung von GAV’s?
- Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung, 
gibt es Schwierigkeiten?
- Inhalt der GAV’s? 
(Sozialleistungen/Arbeitszeit/Fortbildung
- Branchen/Firmen (ev. Basler Chemie)
- Regionen
- KMU/MNC’s
- Durchsetzbarkeit?
- Früher, heute?
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en)
- Unterschiede Deckungsgrad GAV’s von
Firmen unterschiedlicher Länder?
- Unterschiede KMU/MNC?
- Kann man in CH von Zweiteilung der 
Arbeitnehmerschaft in GAV- und nicht
GAV-gedeckte sprechen?
- Unterschiede zwischen Branchen?
- Unterschiede 80/90/2010?
- These, MNC’s schmettern Verhandlungen ab 
mit Verweis auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit?
- Beispiele von Branchen mit schlechter 
Deckung? (Versicherungen)
- Warum
ARBEITGEBERVERBAND UND DUALE AUSBILDUNG
- Generell nachlassende 
Ausbildungsbereitschaft in CH?
- Rolle des Arbeitgeberverbandes? 
- Gibt es politischen Druck?
- Rolle des Arbeitgeberverbandes bei 
Verbundausbildungen? 
(AZW/Aprentas)
- Trittbrettfahrer
- Unterschiede Branchen/Regionen/KMU, 
MNC’s?
- Bedarfsentwicklung
- Seit wann gibt es diese Zentren?
- Wie kam es zu dieser Entwicklung?
- Warum gibt es diese Zentren?
- Ist der Arbeitgeberverband beteiligt?
SOZIALPARTNERSCHAFT IN DER SCHWEIZ
- Abnehmender Sinn für 
Sozialpartnerschaft der Unternehmen?
- Relative Schwäche von Arbeitgeber 
und Arbeitnehmerverbänden wegen 
Dezentralisierung?
- Konsequenzen der Verlagerung auf 
Betriebsebene?
- Veränderte Rolle des 
Arbeitgeberverbandes?
- Gibt es in CH Einfluss des 
Mitwirkungsgesetzes und/oder freiwillig 
konstituierter Arbeitnehmervertretungen?
- Desintegration des integrierten CH-
Systems der IR?
- Verlagerung nicht 
sozialpartnerschaftlich-konsensuell 
geregelter Arbeits-Konflikte von der 
Branchen- auf die politische Ebene?
- Unterschiede KMU/MNC?
- Ausländische MNC’s?
- Nationalität der Manager?
- Unterschiede Branchen? Regionen? Gründe?
- Unterschiedliche Strategien KMU/MNC?
- Freistellung von Arbeitsnehmervertretern
- Vermehrte Streiks
- Verschiebung der Arbeitnehmerstruktur
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- Prägung des Angelsächsischen 
Modells ?
SOZIALPARTNERSCHAFT UND MNC’S
- Unterschiede MNC’s zu KMU’s in der 
Sozialpartnerschaft ?
- Gibt es Unternehmen die sich gegen 
GAV’s wehren?
- Unterschiede nach Herkunftsland?
- Sind US MNC’s in GAV’s?
- Unterschiede nach Branche?
- Vergabe von Aufträgen?
- Fusionen?
A1.10 Interview template SECO
DIE WICHTIGSTEN REGELUNGEN/REGELUNGSBEREICHE IN GAVS
=> was wird generell in GAVs geregelt?
- Arbeitszeiten
- Arbeitsbedingungen
- Mindestlöhne 
- Löhne
- Arbeitsfriede  relativ und absolut
- in wie vielen % der GAVs gibt es hierzu 
Bestimmungen?
- Unterschiede nach Regionen und/oder Branchen?
- in wie vielen % der GAVs sind Löhne enthalten?
- in welchen Branchen/Regionen/ 
Unternehmensgrössen etc. eher ja oder eher nein?
- Tendenzen? (z.B. Entwicklung in Basler Chemie 
seit 1990er-Jahren Herausnahme der Löhne aus 
GAVs, zunehmende Verlagerung der 
Lohnverhandlungen auf Betriebsebene (Meyrat 
2000, in Armingeon/Geissbühler 2000: 216)?)
- in wie vielen % der GAVs ist relativer oder absoluter
Arbeitsfriede vorgesehen? - Unterschiede nach 
Branchen und Regionen?
- Bestimmungen in den wichtigsten GAVs?
- Tendenzen?
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- Kündigungsschutz 
- Sozialleistungen &
- Sozialpläne
- duale Ausbildung
- Gibt es Bestimmungen, die über gesetzliche 
Normen hinausgehen? Umfang?
- Gibt es Bestimmungen, die im Fall von 
Entlassungen/Massenentlassungen Sozialpläne 
vorsehen? Umfang?
- gibt es in GAVs Bestimmungen zur dualen 
Ausbildung?
- Was wird geregelt?
- Unterschiede Branche/Region?
ALLGEMEINVERBINDLICHKEITSERKLÄRUNG VON GAVS
Prozedere und Voraussetzungen?
In welchen Branchen/Regionen wurden GAVs für 
allgemeinverbindlich erklärt?
Aus welchen Gründen?
Tendenzen?
Auswirkungen geschwächter 
Arbeitgeberverbände auf kollektive 
Arbeitsbeziehungen/GAVs 
Tendenzen?
Defragmentierung des CH-IR-Systems und Rolle 
der GAVs (wirkt dem entgegen?)
Konfliktualität und Sozialpartnerschaft
=> Bedeutende excess coverage von GAVs in der 
CH (Venn 2009?)
=> Interview Pardini/UNIA: Gewerkschaften haben 
fusioniert, Arbeitgeberverbände sind aber schwächer
geworden/keine Verpflichtungsfähigkeit => mit 
wem soll man da verhandeln?...
=> Defragmentierung von Giardini et al.. 2005 für D 
festgestellt
Meyrat  2000,  in  Armingeon/Geissbühler  2000:  216
=>  Veränderungen  der  Verhandlungsstrukturen  auf
der  Mesoebene der  Branchen hatte  mittelfristige
Rückkopplungseffekte  auf  die  Makroebene  der
Politik =>  bislang  konsensuell
sozialpartnerschaftlich  ausgehandelte  Themen
führen  zu  polarisierenden  und  langwierigen
Auseinandersetzungen  auf  der  politischen
Bühne)
UNTERSCHIEDE MNCS VS. KMUS/CH-UNTERNEHMEN, 
D-MNCS VS. US-MNCS 
GAVS UND MNCS :
Unterscheiden sich MNCs allgemein hinsichtlich 
ihrer kollektiven Arbeitsbeziehungen in der 
Schweiz von KMUs bzw. stärker national 
schweizerisch ausgerichteten Unternehmen wie 
Migros oder Swisscom?
Inwiefern? 
Verbreitung von Haus-GAVs für grössere 
Unternehmen? (=> Johnson&Johnson 
Schaffhausen)
MNCs eher nicht in GAVs?
Abhängigkeit von Branche, Region oder Tätigkeit in 
der Schweiz? (Produktion vs. Management...)
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Stehen MNCs oder CH-Unternehmen unter Druck, 
einem GAV beitzutreten? 
Inwiefern?
GAVs und gesellschaftliche Legitimität?
Was treibt Firmen dazu, einen GAV abzuschliessen?
=> gesetzliche Vorschriften, Medien, 
Gewerkschaften, kantonale Regierungen, 
Konsumenten, Vorteile durch Sozialpartnerschaft...
D-MNCS VS. US-MNCS:
Können Sie Unterschiede zwischen D-MNCs, CH-
MNCs und US-MNCs hinsichtlich Ihrer kollektiven 
Atbeitsbeziehungen feststellen?
Inwiefern?
Gibt es Zahlen zu GAVs, die mit MNCs 
verschiedener Ursprungsländer abgeschlossen 
wurden bzw. denen diese beigetreten sind?
=> pluralist HRM in D-MNCs/negotiated approach? 
(Müller 1999, Wever 1995)
Tüselmann 2006 => dualer D-MNC-Ansatz: 
kollektive IR und employee relations nebeneinander
vs. unitarist HRM in US-MNCs Entscheidungen 
werden einseitig durch Management getroffen, das 
sich in Entscheidungsfreiheit nicht duch kollektive 
Interessenvertretungen einschränken lassen möchte
s.a. Interview UNIA/Davoine 193-195: Partizipation 
schwierig mit angelsächsischen MNCs
Sonstige aktuelle/wichtige Themen, die nicht angesprochen worden sind?
Anregungen?
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A2 The MAXQDA coding system
Interview  transcripts  have  been  analysed  using  MAXQDA 10  sofware,  following  a  template
analysis  approach. As we have seen,  in such an approach,  thematic issues in text  passages are
attributed to corresponding codes in the coding system. Starting with a rather limited set of mostly
descriptive codes corresponding to the large topics defined in our interview template, our coding
system, was successively developed and refined in  the course of the investigation.  During this
process, higher- and lower-level codes were established, and interpretive codes were defined so that
a higher level of analytical abstraction could be achieved.
The codes at the left boarder are first level codes with every sub-code level going one space towards
the right.  The numbers  in  brackets  indicate  the numbers of codings  listed under  the respective
codes.
Codesystem [6282]
Information on interviewee [47]
local career orientation, local embeddedness [5]
corporate career orientation [9]
work experience abroad (international) [22]
job/firm tenure [39]
vocational education (has done dual VET) [6]
Micro-level variables [0]
Facts MNC [6]
size (employees) [15]
activities [23]
strategic priorities [25]
internationalization_strategy and growth history (acquisitions? [15]
year of foundation [6]
Family-owned enterprise [16]
organization (Divisions, regions, matrix, int. Integration) [65]
shared service centres; centres of excellence/expertise [41]
structural variables [3]
decisions [23]
perceived level of transparency and trust [30]
mechanisms of decisison-making [58]
strategic decisional discretion/margin of subsid [34]
who decides (financial & managerial issues: investment,
product [41]
who decides on HR issues? [34]
coordination [13]
kind of coordination mechanism- HR meetings etc. [61]
ISO processes/process quality [3]
existence/use of int. HR guidelines (Y/N) [29]
Communication [21]
directions and partners, int.HR/Mgt.-meetings [51]
channels [70]
frequency [48]
mechanisms [15]
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Control [31]
influence of latest international scandals (Siemens...) [5]
kind of control mechanism(s) [44]
personal direct [23]
impersonal indirect [32]
ISO processes/process quality [9]
coercive comparisons, performance comparisons [12]
existence of a common information system (Y/N) [40]
Reporting [40]
subsid reports to whom/which unit? [29]
Strategy/mindset [1]
global/ethnocentric [44]
multidomestic/polycentric [42]
transnational/geocentric (non-ethnocentric) [30]
Facts Subsid [12]
activities,business area, division, EMEA HQ, subsid role/agency [86]
Specific subsid competencies of interest for HQ/power resources [79]
Strategic priorities [36]
Year of foundation [23]
history/market entry (Greenfield/Brownfield) [50]
Market orientation (global-regional-national/local) [50]
Size [36]
non-production site [2]
Why in Switzerland [21]
HR practice transfer ; standardized & localised practices [0]
Transfer/centralization: willingness, process, mechanisms, conduits [23]
HQ-subid cooperation policy making,innovation,HR practices) [25]
will to transfer [69]
reasons for transfer [67]
Transfer / standardization negative (probl, diver.interests...) [64]
In case of conflict over transferred/standardized HR practice [38]
transfer process - who? how? control? [55]
conduits (communcation/coordination) [40]
broad frameworks/guidelines [21]
change management team [3]
expatriate involvement [10]
corporate culture [64]
trainings, information, explanations, workshops [18]
transfer via SAP/common HR-IT and processes [31]
best practice scheme [35]
transfer control [18]
HR practice transfer as objective [9]
Reverse Transfer [19]
standardized/transferred (1:1) practices [33]
common HR IT and organization, HR process standardization [31]
performance mgt.t (process) & rewards [60]
safety and health, security, risk management [10]
pay policy / compensation-benefits, local benchm.pay increases [47]
payroll administration [4]
promotion processes, career development/succession [12]
pers. development/career, competence mgt.,training (HQ-courses)
[40]
expatriates/mobility (compensation, administration,etc.) [22]
recruitment (standards/process/employer branding/trainee progr) [30]
Socialization practices [0]
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Corporate values & culture / way of doing things [36]
Code of Conduct [35]
code is trained on and tested [17]
Code is part of employment contract [10]
employee satisfaction surveys (social dialogue/ER) [22]
diversity policy [19]
sustainability policy (also "people sustainability") [12]
job descriptions/job families [12]
Quality standards / legal compliance / six sigma / ISO [8]
legal affairs (centralised function) [1]
work-life-balance [5]
harassment [4]
HR administrative / day-to-day business / contracts [3]
global service contracts (insurances, pensions, tax control) [3]
global directive for restructuring/reduction in workforce [2]
senior/management level [6]
performance mgt. for senior management only [8]
bonuses, variable, performance-related pay [13]
high potential/talent management [37]
training,intl.mgt.devlpt(promo criteria)succession/career plang. [33]
leadership instruments / principles / guidelines [23]
recruitment (senior mgt. level) [11]
appraisal interviews, 180°/360° [5]
job evaluation [2]
local adaptations (reasons?how argued against 1:1 transfer?) [67]
local practices (why?) [48]
local agency, power resources [8]
tax, social & health insurance,pensions,administration [22]
recruitment [35]
university marketing activities(Hochschulmarketing) [1]
local importance of job reference & personal meetings [3]
lay-offs, indemnity amounts (though no legal requirement) [11]
local mobility-provider (tax, social insurance, work permits) [4]
IR [11]
"works council" negotiations with employee commission [4]
redundancy programme/social compensation plan [2]
GAV for shop-floor (shift work/production, clerical employees) [14]
working time management: schedules, flexible working time [6]
training/developmt (local languages, shop floor techn.training) [32]
joint training schemes (participation) [2]
leadership training&principles [4]
dual VET [26]
compensation/pay system, benefits, local benchmarking [28]
salary [7]
payroll [5]
well-being at work, health [2]
performance appraisal (forms/instruments)-development discussio [9]
job descriptions [3]
high potential identification tools [2]
diversity - equal pay policy CH (confederation as client) [1]
succession/talent management - not centralised (!!!) [3]
below middle/senior manager level [2]
recruitment [1]
bonus [4]
local performance mgt., salary increases, fixing obectives [6]
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training [6]
HR practices [1]
current HR topics/issues [56]
HR-issues/problems same for HQ and subsid? (Y/N) [19]
positive experiences with HR practices [23]
negative experiences with HR practices [22]
IR/ER, communication(direct/representative channels) [25]
employee surveys [3]
employee survey: YES [22]
European works council [4]
workers representatives [14]
union /GAV [18]
no workers' representatives [6]
no union [21]
participation in local associations [15]
participation in local associations NO [1]
participation in local associations YES [41]
reasons for participation in loc. associations? activities? [39]
recruitment & selection [62]
performance mgt.: appraisal, pay, objectives [104]
rather fixed salary (few bonus or performance-related pay) [7]
performance-related pay [30]
profit-sharing [15]
Stock option schemes/share ownership [7]
promotion (criteria) & careers [48]
lifetime employment [16]
lifetime employment NO [11]
lifetime employment YES [8]
training, personnel development / int.or external labour market [117]
internal labour market and mgt. development [4]
high potential identification (structured, formalised) [14]
high potential identification (structured, formalised): NO [3]
high potential identification (structured, formalised): YES [32]
international management development programmes (Y/N) [12]
internat. mgt. devl prog. NO [6]
international mgt. devl. prog. YES [21]
Mobility programmes [11]
mobility programmes: NO [8]
mobility programmes: YES [31]
directions of mobility (HQ-> subsid...) [16]
engagement with dual VET [19]
apprentices NO [6]
apprentices YES [22]
reasons, number of apprentices [31]
Diversity Management Programme [8]
Diversity Management NO [5]
Diversity Management YES [19]
corporate values/ motto/ mission statement [30]
typical elements (US-D-CH) [1]
typically US-American [14]
informal clothing style [1]
USA = "a transient nation" [1]
short termism [6]
financial targets/objectives (financial market driven) [7]
more long-term elements (corp. culutre, career necessities...) [7]
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ethnocentrism - English language & practices from US "invading" [28]
lack of understanding for European differences [10]
centralization [32]
great exception [3]
strong willingness to standardize, thorough implementation [12]
standard processes [25]
cascading [5]
highly standardized perf.mgt.syst.-strong nexus perf-pay&career
[25]
quarterly/annual HR processes [7]
Safety & health,security,risk mgt.--(busn.case/inst.effect?) [26]
strong diversity polic:busin.case / US inst.effect? [17]
codes of conduct (central tool, signed, tested...)inst.effect? [17]
Corporate values and engineering corporate culture [31]
institutional partnerships for mgt. training with selected univ [5]
strong reliance on IT systems & processes (competences, knowled [14]
e-learning [6]
exception - outdated/no common IT in US MNC!!! [3]
exception: structured training programmes (compulsory like in D [5]
unilateralism & no unions [7]
decisions fast, top-down, universalist, unilateral (e.g. pay!) [23]
non-union,works councils and ER to avoid unions [8]
direct communication with employees [12]
Pervasive market mentality, individualism - low trust [24]
strong performance orientation [3]
labour market benchmarking-strong competitve market approach [11]
arm's length relations between people [10]
principle of contract, impersonal, process & numbers controlled [25]
US anti-trust legislation: impact on soc.rationality/associatio [3]
"active" career, entrepreneurial, employability-driven [19]
frequent changes/no continuity - short job tenures at the top [1]
individual salary negotiations [2]
stock options [1]
Performance awards-symbolic [2]
Universalism, legalistic approach, importance of standard rules [8]
Compliance, SOX,Codes of Conduct,moralizing [25]
transparency [2]
communication style: everything is fantastic, no criticism [0]
easy to grow social network [2]
Make yourself heard, promote yourself [5]
informal communication style, low power distance [7]
Hooray-mentality, Let's Go for change,message is important [4]
CSR/Employer Image-the business case for CSR (...or not!) [9]
business case for CSR, volunteer work,"marketing CSR" [13]
CSR is NOT connected with lay-offs [3]
a priori no understanding for CH-CSR and dual VET [3]
Anglo-Saxonization (=> global inter-corp. isomorphism) [25]
...but what is "Anglo Saxon", after all? [5]
typically German [29]
institutional D-NBS effects [1]
works council effects [2]
institutional (forced) consensus [7]
Works council mindset_inst. influence on socialised
rationality [20]
more sensibility for local differences, more moderate
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than US-M [2]
rather "humane" performance appraisal [7]
democratic leadership style, much co-determination
[3]
works council corporate isomorphism (coercive/veto-player) [5]
labour market institutions (collective bargaining, VET, labour [1]
tariff and exempt employees - diploma/career influence [2]
"passive" careers internal,being proposed for promotions [19]
long internal careers and job tenures, functional careers
[11]
D different labour market (<=> CH),whole families in firm
[3]
compensation aligned [2]
culture of training & "idée de cursus" for promotion [38]
technical skills/technical competence are key [7]
large-scale dual VET (in D-production operations) [9]
participation in joint training schemes(AZW/Aprentas) [13]
CSR (see Schlie/Warner 2000; Kieser 2004) [7]
stakeholder-orientation [3]
social responsibility, lifetime employment, job garantee [8]
CSR and dual VET/apprentice training [7]
CSR and union invovement in lay-offs, generous social plans [12]
Kurzarbeit, short-time work (not numerical flexibility) [2]
associational form of coordination [3]
German IR/ER_collective (unions,councils) AND direct (surveys) [2]
old-school expat practices [2]
many Germans in CH subsids [5]
communication German style [15]
communication more formal, more "Sie" [5]
D communication more direct than CH [8]
separation private-professional life [2]
hierarchy [11]
Apéro elements/sense for community/Betriebsgemeinschaft [5]
titels imporant in D [5]
problems in latin countries (strict rules on titles) [1]
co-operative style (in HR HQ-subsid relations) [1]
car policy [2]
long term logic, sustainability, trustful relations [9]
efficiency/ results-orientation [3]
speed, agility [1]
cost consciousness [2]
important planning, structures, slowness,low mistake-tolerance [14]
tendency towards bureaucracy "deutsche Gründlichkeit" [11]
control more informal and less than in US-MNCs (except D1? [9]
typically Swiss [49]
US cultural elements that don't work in CH -low internalization [14]
less HR managers with university HR degree (other degrees) [2]
Swiss values [5]
Quality of life orientation (flexible working time) [1]
good food [4]
modesty-keeping a low profile [7]
perfectionism, quality,order,universalism,smugness (spiessigkt) [20]
performace orientation, dependability/reliability [9]
Sonderfall,local bound, insular mentality,self-centred,Willensn [24]
sustainability, stable client relations => demand for collabora [5]
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sustainability and public transport [1]
many SMEs in local CH economy [4]
culture of trust, e.g.less control of collaborators [9]
importance of personal contacts, trustful relations, rituals [47]
social activities with colleagues outside work [1]
apero culture [19]
strengths, chances, opportunities [4]
political stability, social peace, security, patent protection [3]
quality of life/attractiveness of living conditions [8]
bank secrecy [1]
geographic position, infrastructure, skilled workforce [3]
multilingualism of Swiss staff as advantage [2]
high quality processes / process competence [10]
highly flexible collaborative NBS/legal framework [4]
lean state / militia / associational coordination [8]
tax system [8]
legal limbo (grey areas),flexible syst.co-operation&negotiatio [26]
lobbying - political and economic elites intertwined [12]
decentralised IR - sector/industry, region [13]
GAVs / AV-GAVs, wage floor (minimum wages) [55]
GAVs and social plans [2]
NAVs (Normalarbeitsverträge) [2]
wage bargaining on plant/firm level [18]
IR_labour market & labour law liberal [27]
strong employers' associations [9]
weak unions - but institutional/politcal veto player power
[19]
weaker worker representatives [8]
social partnership [25]
industrial peace/labour peace [2]
short-time work (stricter than in D) supported by
state & GAVs [4]
few strikes, but increasing [2]
co-operation, negotiation, tailor-made solutions.../agency [19]
local co-operative networks (HR/IR associations) [43]
Geneva/EMEA-HQ bringing international dimension
into MNC [6]
local, cantonal solutions (EU-free movement of
persons)/customs [9]
dual VET, joint training schemes-competitive supports to
MNCs [52]
weaknesses, problemes, threats [4]
Swiss Employment Act (Arbeitsgesetz) - old-fashioned, rigid [4]
non-EU member, quotas for foreigners (non-EU) [16]
high labour costs & cost of living - efficiency, cost pressure; [4]
tough labour market,difficult: find qualified staff,retention [17]
federalism, languages, tax systems, customs = additional costs [27]
Suisse alémanique - Suisse romande [9]
developments/changes in CH system [35]
consensus/concordance - non formal-institutional,(<=>D), [23]
change resistance, critical/challenging new practices [23]
participation/consultation as a must (dir.democracy)/decisions [16]
leaderhsip style: low power distance (?), decision-making [31]
communication Swiss style: Duzen,informal, personal [38]
insisting on use of local language: French [2]
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dialect (Germanic CH) [8]
Swiss-Germans and Germans particular relations [20]
problems with standard German [8]
indirect, a priori consensus/no debate (Auseinandersetzung) [13]
more disponibility for interruptions/informal [4]
faster and more flexible, less administration than D [6]
social control, Good Citizenship, good treatment of persons,CSR [25]
multiple encounters in life, local press,pers,relations(clients [6]
lay-offs - no hire & fire although flexible labour market [12]
CSR and union involvement in restructuring (negotiating legitim [2]
CSR and local manager careers [8]
CSR and dual VET [15]
direct democracy [4]
confidentiality [3]
pragmatism [3]
more informal clothing than in D [2]
expats - roles [49]
Isomorphism(normative+mimetic)exchange in networks [6]
References
24 Heures (2012). ‘Publicité Licenciements. Genève se mobilise après la fermeture de D7 
pharmaceuticals division’. 24 Heures,  25.04.2012. Available at 
http://www.24heures.ch/suisse/geneve-mobilise-fermeture/story/23488449.
Ackermann, E. (2008). Der SGB und seine Gewerkschaften.: Eine Kurzdarstellung mit Hinweisen 
auf die Geschichte der Gewerkschaften in der Schweiz. Available at 
http://www.sgb.ch/downloads/Broschuere_SGB_deutsch.pdf.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997). ‘Formal and real authority in organizations’. Journal of Political 
Economy, 105 (1): 1–29.
Aharoni, Y. and Brock, D. M. (2010). ‘International business research: Looking back and looking 
forward’. Journal of International Management, 16 (1): 5–15.
Albert, M. (1993). Capitalism vs. capitalism: How America's obsession with individual 
achievement and short-term profit has led it to the brink of collapse. New York: Four Wall Eight
Windows.
Aldrich, H. (1976). ‘Resource dependence and interorganizational relations: Local employment 
service offices and social services sector organizations’. Administration & society, 7 (4): 419–
53.
Almond, P. (2011a). ‘Re-visiting ‘country of origin’ effects on HRM in multinational corporations’. 
Human Resource Management Journal, 21 (3): 258–71.
—— (2011b). ‘The sub-national embeddedness of international HRM’. Human Relations, 64 (4): 
531–51.
Almond, P., Edwards, T. and Clark, I. (2003). ‘Multinationals and changing national business 
systems in Europe: towards the 'shareholder value' model?’. Industrial Relations Journal, 34 (5):
430–45.
Almond, P., Edwards, T., Colling, T., Ferner, A. and Gunnigle, P. (2005). ‘Unraveling home and 
host country effects: An investigation of the HR policies of an American multinational in four 
European countries’. Industrial Relations, 44 (2): 276–305.
Alvesson, M. (2002). Understanding organizational culture. London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
525
Amable, B. (2009). The diversity of modern capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amos, J., Böni, E., Donati, M., Hupka, S., Meyer, T. and Stalder, B. E. (2003). Wege in die 
nachobligatorische Ausbildung: Die ersten zwei Jahre nach Austritt aus der obligatorischen 
Schule ; Zwischenergebnisse des Jugendlängsschnitts TREE. Neuchâtel: BFS.
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M. and Holm, U. (2007). ‘Balancing subsidiary influence in the federative
MNC: a business network view’. Journal of International Business Studies, 38 (5): 802–18.
Andeweg, R. B. (2000). ‘Consociational Democracy’. Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (1): 
509–36.
Armingeon, K. (2001). ‘Schweiz. Das Zusammenspiel von langer demokratischer Tradition, 
direkter Demokratie, Föderalismus und Korporatismus’. In: W. Reutter and P. Rütters (eds.), 
Verbände und Verbandssysteme in Europa. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 405–26.
Armingeon, K. and Emmenegger, P. (2007). ‘Die Erosion des schweizerischen Modells’. In: H. 
Scholtz and M. Nollert (eds.), Schweizer Wirtschaft - ein Sonderfall? Zürich: Seismo, pp. 175–
207.
Aubert, G. (2005). ‘L'entreprise et le droit du travail: l'exemple suisse’. Droit social (2): 147–51.
Avery, G., Donnenberg, O., Gick, W. and Hilb, M. (1999). ‘Challenges for management 
development in the German-speaking nations for the twenty-first century’. Journal of 
Management Development, 18 (1): 18–31.
Bae, J., Chen, S.-J. and Lawler, J. J. (1998). ‘Variations in human resource management in Asian 
countries: MNC home-country and host-country effects’. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 9 (4): 653–70.
Barmeyer, C. I. and Davoine, E. (2008). ‘Culture et Gestion en Allemagne: La Machine "Bien 
Huilée"’. In: E. Davel, J.-P. Dupuis and J.-F. Chanlat (eds.), Gestion en Contexte Interculturel: 
Approches, problématiques, pratiques et plongées. Québec: Presses de l'Univ. Laval, pp. V.3: 1-
39.
—— (2011). ‘Die Implementierung wertefundierter nordamerikanischer Verhaltenskodices in 
deutschen und französischen Tochtergesellschaften: Eine vergleichende Fallstudie’. Zeitschrift 
für Personalforschung, 25 (1): 5–27.
—— (2012). ‘Unternehmenskultur und interkulturelle Personalentwicklung in der internationalen 
Unternehmung - Das Beispiel der D1 Gruppe’. In: J. Zentes, B. Swoboda and D. Morschett 
(eds.), Fallstudien zum internationalen Management: Grundlagen - Praxiserfahrungen - 
Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 769–86.
Bartlett, C. A. and Ghoshal, S. (1986). ‘Tap your subsidiaries for global reach’. Harvard Business 
Review, 64 (6): 87–94.
—— (1998). Managing across borders: The transnational solution, 2nd edn. Boston, Mass.: 
Harvard Business School Press.
Bartlett, C. A., Ghoshal, S. and Birkinshaw, J. M. (2004). Transnational management: Text cases 
and readings in cross-border management, 4th edn. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Baudenbacher, C. (2001). ‘Kartellrechtsreform 2001: Nach dem Aufstieg in die Oberste Liga 1995 
nun die Qualifikation für die Championsleague?’. In: J. Furrer and B. Gehrig (eds.), Aspekte der
schweizerischen Wirtschaftspolitik. Chur, Zürich: Rüegger, pp. 353–72.
Bauer, M. and Bertin-Mourot, B. (1996). Vers un modèle européen de dirigeants ou Trois modèles 
contrastés de production de l'autorité légitime au sommet des grandes entreprises. Paris, 
Biarritz: Boyden; Abacus.
Beaumont, P., Cressey, P. and Jakobsen, P. (1990). ‘Key Industrial Relations: West German 
Subsidiaries in Britain’. Employee Relations, 12 (6): 3–7.
Beaumont, P. and Townley, B. (1985). ‘Non-Union American Plants in Britain: Their Employment 
Practices’. Relationnes Industrielles, 40 (4): 810–25.
526
Becker-Ritterspach, F. A. A. (2009). Hybridization of MNE subsidiaries: The automotive sector in 
India. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Beckert, J. (2003). ‘Economic Sociology and Embeddedness: How Shall We Conceptualize 
Economic Action?’. Journal of Economic Issues, 37 (3): 769–87.
Beechler, S., Bird, A. and Raghuram, S. (1993). ‘Linking business strategy and human resource 
management practices in multinational corporations: A theoretical framework’. Advances in 
International and Comparative Management, 8: 199–215.
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M. and Zimmermann, H. (2006). ‘An Integrated Framework of 
Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation’. European financial management the journal of the 
European Financial Management Association, 12 (2): 249–83.
Bélanger, J. and Edwards, P. K. (2006). ‘Towards a Political Economy Framework: TNCs as 
National and Global Players’. In: A. Ferner, J. Quintanilla and C. Sánchez-Runde (eds.), 
Multinationals, institutions and the construction of transnational practices: Convergence and 
diversity in the global economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 24–51.
Beloucif, A., Lal, D. and Strachan, P. A. (2010). ‘'Tell him I called.' Some Practical Considerations 
in Gaining Research Access to Organisations’. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary 
Research in Business, 2 (4): 17–41.
Bender, C., Grassl, H. and Schaal, M. (2007). ‘Der Schweizer Arbeitsmarkt: Sonderfall unter 
Modernisierungsdruck’. In: T. S. Eberle and K. Imhof (eds.), Sonderfall Schweiz. Zürich: 
Seismo, pp. 172–87.
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology
of knowledge. New York: Doubleday.
Bergier, J.-F. (1990). Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 
2nd edn. Zürich: Benziger.
Bergmann, A. (1986). ‘Management Schweizer Art’. Die Unternehmung, 40 (4): 289–94.
—— (1990). ‘Nationale Kultur - Unternehmenskultur: Erkenntnisse aus einer empirischen 
Untersuchung’. Die Unternehmung, 44 (5): 360–70.
—— (1994). Le "Swiss way of management": Ou les évidences cachées des entreprises suisses ce 
qui fait marcher les entreprises suisses et ce qui leur pose problème. Paris: Ed. ESKA.
Berufsbildungsgesetz (BBiG) (2007).
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (1972).
Birkinshaw, J. M. and Morrison, A. J. (1995). ‘Configurations of Strategy and Structure in 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations’. Journal of International Business Studies, 26 (4): 
729–53.
Bisman, J. (2010). ‘Postpositivism and Accounting Research: A (Personal) Primer on Critical 
Realism’. Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, 4 (4): 3–25.
Björkman, I. (2006). ‘International human resource management research and institutional theory’. 
In: G. K. Stahl and I. Björkman (eds.), Handbook of research in international human resource 
management. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 463–74.
Björkman, I. and Stahl, G. K. (2006). ‘International human resource management research: an 
introduction to the field’. In: G. K. Stahl and I. Björkman (eds.), Handbook of research in 
international human resource management. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 1–11.
Bluhm, K. (2001). ‘Exporting or Abandoning the 'German Model'?: Labour Policies of German 
Manufacturing Firms in Central Europe’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 7 (2): 153–
73.
Boggs, J. S. and Rantisi, N. M. (2003). ‘The 'relational turn' in economic geography’. Journal of 
economic geography, 3 (2): 109–16.
Bond, M. A. and Pyle, J. L. (1998). ‘Diversity Dilemmas at Work’. Journal of Management Inquiry,
527
7 (3): 252–69.
Bonoli, G. and Mach, A. (2001). ‘The New Swiss Employment Puzzle’. Swiss Political Science 
Review, 7 (2): 81–94.
Bonvin, J. M. (2007). ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a Context of Permanent Restructuring: a 
case study from the Swiss metalworking sector’. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15 (1): 36–44.
Bosch, G. and Charest, J. (2008). ‘Vocational training and the labour market in liberal and 
coordinated economies’. Industrial Relations Journal, 39 (5): 428–47.
Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C. (eds.) (2008). Low-wage work in Germany. New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation.
Boucher, G. and Wickham, J. (2003). Engaged Autonomy: The Fexibility of the European Social 
Model in Smaller European Countries: Irish Cross-Cutting Theme Flex.Com (Flexibility and 
Competitiveness: Labour Market Flexibility, Innovation and Organisational Performance) EU 
Commission DG Research Contract HPSE-CT-2001-00093; October 2003. Available at 
http://flexcom.econ.uoa.gr/files/Theme_European%20Social%20Model.doc.
Bouquet, C. and Birkinshaw, J. M. (2008). ‘Weight Versus Voice: How Foreign Subsidiaries Gain 
Attention From Corporate Headquarters’. Academy of Management Journal, 51 (3): 577–601.
Boyer, R., Charron, E., Jürgens, U. and Tolliday, S. (eds.) (1998). Between imitation and 
innovation: The transfer and hybridization of productive models in the international automobile
industry. Oxford, England ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Braun, D. (2003). ‘Dezentraler und unitarischer Föderalismus: Die Schweiz und Deutschland im 
Vergleich’. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für politische Wissenschaft = Revue suisse de science 
politique = Swiss political science review, 9 (1): 57–89.
Brewster, C. (1995). ‘Towards a 'European' Model of Human Resource Management’. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 26 (1): 1–21.
—— (2004). ‘European perspectives on human resource management’. Human Resource 
Management Review, 14 (4): 365–82.
—— (2007). ‘Comparative HRM: European views and perspectives’. The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 18 (5): 769–87.
Brewster, C., Mayrhofer, W. and Morley, M. J. (eds.) (2000). New challenges for European human 
resource management. New York: St. Martin's Press.
—— (2004). Human resource management in Europe. Evidence of convergence? Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.
Brookes, M., Croucher, R., Fenton-O'Creevy, M. P. and Gooderham, P. N. (2011). ‘Measuring 
competing explanations of human resource management practices through the Cranet survey: 
Cultural versus institutional explanations’. Human Resource Management Review, 21 (1): 68–
79.
Broussolle, D. (2009). ‘Self-interest, Legal Commitment and Benevolence: The Emergence and 
Enforcement of a Swiss Labour Market Institution’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
15 (3): 277–95.
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2007). Business research methods, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Buchanan, D., Boddy David and McCalman, J. (1988). ‘Getting in, getting on, getting out, and 
getting back’. In: A. Bryman (ed.), Doing research in organizations. London, New York: 
Routledge, pp. 53–67.
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. (1976). The Future of Multinational Enterprise, 1st edn. London: 
Macmillan.
Bulkeley, W. M. (2009). ‘US2 to Cut U.S. Jobs, Expand in India’. The Wall Street Journal.
528
Bundesgesetz über die Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann: Gleichstellungsgesetz (GlG) (1995).
Bundesgesetz über die Information und Mitsprache der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer in 
den Betrieben (Mitwirkungsgesetz) (1993).
Bundesgesetz über die obligatorische Arbeitslosenversicherung und die Insolvenzentschädigung 
(Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz, AVIG) (1982).
Bundesgesetz über das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen (BöB) (1994).
Bundesgestz über Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Kartellgesetz) (1995).
Bureau of Labor Statistics BLS (2010). Employee Tenure Summary - Employee Tenure in 2010. 
Economic News Release. Available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.
Calori, R. and Dufour, B. (1995). ‘Management European Style’. The Academy of Management 
Executive, 9 (3): 61–73.
Campbell, J. L. and Lindberg, L. N. (1990). ‘Property Rights and the Organization of Economic 
Activity by the State’. American Sociological Review, 55 (5): 634–47.
Cantwell, J. and Bellak, C. (1998). ‘How important is foreign direct investment?’. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics & Statistics, 60 (1): 99–106.
Cantwell, J. and Mudambi, R. (2005). ‘MNE competence-creating subsidiary mandates’. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26 (12): 1109–28.
Casper, S. (2001). ‘The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influence of Contract 
Law on Company Strategies in Germany and the United States’. In: P. A. Hall and D. W. 
Soskice (eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 387–416.
Casper, S. and Kettler, H. (2001). ‘National Institutional Frameworks and the Hybridization of 
Entrepreneurial Business Models: The German and UK Biotechnology Sectors’. Industry & 
Innovation, 8 (1): 5–30.
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chandler, A. D. (1977). The visible hand. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press.
Chandler, A. D. (1990). Scale and scope: The dynamics of industrial capitalism, 2nd edn. 
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Chang, S.-I. (2004). Das Konzept des "National Business System" und der Transfer von HRM-
Praktiken multinationaler Unternehmen auf ihre Tochtergesellschaften. Trier.
—— (2006). ‘Der Transfer von HRM-Praktiken von deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen auf 
ihre Tochtergesellschaften in Korea’. Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 20 (3): 233–54.
Chevrier, S. (2002). ‘Le solide conte l'ingénieux: malentendus dans la gestion de projets franco-
suisses’. In: P. d' Iribarne, A. Henry, J.-P. Segal, S. Chevrier and T. Globokar (eds.), Cultures et 
mondialisation. Gérer par-delà les frontières. Paris: Seuil, pp. 139–63.
—— (2009). ‘Is national culture still relevant to management in a global context? The case of 
Switzerland’. International journal of cross cultural management, 9 (2): 169–83.
Child, J. (1973). ‘Predicting and understanding organization structure’. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 18 (2): 168–85.
—— (2002). ‘Theorizing about organization cross-nationally: part 2 - towards a synthesis’. In: M. 
Warner and P. Joynt (eds.), Managing across cultures: Issues and perspectives. London: 
Thomson Learning, pp. 40–58.
Child, J., Fores, M., Glover, I. and Lawrence, P. (1983). ‘A Price to pay? Professionalism and Work 
Organization in Britain and West Germany’. Sociology, 17 (1): 63–78.
Child, J. and Tayeb, M. (1982). ‘Theoretical Perspectives in Cross-National Organizational 
529
Research’. International Studies of Management & Organization, 12 (4): 23–70.
Christen, H. (2006). ‘Schweiz’. In: W. Weidenfeld (ed.), Die Staatenwelt Europas. Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 319–28.
Christen, H. (2008). Schlussbericht: Gesprochene Standardsprache im Deutschschweizer Alltag: 
Nationales Forschungsprogramm NFP 56: Sprachenvielfalt und Sprachkompetenz in der 
Schweiz. Available at http://www.nfp56.ch/d_portraet_resultate.cfm?
Projects.Command=resultate&pid=9.
Church, C. H. (2000). ‘Redifining Swiss Relations with Europe’. In: M. Butler, M. Pender and J. 
Charney (eds.), The making of modern Switzerland: 1848 - 1998. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 
137–60.
Clark, E. and Geppert, M. (2011). ‘Subsidiary integration as identity construction and institution 
building: a political sensemaking approach’. Journal of Management Studies, 48 (2): 395–416.
Clark, I. (1999). ‘Institutional Stability in Industrial Relations and Management Practice: The 
Influence of the Anglo- American Council for Productivity, 1948–1952’. Business History, 41 
(3): 64–93.
Clark, I. and Almond, P. (2004). ‘Dynamism and embeddedness: towards a lower road? British 
subsidiaries of American multinationals’. Industrial Relations Journal, 35 (6): 536–56.
Clark, I., Almond, P., Gunnigle, P. and Wächter, H. (2005). ‘The Americanisation of the European 
business system?’. Industrial Relations Journal, 36 (6): 494–517.
Coller, X. (1996). ‘Managing Flexibility in the Food Industry: A Cross-National Comparative Case 
Study in European Multinational Companies’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 2 (2): 
153–72.
Coller, X. and Marginson, P. (1998). ‘Transnational management influence over changing 
employment practice: A case from the food industry’. Industrial Relations Journal, 29 (1): 4–17.
Collings, D., Gunnigle, P. and Morley, M. J. (2008). ‘Between Boston and Berlin: American MNCs 
and the shifting contours of industrial relations in Ireland’. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 19 (2): 240–61.
Collins, R. (1979). The credential society: An histor. sociology of education and stratification. New 
York: Acad. Pr.
Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1998). The associational economy: firms, regions and innovation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooke, W. N. (1997). ‘The influence of industrial relations factors on US foreign direct investment 
abroad’. Industrial & labor relations review, 51 (1): 3–17.
Cook, T. D. and Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field 
settings. Chicago: Rand McNally College Pub. Co.
Cowling, K. and Sugden, R. (1987). Transnational monopoly capitalism. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Crabtree, B. F. and Miller, W. L. (1999). Doing qualitative research, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif: Sage Publications.
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Crouch, C., Schröder, M. and Voelzkow, H. (2009). ‘Regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism’. 
Economy & Society, 38 (4): 654–78.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
D1 group (2011). Annual report 2011.
—— (2012). D1 worldwide - about us. Available at 
http://www.D1.com/en/com/D1_group/D1_figures/D1-figures.php.
—— (2013). D1 worldwide - About us - sustainability - values. Available at 
530
http://www.D1.com/en/com/sustainability/issues/corporate_leadership/values/values.php.
D1 Switzerland big subsidiary (2013). Company web pages: presentation and history. Available at 
http://www.D1 Switzerland big subsidiary.ch/content/language1/company/company_D1 
Switzerland big subsidiary_overview.htm.
D2 group (2011a). About D2 - D2 employees. Available at http://www.D2.com/en/D2-
Employees.aspx.
—— (2011b). Annual Report 2011.
—— (2013a). About D2 - D2 worldwide - overview. Available at http://www.D2.com/en/D2-
worldwide.aspx.
—— (2013b). About D2 - profile and organization - overview. Available at 
http://www.D2.com/en/profile-and-organization.aspx.
D2 Switzerland (2013). Geschichte. Available at 
http://www.D2.ch/scripts/pages/de/unternehmen/geschichte/index.php.
D3 group (2012a). Beratung und support - Standorte. Available at http://www.D3.de/beratung-
support/standorte/standorte.jsp.
—— (2012b). Code of Conduct: for Corporate Social Responsibility.
—— (2013). D3 - Wir über uns - Daten und Fakten. Available at http://www.D3.de/D3/wir-ueber-
uns/daten-fakten/daten-und-fakten-1.jsp.
D4 group (2012). D4 at a glance - key figues / employees. Available at 
http://www.D4.eu/en/company/D4-at-a-glance/employees/Employees.html.
—— (2013a). D4 2012 Annual Report.
—— (2013b). D4 company history. Available at http://www.D4.eu/de/unternehmen/geschichte/D4-
chronik/D4-Chronik.html.
D5 group (2010). Annual Report 2010.
—— (2011a). D5 Annual Report 2011: Zusammengefasster Konzernlagebericht. Available at 
http://www.D5annualreport.com/2011/konzernlagebericht/der-D5-konzern.html.
—— (2011b). D5 Annual Report 2011: Kennzahlenvergleich. Available at 
http://www.D5annualreport.com/2011/zusaetzliche-
informationen/kennzahlenvergleich/kategorie/umsatz_und_ergebnis/unterkategorie/softwareerlo
ese_nach_regionen.html.
—— (2011c). D5 Annual Report 2011: Kennzahlen. Available at 
http://www.D5annualreport.com/2011/zusaetzliche-informationen/kennzahlen.html.
D6 group (2011). Annual Report 2011.
—— (2013a). D6 at a glance - strategy. Available at http://www.D6.com/company/at-a-
glance/strategy/64472.
—— (2013b). Frauenquote: Mehr Frauen an die Spitze. Available at 
http://www.D6.com/konzern/mitarbeiter/diversity-frauenquote/5186.
D6 systems solutions. About D6 systems solutions - company profile. Available at http://www.D6 
systems solutions.com/about-D6 systems solutions/D6 systems solutions-a-strong-
partner/764104.
D6 systems solutions Switzerland: About D6 Systems Solutions Company. Available at 
http://www.D6systemssolutions.ch/aboutD6systemssolutions/company/525370.
D7 group (2011). Annual Report.
—— (2012). News Release. D7 Announces D7 pharmaceuticals division Implementation Plans for 
Its Efficiency Program in Switzerland. Available at 
http://news.D7.de/N/0/551E28BD41D9D1EEC12579EA00258933/$File/Fit-MS-e.pdf.
—— (2013a). D7 Group. Available at http://www.D7group.com/en/company/company.html.
—— (2013b). D7 group - our businesses. Available at 
531
http://www.D7group.com/en/company/our_markets/our_markets.html.
—— (2013c). D7 group strategy: Sustain. Change. Grow. Available at 
http://www.D7group.com/en/company/mission_statement_values_strategy/strategy.html.
D7 pharmaceuticals division (2013). D7 phamaceuticals division at a glance. Available at 
http://www.D7pharmaceuticalsdivision.com/en/about_us/facts_and_figures/index.html.
D7 Switzerland (2013). D7 in Switzerland. Available at 
http://www.D7.ch/en/index.html;jsessionid=B72F6ED72FEDD8430103CDA48818E7FE.
D8 group. Annual Report 2011.
—— (2013a). About D8 - Organization - Group Structure. Available at 
http://D8.com/en/corporate/about-D8/management/organization/.
—— (2013b). D8 At A Glance. Available at http://D8.com/en/corporate/about-D8/.
D9 group (2012). Business Profile 2012.
—— (2013a). Company - At a glance. Available at http://www.D9.info/EN/112210.php.
—— (2013b). Company - History. Available at http://www.D9.info/EN/history.php.
—— (2013c). Strategy. Available at http://www.D9.info/EN/Company_strategy.php.
D9 Switzerland (2012). Fact Sheet 2012.
—— (2013). Unternehmen - Geschichte. Available at 
http://www.D9Switzerland.info/de/unternehmen/geschichte.
Dacin, M. T., Oliver, C. and Roy, J. P. (2007). ‘The legitimacy of strategic alliances: an institutional 
perspective’. Strategic Management Journal, 28 (2): 169–87.
Dacin, M. T., Ventresca, M. J. and Beal, B. D. (1999). ‘The Embeddedness of Organizations: 
Dialogue & Directions’. Journal of Management, 25 (3): 317–56.
Dahl, R. A. (1957). ‘The concept of power’. Behavioral Science, 2 (3): 201–15.
David, T. and Mach, A. (2006). Institutions and economic growth: The successful experience of 
Switzerland (1870-1950). Available at www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-
papers/research-papers/2006/en_GB/rp2006-101/_files/78091810551892106/default/rp2006-
101.pdf.
Davoine, E. (2005). ‘Formation et Parcours Professionnel des Dirigeants d'Entreprise en Suisse’. 
Dossier de la Revue Economique et Sociale (3, September): 89–99.
Davoine, E. and Ravasi, C. (2013). ‘The relative stability of national career patterns in European top
management careers in the age of globalisation: A comparative study in France/Germany/Great 
Britain and Switzerland’. European Management Journal, 31 (2).
Davoine, E. and Schröter, O. (2010). How “Swiss” are the HR-practices of Swiss subsidiaries of 
Multinational Companies?
De Cieri, H. and Dowling, P. J. (2006). ‘Strategic international human resource management in 
multinational enterprises: developments and directions’. In: G. K. Stahl and I. Björkman (eds.), 
Handbook of research in international human resource management. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 15–35.
Deeg, R. and Jackson, G. (2007). ‘Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist variety’. Socio-
Economic Review, 5 (1): 149–79.
Delany, E. (1998). ‘Strategic development of multinational subsidiaries in Ireland’. In: J. M. 
Birkinshaw and N. Hood (eds.), Multinational corporate evolution and subsidiary development. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 239–67.
—— (2000). ‘Strategic Development of the Multinational Subsidiary through Subsidiary Initiative-
taking’. Long Range Planning, 33 (2): 220–44.
Delany, W. (1960). ‘Some Field Notes on the Problem of Access in Organizational Research’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 (3): 448–57.
Delmestri, G. (2006). ‘Streams of inconsistent institutional influences: Middle managers as carriers 
532
of multiple identities’. Human Relations, 59 (11): 1515–41.
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.
Dessler, G. (2002). A framework for human resource management, 2nd edn. Upper Saddle River, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Dicken, P. (2003). Global shift: Reshaping the global economic map in the 21st century, 4th edn. 
London: Sage Publications.
Dickmann, M. (2003). ‘Implementing German HRM abroad: desired, feasible, successful?’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 14 (2): 265–83.
Dickmann, M. and Müller-Camen, M. (2006). ‘A typology of international human resource 
management strategies and processes’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 17 (4): 580–601.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). ‘Interest and agency in institutional theory’. In: L. G. Zucker (ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger 
Pub. Co., pp. 1–38.
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983). ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’. American Sociological Review, 48 (2): 147–60.
Diogo, A. (2011). HRM practice Transfer and the Role of European Headquarters of American 
Multinational Companies based in Switzerland. Fribourg (Switzerland).
Djelic, M.-L. (1998). Exporting the American model: The post-war transformation of European 
business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Djelic, M.-L. and Quack, S. (2003). ‘Theoretical building blocks for a research agenda linking 
globalization and institutions’. In: M.-L. Djelic and S. Quack (eds.), Globalization and 
institutions: Redefining the rules of the economic game. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 15–34.
Doellgast, V. and Greer, I. (2007). ‘Vertical Disintegration and the Disorganization of German 
Industrial Relations’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45 (1): 55–76.
Doremus, P. N., Keller, W. W., Pauly, L. W. and Reich, S. (1998). The myth of the global 
corporation, 2nd edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dörrenbächer, C. (2001). The international transfer of production models Some lessons from 
German FDI in Hungary: Paper presented at the link program seminar series Copenhagen 
Business School department of international economics and management. Available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhb/cbsint/2001-004.html.
—— (2004). ‘Fleeing or exporting the German model?: The internationalization of German 
multinationals in the 1990s’. Competition & Change, 8 (4): 443–56.
Dörrenbächer, C. and Gammelgaard, J. (2006). ‘Subsidiary role development: The effect of micro-
political headquarters–subsidiary negotiations on the product, market and value-added scope of 
foreign-owned subsidiaries’. Journal of International Management, 12 (3): 266–83.
—— (2011). ‘Subsidiary power in multinational corporations: the subtle role of micro-political 
bargaining power’. Critical Perspectives on International Business, 7 (1): 30–47.
Dörrenbächer, C. and Geppert, M. (2006). ‘Micro-politics and conflicts in multinational 
corporations: Current debates, re-framing, and contributions of this special issue’. Journal of 
International Management, 12 (3): 251–65.
—— (2009). ‘A micro-political perspective on subsidiary initiative-taking: Evidence from German-
owned subsidiaries in France’. European Management Journal, 27 (2): 100–12.
—— (2010). ‘Subsidiary staffing and initiative-taking in multinational corporations: A socio-
political perspective’. Personnel Review, 39 (5): 600–21.
Dowling, P. J. (1999). ‘Completing the Puzzle: Issues in the Development of the Field of 
International Human Resource Management’. Management International Review (MIR), 39 (3, 
533
Strategic Issues in International Human Resource Management): 27–43.
Dowling, P. J., Festing, M. and Engle, A. D. (2009). International human resource management: 
Managing people in a multinational context, 5th edn. Mason, OH: South Western Cengage 
Learning.
Doz, Y. L. and Prahalad, C. K. (1991). ‘Managing DMNCs: A Search for a New Paradigm’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12 (summer): 145–64.
Doz, Y. L., Santos, J. and Williamson, P. J. (2001). From global to metanational: How companies 
win in the knowledge economy. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
Durkheim, É. (1997). The division of labour in society. New York: Free Press.
Ebbinghaus, B. and Kittel, B. (2006). ‘Europäische Sozialmodelle à la carte: Gibt es institutionelle 
Wahlverwandtschaften zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaat und Arbeitsbeziehungen?’. In: J. Beckert, B. 
Ebbinghaus, A. Hassel and P. Manow (eds.), Transformationen des Kapitalismus. 
Frankfurt/Main [u.a.]: Campus-Verl., pp. 223–46.
Eberwein, W. and Tholen, J. (1993). Euro-manager or splendid isolation?: International 
management ; an Anglo-German comparison. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Edlund, J. and Gronlund, A. (2008). ‘Protection of Mutual Interests? Employment Protection and 
Skill Formation in Different Labour Market Regimes’. European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 14 (3): 245–64.
Edwards, P. K. (1995). ‘The Employment Relationship’. In: P. K. Edwards (ed.), Industrial 
relations: Theory and practice in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 3–26.
Edwards, P. K., Edwards, T., Ferner, A., Marginson, P. and Tregaskis, O. (2007a). Employment 
Practices of MNCs in Organisational Context: A Large-Scale Survey: Report of Main Survey. 
Available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/projects/mncemployment.
Edwards, P. K. and Wright, M. (2001). ‘High-involvement work systems and performance 
outcomes: the strength of variable, contingent and context-bound relationships’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 12 (4): 568–85.
Edwards, T. (1998). ‘Multinationals, labour management and the process of reverse diffusion: A 
case study’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (4): 696–709.
—— (2011). ‘The nature of international integration and human resource policies in multinational 
companies’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35 (3): 483–98.
Edwards, T., Almond, P., Clark, I., Colling, T. and Ferner, A. (2005). ‘Reverse Diffusion in US 
Multinationals: Barriers from the American Business System’. Journal of Management Studies, 
42 (6): 1261–86.
Edwards, T., Colling, T. and Ferner, A. (2007b). ‘Conceptual approaches to the transfer of 
employment practices in multinational companies: an integrated approach’. Human Resource 
Management Journal, 17 (3): 201–17.
Edwards, T., Edwards, P. K., Ferner, A., Marginson, P. and Tregaskis, O. (2010). ‘Multinational 
Companies and the Diffusion of Employment Practices from Outside the Country of Origin’. 
Management International Review (MIR), 50 (5): 613–34.
Edwards, T. and Ferner, A. (2002). ‘The renewed 'American Challenge': a review of employment 
practice in US multinationals’. Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (2): 94–111.
—— (2004). ‘Multinationals, Reverse Diffusion and National Business Systems’. Management 
International Review (MIR), 44 (1): 49–79.
Edwards, T. and Kuruvilla, S. (2005). ‘International HRM: national business systems, 
organizational politics and the international division of labour in MNCs’. The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 16 (1): 1–21.
Edwards, T. and Rees, C. (2006a). ‘Chapter 14: Conclusions and looking ahead’. In: T. Edwards and
C. Rees (eds.), International human resource management: Globalization, national systems and 
534
multinational companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 287–93.
—— (2006b). ‘Chapter 3: The internationalization of the firm’. In: T. Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), 
International human resource management: Globalization, national systems and multinational 
companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 45–65.
—— (2006c). ‘Chapter 4: International strategy and structure in multinational companies’. In: T. 
Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), International human resource management: Globalization, 
national systems and multinational companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 66–
87.
—— (2006d). ‘Chapter 5: The transfer of human resource practices in multinational companies’. In:
T. Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), International human resource management: Globalization, 
national systems and multinational companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 91–
110.
Edwards, T., Rees, C. and Coller, X. (1999). ‘Structure, Politics and the Diffusion of Employment 
Practices in Multinationals’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 5 (3): 286–306.
Edwards, T. and Tempel, A. (2010). ‘Explaining variation in reverse diffusion of HR practices: 
Evidence from the German and British subsidiaries of American multinationals’. Journal of 
World Business, 45 (1): 19–28.
Egan, M. L. and Bendick., M. (2003). ‘Workforce Diversity Initiatives of U.S. Multinational 
Corporations in Europe’. Thunderbird International Business Review, 45 (6): 701–27.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (4): 532–50.
Eisenhardt, K. M. and Graebner, M. E. (2007). ‘Theory Building From Cases: Opportunities And 
Challenges’. Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1): 25–32.
Elger, T. and Smith, C. (2006). ‘Theorizing the Role of the Internaitonal Subsidiary: Transplants, 
Hybrids and Branch-Plants Revisited’. In: A. Ferner, J. Quintanilla and C. Sánchez-Runde 
(eds.), Multinationals, institutions and the construction of transnational practices: Convergence
and diversity in the global economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53–85.
Ellguth, P. and Kohaut, S. (2011). Tarifbindung und betriebliche Interessenvertretung: aktuelle 
Ergebnisse dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2010. WSI-Mitteilungen 5/2011. Available at 
http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/hbs/hs.xsl/wsi_34969_34977.htm.
Erten, C., Strunk, G., Gonzalez, J.-C. and Hilb, M. (2004). ‘Austria and Switzerland: small 
countries with large differences’. In: C. Brewster, W. Mayrhofer and M. J. Morley (eds.), 
Human resource management in Europe. Evidence of convergence? Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 95–122.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990a). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press.
—— (1990b). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Esser, H. (2000). Soziologie: Spezielle Grundlagen. Frankfurt/Main ; New York: Campus-Verl.
Ethos Stiftung (2005). Corporate Governance der Schweizer Unternehmen. Available at 
http://www.ethosfund.ch/upload/publication/p33d_051130_studie_ber_die_corporate_governanc
e_der_schweizer_unternehmen_.pdf.
Evans, P., Pucik, V. and Barsoux, J.-L. (2002). The global challenge: Frameworks for international 
human resource management. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. H. P. (2002). ‘The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations’. 
Journal of financial economics, 65 (3): 365–95.
Farago, P. (1987). Verbände als Träger öffentlicher Politik: Aufbau und Bedeutung privater 
Regierungen in der Schweiz. Grüsch: Rüegger.
Farndale, E., Brewster, C. and Poutsma, E. (2008). ‘Coordinated vs. liberal market HRM: the 
535
impact of institutionalization on multinational firms’. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 19 (11): 2004–23.
Federal Act of 13 December 2002 on Vocational and Professional Education and Training (2002): 
Vocational and Professional Education and Training Act, VPETA.
Feldman, M. S., Bell, J. and Berger, M. T. (2003). Gaining access: A practical and theoretical 
guide for qualitative researchers. Walnut Creek, Calif: AltaMira Press.
Fendt, J. and Sachs, W. (2007). ‘Grounded Theory Method in Management Research: Users' 
Perspectives’. Organizational Research Methods, 11 (3): 430–55.
Fenton-O'Creevy, M. P., Gooderham, P. N. and Nordhaug, O. (2008). ‘Human resource 
management in US subsidiaries in Europe and Australia: centralisation or autonomy?’. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 39 (1): 151–66.
Ferner, A. (1994). ‘Multinational companies and human resource management: an overview of 
research issues’. Human Resource Management Journal, 4 (2): 79–101.
—— (1997). ‘Country of origin effects and HRM in multinational companies’. Human Resource 
Management Journal, 7 (1): 19–37.
—— (2000a). The embeddedness of US multinational companies in the US business system: 
Implications for HR/IR. Available at http://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/business-and-law-
documents/business/occasional-papers/opaper61.doc.
—— (2000b). ‘The Underpinnings of 'Bureaucratic' Control Systems: HRM in European 
Multinationals’. Journal of Management Studies, 37 (4): 521–39.
Ferner, A., Almond, P., Butler, P., Clark, I., Colling, T., Edwards, T. and Holden, L. (2004a). ‘Das 
Human Resource Mangement amerikanischer Unternehmen in Grossbritannien’. In: H. Wächter 
and R. Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: 
Hampp, pp. 109–28.
Ferner, A., Almond, P., Clark, I., Colling, T., Edwards, T., Holden, L. and Müller-Camen, M. 
(2004b). ‘Dynamics of Central Control and Subsidiary Autonomy in the Management of Human
Resources: Case-Study Evidence from US MNCs in the UK’. Organization Studies, 25 (3): 
363–91.
Ferner, A., Almond, P. and Colling, T. (2005a). ‘Institutional theory and the cross-national transfer 
of employment policy: the case of ‘workforce diversity’ in US multinationals’. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 36 (3): 304–21.
Ferner, A., Almond, P., Colling, T. and Edwards, T. (2005b). ‘Policies on Union Representation in 
US Multinationals in the UK: Between Micro-Politics and Macro-Institutions’. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 43 (4): 703–28.
Ferner, A. and Edwards, P. K. (1995). ‘Power and the Diffusion of Organizational Change within 
Multinational Enterprises’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 1 (2): 229–57.
Ferner, A., Edwards, T. and Tempel, A. (2012). ‘Power, institutions and the cross-national transfer 
of employment practices in multinationals’. Human Relations, 65 (2): 163–87.
Ferner, A. and Müller-Camen, M. (2004). ‘Herkunftsland USA: Prägung der Personalpolitik durch 
das amerikanische "Business System"’. In: H. Wächter and R. Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik 
amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp. 65–82.
Ferner, A. and Quintanilla, J. (1998). ‘Multinationals, national business systems and HRM: the 
enduring influence of national identity or a process of 'Anglo-Saxonization'’. The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (4): 710–31.
Ferner, A., Quintanilla, J. and Varul, M. Z. (2001). ‘Country-of-Origin Effects, Host-Country 
Effects, and the Management of HR in Multinationals: German Companies in Britain and 
Spain’. Journal of World Business, 36 (2): 107–27.
Ferner, A., Tregaskis, O., Edwards, P. K., Edwards, T., Marginson, P., Adam, D. and Meyer, M. 
536
(2011). ‘HRM structures and subsidiary discretion in foreign multinationals in the UK’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22 (3): 483–509.
Ferner, A. and Varul, M. Z. (2000a). ‘`Vanguard' subsidiaries and the diffusion of new practices: A 
case study of German multinationals’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38 (1): 115–40.
—— (2000b). ‘Internationalisation and the personnel function in German multinationals’. Human 
Resource Management Journal, 10 (3): 79–96.
Festing, M., Räthel, F., Weber, W. and Weller, I. (2008). ‘Internationales Personalmanagement bei 
der D6 AG’. In: J. Zentes, B. Swoboda and D. Morschett (eds.), Fallstudien zum internationalen
Management: Grundlagen - Praxiserfahrungen - Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 589–
604.
Fischer, A. (2003). ‘Vetospieler und die Durchsetzbarkeit von Side-Payments: Der schweizerische 
innenpolitische Entscheidungsprozess um flankierende Massnahmen zur Personenfreizügigkeit 
mit der Europäischen Union’. Swiss Political Science Review, 9 (2): 27–58.
Flanagan, R. J. (1999). ‘Macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining: An international 
perspective’. Journal of economic literature, 37 (3): 1150–75.
Forsgren, M., Holm, U. and Johanson, J. (2005). Managing the embedded multinational: A business
network view. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Foss, K. and Foss, N. J. (2005). ‘Resources and Transaction Costs: How Property Rights Economics
Furthers the Resource-Based View’. Strategic Management Journal, 26 (6): 541–53.
Freitag, M. (2001). ‘Das soziale Kapital der Schweiz: Vergleichende Einschätzungen zu Aspekten 
des Vertrauens und der sozialen Einbindung’. Swiss Political Science Review, 7 (4): 87–117.
—— (2003). ‘Social capital in (dis)similar democracies - The development of generalized trust in 
Japan and Switzerland’. Comparative Political Studies, 36 (8): 936–66.
—— (2004). ‘Schweizer Welten des Sozialkapitals: Empirische Untersuchungen zum sozialen 
Leben in Regionen und Kantonen’. Swiss Political Science Review, 10 (2): 87–118.
Freitag, M. and Buehlmann, M. (2009). ‘Crafting Trust The Role of Political Institutions in a 
Comparative Perspective’. Comparative Political Studies, 42 (12): 1–30.
Friel, D. (2005). ‘Transferring a Lean Production Concept from Germany to the United States: The 
Impact of Labor Laws and Training Systems’. The Academy of Management Executive, 19 (2): 
50–58.
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S. and Williams, K. (2000). ‘Restructuring for shareholder value and 
its implications for labour’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 24 (6): 771.
Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2006). Financialization and strategy: Narrative 
and numbers, 1st edn. London: Routledge.
Fumagalli-Senn, M. (2009). Erhebung der Gesamtarbeitsverträge in der Schweiz 2007. Neuchâtel: 
Office fédéral de la statistique (OFS).
Furgler, D. (2000). ‘The Swiss Economy: Facing the Future’. In: M. Butler, M. Pender and J. 
Charney (eds.), The making of modern Switzerland: 1848 - 1998. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 
123–36.
Gabriel, O. W. (2002). Sozialkapital und Demokratie: Zivilgesellschaftliche Ressourcen im 
Vergleich. Wien: WUV-Univ.-Verl.
Ganz, R. (2012). Human Resource Management Practices in Swiss Multinational Companies. 
Fribourg (Switzerland).
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books.
Geppert, M., Matten, D. and Williams, K. (2003a). ‘Change Management in MNCs: How Global 
Convergence Intertwines with National Diversities’. Human Relations, 56 (7): 807–38.
Geppert, M. and Mayer, M. (eds.) (2006). Global, national and local practices in multinational 
companies. Basingstoke etc: Palgrave Macmillan.
537
Geppert, M. and Williams, K. (2006). ‘Global, national and local practices in multinational 
corporations: towards a sociopolitical framework’. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 17 (1): 49–69.
Geppert, M., Williams, K. and Matten, D. (2003b). ‘The Social Construction of Contextual 
Rationalities in MNCs: An Anglo-German Comparison of Subsidiary Choice’. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40 (3): 617–41.
Gereffi, G. (1999). ‘International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain’. 
Journal of International Economics, 48 (1): 37–70.
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005). ‘The governance of global value chains’. Review
of International Political Economy, 12 (1): 78–104.
Ghemawat, P. (2007). Redefining global strategy: Crossing borders in a world where differences 
still matter. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
Ghoshal, S. and Bartlett, C. A. (1988). ‘Creation, Adoption, and Diffusion of Innovations by 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations’. Journal of International Business Studies, 19 (3): 
365–88.
Ghoshal, S. and Nohria, N. (1989). ‘Internal Differentiation Within Multinational Corporations’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 10 (4): 323–37.
Giardini, A., Kabst, R. and Müller-Camen, M. (2005). ‘HRM in the German business system: A 
review’. Management Revue, 16 (1): 63–80.
Gibbert, M. and Ruigrok, W. (2010). ‘The ''What'' and ''How'' of Case Study Rigor: Three Strategies
Based on Published Work’. Organizational Research Methods, 13 (4): 710–37.
Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W. and Wicki, B. (2008). ‘What passes as a rigorous case study?’. Strategic 
Management Journal, 29 (13): 1465–74.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action structure and contradiction in social 
analysis, 1st edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gilpin, R. (2000). The challenge of global capitalism: The world economy in the 21st century. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. L. (2010). Grounded Theory: Strategien qualitativer Forschung, 3rd 
edn. Bern: Huber.
Glunk, U., Wilderom, C. and Ogilvie, R. (1997). ‘Finding the Key to German-Style Management’. 
International Studies of Management & Organization, 26 (3): 93–108.
Gmür, M. and Schwerdt, B. (2005). ‘Der Beitrag des Personalmanagements zum 
Unternehmenserfolg: Eine Metaanalyse nach 20 Jahren Erfolgsfaktorenforschung’. Zeitschrift 
für Personalforschung, 19 (3): 221–51.
Godard, J. (2002). ‘Institutional environments, employer practices, and states in liberal market 
economies’. Industrial Relations, 41 (2): 249–86.
—— (2009). ‘The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement’. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 63 (1): 82–108.
Gonon, P. (1999). ‘Neue Reformbestrebungen im beruflichen Bildungswesen in der Schweiz’. 
Berufsbildung, 17: 48–54.
—— (2005). Challenges in the Swiss Vocational Education and Training-system. bwp@Issue7. 
Available at http://www.bwpat.de/7eu/gonon_ch_bwpat7.pdf.
Gooderham, P. N., Morley, M. J., Brewster, C. and Mayrhofer, W. (2004). ‘Human resource 
management: a universal concept?’. In: C. Brewster, W. Mayrhofer and M. J. Morley (eds.), 
Human resource management in Europe. Evidence of convergence? Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 3–26.
Gooderham, P. N. and Nordhaug, O. (2010). ‘One European model of HRM? Cranet empirical 
contributions’. Human Resource Management Review, 21 (1): 27–36.
538
Gooderham, P. N., Nordhaug, O. and Ringdal, K. (1999). ‘Institutional and Rational Determinants 
of Organizational Practices: Human Resource Management in European Firms’. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44 (3): 507–31.
—— (2006). ‘National embeddedness and calculative human resource management in US 
subsidiaries in Europe and Australia’. Human Relations, 59 (11): 1491–513.
Goutas, L. and Lane, C. (2009). ‘The Translation of Shareholder Value in the German Business 
System: A Comparative Study of DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen AG’. Competition & 
Change, 13 (4): 327–46.
Granovetter, M. (1985). ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’. 
The American Journal of Sociology, 91 (3): 481–510.
Grant, R. M. (1996). ‘Prospering in Dynamically-competitive Environments: Organizational 
Capability as Knowledge Integration’. Organization Science, 7 (4): 375–87.
Greenwood, R., Morris, T., Fairclough, S. and Boussebaa, M. (2010). ‘The organizational design of 
transnational professional service firms’. Organizational dynamics, 39 (2): 173–83.
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1998). ‘Competing paradigms in qualitative research’. In: N. K. 
Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), The landscape of qualitative research: Theories and issues. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, pp. 195–220.
Guertzgen, N. (2009). ‘Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked 
Employer-Employee Data’. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111 (2): 323–49.
Guest, D. E. (1990). ‘Human Resource Management and the American Dream’. Journal of 
Management Studies, 27 (4): 377–97.
Guest, D. E. and Conway, N. (1999). ‘Peering into the Black Hole: The Downside of the New 
Employment Relations in the UK’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37 (3): 367–89.
Guest, D. E. and Hoque, K. (1996). ‘National Ownership and HR Practices in UK Greenfield Sites’.
Human Resource Managment Journal, 6 (4): 50–74.
Guillén, M. F. (2001). ‘Is globalization civilizing, destructive of feeble? A critique of five key 
debates in the social science literature’. Annual Review of Sociology, 27 (1): 235–60.
Gunnigle, P., Collings, D. G. and Morley, M. J. (2004). ‘Die Personalpolitik amerikanischer 
multinationaler Unternehmen in Irland’. In: H. Wächter and R. Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik 
amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp. 153–78.
Gupta, A. K. and Govindarajan, V. (1991). ‘Knowledge Flows and the Structure of Control within 
Multinational Corporations’. Academy of Management Review, 16 (4): 768–92.
—— (2000). ‘Knowledge Flows within Multinational Corporations’. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21 (4): 473–96.
Haas, W. (ed.) (2010). Do you speak Swiss?: Sprachenvielfalt und Sprachkompetenz in der 
Schweiz ; Nationales Forschungsprogramm NFP 56. Zürich: Verl. Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Hall, P. A. and Gingerich, D. W. (2004). Varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarities 
in the macroeconomy: An empirical analysis. Köln: Max-Planck-Inst. für 
Gesellschaftsforschung.
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. W. (2001a). ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’. In: P. A. Hall 
and D. W. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–68.
—— (2001b). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanhart, S. and Bossio, S. (1998). ‘Costs and benefits of dual apprenticeship: Lessons from the 
Swiss system’. International Labour Review, 137 (4): 483–500.
Hantrais, L. (1999). ‘Contextualization in cross-national comparative research’. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 2 (2): 93–108.
539
Harcourt, M., Wood, G. and Roper, I. (2007). ‘The Importance of Legislated Employment 
Protection for Worker Commitment in Coordinated Market Economies’. Journal of Economic 
Issues, 41 (4): 961–80.
Hardy, C. (1996). ‘Understanding Power: Bringing about Strategic Change’. British Journal of 
Management, 7 (1 special issue): 3–16.
Harris, H. and Holden, L. (2001). ‘Between Autonomy and Control: Expatriate Managers and 
Strategic IHRM in SMEs’. Thunderbird International Business Review, 43 (1): 77–100.
Hartley, J. (2004). ‘Case Study Research’. In: C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds.), Essential guide to 
qualitative methods in organizational research. London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 
323–33.
Harzing, A.-W. (1999). Managing the multinationals: An international study of control mechanisms.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
—— (2000). ‘An Empirical Analysis and Extension of the Bartlett and Ghoshal Typology of 
Multinational Companies’. Journal of International Business Studies, 31 (1): 101–20.
—— (2001). ‘An analysis of the functions of international transfer of managers in MNCs’. 
Employee Relations, 23 (6): 581–98.
—— (2002). ‘Acquisitions versus greenfield investments: international strategy and management of
entry modes’. Strategic Management Journal, 23 (3): 211–27.
Harzing, A.-W. and Noorderhaven, N. G. (2006). ‘Knowledge flows in MNCs: An empirical test 
and extension of Gupta and Govindarajan's typology of subsidiary roles’. International Business
Review, 15 (3): 195–214.
Harzing, A.-W. and Sorge, A. (2003). ‘The Relative Impact of Country of Origin and Universal 
Contingencies on Internationalization Strategies and Corporate Control in Multinational 
Enterprises: Worldwide and European Perspectives’. Organization Studies, 24 (2): 187–214.
Häusermann, S., Mach, A. and Papadopoulos, Y. (2004). ‘From Corporatism to Partisan Politics. 
Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland’. Swiss Political Science Review, 10 (2): 33–
59.
Hawley, A. (1968). ‘Human ecology’. In: D. L. Sills and R. K. Merton (eds.), International 
encyclopedia of the social sciences. London: Macmillan, pp. 328–37.
Hayden, A. and Edwards, T. (2001). ‘The Erosion of the Country of Origin Effect’. Relations 
Industrielles / Industrial Relations, 56 (1): 116–40.
Hayter, S., Fashoyin, T. and Kochan, T. A. (2011). ‘Review Essay: Collective Bargaining for the 
21st Century’. Journal of Industrial Relations, 53 (2): 225–47.
Healy, M. and Perry, C. (2000). ‘Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability of 
qualitative research within the realism paradigm’. Qualitative Market Research: An 
International Journal, 3 (3): 118–26.
Hedlund, G. (1986). ‘The Hypermodern MNC: A Heterarchy?’. Human Resource Management, 25 
(1): 9–35.
Heidenreich, M. (2012). ‘The social embeddedness of multinational companies: A literature 
review’. Socio-Economic Review, 10 (3): 549–79.
Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2004). ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research 
Agenda’. Perspectives on Politics, 2 (4): 725–40.
Herrigel, G. (1994). ‘Industry as a Form of Order: A Comparison of the Historical Development of 
the Machine Tool Industries in the United States and Germany’. In: J. R. Hollingsworth, P. C. 
Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds.), Governing capitalist economies: Performance and control of 
economic sectors. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–128.
—— (1996). Industrial constructions: The sources of German industrial power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
540
Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., McMillan, C. J. and Schwitter, J. P. (1974). ‘The culture-free context
of organization structure: a tri-national comparison’. Sociology, 8 (1): 59–80.
Hill, C. W. and Hoskisson, R. E. (1987). ‘Strategy and Structure in the Multiproduct Firm’. 
Academy of Management Review, 12 (2): 331–41.
Hirst, P. Q. and Thompson, G. (1999). Globalization in question: The international economy and 
the possibilities of governance, 2nd edn. Cambridge, Angleterre: Polity Press.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values behaviors institutions and 
organizations across nations, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Hollingsworth, J. R. (1997a). ‘Continuities and changes in social systems of production: the cases 
of Japan, Germany and the United States’. In: J. R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds.), 
Contemporary capitalism: The embeddedness of institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 265–308.
—— (1997b). ‘The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism’. In: C. Crouch and W. 
Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity. 
London, Thousand Oaks (Calif.), New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 133–47.
Hunt, S. D. (1991). Modern marketing theory: Critical issues in the philosophy of marketing 
science. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western Pub. Co.
Hyman, R. (1987). ‘Strategy or Structure? Capital, Labour and Control’. Work, Employment & 
Society, 1 (1): 25–55.
—— (2001). ‘Trade Union Research and Cross-National Comparison’. European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 7 (2): 203–32.
Ichniowski, C., Shaw, K. and Prennushi, G. (1997). ‘The Effects of Human Resource Management 
Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing lines’. American Economic Review, 87 (3): 
291–313.
Imhof, K. (2007). ‘Sonderfallsdiskurse und Pfadabhängigkeit: Der Fall Schweiz’. In: T. S. Eberle 
and K. Imhof (eds.), Sonderfall Schweiz. Zürich: Seismo, pp. 25–55.
Iribarne, P. d' (1989). La Logique de l'honneur: Gestion des entreprises et traditions nationales. 
Paris: Éd. du Seuil.
Jacoby, S. M. (1997). Modern manors: Welfare capitalism since the new deal, 1st edn. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jain, H. C., Lawler, J. J. and Morishima, M. (1998). ‘Multinational corporations, human resource 
management and host-country nationals’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 9 (4): 553–66.
Jepperson, R. L. (1991). ‘Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism’. In: W. W. Powell 
and P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), The New institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 143–63.
Jessop, B. (1993). ‘Towards a Schumpeterian workfare state? Preliminary remarks on Post-Fordist 
poilitical economy’. Studies in Political Economy, 40 (Spring): 7–39.
Jinks, B. (2012). ‘US2 Fires More Than 1,000 in North America, Group Says’. Bloomberg.
Johl, S. K. and Renganathan, S. (2010). ‘Strategies for Gaining Access in Doing Fieldwork: 
Reflection of two Researchers’. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 8 (1): 42–50.
Johnson, P. (2004). ‘Analytic Induction’. In: C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds.), Essential guide to 
qualitative methods in organizational research. London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 
165–79.
Jürgens, U., Naumann, K. and Rupp, J. (2000). ‘Shareholder value in an adverse environment: The 
German case’. Economy and society, 29 (1): 54–79.
Kabst, R., Matiaske, W. and Schmelter, A. (2003). ‘Gewinn- und Kapitalbeteiligungen in britischen,
französischen und deutschen Unternehmen’. Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 17 (3): 259–77.
541
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small states in world markets. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.
Katz, H. C. (2005). ‘The Causes and Consequences of Increased Within-Country Variance in 
Employment Practices’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 43 (4): 577–83.
Kenworthy, L. (2003). ‘Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism’. International Journal of Sociology,
33 (3): 10–44.
Kerckhoff, A. C. (2001). ‘Education and Social Stratification Process in Comparative Perspective’. 
Sociology of Education, 74 (Extra Issue: Current of Thought: Sociology of Education at the 
Dawn of the 21st Century): 3–18.
Kimberly and John R. (1976). ‘Organizational Size and the Structuralist Perspective: A Review, 
Critique, and Proposal’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21 (4): 571–97.
King, G., Murray, C. J., Salomon, J. A. and Tandon, A. (2004). ‘Enhancing the Validity and Cross-
Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research’. American Political Science 
Review, 98 (1): 191–207.
King, N. (2004a). ‘Using Interviews in Qualitative Research’. In: C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds.), 
Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research. London, Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, pp. 11–22.
—— (2004b). ‘Using Templates in the Thematic Analysis of Text’. In: C. Cassell and G. Symon 
(eds.), Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research. London, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 256–70.
Kipping, M. (1996). ‘The U.S. Influence on the Evolution of Management Consultancies in Britain,
France, and Germany since 1945’. Business and Economic History, 25 (1): 112–23.
—— (1997). ‘Consultancies, Institutions and the Diffusion of Taylorism in Britain, Germany and 
France, 1920s to 1950s’. Business History, 39 (4): 67–83.
Kipping, M., Üsdiken, B. and Puig, N. (2004). ‘Imitation, Tension, and Hybridization: Multiple 
“Americanizations” of Management Education in Mediterranean Europe’. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 13 (2): 98–108.
Klarsfeld, A. and Mabey, C. (2004). ‘Management Development in Europe’. European 
Management Journal, 22 (6): 649–58.
Kluge, N. and Vitols, S. (2001). ‘Works Councils: Managers of cross-cultural change’. 
Mitbestimmung International Edition (July): 40–43.
Knyphausen-Aufsess, D. z. and Schweizer, L. (2008). ‘Akquisition und Integration von Lexigen 
Pharmaceuticals Corp. durch D7 KGaA’. In: J. Zentes, B. Swoboda and D. Morschett (eds.), 
Fallstudien zum internationalen Management: Grundlagen - Praxiserfahrungen - Perspektiven. 
Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 689–702.
Kochan, T. A. (2006). ‘The American Worker: Disposable or Indispensable?’. Work & Occupations,
33 (4): 377–81.
Kochan, T. A., Katz, H. C. and MacKersie, R. B. (1994). The transformation of American industrial
relations, 2nd edn. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Kochan, T. A. and Rubinstein, S. A. (2000). ‘Toward a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn 
Partnership’. Organization Science, 11 (4): 367–86.
Koen, C. I. (2005). Comparative international management. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.
Kogut, B. (1991). ‘Country Capabilities and the Permeability of Borders’. Strategic Management 
Journal, 12 (1 special issue): 33–47.
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (2003). ‘A memoir and reflection: knowledge and an evolutionary theory 
of the multinational firm 10 years later’. Journal of International Business Studies, 34 (6): 505–
15.
Köhnen, H. (2000). Das System Wal-Mart: Strategien, Personalpolitik und Unternehmenskultur 
eines Einzelhandelsgiganten. Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
542
Kostova, T. (1999). ‘Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: a contextual 
perspective’. Academy of Management Review, 24 (2): 308–24.
Kostova, T. and Roth, K. (2002). ‘Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects’. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 45 (1): 215–33.
Kostova, T., Roth, K. and Dacin, M. T. (2008). ‘Institutional Theory in the Study of Multinational 
Corporations: A Critique and New Directions’. Academy of Management Review, 33 (4): 994–
1006.
—— (2009). ‘Theorizing on MNCs: A Promise for Institutional Theory’. Academy of Management 
Review, 34 (1): 171–73.
Kostova, T. and Zaheer, S. (1999). ‘Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The 
case of the multinational enterprise’. Academy of Management Review, 24 (1): 64–81.
KPMG (2008). Financing Benchmark 2008: Die finanzstrategische Ausrichtung Schweizer 
Unternehmen / Corporate finance / Advisory. Audit - tax - advisory. Available at 
www.kpmg.ch/Topics/8718.htm.
Krauss, S. E. (2005). ‘Research Paradigms and Meaning Making: A Primer’. The Qualitative 
Report, 10 (4): 158–770.
Kriesi, H. (2007). ‘Die Schweiz - ein Nationalstaat?’. In: T. S. Eberle and K. Imhof (eds.), 
Sonderfall Schweiz. Zürich: Seismo, pp. 82–93.
Kriesi, H. and Baglioni, S. (2003). ‘Putting local associations into their context: Preliminary results 
from a Swiss study of local associations’. Swiss Political Science Review, 9 (3): 1–34.
Kristensen, P. H. (2003). ‘National Systems of Governance and Managerial Strategies in the 
Evolution of Work Systems: Britain, Germany and Denmark Compared’. In: R. Whitley and P. 
H. Kristensen (eds.), Governance at work: The social regulation of economic relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 3–46.
Kristensen, P. H. and Morgan, G. (2007). ‘Multinationals and institutional competitiveness’. 
Regulation & Governance, 1 (3): 197–212.
Kristensen, P. H. and Zeitlin, J. (2005). Local players in global games: The strategic constitution of 
a multinational corporation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kurowski, L. L. (1999). ‘Cloaked culture and veiled diversity: why theorists ignored early U.S. 
workforece diversity’. Academy of Management Proceedings & Membership Directory: C1-C5.
—— (2002). ‘Cloaked culture and veiled diversity: why theorists ignored early US workforce 
diversity’. Management Decision, 40 (1/2): 183–91.
Lane, C. (1989). Management and labour in Europe: The industrial enterprise in Germany, Britain 
and France. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
—— (1994). ‘European Business Systems: Britain and Germany compared’. In: R. Whitley (ed.), 
European business systems: Firms and markets in their national contexts. London: Sage 
Publications, pp. 64–97.
—— (1995). Industry and society in Europe: Stability and change in Britain, Germany and France.
Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
—— (2000a). ‘Globalization and the German model of capitalism - erosion or survival?’. British 
Journal of Sociology, 51 (2): 207–34.
—— (2000b). ‘Understanding the globalization strategies of German and British multinational 
companies: Is a "societal effects" approach still useful?’. In: M. Maurice and A. Sorge (eds.), 
Embedding organizations: Societal analysis of actors organizations and socio-economic 
context. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 189–208.
—— (2001). ‘The Emergence of German, Transnational Companies: A Theoretical Analysis and 
Empirical Study of the Globalization Process’. In: G. Morgan, P. H. Kristensen and R. Whitley 
543
(eds.), The multinational firm: Organizing across institutional and national divides. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 69–96.
—— (2006). ‘Institutional transformations and system change: Changes in the corporate 
governance of German corporations’. In: G. Morgan, R. Whitley and E. Moen (eds.), Changing 
capitalisms?: Internationalism, institutional change, and systems of economic organization. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 78–109.
Lane, C. and Wood, G. (2009). ‘Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism’. Economy and 
society, 38 (4): 531–51.
Larson, M. S. (1977). The rise of professionalism: A sociological analysis. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Laurent, A. (1983). ‘The Cultural Diversity of Western Conceptions of Management’. International 
Studies of Management & Organization, 13 (1/2): 75–96.
—— (1985). ‘The cultural diversity of Western conceptions of management’. In: P. Joynt and M. 
Warner (eds.), Managing in different cultures. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget AS, pp. 41–56.
Laurila, J. (1997). ‘Promoting Research Access and Informant Rapport in Corporate Settings: Notes
from Research on a Crisis Company’. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 13 (4): 407–18.
Lawrence, P. (1980). Managers and management in West Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press.
—— (1996). Management in the USA. London: Sage Publications.
Lawrence, T. and Suddaby, R. (2006). ‘Institutions and institutional work’. In: S. R. Clegg, C. 
Hardy, T. Lawrence and W. R. Nord (eds.), The sage handbook of organization studies. London: 
Sage Publications, pp. 215–54.
Lazonick, W. and O'Sullivan, M. (2000). ‘Maximizing shareholder value: A new ideology for 
corporate governance’. Economy and society, 29 (1): 13–35.
Le Matin (2012). D7 pharmaceuticals division va fermer son siège de Genève. Available at 
http://www.lematin.ch/suisse/D7 pharmaceuticals division-va-fermer-son-siege-de-
Geneve/story/22006580.
Ledentu, F. (2007). Système de Gouvernement d'Entreprise et Présence d'actionnaires de Contrôle: 
Le Cas de la Suisse. Fribourg (Suisse).
Legrain, P. (2002). Open world: The truth about globalisation. London: Abacus.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1990). ‘A Dual Methodology For Case Studies: Synergistic Use Of A 
Longitudinal Single Site With Replicated Multiple Sites’. Organization Science, 1 (3): 248–66.
Lerman, R. I. (2008). ‘Apprenticeship in the United States: Patterns of Governance and Recent 
Developments’. In: P. Schlögl, F. Rauner, P. Grollmann and E. Smith (eds.), Situated 
Competence Development Through Innovative Apprenticeships: The Role Of Different 
Stakeholders. Vienna: The Austrian Institute for Research on Vocational Training öibf 
Österreichisches Institut für Berufsbildungsforschung, Vienna, Austria; University of Bremen, 
Institute Technology and Education, Bremen, Germany, pp. 73–77.
Lerman, R. I., Eyster, L. and Chambers, K. (2009). The Benefits and Challenges of REgistered 
Apprenticeship: The Sponsor's Perspective: Final Report. Available at 
http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/The%20Benefits%20and%20Challenges
%20of%20Registered%20ApprenticeshipThe%20Sponsors%20Perspetive%20-%20Final
%20Report.pdf.
Lesch, H. (2003). ‘Der Arbeitskampf als Instrument tarifpolitischer Konfliktbewältigung’. Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 53 (47/48): 30–38.
—— (2004). Trade Union Density in International Comparison. CESifo Forum Special 4 Special. 
Available at www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum4-04-special-lesch.pdf.
Lever, S. (1997). ‘An Analysis of Managerial Motivations Behind Outsourcing Practices in Human 
Resources’. Human Resource Planning, 20 (2): 37–47.
544
Levy, D. L. (2008). ‘Political Contestation in Global Production Networks’. Academy of 
Management Review, 33 (4): 943–63.
Lindberg, L. N., Campbell, J. L. and Hollingsworth, J. R. (1991). ‘Economic governance and the 
analysis of structural change in the american economy’. In: J. L. Campbell, J. R. Hollingsworth 
and L. N. Lindberg (eds.), Governance of the American economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 3–34.
Linder, W. (2003). ‘Das politische System der Schweiz’. In: W. Ismayr (ed.), Die politischen 
Systeme Westeuropas. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 487–520.
Ling, Y., Floyd, S. W. and Baldridge, D. C. (2005). ‘Toward a model of issue-selling by subsidiary 
managers in multinational organizations’. Journal of International Business Studies, 36 (6): 
637–54.
Liu, W. (2004). ‘The cross-national transfer of HRM practices in MNCs: An integrative research 
model’. International Journal of Manpower, 25 (6): 500–17.
Lodge, G. C. and Vogel, E. F. (eds.) (1987). Ideology and national competitiveness: An analysis of 
nine countries. Boston (Mass.): Harvard Business School Press.
Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A radical view, 2nd edn. Basingstoke etc: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lundvall, B.-°. and Johnson, B. (1994). ‘The learning economy’. Journal of industry studies, 1 (2): 
23–43.
Luthans, F. and Hodgetts, R. (1996). ‘Managing in America: Recreating a competitive culture’. In: 
P. Joynt and M. Warner (eds.), Managing across cultures: Issues and perspectives. London: 
Internat. Thomson Business Press, pp. 105–24.
Lu, Y. and Björkman, I. (1997). ‘HRM practices in China-Western joint ventures: MNC 
standardization versus localization’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 8 (5): 614–28.
Mach, A. (1998). ‘Quelles réponses politiques face à la globalisation et à la construction 
européenne? Illustration à partir de la révision de la loi suisse sur les cartels’. Swiss Political 
Science Review, 4 (2): 25–49.
—— (2002). ‘Economists as policy entrepreneurs and the rise of neoliberal ideas in Switzerland 
during the 1990s’. Economic sociology, 4 (1): 1–14.
—— (2006). La Suisse entre internationalisation et changements politiques internes: La législation
sur les cartels et les relations industrielles dans les années 1990. Chur: Rüegger.
Mach, A., Häusermann, S. and Papadopoulos, Y. (2003). ‘Economic regulatory reforms in 
Switzerland: Adjustment without European integration, or how rigidities become flexible’. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (2): 301–18.
Mach, A., Schnyder, G., David, T. and Lüpold, M. (2006). ‘Transformations de l’autorégulation et 
nouvelles régulations publiques en matière de gouvernement d’entreprise en Suisse (1985-
2002)’. Swiss Political Science Review, 12 (1): 1–32.
Macneil, I. R. (1974). ‘The many futures of contracts’. Southern California Law Review, 47: 691–
816.
Mahon, P. (2000). ‘L’évolution récente du droit L’évolution récente du droit du travail en Suisse – 
une appréciation critique’. Aspects de la sécurité sociale (3): 9–26.
Maillard, C. (2010). Gesamtarbeitsvertragliche Lohnabschlüsse für 2009: Kommentierte 
Ergebnisse und Tabellen. Available at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/03/22/publ.Document.130893.pdf.
Mallinson, S. (2002). ‘Listening to respondents: a qualitative assessment of the Short-Form 36 
Health Status Questionnaire’. Social Science & Medicine, 54 (1): 11–21.
Manager Magazin Online (2006). D7s Millardendeal.
Manicas, P. T. and Secord, P. F. (1983). ‘Implications for psychology of the new philosophy of 
545
science’. American Psychologist, 38 (4): 399–413.
March, J. G. (1978). ‘Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice’. Bell Journal 
of Economics, 9 (2): 587–608.
Marginson, P. (1992). ‘European Integration and Transnational Management--Union Relations in 
the Enterprise’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 30 (4): 529–45.
Marginson, P., Buitendam, A., Deutschmann, C. and Perulli, P. (1993). ‘The emergence of the Euro-
company: Towards a European industrial relations?’. Industrial Relations Journal, 24 (3): 182.
Marginson, P., Edwards, P. K., Edwards, T., Ferner, A. and Tregaskis, O. (2010). ‘Employee 
Representation and Consultative Voice in Multinational Companies Operating in Britain’. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 48 (1): 151–80.
Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (1994). ‘Transnational Capital and European Industrial Relations’. In: 
R. Hyman (ed.), New frontiers in European industrial relations. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 15–51.
Markees, S. (2002). Kantonale Schulsysteme in der Schweiz. Available at http://www.spasri.ch/-
verkn/schulsysteme.pdf.
Marschan-Piekkari, R., Plakoyiannaki, E. and Welch, C. (2010). ‘"Good" case research in industrial 
marketing: Insights from research practice’. Industrial marketing management, 39 (1): 109–17.
Martinez, J. I. and Jarillo, J. C. (1991). ‘Coordination Demands of International Strategies’. Journal
of International Business Studies, 22 (3): 429–44.
Martin, G. and Beaumont, P. (1998). ‘Diffusing 'best practice' in multinational firms: prospects, 
practice and contestation’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (4): 
671–95.
Matten, D. and Geppert, M. (2004). ‘Work systems in heavy engineering: the role of national 
culture and national institutions in multinational corporations’. Journal of International 
Management, 10 (2): 177–98.
Maurice, M., Sellier, F. and Silvestre, J.-J. (1984). ‘The search for a societal effect in the production
of company hierarcy: A comparison of France and Germany’. In: P. Osterman (ed.), Internal 
labor markets. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 231–70.
—— (1986a). The social foundation of industrial power. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
—— (1986b). The social foundations of industrial power: A comparison of France and Germany. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
McClelland, D. C. (1953). The achievement motive. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
—— (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
McGrath, J. E. and Brinberg, D. (1983). ‘External Validity and the Research Process: A Comment 
on the Calder/Lynch Dialogue’. Journal of Consumer Research, 10 (1): 115–24.
McSweeney, B. (2002). ‘Hofstede's model of national cultural differences and their consequences: 
A triumph of faith -- a failure of analysis’. Human Relations, 55 (1): 89–118.
Meardi, G. (2007). ‘More voice after more exit? Unstable industrial relations in Central Eastern 
Europe’. Industrial Relations Journal, 38 (6): 503–23.
Meardi, G., Marginson, P., Fichter, M., Frybes, M. and Stanojević, M. (2009). ‘Varieties of 
multinationals: Adapting employment practices in Central Eastern Europe’. Industrial Relations,
48 (3): 489–511.
Meunier, M. (2007). Analyse économique de la production éducationnelle le cas de la Suisse. 
Genève.
Meyer, J. W. (2000). ‘Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies’. 
International Sociology, 15 (2): 233–48.
Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M. and Ramirez, F. O. (1997). ‘World Society and the Nation‐
State’. American Journal of Sociology, 103 (1): 144–81.
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1977). ‘Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
546
ceremony’. The American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2): 340–63.
Meyer, K. E., Mudambi, R. and Narula, R. (2011). ‘Multinational Enterprises and Local Contexts: 
The Opportunities and Challenges of Multiple-Embeddedness’. Journal of Management Studies,
48 (2): 235–52.
Mintzberg, H. (1987). ‘Crafting strategy’. Harvard Business Review, 65 (4): 66–75.
Moore, F. (2006). ‘Strategy, power and negotiation: social control and expatriate managers in a 
German multinational corporation’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 17 (3): 399–413.
Morgan, G. (2001). ‘Transnational Communities and Business Systems’. Global Networks, 1 (2): 
113–30.
—— (2007). ‘National business systems research: Progress and prospects’. Scandinavian Journal 
of Management, 23 (2): 127–45.
Morgan, G., Kelly, B., Sharpe, D. and Whitley, R. (2003). ‘Global managers and Japanese 
multinationals: internationalization and management in Japanese financial institutions’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 14 (3): 389–407.
Morgan, G. and Kristensen, P. H. (2006). ‘The contested space of multinationals: Varieties of 
institutionalism, varieties of capitalism’. Human Relations, 59 (11): 1467–90.
Morgan, G. and Whitley, R. (2003). ‘Introduction’. Journal of Management Studies, 40 (3): 609–16.
Morin, M.-L. and Vicens, C. (2001). ‘Redundancy, business flexibility and workers' security: 
Findings of a comparative European survey’. International Labour Review, 140 (1): 45–67.
Morley, M. J., Brewster, C., Gunnigle, P. and Mayrhofer, W. (2000). ‘Evaluating Change in 
European Industrial Relations: Research Evidence on Trends at Organisational Level’. In: C. 
Brewster, W. Mayrhofer and M. J. Morley (eds.), New challenges for European human resource 
management. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 199–221.
Mudambi, R. and Navarra, P. (2004). ‘Is knowledge power? Knowled flows, subsidiary power and 
rent-seeking within MNCs’. Journal of International Business Studies, 35 (5): 385–406.
Muhl, C. J. (2001). ‘The employment-at-will doctrine: three major exceptions’. Monthly Labor 
Review, 124 (1): 3–11.
Müller, F. U. (1994). ‘Societal effect, organizational effect and globalization’. Organization Studies,
15 (3): 407–28.
Müller, F. U. and Purcell, J. (1992). ‘The Europeanization of manufacturing and the decentralization
of bargaining: multinational management strategies in the European automobile industry’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 3 (1): 15–34.
Müller, M. (1997). ‘Institutional Resilience in a Changing World Economy? The Case of the 
German Banking and Chemical Industries’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35 (4): 609–
26.
—— (1998). ‘Human resource and industrial relations practices of UK and US multinationals in 
Germany’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (4): 732–49.
—— (1999a). ‘Human resource management under institutional constraints: The case of Germany’.
British Journal of Management, 10 (3): 31–44.
—— (1999b). ‘Unitarism, Pluralism, and Human Resource Management in Germany’. 
Management International Review (MIR), 39 (3): 125–44.
Myloni, B., Harzing, A.-W. and Mirza, H. (2007). ‘The effect of corporate-level organizational 
factors on the transfer of human resource management practices: European and US MNCs and 
their Greek subsidiaries’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 (12): 
2057–74.
Nakhle, S. F. (2011). The transfer of human resource practices from American and European 
multinational companies to their Lebanese subsidiaries: A study of the host-country effects and 
547
of the standardization-adaptation dilemma. Fribourg (Switzerland).
Napier, N. K. and van Vu, T. (1998). ‘International Human Resource Management in developing 
and Transitional Economy countries: A breed apart?’. Human Resource Management Review, 8 
(1): 39–77.
Naville, M., Walti, A. and Tischhauser, P. (2007a). Multinational Companies on the Move: How 
Switzerland Will Win the Battle! Available at 
http://www.osec.ch/internet/osec/en/home/invest/worldwide/publications.-RelatedBoxSlot-
52403-ItemList-56531-File.File.pdf/pub_mult_companies_on_the_move.pdf.
—— (2007b). Multinational Companies on the Move: How Switzerland Will Win the Battle! 
Available at http://www.osec.ch/internet/osec/en/home/invest/worldwide/publications.-
RelatedBoxSlot-52403-ItemList-56531-File.File.pdf/pub_mult_companies_on_the_move.pdf.
Nikolai, R. (2005). ‘Die Arbeitsmarkt-und Beschäftigungspolitik in der Schweiz: Die Schweiz als 
Erfolgsmodell?’. Swiss Political Science Review, 11 (3): 193–97.
Nohria, N. and Ghoshal, S. (1997). The differentiated network: Organizing multinational 
corporations for value creation, 1st edn. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Nollert, M. (2007). ‘Sonderfall im rheinischen Kapitalismus oder Sonderweg im liberalen 
Wohlfahrtskapitalismus? - Zur Spezifizität des Sozialstaats Schweiz’. In: T. S. Eberle and K. 
Imhof (eds.), Sonderfall Schweiz. Zürich: Seismo, pp. 153–71.
Noorderhaven, N. G. and Harzing, A.-W. (2003). ‘The 'Country-of-origin Effect' in Multinational 
Corporations: Sources, Mechanisms and Moderating Conditions’. Management International 
Review (MIR), 43 (2 Special Issue): 47–66.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
—— (1991). ‘Institutions’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1): 97–112.
Numagami, T. (1998). ‘The Infeasibility of Invariant Laws in Management Studies: A Reflective 
Dialogue in Defense of Case Studies’. Organization Science, 9 (1): 2–15.
OCED (2013). OECD.Stat Extracts - General Statistics - Country statistical profiles - Germany. 
Available at http://stats.oecd.org/.
OECD (1996). Labour market policies in Switzerland. Paris: OECD.
—— (2004). Promoting Entrepreneurship and innovative SMEs on a Global Economy. Towards a 
more responsible and inclusive Globalisation: Financing Innovative SMEs in a Global 
Economy. Available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/smesandentrepreneurship/31919231.pdf.
—— (2012a). OECD.Stat Extracts - Employment by job tenure intervals - average tenure. Available
at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=9591#.
—— (2012b). OECD.Stat Extracts - Strictness of employment protection – overall. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN.
—— (2012c). OECD.Stat Extracts - Trade Union Density. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN.
Oesch, D. (2007). ‘Weniger Koordination, mehr Markt?: Kollektive Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Neokorporatismus in der Schweiz seit 1990’. Swiss Political Science Review, 13 (3): 337–68.
O'Hara-Devereaux, M. and Johansen, R. (1994). Globalwork. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Ohmae, K. (1990). The borderless world: Power and strategy in the interlinked economy. New 
York: Harper Business.
—— (1995). The evolving global economy: Making sense of the new world order / edited with a 
preface by Kenichi Ohmae. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Oliver, C. (1991). ‘Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes’. The Academy of Management 
Review, 16 (1): 145–79.
Osterman, P. (1999). ‘HRM in the wings: Jacoby's Modern Manors’. Industrial Relations, 38 (2): 
548
141–44.
—— (2010). ‘Job design in the context of the job market’. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 31 
(2/3): 401–11.
O'Sullivan, M. (2000). Contests for corporate control: Corporate governance and economic 
performance in the United States and Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—— (2005). ‘Typologies, ideologies and realities of capitalism’. Socio-Economic Review, 3 (3): 
547–58.
Palazzo, B. (2002). ‘U.S.-American and German Business Ethics: An Intercultural Comparison’. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 41 (3): 195–216.
Parry, E., Dickmann, M. and Morley, M. J. (2008). ‘North American MNCs and their HR policies in
liberal and coordinated market economies’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 19 (11): 2024–40.
Pelizzari, A. and Schief, S. (2008). Between Integration and Illusion - Corporatism in Switzerland. 
Fribourg (Suisse).
Pempel, T. J. and Tsunekawa, K. (1979). ‘Corporatism Without Labor: The Japanese Anomaly’. In: 
P. C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends toward corporatist intermediation. London, 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 321-270.
Perlitz, M. and Seger, F. (2004). ‘European cultures and management styles’. International Journal 
of Asian Management, 3 (1): 1–26.
Perlmutter, H. V. (1969). ‘The tortuous evolution of the multinational corporation’. The Columbia 
journal of World Business, 4 (1): 9–18.
Perlmutter, H. V. and Heenan, D. A. (1974). ‘How multinational should your top managers be?’. 
Harvard Business Review, 52 (6): 121–32.
Peters, B. G. (1988). ‘The machinery of government’. In: C. Campbell and B. G. Peters (eds.), 
Organizing governance, governing organizations. Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,
pp. 19–53.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. R. (1978). External control of organizations. a resource dependence 
perspective. London.
Phelan, C., Baird, M., Lansbury, R., Brown, W., Lynch, L. M. and Kochan, T. A. (2007). ‘Labor 
History Symposium’. Labor History, 48 (3): 347–69.
Piekkari, R. and Tietze, S. (2011). ‘A world of languages: Implications for international 
management research and practice’. Journal of World Business, 46 (3): 267–69.
Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (2006). ‘Guest Editors' Introduction to the Focused Issue: Qualitative 
Research Methods in International Business’. Management International Review (MIR), 46 (4): 
391–96.
Porter, M. E. (1986a). ‘Changing Patterns of International Competition’. California Management 
Review, 28 (2): 9–40.
—— (1986b). Competition in global industries. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
—— (1987). ‘From competitive advantage to corporate strategy’. Harvard Business Review, 65 (3): 
43–59.
—— (1990). The competitive advantage of nations, 1st edn. London: Macmillan.
—— (1998). ‘Clusters and the new Economics of Competition’. Harvard Business Review, 76 (6): 
77–90.
Powell, W. W. (1996). ‘On the nature of institutional embeddedness: Labels vs. explanation’. In: J. 
A. C. Baum and J. E. Dutton (eds.), The embeddedness of strategy. Greenwhich, CT: JAI Press, 
pp. 293–300.
Pudelko, M. (2006). ‘A comparison of HRM systems in the USA, Japan and Germany in their 
socio-economic context’. Human Resource Management Journal, 16 (2): 123–53.
549
Pudelko, M. and Harzing, A.-W. (2007). ‘Country-of-origin, localization, or dominance effect? An 
empirical investigation of HRM practices in foreign subsidiaries’. Human Resource 
Management, 46 (4): 535–59.
Pulignano, V. (2006). ‘The Diffusion of Employment Practices of US-Based Multinationals in 
Europe. A Case Study Comparison of British- and Italian-Based Subsidiaries’. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 44 (3): 497–518.
Purcell, J. (1995). ‘Ideology and the End of Institutional Industrial Relations: Evidence from the 
UK’. In: C. Crouch and F. Traxler (eds.), Organized industrial relations in Europe: What future?
Aldershot: Avebury, pp. 101–20.
Python, M. (2011). American and French MNCs in Switzerland: HRM and transfer of practises. 
Fribourg (Switzerland).
Quintanilla, J. and Ferner, A. (2003). ‘Multinationals and human resource management: between 
global convergence and national identity’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 14 (3): 363–68.
Quintanilla, J., Susaeta, L. and López, L. (2004). ‘Personalmanagement amerikanischer MNU in 
spanischen Tochtergesellschaften - vorläufige Ergebnise der Fallstudien’. In: H. Wächter and R. 
Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp. 
129–52.
Quintanilla, J., Susaeta, L. and Sanchez-Mangas, R. (2008). ‘The Diffusion of Employment 
Practices in Multinationals: `Americanness' within US MNCs in Spain?’. Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 50 (5): 680–96.
Redding, G. (2005). ‘The thick description and comparison of societal systems of capitalism’. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 36 (2): 123–55.
Rees, C. and Edwards, T. (2006a). ‘Chapter 1: Globalization and International management’. In: T. 
Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), International human resource management: Globalization, 
national systems and multinational companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 3–
26.
—— (2006b). ‘Chapter 2: National systems and managment action’. In: T. Edwards and C. Rees 
(eds.), International human resource management: Globalization, national systems and 
multinational companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 27–44.
Reich, R. B. (1990). ‘Who Is Us?’. Harvard Business Review, 68 (1): 53–64.
Rentsch, H., Flückiger, S., Held, T., Heiniger, Y. and Straubhaar, T. (2004). Ökonomik der Reform: 
Wege zu mehr Wachstum in der Schweiz. Zürich: Orell Füssli.
Rosenzweig, P. M. (2006). ‘The dual logics behind international human resource management: 
pressures for global integration and local responsiveness’. In: G. K. Stahl and I. Björkman 
(eds.), Handbook of research in international human resource management. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 36–48.
Rosenzweig, P. M. and Nohria, N. (1994). ‘Influences on Human Resource Management Practices 
in Multinational Corporations’. Journal of International Business Studies, 25 (2): 229–51.
Rosenzweig, P. M. and Singh, J. V. (1991). ‘Organizational Environments and the Multinational 
Enterprise’. The Academy of Management Review, 16 (2): 340–61.
Roth, K. and Morrison, A. J. (1992). ‘Implementing global strategy: Characteristics of global 
subsidiary mandates’. Journal of International Business Studies, 23 (4): 715–35.
Rowley, C. and Benson, J. (2002). ‘Convergence and Divergence in Asian Human Resource 
Management’. California Management Review, 44 (2): 90–109.
Royle, T. (1998). ‘Avoidance strategies and the German system of co-determination’. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (6): 1026–47.
—— (2004). ‘Employment Practices of Multinationals in the Spanish and German Quick-Food 
550
Sectors: Low-Road Convergence?’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 10 (1): 51–71.
Royle, T. and Towers, B. (eds.) (2002). Labour relations in the global fast-food industry. London: 
Routledge.
Rubin, H. J. and Rubin, I. S. (1995). Qualitative interviewing. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Rugman, A. M. (2005). ‘A further comment on the myth of globalization’. Journal of International 
Management, 11 (3): 441–45.
Rugman, A. M. and Verbeke, A. (2004). ‘A perspective on regional and global strategies of 
multinational enterprises’. Journal of International Business Studies, 35 (1): 3–18.
Ruigrok, W. and van Tulder, R. (1995). The logic of international restructuring: The management 
of dependencies in rival industrial complexes / Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder. London: 
Routledge.
Rumjanzewa, M. (2013). ‘Die Verschriftlichung der Mundart: SMS in Schwyzerdütsch’. Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung.
Sahlin-Andersson, K. and Engwall, L. (eds.) (2002). The expansion of management knowledge: 
Carriers, flows, and sources. Standford, Calif: Stanford Business Books.
Saka-Helmhout, A. and Geppert, M. (2011). ‘Different Forms of Agency and Institutional 
Influences within Multinational Enterprises’. Management International Review (MIR), 51 (5): 
567–92.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009). Research methods for business students, 5th edn. 
Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall.
Sayim, K. Z. (2011). ‘Policy transfer from advanced to less-advanced institutional environments: 
Labour market orientations of US MNEs in Turkey’. Human Relations, 64 (4): 573–97.
Scandura, T. A. and Williams, E. A. (2000). ‘Research Methodology in Management: Current 
Practices, Trends, and Implications for Future Research’. The Academy of Management Journal,
43 (6): 1248–64.
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York NY: W. W. Norton.
Scheuer, S. (2006). ‘A Novel Calculus? Institutional Change, Globalization and Industrial Conflict 
in Europe’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (2): 143–64.
Schlie, E. H. and Warner, M. (2000). ‘The 'Americanization' of German Management’. Journal of 
General Management, 25 (3): 33–50.
Schmid, H. (2001). ‘Industrial Relations in Changing Times’. International Journal of Applied 
Economics & Econometrics, 9 (4): 451–77.
Schmidt, R., Röbenack, S. and Hinke, R. (2003). ‘Prekarisierung des kollektiven Tarifsystems am 
Beispiel der ostdeutschen Metallindustrie’. Industrielle Beziehungen, 10 (2): 220–49.
Schmitter, P. C. (1990). ‘Sectors in modern capitalism: Models of governance and variations in 
performance’. In: R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa (eds.), Labour relations and economic 
performance: Papers presented at the conference "Markets, institutions and co-operation: 
labour relations and economic performance". Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the 
International Economic Association, pp. 3–39.
Schnabel, C. (2006). ‘Collective Bargaining Structure and its Determinants: An Empirical Analysis 
with British and German Establishment Data’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (2):
165–88.
Schnyder, G., Lüpold, M., Mach, A. and David, T. (2005). The Rise and Decline of the Swiss 
Company Network during the 20th Century. Travaux de Science Politique Nouvelle Série no. 22.
Available at http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/iepi/users/epibiri1/public/PaperNo22IEPI.pdf.
Schröter, O. and Davoine, E. (2009). The Cross-National Transfer of HRM Practices in 
Multinational Companies towards their Swiss Subsidiaries. Actes de Congrès. Available at 
http://www.reims-ms.fr/agrh/03-publications/01-actes-congres.html.
551
Schuler, R. S., Dowling, P. J. and De Cieri, H. (1993). ‘An Integrative Framework of Strategic 
International Human Resource Management’. Journal of Management, 19 (2): 419–59.
Schuler, R. S. and Jackson, S. E. (2005). ‘A Quarter-Century Review of Human Resource 
Management in the U.S.: The Growth in Importance of the International Perspective’. 
Management Revue, 16 (1): 11–35.
Schwab, K. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2012). The global competitiveness report 2012 - 2013: Full Data
Edition. The Global Competitiveness Report. Available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf.
Scott, W. R. (1987). ‘The Adolescence of Institutional Theory’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
32 (4): 493–511.
—— (1994). ‘Conceptualizing Organizational Fields. Linking Organizations and Societal Systems’.
In: H.-U. Derlien, U. Gerhardt and F. W. Scharpf (eds.), Systemrationalität und Partialinteresse:
Festschrift für Renate Mayntz. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 203–21.
—— (1995). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
—— (2003). Organizations: Rational natural and open systems, 5th edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
Scullion, H. and Starkey, K. (2000). ‘In search of the changing role of the corporate human resource
function in the international firm’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 
11 (6): 1061–81.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. New York: Harper 
& Row.
Seo, M.-G. and Creed, W. E. D. (2002). ‘Institutional Contradictions, Praxis, and Institutional 
Change: A Dialectical Perspective’. The Academy of Management Review, 27 (2): 222–47.
Siegenthaler, H. (1986). ‘Schweiz 1910-1970’. In: C. M. Cipolla and K. Borchardt (eds.), 
Europäische Wirtschaftsgeschichte In 5 Bänden: Bd. 5 Die europäischen Volkswirtschaften im 
zwanzigsten Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, pp. 245–75.
Singe, I. and Croucher, R. (2005). ‘US multi-nationals and the German industrial relations system’. 
Management Revue, 16 (1): 123–37.
Sinkovics, R. R., Penz, E. and Ghauri, P. N. (2008). ‘Enhancing the Trustworthiness of Qualitative 
Research in International Business’. Management International Review (MIR), 48 (6): 689–714.
Sisson, K. (2006). ‘International employee representation - a case of industrial relations systems 
following the market?’. In: T. Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), International human resource 
management: Globalization, national systems and multinational companies. Harlow: Financial 
Times Prentice Hall, pp. 242–61.
Sisson, K., Arrowsmith, J. and Marginson, P. (2003). ‘All benchmarkers now? Benchmarking and 
the 'Europeanisation' of industrial relations’. Industrial Relations Journal, 34 (1): 15–31.
Slashdot (2012). In a Symbolc Shift, US2's Inida Workforce Likely Exceeds That In US. Available at 
http://developers.slashdot.org/story/12/11/29/1545245/in-a-symbolic-shift-US2s-india-
workforce-likely-exceeds-that-in-us.
Smith, C. and Meiksins, P. (1995). ‘System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National 
Organisational Analysis’. Work, Employment & Society, 9 (2): 241–67.
Sobh, R. and Perry, C. (2006). ‘Research design and data analysis in realism research’. European 
Journal of Marketing, 40 (11/12): 1194–209.
Sorge, A. (1991). ‘Strategic Fit and the Societal Effect: Interpreting Cross-National Comparisons of 
Technology, Organization and Human Resources’. Organization Studies, 12 (2): 161–90.
—— (2004). ‘Cross-National Differences in Human Resources and Organization’. In: A.-W. 
Harzing and J. van Ruysseveldt (eds.), International human resource management. London: 
Sage Publications, pp. 117–40.
552
Soskice, D. W. (1990). ‘Wage determination: The changing role of institutions in advanced 
industrialized countries’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6 (4): 36–61.
—— (1999). ‘Globalisierung und institutionelle Divergenz: Die USA und Deutschland im 
Vergleich’. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 25 (2): 201–25.
Sousa-Poza, A. (2004). ‘Job stability and job security: A comparative perspective on Switzerland's 
experience in the 1990s’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 10 (1): 31–49.
Sparrow, P. and Hiltrop, J.-M. (1994). European human resource management in transition. New 
York: Prentice Hall.
Stehle, W. and Erwee, R. (2007). ‘Transfer of Human Resource Practices from German 
Multinational Enterprises to Asian Subsidiaries’. Research & Practice in Human Resource 
Management, 15 (1): 63–88.
Stern, J. (2010). La dynamique multiculturelle des filiales d’entreprises multinationales Le cas 
Losinger. Fribourg (Switzerland).
Stewart, R., Barsoux, J.-L., Kieser, A., Ganter, H.-D. and Walgenbach, P. (1994). Managing in 
Britain and Germany, 1st edn. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
—— (1996). ‘A comparison of British and German managerial roles, perceptions and behavior’. In:
P. Joynt and M. Warner (eds.), Managing across cultures: Issues and perspectives. London: 
Internat. Thomson Business Press, pp. 202–11.
Stiles, P. and Trevor, J. (2006). ‘The human resource department: roles, coordination and influence’.
In: G. K. Stahl and I. Björkman (eds.), Handbook of research in international human resource 
management. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 49–67.
Streckeisen, P. (2007). ‘Die "besondere Chemie" ist verschwunden: Die Entwicklung der Basler 
Chemie seit 1990’. In: H. Scholtz and M. Nollert (eds.), Schweizer Wirtschaft - ein Sonderfall? 
Zürich: Seismo, pp. 78–98.
Streeck, W. (1987). ‘The Uncertainties of Management in the Management of Uncertainty’. 
International Journal of Political Economy, 17 (3): 57–87.
—— (1991). ‘More uncertainties: German unions facing 1992’. Industrial Relations, 30 (3): 317–
49.
—— (1997a). ‘Beneficial Costraints: On the Economic Limits of Rational Voluntarism’. In: J. R. 
Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds.), Contemporary capitalism: The embeddedness of institutions.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197–219.
—— (1997b). ‘German capitalism: Does it exist? Can it survive?’. New Political Economy, 2 (2): 
237–56.
Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P. C. (1985). ‘Community, market, state - and associations?: The 
prospective contribution of interest governance to social order’. European Sociological Review, 
1 (2): 119–38.
Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. A. (2005). Beyond continuity: Institutional change in advanced political
economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Surlemont, B. (1998). ‘A Typology of Centres Within Multinational Corporations: An Empirical 
Investigation’. In: J. M. Birkinshaw and N. Hood (eds.), Multinational corporate evolution and 
subsidiary development. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 168–88.
Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (2007). Interkantonale Vereinbarung über 
die Harmonisierung der obligatorischen Schule (HarmoS-Konkordat): vom 14. Juni 2007. 
Available at http://edudoc.ch/record/24711/files/HarmoS_d.pdf.
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2012a). Registered unemployed and unemployment rate per 
gender. Available at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/03/03/blank/key/registrierte_arbeitslose/ent
wicklung.html.
553
—— (2012b). Wohnbevölkerung nach Hauptsprache. Available at 
www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/05/blank/key/sprachen.Document.21751.xls.
Swiss National Bank (2012). Direct Investment 2011. Available at 
http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/fdi/pdf/en/Direktinvestitionen.book.pdf.
Swissinfo.ch (2012). Geneva hit by D7 pharmaceuticals division job cuts. Available at 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Geneva_hit_by_D7 pharmaceuticals 
division_job_cuts.html?cid=32542876.
Szulanski, G. (1996). ‘Exploring Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the Transfer of Best Practice 
Within the Firm’. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special Issue: Knowledge and the 
Firm): 27–43.
Taylor, S., Beechler, S. and Napier, N. K. (1996). ‘Toward an Integrative Model of Strategic 
International Human Resource Management’. Academy of Management Review, 21 (4): 959–85.
Teece, D. J. (2006). ‘Reflections on the Hymer thesis and the multinational enterprise’. 
International Business Review, 15 (2): 124–39.
Tempel, A. (2001). The cross-national transfer of human resource management practices in 
German and British multinational companies. München ; Mering: Hampp.
—— (2002). ‘Multinational companies, institutional environments and the diffusion of industrial 
relations practices’. In: M. Geppert, D. Matten and K. Williams (eds.), Challenges for European
management in a global context: experiences from Britain and Germany. Basingstoke etc: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 143–64.
—— (2003). ‘Transfer oder Anpassung?: Die Auswirkungen von institutionellen Faktoren auf die 
Arbeitsbeziehungen in deutschen und britischen multinationalen Unternehmen’. In: C. 
Dörrenbächer (ed.), Modelltransfer in multinationalen Unternehmen. Strategien und Probleme 
grenzüberschreitender Konzernintegration. Berlin: Ed. Sigma, pp. 131–50.
Tempel, A., Edwards, T., Ferner, A., Müller-Camen, M. and Wächter, H. (2006a). ‘Subsidiary 
responses to institutional duality: Collective representation practices of US multinationals in 
Britain and Germany’. Human Relations, 59 (11): 1543–70.
Tempel, A., Wächter, H. and Walgenbach, P. (2005). ‘Multinationale Unternehmen und 
internationales Personalmanagement. Eine vergleichende institutionalistische Perspektive.’. 
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 19 (2): 181–202.
—— (2006b). ‘The Comparative Institutional Approach to Human Resource Management in 
Multinational Companies’. In: M. Geppert and M. Mayer (eds.), Global, national and local 
practices in multinational companies. Basingstoke etc: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17–37.
Tempel, A. and Walgenbach, P. (2004). ‘Personalpolitik multinationaler Unternehmungen: 
Institutionalistische Theorien als Grundlage der vergleichenden Forschung’. In: H. Wächter and 
R. Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp.
7–30.
—— (2007). ‘Global Standardization of Organizational Forms and Management Practices? What 
New Institutionalism and the Business-Systems Approach Can Learn from Each Other’. Journal
of Management Studies, 44 (1): 1–24.
Theurillat, T., Corpataux, J. and Crevoisier, O. (2008). ‘The impact of institutional investors on 
corporate governance: A view of Swiss pension funds in a changing financial environment’. 
Competition & Change, 12 (4): 307–27.
Thibodeau, P. (2010). ‘US2 stops disclosing U.S. headcount data: Despite U.S. layoffs last year, 
US2 global headcount grows slightly’. Computerworld.
Thomas, G. M. and Meyer, J. W. (1984). ‘The Expansion of the State’. Annual Review of Sociology, 
10: 461–82.
Tichy, N. M., Fombrun, C. J. and Devanna, M. A. (1982). ‘Strategic human resource management’. 
554
Sloan Management Review, 23 (2): 47–61.
Tixier, M. (1994). ‘Management and Communication Styles in Europe: Can They Be Compared and
Matched?’. Employee Relations, 16 (1): 8–26.
Trampusch, C. and Mach, A. (2011). Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and change in the Swiss 
political economy. Abingdon England: Routledge.
Transparency International (2011a). Corruption Perceptions Index 2011. Available at 
http://www.transparency.ch/de/publikationen/Les_indices_de_TI/CPI/Index.php.
—— (2011b). Global Corruption Barometer 2010/11. Available at 
http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/results/.
Trompenaars, F. (1996). ‘Resolving International Conflict: Culture and Business Strategy’. 
Business Strategy Review, 7 (3): 51–68.
Trompenaars, F. and Hampden-Turner, C. (2012). Riding the waves of culture: Understanding 
cultural diversity in business, 3rd edn. London: Brealey.
Tüselmann, H.-J., Allen, M. M. C., Barrett, S. and McDonald, F. (2008). ‘Varieties and variability 
of employee relations approaches in US subsidiaries: Country-of-origin effects and the level and
type of industry internationalisation’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 19 (9): 1622–35.
Tüselmann, H.-J., McDonald, F. and Heise, A. (2003). ‘Employee relations in German 
multinationals in an Anglo-Saxon setting: Toward a Germanic version of the Anglo-Saxon 
approach?’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9 (3): 327–49.
Tüselmann, H.-J., McDonald, F. and Thorpe, R. (2006). ‘The emerging approach to employee 
relations in German overseas affiliates: A role model for international operation?’. Journal of 
World Business, 41 (1): 66–80.
Uchitelle, L. (2006). The disposable American: Layoffs and their consequences, 1st edn. New York:
Knopf.
Ulrich, D. (1995). ‘Shared Services: From Vogue to Value’. Human Resource Planning, 18 (3): 12–
23.
—— (1997). Human resource champions: The next agenda for adding value and delivering results. 
Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
UNCTAD (2009). ‘Transnational corporations, agricultural production and development’. 
Transnational corporations, agricultural production and development.
—— (2010). World investment report, 20th edn. New York: United Nations.
—— (2012). Word Investment Report: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies. Available
at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf.
United States of America (1789). Constitution of the United States. Available at 
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amendments.
US1 group (2012a). Annual Review.
—— (2012b). Global Annual Review - Facts and figures. Available at 
http://www.US1.com/gx/en/annual-review/facts-figures.jhtml.
—— (2013a). About us - Governance structures. Available at http://www.US1.com/gx/en/corporate-
governance/governance-structures.jhtml.
—— (2013b). About us - How we are structured. Available at 
http://www.US1.com/gx/en/corporate-governance/network-structure.jhtml.
US1 group Switzerland (2013). Alles über uns - Geschichte. Available at 
http://www.US1.ch/de/alles_ueber_uns/geschichte.html.
US1 Switzerland (2012). In Kürze - Facts & Figures. Available at 
http://www.US1.ch/de/alles_ueber_uns/in_kuerze.html.
US10 group (2011). Annual Report.
555
—— (2012). Company - Our History. Available at http://www.US10.com/Company/Our-
History.html.
—— (2013). SEC Form 10-K.
US2 group (2011). Annual Report.
—— (2013a). About US2. Available at http://www.US2.com/US2/us/en/?lnk=fai-maib-usen.
—— (2013b). Generating higher value at US2. Available at 
http://www.US2.com/annualreport/2011/ghv/.
US2 group Switzerland (2013a). Standorte in der Schweiz. Available at http://www-
05.US2.com/ch/US2/standorte.shtml.
—— (2013b). US2 in der Schweiz. Available at http://www.US2.com/US2/ch/de/.
US3 group (2011). Annual Report.
—— (2013a). About US3 - Company Profile - Corporate Overview. Available at 
http://US3.com/about_US3/company_profile/corporate_overview.html.
—— (2013b). About US3 - Company Profile - History. Available at 
http://US3.com/about_US3/company_profile/history.html.
US4 group (2010). Enterprise Strategy.
—— (2011). Year In Review.
—— (2013). SEC Form 10-K.
US5 group (2013a). History.
—— (2013b). Investor Relations. Available at http://investors.US5.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=73320&p=irol-irhome.
—— (2013c). SEC Form 10-K.
US6 group (2012). Annual Report.
—— (2013a). Our Company - our history. Available at 
http://www.US6.com/company/history/index.jsp.
—— (2013b). Our Company. Available at http://www.US6.com/company/index.jsp.
—— (2013c). Our Company - At a glance. Available at 
http://www.US6.com/company/glance/index.jsp.
—— (2013d). Our Company - our businesses. Available at 
http://www.US6.com/company/businesses/index.jsp.
US7 group (2012). Company Report.
—— (2013a). About us - Businesses. Available at http://www.US7.com/about-
us/businesses/business-overview.
—— (2013b). About us - Company Prodile - History. Available at http://www.US7.com/about-
us/company-profile/US7-history/index.htm.
—— (2013c). About us - Company Profile - At a Glance. Available at http://www.US7.com/about-
us/company-profile/medical-technology.htm?
loc=MDTHomeRefresh_B_InPage_SubNav_Company_Line2_3.
—— (2013d). About us - Company Profile - At a Glance - Locations. Available at 
http://www.US7.com/about-us/company-profile/locations/index.htm.
US8 group (2011). Annual Report.
—— (2012). SEC Form 10-K.
—— (2013a). About Us. Available at http://www.US8.com/corporate/About-US8/about-us.htm.
—— (2013b). About Us - History of Our Firm. Available at http://www.US8.com/corporate/About-
US8/US8-history.htm.
US9 group (2012a). Annual Report.
—— (2012b). Company - Corporate Structure. Available at 
http://www.US9.com/en_US/company/global_structure_operations/corporate_structure.shtml.
556
—— (2012c). Company - Heritage - Corporate Newsroom. Available at 
http://news.US9.com/blog/partner1-meets-partner2.
—— (2012d). SEC Form 10-K.
Vachani, S. (1999). ‘Global diversification's effect on multinational subsidiaries' autonomy’. 
International Business Review, 8 (5/6): 535–60.
van Klaveren, M. and Tijdens, K. (2011). Multinationals versus domestic firms: wages, working 
hours and industrial relations. Amsterdam.
Velo Roessl, V. (2003). Analyse des raisons pour lesquelles les cadres romands optempèrent face à 
l'autorité dans des cas où ils pourraient refuser de le faire recherche menée à travers une 
application de la méthode des chaînages cognitifs à l'étude du comportement de 102 cadres. 
Lausanne.
Venn, D. (2009). Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating the OECD 
employment protection indicators. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 
89. Available at www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers.
Vernon, G. (2006). ‘Chapter 11: International pay and reward’. In: T. Edwards and C. Rees (eds.), 
International human resource management: Globalization, national systems and multinational 
companies. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, pp. 217–41.
Visser, J. (2000). Trends in unionisation and collective bargaining. Available at http://ilo-
mirror.library.cornell.edu/public/english/bureau/exrel/global/ilopub/tucb.pdf.
Vitols, S. (2001). Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsbeziehungen in deutschen 
Tochtergesellschaften großer ausländischer Unternehmen. Available at 
http://www.wzb.eu/gwd/into/pdf/vitols/vitols01_unternehmensfuehrung.pdf.
—— (2004). ‘Negotiated shareholder value: The German variant of an Anglo-American practice’. 
Competition & Change, 8 (4): 357–74.
Vora, D. and Kostova, T. (2007). ‘A model of dual organizational identification in the context of the 
multinational enterprise’. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28 (3): 327–50.
Wächter, H. (2004). ‘Einleitung und Überblick’. In: H. Wächter and R. Peters (eds.), 
Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp. 3–6.
Wächter, H. and Müller-Camen, M. (2002). ‘Co-determination and strategic integration in German 
firms’. Human Resource Management Journal, 12 (3): 76–87.
Wächter, H. and Peters, R. (eds.) (2004). Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa, 
1st edn. München: Hampp.
Wächter, H., Peters, R., Tempel, A. and Müller-Camen, M. (2003). The "country-of-origin effect" in
the cross-national management of human resources: Results and case study evidence of 
research on American multinational companies in Germany, 1st edn. München ; Mering: 
Hampp.
—— (2004). ‘Amerikanische Multinationale Unternehmen in Deutschland’. In: H. Wächter and R. 
Peters (eds.), Personalpolitik amerikanischer Unternehmen in Europa. München: Hampp, pp. 
85–107.
Wächter, H. and Stengelhofen, T. (1992). ‘Human resource management in a unified Germany’. 
Employee Relations, 14 (4): 21–37.
Wailes, N., Ramia, G. and Lansbury, R. (2003). ‘Interests, Institutions and Industrial Relations’. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41 (4): 617–37.
Wanner, E. and Neumark, D. (1999). ‘Preface: Special Issue on "Changes in Job Stability and Job 
Security"’. Journal of Labor Economics, 17 (s4): Siii.
Waring, T. and Wainwright, D. (2008). ‘Issues and Challenges in the Use of Template Analysis: Two
Comparative Case Studies from the Field’. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 6 
(1): 85–93.
557
Warner, M. and Campbell, A. (1993). ‘German Management’. In: D. J. Hickson (ed.), Management 
in Western Europe: Society, culture and organization in twelve nations. Berlin, New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, pp. 89–108.
Weber, M. (1952). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Scribner.
Weber, W., Dowling, P. J. and Festing, M. (1999). ‘Internationales Personalmanagement. Stand der 
Forschung, offene Fragen, weitere Entwicklung: Konturen eines Arbeitsgebietes’. In: M. 
Kutschker (ed.), Management verteilter Kompetenzen in multinationalen Unternehmen. 
Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 177–208.
Weibler, J. and Wunderer, R. (2007). ‘Leadership and Culture in Switzerland: Theoreticlal and 
Empirical Findings’. In: J. S. Chhokar, F. C. Brodbeck and R. J. House (eds.), Culture and 
leadership across the world: The GLOBE book of in-depth studies of 25 societies. Mahwah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 251–95.
Weil, G. M. L. (2002). Comparative Study Of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the 
European Union And Its Member States: On behalf of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Internal
Market Directorate General. Available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/comparative_study_eu_i_to_v_en.pdf.
Welch, C. and Marschan-Piekkari, R. (2006). ‘Crossing language boundaries: Qualitative 
interviewing in international business’. Management International Review (MIR), 46 (4): 417–
37.
Wentling, R. M. and Palma Rivas, N. (2000). ‘Current Status of Diversity Initiatives in Selected 
Multinational Corporations’. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 11 (1): 35–60.
Westney, D. E. (1987). Imitation and innovation: The transfer of western organizational patterns to
Meiji Japan. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press.
—— (1993). ‘Institutionalization Theory and the Multinational Corporation’. In: S. Ghoshal and D. 
E. Westney (eds.), Organization theory and the multinational corporation. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire ; London: Macmillan, pp. 53–76.
Westney, D. E. and Zaheer, S. (2001). ‘The multinational enterprise as an organization’. In: A. M. 
Rugman (ed.), The Oxford handbook of international business. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 349–79.
Wever, K. S. (1995). ‘Human resource management and organizational strategies in German and 
US-owned companies’. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 6 (3): 606–
25.
Whitley, R. (1994a). ‘Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies’. 
Organization Studies, 15 (2): 153–82.
—— (1994b). European business systems: Firms and markets in their national contexts, 1st edn. 
London: Sage Publications.
—— (2000a). Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and change of business systems. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—— (2000b). ‘The Institutional Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm 
Types and Patterns of Technical Change in Different Market Economies’. Organization Studies, 
21 (5): 855–86.
—— (2008). The institutional construction of firms. Manchester Business School Working Paper 
Series 555. Available at http://www.mbs.ac.uk/research/cgi/apps/research/workingpapers/.
Whittington, R. (2001). What is strategy - and does it matter?, 2nd edn. London: Thomson 
Learning.
Widmer, J., Coray, R., Acklin Muji, D. and Godel, E. (2005). Die Schweizer Sprachenvielfalt im 
öffentlichen Diskurs: Eine sozialhistorische Analyse der Transformationen der 
Sprachenordnung von 1848 bis 2000 = La diversité des langues en Suisse dans le débat public, 
558
2nd edn. Bern: Lang.
Williams, K. and Geppert, M. (2006a). ‘Employment relations as a resource in the socio-political 
construction of transnational social spaces by multinational companies: Evidence from German 
and British subsidiaries’. In: M. Geppert and M. Mayer (eds.), Global, national and local 
practices in multinational companies. Basingstoke etc: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 38–60.
—— (2006b). ‘The German model of employee relations on trial: negotiated and unilaterally 
imposed change in multi-national companies’. Industrial Relations Journal, 37 (1): 48–63.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications ; a study in 
the economics of internal organization. New York: Free Press.
Windolf, P. (1989). ‘Productivity Coalitions and the Future of European Corporatism’. Industrial 
Relations, 28 (1): 1–20.
Winterton, J. (2007). ‘Building social dialogue over training and learning: European and national 
developments’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13 (3): 281–300.
Witt, M. A. and Redding, G. (2009). ‘Culture, meaning, and institutions: Executive rationale in 
Germany and Japan’. Journal of International Business Studies, 40 (5): 859–85.
Wood, S. J. and Fenton-O'Creevy, M. P. (2005). ‘Direct Involvement, Representation and Employee
Voice in UK Multinationals in Europe’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11 (1): 27–50.
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods, 4th edn. Los Angeles, Calif: Sage 
Publications.
Yu, T. and Wu, N. (2009). ‘A Review of Theories on Transnational Transfer of HR Practice within 
Multinationals’. International Journal of Business and Management, 4 (5): 121–27.
Zaheer, S. (1995). ‘Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness’. Academy of Management Journal, 38
(2): 341–63.
Zucker, L. G. (1977). ‘The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence’. American 
Sociological Review, 42 (5): 726–43.
—— (1988). Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment. Cambridge, Mass: 
Ballinger Pub. Co.
559
